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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the historical realities of Javanese indentured labour in 
British North Borneo from 1914 to 1932. The empirical findings are interpreted in terms of 
the theoretical debate surrounding the indentured labour system, seen either as a ‘new 
system of slavery’, or as a particular variety of ‘free labour’. By using primary and 
secondary sources, the study analyses the dynamics of the Javanese indentured labour 
system, i.e. from the negotiation between the colonial states for the procurement of 
Javanese labour, to the actual recruitment in Java, and working conditions in British North 
Borneo under civil contracts, which sanctioned criminal punishments. The thesis argues 
that the desperate need for labour, the prevailing conditions in Java, the regulated 
recruitment and immigration procedures, the characteristics of their indenture experience 
on British North Borneo enterprises, the post-indenture options available to the labourers, 
the inferior position of the Company government vis-a-vis the Dutch authorities, and the 
incessant disagreement between employers’ representatives, which weakened their 
collective bargaining power, have all helped to depict Javanese indentured labour 
experience in British North Borneo not so much as slavery in a disguised form, but as a 
unique variety of ‘free labour’.
This thesis contributes to the wider history of colonial labour in three ways. Firstly, 
it provides an extensive and analytical review of Javanese indentured labour in British 
North Borneo during the period of imperialism and colonialism, which has not been 
attempted before. Secondly, it goes beyond the study of colonial and capitalist interests, 
moving towards an analysis of the experience of indenture by Javanese immigrants 
themselves. Thirdly, in contrast with previous studies depicting Javanese labourers as 
part of British North Borneo’s local history, this thesis frames the story in terms of the 
wider debate surrounding the system, thus providing a modest contribution from British 
North Borneo to continuing deliberations on this controversial topic.
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GLOSSARY
adat
Arbeidsinspectie (Dutch)
bangsa
bridle path
changkol
coolie
gamelan
gantang
gimat 
haji sheikh 
Hari Maulud 
Hari Raya
Hari Raya Korban
hun
ikan blanak 
imam
kadi
kampong, desa
kati
kedai
ketoprak
kongsi, coolie lines
kontrakkan
korban
krani
laukeh
laukeh system
mandur
mateng
mentah
merantau
minggat
mufti
opas
orang tebusan
traditional/customary law 
Labour Inspectorate 
race
a dirt track approximately six feet wide, elevated four to
five feet above ground level
hoe
term for agricultural (specifically estate labourer), 
generally associated with Asian labourer, i.e Javanese 
and Chinese
Javanese musical ensemble or orchestra 
measurement of weight by volume, equivalent to 
imperial gallon, gantang is % o f a picul. 
charm
pilgrim brokers
birthday of the Prophet Mohammad (12 Rabiul Awal) 
meaning ‘Day of Celebration’, in this context, the 
Muslim festival of Eid-ul-Fitr. (Aidilfitri) (1 Shawal) 
meaning “Festival of Sacrifice’, a religious festival 
celebrated by Muslims (10 Zulhijjah) 
weight measure (0.378g)
a small river fish normally used to make salted-fish, 
an Islamic leadership position, leader of a mosque and 
the Islamic community 
judges of the shariah law 
village
weight measure (0.625 kg or 1.33 pound avoirdupois) 
shop
Javanese staged play 
labourers’ houses
Javanese coolies under the Dutch Contract
sacrifice
Asian clerk
experienced labourer; coolie on renewed contract 
(‘old hands’)
a system where a Javanese ‘old hand’ was sent to his 
village, or a particular destination, to recruit Javanese 
labour
Javanese foreman, overseer 
mature / ripe 
immature I raw
leaving one’s territory voluntarily, to earn a living, or to 
seek further knowledge or experience, normally with the 
intention of returning home 
leaving one’s village without the knowledge of the 
village community
■ an Islamic scholar who is an interpreter and expounder 
of the Islamic law (Shariah)
■ watchman
• a person held at ransom
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padi 
parang 
pasar orang 
pikul / picul
pisau blati
poenale sanctie (Dutch)
Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst
ronggeng
sakit panat
sambal, blatchan
sampan
samsu
Sarekat Dagang Islam
Sarekat Islam
sawah
senang
sheikh ul-lslam
singkeh
sombong
sulap
surau
tahil
taikong
tamu
tanah sabrang 
tandil
tauhu, tempe
taukeh
termasu
tiffin
tiki-tiki
tripang
wakil
wayang
wereg
wervingsordonnantien
(Dutch)
wervingscommissarissen
(Dutch)
rice
machete 
people’s market
measure of weight equal to 133.33 pound avoirdupois
or ten kati
small knife
penal sanction
Political intelligence Service
Javanese social dance
tired
shrimp paste 
wooden boat
locally distilled potent spirit made from fermented rice
Islamic Trade Union (a Javanese batik trader’s
cooperative), later became Sarekat Islam
Islamic Union (the ideology was based on the teachings of
Islam in the modernist tradition
rice field
happy, content
a title of superior authority in the issues of Islam
newly arrived coolie
arrogant
shack
a special place to pray for the Muslims; it could also be 
a cultural meeting place, or a place to spread the 
teachings of Islam (dakwah)
measurement of weight equal to 1.33 ounces, or 37.8g.
foremen
native market
outer islands of the Netherlands East Indies 
Chinese foreman, overseer 
soya-based food 
shopkeeper, usually a Chinese 
gravestone post 
courtesy snack
a local term in Manila to mean the extract from rice
bran for the purpose of curing beri-beri
sea cucumber
representative
shadow puppet, show
local henchman, field recruiter
recruitment ordinance
recruitment commissioners
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study arose from the desire to understand the historical processes of immigrants 
and labour in British North Borneo, or present day, Sabah.1 In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC) sought 
to procure Chinese and Javanese immigrant labourers to combat the lack of a labour 
source for the enterprises of British North Borneo. Although both groups were 
instrumental in turning this once scarcely populated and underdeveloped vast land into 
an economic enterprise, to assist in the expansion of Western capitalist interests, the 
Javanese were less important in academic terms, as compared to the Chinese. Why 
was there little coverage of the Javanese immigrants who came to toil in British North 
Borneo enterprises? Did they not arrive in hordes, almost 10,000 of them, officially 
recruited under the indenture system, on a special government-permit, approved by the 
Dutch authorities? This led to a decision to study the experience of Javanese 
indentured labourers in the territory. Given this gap in the literature, it became the 
author’s intention to redress this shortfall by identifying the characteristics of indenture. 
Moreover, in contrast with previous studies depicting Javanese labourers as part of a 
local history, this thesis frames the story in terms of the wider debate surrounding the 
system. This provides a modest contribution from British North Borneo to continue 
deliberations on this controversial topic.
JAVANESE AND LABOUR: A HISTORIOGRAPHY
There is limited literature on Javanese immigrants in British North Borneo, and even 
less on Javanese labour, despite the crucial role they played in the plantation economy 
of the territory during the Chartered Company era. One scholar puts this down to the
1 The territory continued to be known as British North Borneo until 1963 when, due to popular local 
demands, its name was o ffic ia lly  reverted to Sabah. In the thesis, the term ‘ Sabah’ is used when referring 
to modem day Malaysian state o f  Sabah.
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limited impact on demographic and economic patterns brought about by the Javanese.2 
Another suggests that the Javanese ‘left little traits’ in present day Sabah because they 
were brought in ‘as indentured labourers, not colonists’, hence the indifference to their 
role in the history of the territory.3
Even writings specifically on Javanese in British North Borneo during the 
Chartered Company period or beyond are few. Suhaimi bin Untong made the first 
attempt to do so in 1994, by looking into the immigration of Javanese from Java and 
Singapore, and their lives as labourers under different types of labour contract. The 
work is useful as a first introduction to the life of Javanese labourers in British North 
Borneo, but fails to utilise most of the primary sources available, and therefore, does 
not give a proper account of the entire matrix of Javanese immigration, and its 
relationship to labour. In the same vein, Koji Miyazaki demonstrates the ‘relationship 
between the colonial powers, namely the British and the Dutch’, by focusing on the 
processes and problems concerning the importation and repatriation of labourers, both 
to and from Java. Miyazaki argues that the Chartered Company mediated on behalf of 
the planters in the negotiation with the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) authority, and 
both colonial states were very much concerned with the labourers’ welfare and rights. 
Miyazaki’s writing is essential in understanding the basis for the relationship between 
colonial states of sending and receiving countries, but it lacks analysis, and the 
discussion itself was extremely brief, patchy, and at certain junctures, needed further 
elaboration and clarification.4
Khazin Mohd. Tamrin departs from earlier works by attempting to situate the 
Javanese immigrants before, during, and after the Japanese occupation, thus providing
2 Lee Yong Leng. North Borneo (Sabah): A Study in Settlement Geography. Singapore: Eastern 
Universities Press Ltd. 1965. p. 48.
3 K o ji Miyazaki. ‘ Javanese Labourers to North Borneo in the First H a lf o f  the Twentieth Century’ , in: 
K o ji M iyazaki (ed.). Making o f Multi Cultural Sabah. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and 
Cultures o f Asia and Africa. 2002.
4 Suhaimi bin Untong. “ Melencer’ Orang-orang Jawa ke Borneo Utara, 1881-1941’ . Unpublished 
Graduation Exercise. University Malaya. 1994.; K o ji Miyazaki. ‘Javanese Labourers’ .
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a better understanding of the Javanese existence in Sabah today. He provides a 
general account of the settlement pattern of Javanese immigrants, and argues that the 
tradition of ‘merantau\ a temporary movement for the purpose of seeking employment, 
was the main reason for Javanese migration to Sabah. This was due to the perception 
that Sabah was part of the tanah sabrang, or the ‘Outer Islands’5 in the Malay 
archipelago. This view subsequently influenced the settlement pattern and formation of 
various Javanese villages throughout the state. Danny Wong Tze-Ken provides an 
insight into labour unrest in colonial British North Borneo. The study is vital in 
assessing the social dimension of their indentured experience, and describes the form 
of resistance that Javanese labourers resorted to, and the methods used by employers 
and government to combat dissension and riots. Wong Yieng Ching gives particular 
emphasis to examining the Javanese migrants' impact on the socio-economic 
development of the territory.6
While these writings have sought to provide a comprehensive account of 
Javanese immigrants, such accounts tend to be descriptive rather than analytical. Most 
have devoted little space to an understanding of the indenture system itself, let alone 
how it affected the Javanese immigrants. To be sure, there are several works on British 
North Borneo that draw attention to the question of labour, namely those by Massey, 
Tregonning, Black, Kahin, and Kaur. All highlighted British North Borneo’s lack of 
population and its need for labour. They also demonstrated how these predicaments 
were solved, by assisting immigrant settlers and securing outside labourers, particularly 
the Chinese and Javanese.
5 The ‘Outer Islands’ was the term given to all the islands o f the Netherlands East Indies beyond Java and 
Madura.
6 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. ‘Perantau Jawa di Sabah dari Perspektif Sejarah’ . in: Mohd. Sarim Mustajab. 
(ed). Warisan Budaya Sabah: Etnisiti dan Masyarakat. Universiti Malaysia Sabah. 2004. pp 229-243; 
Danny Wong Tze-Ken. Historical Sabah: Community and Society. Kota Kinabalu: Natural History 
Publications (Borneo). 2004. Wong Yieng Ching. ‘Orang Jawa di Borneo Utara (1881-1941)’ . 
Unpublished Graduation Exercise. Universiti Malaysia Sabah. 2005.
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Massey’s doctoral research on the nature and causes of the territory’s 
economic growth and development during the Chartered Company period is essential 
for a better understanding of British North Borneo’s colonial economic history. 
Tregonning’s work provides elements of discussion that are essential in appraising the 
role of the state on the question of labour. The discussion on labour legislation, though 
not detailed, acknowledges those positive measures brought to bear on improving 
labour conditions. His observations on labour problems, labour recruitment and 
conditions of labour in British North Borneo provide a good basis for further discussion 
on the subject. Tregonning’s work provides essential background to labour and 
immigrants’ issues, but it could be faulted in the sense that it was Eurocentric, and the 
official view comes through very strongly in his account.7
Ian D. Black provides an analytical discussion of early British North Borneo by 
discussing the policies of the Chartered Company, and the reactions of the people to 
Company rule. In regards to contract labour, Black has highlighted the contractual 
elements and the consequences of debts on the migrants. Although he noted that 
many imported labourers spent years on the estates, in a condition akin to ‘debt 
slavery', the Malayan abolition of Indian and Chinese indentured labourers led him to 
conclude that conditions were slowly improving on the estates in British North Borneo.8 
Here, he concurred with the sentiments of Tregonning. These views will be further 
studied in this thesis. Given the situation described above, Black’s work is vital in 
looking at the close relationship between the BNBC government and the colonial 
government in Malaya, so as to determine the policies and legislation pertaining to 
indentured labour in British North Borneo.
7 Andrew Massey. ‘The Political Economy o f  Stagnation. British North Borneo under the Chartered 
Company 1881-1946’ . Unpublished PhD. Dissertation. Hamilton University, Queensland, Australia. July 
2004; K.G. Tregonning, A Histoiy o f Modern Sabah, 1881-1963. Singapore: University o f  Malaya Press. 
1965. pp.129-154.
8 Ian D. Black. A Gambling Style o f  Government. London: Oxford University Press. 1984. p. 211.
22
Just as important were Black’s and D.S. Ranjit Singh’s examinations of 
indigenous wage labour. Both authors remarked that it was not so much that the 
indigenous people were against wage labour and unsuitable for the regular agricultural 
labour that was required by the planters. According to them, the colonial state imposed 
rules restricting the participation of the indigenous peoples in the economic 
modernisation of the territory, and instead, urged them to concentrate on their 
traditional economic endeavours. In his observation of the dynamics of British North 
Borneo’s indigenous society, D.S. Ranjit Singh further reiterates that employers 
eventually tended to rely more on native labour, as a consequence of rigid regulations 
imposed by the NEI authorities pertaining to labour from Java.9
From a different perspective, George McTurnan Kahin unveils that the reasons 
behind the absence of organised indigenous labour in British North Borneo was the 
weak bargaining position of local labour in the face of constant pressure from outside 
sources of labour. The latter was always ready to come in and take the former’s place. 
Additionally, local labour had no control over the government’s immigration policy. 
Kahin concludes that legislation made the forming of labour unions extremely difficult, 
and that any organisation that was 'likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for 
purposes prejudicial to the peace, good order or welfare of the State’, could be refused 
registration, or ordered by the Government to be dissolved.10 This work provides an 
essential background to labour legislation and government policies.
On the contrary, Amarjit Kaur’s analysis of labour differs from the positive 
sentiments of earlier Western writers. Amarjit Kaur’s work shows the Company 
governments efforts to gradually eliminate the many varieties of traditionally coerced 
labour. She noted that opportunities for wage labour expanded with a greater
9
Black. Gambling, p. 116; D.S. Ranjit Singh. The Making o f  Sabah 1865-1941. The Dynamics o f  
Indigenous Society. 2nd Edition. Kuala Lumpur: University o f  Malaya Press. 2003. pp. 246-249.
George McTurnan Kahin, ‘The State o f North Borneo, 1881-1946’ . The Far Eastern Quarterly 7 1 
(Nov., 1947). p. 61. ’
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commercialisation of the economy, the spread of plantation agriculture, and increased 
trade. Nevertheless, she argues that the remnants of ‘bonded’ labour persisted with the 
emergence of indentured labour with a special penal clause, as the economy of the 
state was integrated into the wider international economy with the spread of capitalism. 
Hence, immigrants, according to her, laboured under ‘harsh conditions reminiscent of 
slavery’ .11 Her detailed account of the lure of wage labour for the indigenous people, 
and their sophistication about the value of their labour once they were exposed to it 
and each other, is also imperative in examining the impact of indigenous wage labour 
on Javanese indentured immigrants.
Lee’s work, although focusing mainly on population and settlement, is equally 
important in the discussion of Javanese indentured labour, and especially in an attempt 
to better appreciate the main impact of the Javanese indentured immigration to the 
state. Lee argues that the rise in population was due to the importation of Javanese 
and Chinese as rubber estate labourers, and their increase or decrease had simply 
followed the agricultural development of the state. According to him, critics of 
indentured labour under penal clauses, and the loud outcry against the system world 
wide, which finally led to abolition of indentured labour in many colonies, had a 
consequential impact on British North Borneo. It witnessed a decline in the population 
of the territory, as many indentured labourers were repatriated to their own country. On 
a different note, he observes that the immigration of Javanese indentured labourers 
had adverse effects on the indigenous population, especially on the Murut people.12 
Similar observations were also made by Anwar Sullivan and Patricia Regis, and 
Jones.13
11 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850. New York: St. 
M artin ’s Press. 1998. p. 93.
12 Lee Yong Leng, North Borneo. 1965.
13 Anwar Sullivan and Patricia Regis. ‘Demography’ , in: Anwar Sullivan and Cecilia Leong. (eds). 
Commemorative History o f  Sabah, 1881-1981. Kota Kinabalu: The Sabah State Government. 1981; L.W. 
Jones. The Population o f  Borneo: A Study o f  Peoples o f Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. University o f 
London: The Athlone Press. 1966.
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Apart from those mentioned above, studies by Termorshuizen, Gooszen, 
Houben, Spaan, and Lockard, are among those that have made a fleeting remark on 
the role of British North Borneo as one of the colonies utilising Javanese indentured 
labourers, and its function in ‘sponging up1 excess population from the island of Java. 
Recently published in 2008, Termorshuizen’s article looks into the system of indentured 
labour in the various colonies within the Dutch coionial empire, in addition to some 
comparative analysis on non-Dutch colonies that have secured Javanese labourers. 
Again, the absence of British North Borneo in the discussion on demographic figures, 
migratory routes and destinations, and early working and living conditions, is starkly 
obvious. Goozen focuses on the impact of overpopulation to Indonesia’s demography, 
while Houben studies Javanese coolie immigration in general. Conversely, Spaan 
concentrates on the role of middle persons and brokers in assisting Javanese 
immigration, with Lockard looking into the settlement patterns of Javanese emigrants in 
overseas destinations.14 Also important is the study by Yoko Hayashi who delves into 
the role of labour recruitment organisations in colonial Java.15
in contrast, the historiography on the Javanese as indentured immigrants in a 
wider geographical spread is quite rich. The vast literature is important in assessing 
and comparing Dutch colonial government’s policies, methods of recruitment, and 
conditions of indenture. Lindbiad analyses Dutch colonial economic expansion in the 
NEI, and the mobilisation of Javanese coolies to cater to this rapid development. 
Houben, Lindbiad and et al, have systematically described and analysed the conditions 
of Javanese and Chinese coolie labour in colonial Indonesia, specifically in the Outer
14 Thio Termorshuizen. ‘ Indentured Labour in the Dutch Colonial Empire, 1800-1940’ , in: Gert Oostindie 
(ed.). Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage. Leiden: K IT L V  Press. 2008; A.J. Gooszen, A 
Demographic History o f  the Indonesian Archipelago, 1880-1942. Leiden: K IT L V  Press. 1999; Ernst 
Spaan. ‘Taikongs and Calos: The Role o f Middlemen and Brokers in Javanese International M igration’ . 
International Migration Review. 28,1 (Spring 1994). pp. 93-113; V.J.H. Houben. "Menyang Tanah 
Sabrang': Javanese Coolie M igration In-and Outside Indonesia 1900-1940.’ Paper presented at the 
conference ‘The Malay Archipelago and the W orld Economy, 1790s- 1990s,’ Canberra. 23-27 November 
1992; Craig A. Lockard. ‘The Javanese as Emigrant: Observations on the Development o f  Javanese 
Settlement Overseas’ . Indonesia. 11 (A pril 1971), pp. 41-62.
15 Yoko Hayashi. ‘Agencies and Clients: Labour Recruitment in Java, 1870s-1950s\ IIAS/IISG CLARA 
Working Paper. No. 14. Amsterdam. 2002.
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Islands, to ‘provide a more solid foundation for final judgment’. Ann Stoler focuses on 
indentured labourers, and their descendants, in Deli, east coast Sumatra, the efforts by 
foreign plantation companies to control Javanese and Chinese labour, and labour’s 
resistance to that control. On a slightly different note, Jan Breman analyses colonial 
policies in promoting the interests of agrarian capitalism, and argues that violence was 
part and parcel of plantation life in Deli, as the life and work of the coolies, which 
includes Javanese and Chinese, were conditioned by outside forces beyond their 
control. By using the economic-historical approach, works by Mohammad Said and 
Thee Kian-Wie raise issues of rising plantation economies in Deli, with the former 
focusing on wage levels and standard of living of the contract coolies, and the latter, 
examining its impact on export trade under Dutch rule. Also of particular importance 
are studies conducted by Karl Pelzer which looked into the suitability of lands in the 
Outer Islands, not only for plantation agricultures and their demands for Javanese 
labourers, but also to absorb Java’s population problem .16 Meanwhile, Rosemarijn 
Hoefte’s study provides a historical analysis on the social and economic experience of 
indentured and contract labour in Surinam, focusing primarily on Javanese and British 
Indians. Likewise, earlier works by anthropologists and sociologists such as, Joseph 
Ismael, Justus M. van der Kroef, Annemarie de Waal Malefijt, G.D. van Wengen, and 
Parsudi Suparian, have looked into various aspects of Javanese immigration into 
Surinam, from the circumstances surrounding the labour immigration to the integration 
of the Javanese with the larger population.17 Works by Webby Silupya Kalikiti, Malte
16 J. Thomas Lindbiad. ‘The Late Colonial State and Economic Expansion 1900-1930s’, in: Howard W. 
D ick et al. The Emergence o f  a National Economy: An Economic History o f  Indonesia, 1800-2000. 
Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press. 2002; Vincent J.H. Houben, et al. Coolie Labour in Colonial 
Indonesia. A Study o f  Labour Relations in the Outer Islands, c. 1900-1940, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
Verlag. 1999; Ann Stoler. Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979. 2nd. 
Edition. University o f Michigan Press. 1995; Jan Breman. Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation and 
Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia. Delhi and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1989; 
Mohammad Said. Koeli Kontrak Tempo Doeloe, dengan Derila dan Kemarahannya. Medan: Percetakan 
Waspada, 1977; Thee Kian-W ie. Plantation Agriculture and Export Growth: An Economic Histoty of 
East Sumatra, 1863-1942. Jakarta: Leknas-Lipi. 1977. Karl J. Pelzer. ‘Tanah Sabrang and Java’s 
Population Problem’ . The Far Eastern Quarterly. 5,2 (February 1946); Karl J. Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement 
in the Asiatic Tropics. Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeastern Asia. 
New York; American Geographical Society. 1945.
17 Rosemarijn Hoefte. In Place o f  Slavery: A Social Histoty o f  British Indian and Javanese Labourers in 
Suriname. Honolulu: University Press o f Florida. 1998; Joseph Ismael. De immigratie van Indonesians in
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Stokhof, M.J. Murray, C.A. Lockard, among others, have focused on Javanese as 
plantation labourers, their settlement pattern, and their legacy, in Indochina,18 while 
Jean Luc Maurer, Dorothy Shineberg, and Lewis Feuer, have studied the role of the 
Javanese indentured immigrants on New Caledonia plantations and nickel mines.19 
Khazin Mohd. Tamrin, Tunku Shamsul Bahrain, J. Norman Parmer, and Emmer and 
Shlomowitz, are among prominent figures of authority on Javanese indentured labour 
in colonial Malaya.20
Indeed, very few works have placed emphasis on the Javanese indentured 
immigrants in British North Borneo. No attempt had been made to examine the 
government-imported Javanese on its own, the special provisions of the indenture 
contract against the local British North Borneo contract, the actual working and living 
conditions, the impact of indenture on the government-imported Javanese labourers, 
and most importantly, the correlation between the Javanese indenture system in British 
North Borneo and the continued debate surrounding the indentured labour system in 
the wider perspective.
Suriname. Leiden: Luctor et Emergo. 1949; Annemarie de Waal M alefijt. The Javanese o f  Surinam: 
Segment o f  a Plural Society. Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum. 1963; G. D. van Wengen. The Cultural 
Inheritance o f the Javanese in Surinam (Mededelingen van het Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden). 
1975; Parsudi Suparlan. The Javanese in Suriname: Ethnicity in an Ethnically Plural Society. Arizona 
State University: Program for Southeast Asian Studies. 1995.
18 Webby Silupya K a lik iti. ‘Plantation Labour: Rubber Planters and the Colonial State in French 
Indochina, 1890-1939’ . PhD. Thesis. SOAS: University o f London. 2006; Malte Stokhof. ‘ Javanese in 
Hochiminh Today: an Aftermath o f Coolie M igration in French Colonial Vietnam?’ . Unpublished 
Masters Thesis. Universiteit van Amsterdam. 2002; M.J. Murray. ‘White Gold’ or ‘White Blood'?: The 
Rubber Plantations o f  Colonial Indochina, 1910^10. Journal o f  Peasant Studies. 19, 3/4. (1992).
Jean Luc Maurer. ‘Les Javanais du caillou, des affres de l ’exil aux aleas de 1’ integration: sociologie 
historique de la communaute indonesienne de Nouvelle Caledonie/The Javanese o f  the Rock: From the 
Hazards o f Exile to the Hazards o f  Integration’ . Cited from Jean-Louis Rallu. A  book review. 
Contemporary Pacific. 19,2 (2007). pp. 633-634; Dorothy Shineberg. The People Trade: Pacific Island 
Laborers and New Caledonia, 1865-1930. Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii Press. 1999; Lewis S. Feuer, 
‘End o f  Coolie Trade in New Caledonia’ . Far Eastern Survey. 15,17 (1946). pp 264-267.
20 Khazin Mohd Tamrin. ‘Javanese Labour and the Development o f  Malaya. Kertas Kadangkala B il. 6. 
U KM : FSKK, 1992; Tunku Shamsul Bahrain. ‘The Pattern o f Indonesian M igration and Settlement in 
Malaya’ . Asian Studies. 1,2 (August 1967). pp. 233-257; J. Norman Parmer. Colonial Labour Policy and 
Administration: A Histoiy o f Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, c.1910-1941. 
Monographs o f  the Association for Asian Studies. No. IX . New York: J.J. Augustine Inc. 1960; P.C. 
Emmer and R. Shlomowitz. ‘M ortality and the Javanese Diaspora’ . Itinerario. 21,1 (1997).
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The objective of this study is thus to examine the historical process of Javanese 
indentured labourers in British North Borneo during the Chartered Company era. 
Specifically, this study seeks to analyse the extent to which the system of Javanese 
indentured labour in British North Borneo over the 1914 to 1932 period, was ‘a new 
form of slavery’, or a particular variety of ‘free labour’.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The empirical study of Javanese indentured migrants will make it possible to gauge 
whether their experience shared similar characteristics with the general tenets of 
indentured labour, or whether it manages to produce a distinct kind of indenture, which 
can be traced only in British North Borneo. It is the case that if the system of indentured 
labour is assessed in a particular destination, this implies that a theoretical 
consideration is borne in mind, against which the outcome of the study is judged. The 
debate surrounding the indentured system as a new form of slavery will be analysed in 
the case study of the Javanese in British North Borneo, testing whether it falls under 
the Tinker school of thought, or the ‘revisionist’ perspective.
Scholars of the ‘nationalist’, ‘anti-colonial’ and ‘neo-marxist’ school have raised 
controversial arguments regarding indentured forms of labour. Hugh Tinker, in his 
study on the Indian indentured labour overseas, argues that indentured labour was a 
‘new system of slavery’.21 Advocates of this notion discern strong resemblances 
between the old system of labour and the indentured labour system. These Marxist- 
oriented scholars have equated them with one ‘mode of production’ 22 They have 
argued that coolies were very seldom voluntary migrants; most were kidnapped, tricked 
and blackmailed into signing indentures; the official machinery of control was 
inadequate to stop abuses; and the sea voyage, particularly in the mid-nineteenth
21 Hugh Tinker. A New System o f Slavery: The Export o f  Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920. London: 
Oxford University Press. 1974.
22 Vincent J.H. Houben. ‘ Introduction: The Coolie System in Colonial Indonesia’ , in: Houben, Lindbiad, 
et. al. Coolie Labour, p. 5.
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century, was almost as bad as the notorious slave ships from West Africa to the 
Americas. In the plantations, conditions differed very little from those of formal slavery: 
workers were not free to use their labour when and how they wanted, always being at 
the mercy of the planters; there were very low wages, appalling and hazardous working 
and living quarters, brutal punishments, and a high incidence of sexual issues, due to 
the low proportion of female emigrants.23 In the final analysis, indentured labourers 
were depicted as victims of various forms of greed, deception, and colonial coercion. 
Unflattering nicknames, such as ‘blackbirding’, ‘pig trade’ and ‘coolie trade’, emerged to 
describe the negative attributes of the indentured labour system, and associated the 
system with slavery.24
Wells, in his study on India and Indochina, goes so far as to say that the system 
of plantation wage labour was ‘in many respects more insidious than slavery’. 
According to him, ‘the indenture system effectively commodified the person (not just 
their capacity to labour) while placing merely a nominal value on their skills as workers’. 
As opposed to chattel slaves, indentured labourers were also incapable of reproducing 
themselves because they were denied the opportunity or resources to establish 
families. Wells continues to argue that indentured workers were ‘more intensively 
enslaved than many former and ‘traditional’ slaves’.25 Likewise, Gordon contends that 
the system was even worse than slavery. The owners treated slaves as being 
permanent possessions, and as a long-term investment, whose value would drop if 
maltreated. On the contrary, indentured labourers were seen as short-term investment,
23 See Monica Schuler. ‘The Recruitment o f  African Indentured Labourers for European Colonies in the 
Nineteenth Century.”  pp. 125-61, in: P.C. Emmer. (ed.). Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour 
and After Slavery. 1986; Kay Saunders (ed.). Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920. 
London &  Canberra: Croom Helm. 1984; Wendy K. Olsen &  Ramana Murthy. ‘Contract Labour and 
Bondage in Andhra Pradesh (India). Journal o f  Social and Political Thoughts. 1,2 (June 2000).
24 David Northrup. Indentured Labor in the Age o f  Migration, 1834-1922. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1995. p. 5; See Martin J. Murray. “ B lackbirding’ at ‘Crooks Corner’ : Il l ic it Labour 
Recruiting in the Northeastern Transvaal, 1910-1940’ . Journal o f Southeastern African Studies. 21,3 
(Sept. 1995). pp. 373-397.
25 Andrew Wells. ‘ Imperial Hegemony and Colonial Labour’ . Rethinking Marxism, 19,2 (2007). p. 190.
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and since their employers had only a brief interest in them, they could be worked as 
hard as possible, ‘even to death’.28
Nevertheless, the ‘revisionist’, ‘modernist’, ‘imperialist’ and ‘colonialist’ scholars, 
notably Stanley Engerman, Ralph Shlomowitz, and Pieter C. Emmer have all 
challenged the notion of indentured labour as an extension of slavery. The defenders of 
the system undeniably agree that there are similarities between the two systems of 
labour, but these similarities only affected a minority of indentured migrants, and did 
not apply to the entire matrix of indentured labour. They contend that most emigrants 
were indentured voluntarily due to the push-pull factors of migration, and the fact that 
many were re-indentured voluntarily also suggest that the whole trade was conducted 
on a voluntary basis.27 Engerman emphasises the distinction between contract labour 
and enslavement on the voluntary nature of the agreement and limited period of 
indenture.28 Shlomowitz sees the system as ‘a voluntary business arrangement, 
subject to government supervision, with the islanders as willing participants’, in his 
study of the Pacific labour trade.29 Fundamentally, the revisionists’ focus on economic 
rationale of the migrants, who migrated voluntarily due to the harsh living conditions 
back home, and the pull of wages and remittances at the receiving destination. 
Migration, according to Emmer, would make the emigrants better off economically, as 
the indentured system would guarantee them jobs for a specific time frame, regardless 
of the overall economic situation.30 Thus, indentured emigration ‘was the result of 
rational and deliberate choice on the part of migrants, prompted by hopes of bettering 
their future’.31 Some scholars even remarked that indentured labour overall had more in
26 Atec Gordon. ‘Dynamics o f  Labour Transformation: Natural Rubber in Southeast Asia’ . Journal o f  
Contemporary Asia. 34,4 (2004). pp. 523-546.
27 Ralph Shlomowitz. ‘Epidemiology and the Pacific Labor Trade’ . Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History. 
19,4 (Spring 1989). p. 590.
28 Stanley L. Engerman. ‘Contract Labor, Sugar, and Technology in the Nineteenth Century’ . Journal o f  
Economic History. 43,3 (September 1983). pp. 645 &  647.
29 Shlomowitz, ‘Epidemiology’ , p.589
30 Pieter Emmer, ‘European Expansion and Unffee Labour: An Introduction’ . Itinerario, 21,1 (1997). p 
13; Engerman. ‘Contract Labour’ , p. 645.
31 Pieter Emmer. ‘Was Migration Beneficial?’ , in: Jan Lucassen and Lucassen (ed). Migration, Migration 
History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives. Bern: P. Lang. 1997. p 123.
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common with the experience of free migrants of the same period than with slaves, in 
terms of voluntary migration, permanent settlements, cyclical migration, transportation 
and regulation.32
The revisionists, however, were criticised for underestimating the legal 
mechanisms, especially the penal sanctions used to control the contract labourers. The 
traditionalists construed these legal mechanisms as the key ‘unfree’ component in an 
indentured labour system, forcing labourers to live in a state of virtual bondage or 
slavery.33 However, one has to consider that penal sanctions were not always in force 
in law, and even if they were, they were differentially enforced on indenture contracts. 
Some indenture contracts were not subject to penal sanctions, so this was really free 
labour under long fixed contracts. A typical example was the disappearance of penal 
sanctions on labour contracts in Malaya after 1922, although indenture still applied to 
Javanese labourers who arrived under a special Dutch permit until 1932. In fact, 
indenture was abolished for Indians as early as 1910.34
Meanwhile, contracts of indenture with penal sanctions could be divided into 
two. The first type was where the colonial state was reluctant to enforce criminal 
punishment for minor breaches of contract. I shall show in the thesis that the Javanese 
indentured labour system in British North Borneo fell into this category. The second 
category saw the colonial state fully enforcing them on indenture contracts, thus 
pointing to the system being a very strong one. Nevertheless, even ‘strong’ indentures 
should not be conflated with ‘slavery’. It took more than the existence of penal 
sanctions to label the system of indentured labour as a disguised form of slavery. The
32 Colin Newbury, ‘ Labour M igration in the Imperial Phase: An Essay in Interpretation’ . Journal o f  
Imperial and Commonwealth History. 3,2 (1975). p. 235; Pieter Emmer. ‘ The Great Escape: The 
Migration o f  Female Indentured Servants from British India to Suriname’ , in: David Richardson (ed). 
Abolition and Its Aftermath: The Historical Context, 1790-1916. London: Frank Cass, 1985. pp. 245-247; 
Northrup. Indentured Labor. p. 7.
33 Hoefte. In Place o f  Slavery, p. 34; Adapa Satyanarayana. “ Birds o f Passage’ . M igration o f South 
Indian Labour Communities to South-East Asia, 19-20,h Centuries, A .D .k Clara W orking Paper No. 11. 
Amsterdam. 2001. p. 4.
34 See V irg in ia Thompson. Labour Problems in Southeast Asia. New York: Yale University Press, pp. 63 
and 66; Parmer. Colonial Labour Policy. 1960.
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latter was exemplified by the system of automatic re-contracting enforced in Cuba and 
Peru in the nineteenth century. The Spanish government in Cuba decreed that Chinese 
indentured coolies either had to re-indenture themselves at the end of their eight-year 
contract, or leave the island within two months. In the event that they would not, or 
could not, do either, they had to earn money from public works to pay for their passage 
to the destination of their choice. Automatic re-contracting prevailed, and effectively 
made the Cuban system almost indistinguishable from slavery, especially as many 
workers entered the indentured system through self sale or kidnapping.35
Therefore, as accentuated by a revisionist scholar, too much emphasis on the 
legal dimensions, i.e. penal sanctions, notwithstanding their importance, would only 
result in ‘an incomplete, if not distorted understanding of immigrant life’ . This, however, 
can be remedied by considering the multi-dimensional historical reality (social, 
economic and cultural factors) that also helped to shape the indentured experience.361 
shall develop the argument by investigating these multi-dimensional contexts. I want to 
suggest that Javanese immigration, under the indentured system of labour, developed 
from prevailing conditions, in both British North Borneo and Java. I also want to show 
that Javanese indentured workers endured regimented living and working conditions, 
under civil contracts, which sanctioned criminal punishments. However, the desperate 
need for labour, the prevailing conditions in Java, the regulated recruitment and 
immigration procedures, the characteristics of their indenture experience on British 
North Borneo enterprises, the post-indenture options available to the labourers, the 
inferior position of the Company government vis-a-vis the Dutch authorities, and the 
incessant disagreement between employers’ representatives which weakened their 
collective bargaining power, have all helped to depict Javanese indentured labour
35 M att Pratt Guterl. ‘A fter Slavery: Asian Labor, the American South, and the Age o f Emancipation’ . 
Journal o f  World Histoty. 14,2 (2003). p. 217; Ong Jin Hui. ‘Chinese Indentured Labour: Coolies and 
Colonies’ , in: Robin Cohen (ed.). The Cambridge Survey o f  World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1995. pp. 51-56.
36 Richard Allen. ‘ Review Essay. Indentured Labour and the Need for Historical Context’ . Historian. 63,2 
(W inter 2001). p. 393.
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experience in British North Borneo not so much as slavery in a disguised form, but as a 
unique variety of ‘free labour’.
SCOPE AND LIMITS OF STUDY
This study does not attempt to give a comprehensive history of immigrants in British 
North Borneo. Nor is it an attempt to produce a comprehensive history of labour 
immigrants or labour perse. This is essentially a study of Javanese labour immigration, 
and its relationship to the indentured system of labour in British North Borneo. The term 
indentured labour, as understood in this study, refers to legal indentures initially signed 
in Java, for an extended period of time, i.e. usually two to three years. A greater part of 
the Javanese labour force in British North Borneo was privately recruited from 
Singapore using the services of merchant brokers and former labourers (laukehs). Like 
the Java-recruited Javanese, Singapore-recruited Javanese were given advance 
monies upon recruitment, and laboured under written contracts with penal sanctions. 
However, the latter group is excluded from the definition of ‘indentured labourer’ 
referred to in this thesis because they signed a different kind of written contract. The 
contract was concluded within British North Borneo itself, for a period of one year, and 
terminable by the labourer on one month’s notice, and upon repayment of overdue 
debts. Hence, despite the necessary reference to immigration, ‘free’ Javanese and 
Chinese migrants serving local contracts, indigenous labourers, and labour conditions 
in British North Borneo, it is the government-recruited Javanese working on the Dutch 
contract (also locally termed as Java kontrakkan to differentiate them with other 
Javanese in the territory) and the characteristics of indenture, which are the primary 
objects of this investigation. The rest is included in the general discussion, as and 
where appropriate, to allow for a better treatment and understanding of the topic.
The majority of indentured labourers for British North Borneo enterprises were 
the Javanese-speaking people of Central and East Java. The Sundanese of West Java 
and the Madurese-speaking people of the eastern part of Java (close to the island of
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Madura) constituted very small minorities. For the sake of convenience, the term 
‘Javanese’ is used in the thesis to refer to the general natives of the island of Java. 
Distinction based on ethnicity was made when and where necessary. The terms 
‘labourers’, ‘coolies’, and ‘workers’ are used interchangeably to describe unskilled 
people or groups of Asian origin who laboured on British North Borneo estates, timber 
camps or mines.
This study concerns a period delineated by two clear boundaries. It begins in 
1914, with the arrival of the first batch of a long series of indentured migrants from Java 
to British North Borneo. The early twentieth century marked the boom in the rubber 
industry in the territory, and the abolition of the indentured labour system in Malaya by 
1914. The need for labour to work on rubber estates, and the prohibition by the Straits 
Settlements on imports of Chinese labourers from China and Singapore under 
indenture, after July 1914, resulted in the Company importing labourers from Java. The 
study ends in 1932, with the expiration of the remaining contract, and the Company’s 
ending of the importation of Javanese indentured migrants. The year also coincided 
with the abolition of indentured labour under penal sanctions in British North Borneo, 
following external pressure from the International Labour Organisation, the United 
States of America’s, and the impact of the Great Depression (1929-1932) on the world 
economy. Although the temporal focus of this study spans eighteen years, an early 
chapter includes earlier developments, to provide sufficient background for 
understanding migration. The study also breaches the terminal date to consider the 
long-term fate of Javanese indentured migrants.
The orientation of this study is both qualitative and quantitative, and concerns 
not only what is recorded as having happened, but also the ways in which events and 
actions were represented. Apart from descriptive analysis, quantitative evidence is also 
helpful. The thesis structure will be developed thematically, although a chronological
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stance is adopted for the description and analysis within each of the chapter. This 
thesis is primarily an empirical historical study.
SOURCES
Primary sources for this thesis are derived from archives and libraries in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Malaysia, and Singapore. The sources consist of written 
correspondence (official and secret), reports, memos, transcripts, newspapers and 
personal papers. The United Kingdom offers an extensive collection of unpublished 
sources relating to the Chartered Company administration of British North Borneo, and 
company archives. The primary materials deposited at the National Archives (Public 
Record Office, PRO) at Kew consist of policy decisions, correspondence files of the 
North Borneo Chartered Company and the Straits Settlements, sessional papers, 
minutes of meetings, protectorate reports and maps. Additionally, the India Office 
Records administered by the British Library housed important correspondence relating 
to the question of Indian immigration to British North Borneo. Correspondence relating 
to the negotiation between the Company government and the Dutch authorities are 
also derived from The National Archives, The Hague (Algemeen Rijks Archief, ARA), 
under the Mailrapporten (MR) and Verbalen (V) series. However, due to linguistic 
limitations, I was only able to read a limited selection of Dutch materials, for which I 
obtained help with translation. Most importantly, the thesis also depended heavily on 
primary documents found in Malaysia. The Sabah State Archive (SSA) housed 
important sets of original BNBC papers, with more than 1,200 files listed under the 
North Borneo Central Archive (NBCA) series, while invaluable protectorate reports and 
correspondence are kept in ‘Miscellaneous’, under the ‘Despatches and Savingrams’ 
series.
Also important are published primary materials, particularly the House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (HCPP) or the Hansards, which contain debates, 
commission reports, statistical evidence and treaties pertaining to the economic
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development and labour conditions of British North Borneo. Of primary importance is 
the Correspondence on the Subject o f Allegations against the Administration o f the 
British North Borneo Company, which contains communications between the Company 
government, Colonial Office and Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, on the 
conditions of contract labour in British North Borneo. To complement these, 
publications by the Society in London, specifically The Anti-Slavery Reporter and 
Aborigines' Friend proved helpful for this research. These sources have been cross- 
examined with the unpublished correspondence easily accessible at the PRO and the 
SSA.
Published commission reports on the rubber industry, indentured and contract 
labours, and emigration, were also derived from the National University of Singapore 
(NUS), while published Dutch labour inspectorate’s reports have been consulted at the 
Royal Tropical Institute (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, KIT) in Amsterdam 
(although similar linguistic limitations as mentioned above apply). Official published 
primary sources such as, Reports o f the Half-Yearly Meetings o f the BNBC, the 
Progress Report o f the BNBC, Handbooks o f the State o f North Borneo, Administration 
Reports, and Official Gazettes, kept in the United Kingdom and Malaysia, are also 
crucial sources. Other important unofficial published primary sources included works 
written by contemporary writers (planters and ex-civil servants) during the Chartered 
Company rule, such as Owen Rutter, Oscar Cook and Charles Bruce.37
‘Private papers’ is another category of unpublished sources relevant for this 
study. The SOAS archive keeps papers written and collected by E.P. Gueritz (ex- 
Governor of British North Borneo), and the Guthrie Corporation. The latter includes 
records relating to plantation interests in British North Borneo. The private papers of
37 Owen Rutter. British North Borneo: An Account o f  Its Histoiy, Resources and Native Tribes. London: 
Constable &  Co. Ltd. 1922; Oscar Cook. Borneo, the Stealer o f Hearts. New York: Houghton M iff lin  
Company. 1924; Charles (A.B.C. Francis) Bruce. Twenty Years in Borneo. London: Cassell and 
Company Ltd. 1924.
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Allan Chin Yin Foh, a former estate assistant manager, proved invaluable, as it 
provided a first hand account of labour conditions during the early years. Likewise, one 
of the main newspapers consulted was the British North Borneo Herald, BNBH 
(deposited at the Sabah State Archive and Public Records Office). However, although 
the paper, being the only form of printable mass media, represents a wide selection of 
news, commentaries and reports on labour and production, it was still a ‘capitalist’ 
newspaper, and was shaped by the philosophical and ideological motivation of the 
‘superior class’ and authors of the period. Warta Ahad and the Malay Mail were also 
consulted at the Malaysia National Archives (ANM), but they were of minor use.
The sources mentioned above have been synthesised to get a better 
understanding of labour legislation, government’s responses to planters’ demands for 
assistance in recruiting labourers, the negotiations between colonial governments, the 
mechanisms of recruitment, the life of the indentured cooiies, and the post-indenture 
experience of the labourers. However, the range of sources for this thesis, although it 
contained widely different materials, shares a common thread. They often reflect elitist 
perceptions, attitudes, and paradigms, and as the authors are in the vast majority white 
European males, the data are flavoured in that manner. The attitudes and perspectives 
of other persons, such as the Javanese, Chinese and indigenous people, are minimal 
and sometimes rarely mentioned. The voices of these ‘common’ people usually have to 
be inferred from these sources, or read ‘against the grain’.
The printed annual reports of the Protectorate Department particularly, contain 
a wealth of quantitative data on numbers of coolies, their ethnicity and legal status, 
deaths, mortality and morbidity, prosecutions and convictions, labour unrests and 
desertions. The inspection reports by the Protectorate and the Dutch Labour 
Inspectorate officers, both published and unpublished, present insights that are lacking 
from other sources. However, one could say that the alleged affinity of the inspecting 
officers with the Western enterprises, the employers, as opposed to the interests of the
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cooiies, the employees, rendered this source to be problematic. However, on their 
studies of coolie labour in colonial Indonesia, Houben and Lindbiad posit that when 
writing such reports, inspecting officers were usually more concerned whether the legal 
provisions were enforced accordingly, and not with broad policy issues, for instance, 
the justification of bonded labour or the existence of penal sanctions.38 Lindbiad also 
argues that the source can provide information of ‘a sufficient quality for a scientific 
assessment even if takes into account its inevitable flaws, biases and prejudices’ . This 
applies to statistical information on the size and composition of the labour force, and 
other quantitative indicators of labour conditions. The reports would give a ‘reasonably 
accurate impression’ of what inspecting officials had observed. One could also argue 
that there is the possibility of the labour inspectors giving a partial representation of the 
actual situation because cases of unrecorded deaths, or overlooked cases of abuses, 
prevailed during the period. In such cases, corroborative evidence from another source 
has been utilised, but when no such evidence was found, taking the advice of Lindbiad,
I have accepted the reports as a useful source, in the hope that possible distortions 
had not affected general trends.39
One method of corroborating archival materials is the utilisation of oral sources. 
However, as far as I (and the SSA archivists) know, no collections containing 
interviews with the labouring class (Javanese, Chinese, etc) ever came into existence. 
As a result, I attempted to search for this special group of people myself during my 
fieldtrips in Sabah. As expected, the biggest challenge to oral testimonies was the 
availability of respondents, who were actually indentured migrants. Almost all of them 
have passed away. For the few that were interviewed, failing memories due to age 
constraints, and poor health, compromised the credibility of their information. Oral 
traditions had been of some use through family history from descendants of the 
indentured migrants, but I have used them sparingly, and in a calculated manner. The
38 Houben. ‘ Introduction’ , p. 21.
39 J. Thomas Lindbiad. ‘Coolies in Deli: Labour Conditions in Western Enterprises in East Sumatra, 
1910-1938, in: Houben, Lindbiad, et. al. Coolie Labour, p. 45.
38
majority of those interviewed were second or even third generation Javanese, whose 
knowledge of their parents’ or forefathers' indenture experience was extremely limited. 
Even when I interviewed several Javanese from various social backgrounds, most of 
them were ignorant whether their ancestors were indeed indentured labourers, or just 
contract labourers under the local contract. Despite these limitations, I did use a 
handful of interviews to aid in substantiating certain facts and perspectives obtained 
from written sources.
Apart from primary sources, I have also referred to secondary sources which 
are important in filling in the background of the Javanese migrants. Writings by Karl 
Pelzer, Virginia Thompson, Bram Peper, Nathan Keyfitz, J.H. Boeke, Clifford Geertz, 
Wibo Peekema, Widjojo Nitisastro, and Riwanto Tirtosudarmo among others, describe 
domestic conditions in rural Central and East Java which affected Javanese decisions 
to migrate to other destinations, including British North Borneo, under the indentured 
system of labour.40 Additionally, to place the British North Borneo experience into 
context, examination by P.T. Bauer on world rubber conditions also helped in my 
analysis.41 Likewise, I have also consulted the works of renowned historians, 
economists, anthropologists and sociologists, who have written extensively on related 
topics, such as international labour migration, indentured labour, slavery, capitalism, 
imperialism and colonialism.
40 Thompson. Labor Problems. 1947; Bram Peper. ‘Population Growth in Java in the 19th Century: A 
New Interpretation.’ Population Studies. 24,1 (March 1970); Nathan Keyfitz. ‘Indonesian Population and 
the European Industrial Revolution’ . Asian Sui'vey. 5,10 (October 1965). J.H. Boeke. The Structure o f  
Netherlands Indian Economy. Institute o f  Pacific Relation, New York. 1942; C liffo rd  Geertz. The Social 
Context o f  Economic Change: An Indonesian Case Study. M.J.T., Cambridge Mass. 1956; Wibo 
Peekema. ‘ Colonization o f  Javanese in the Outer Provinces o f  the Netherlands East-Indies’ . The 
Geographical Journal. 101,4 (A pril 1943); W id jo jo Nitisastro. Population Trends in Indonesia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 1970; Riwanto Tirtosudarmo. ‘The Indonesian State’ s Response to M igration’ . 
Sojourn. 14,1 (1999).
41 P.T. Bauer. The Rubber Industiy, a Study in Competition and Monopoly. London: Longmanns, Green 
and Co. 1948.
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Conclusion
The thesis is organised thematically. Chapter two presents an overview of British North 
Borneo, including economic growth and the demand for labour. Chapter three 
considers the negotiation between the Company government and Netherlands East 
Indies to recruit Javanese indentured labourers, and the dynamics involved in the 
immigration process. The push factors of Javanese immigration under the indenture 
system of labour, and the recruitment process, are discussed in chapter four, while in 
chapter five, the apparatus of protection for both employees and employers becomes 
the subject of discussion. Chapters six and seven discuss the living conditions of 
Javanese working under indenture, by focusing on material and non-material 
conditions, while Chapter eight discusses the repatriation of Javanese indentured 
labourers. The final chapter draws together the findings of the study to answer the 
research question, and also cross-examines the stance of relevant scholars pertaining 
to indentured labour in British North Borneo.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE GROWTH IN THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR IN 
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO 
Introduction
The granting of a Royal Charter by the British government to the British North Borneo 
Chartered Company (BNBC) in 1882, to govern the area of British North Borneo, 
recognised the BNBC as the sole legitimate government of the territory. Its policy did 
not foresee direct involvement in any business or plantation activity in British North 
Borneo, but it hoped to offer a favourable environment for such enterprise by others. 
This chapter seeks to analyse the growth of plantation agriculture as the mainstay of 
the territory’s economic development, and how its development necessitated the 
demand for labour. It also strives to analyse the attempts made by the Company 
government to procure labour, and assess whether these attempts were successful in 
resolving the labour question within the territory.
Development of Plantation Agriculture in British North Borneo
Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, plantation agriculture was unheard of 
in British North Borneo. It was confined to neighbouring Malaya and the Dutch East 
Indies. After the BNBC was awarded the Royal Charter, it had a dual mission. First, its 
principal policy of administration was to control natural resources, and the utilisation of 
these resources to promote economic development in the territory. Second, it was 
obligated to respect native rights and customs, which among others, included ‘respect 
to the holding, possession, transfer, and disposition of lands and goods’.1 This 
consideration arose at the insistence of individuals in the British government, who were
1 See a reprint o f the Royal Charter in SSA: The Ordinance and Rules o f  the State o f  North Borneo, 1881- 
1936. Sandakan: Government Printing Office. 1937. p. 619.
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against the resurgence of rule by another chartered company following the demise of 
the East India Company.2
To promote economic growth, the BNBC was authorised to improve, develop 
and cultivate any land within the territory, and acquire additional land if desired. The 
Charter further authorised the Company to provide a viable administration, settle the 
territories and establish peaceful conditions, build the necessary communications 
infrastructure, and grant mining and timber concessions, along with land leases for 
agriculture for terms, or in perpetuity.3 In its attempt to attract potential investors, liberal 
policies were offered by the Company, and problems related to labour shortage were 
countered with promises to promote immigration. The Company obtained its revenues 
from land sales, taxation (such as custom import and export duties and poll tax), 
licences and trading permits, and the spirit and opium farms, customarily found in other 
British colonial possessions within Southeast Asia.4 The progress of the territory was 
gauged in terms of the revenue collected, rather than in terms of development.5
Land was utilised to promote economic growth based on plantation agriculture. 
Nevertheless, if plantation enterprise was to succeed, land had to be commodified. 
This was viewed as an important prerequisite for redistributing land to European 
planters, whom it was hoped would secure the economic development of the region.6 
Without this legal step, security of tenure for investors could not be guaranteed, and 
investors would shy away from the territory. Not only would investors be unable to 
reap future benefits due to an inability to bequeath the property to desired heirs, but
2 Black. A Gambling Style o f  Government. London: Oxford University Press. 1984. p. 31.
3 HCPP: C.5617. Papers Relating to North Borneo. 1888. pp. 3-4; Kahin. ‘The State o f North Borneo’ , p. 
44.
4 W.H. Treacher. ‘British Borneo: Sketches o f Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo. Journal o f the 
Straits Branch o f  the Royal Asiatic Society. 21 (June 1890). pp. 82-92.
5 Am ity Doolittle. ‘Colliding Discourses: Western Land Laws and Native Customary Rights in North 
Borneo, 1881-1918’ . Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies. 34,1 (February 2003). p. 101.
6 Mark Cleary and Peter Eaton. Borneo: Change and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1992. p. 73.
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they would not be able to sell the land freely should the need arise.7 However, this was 
no easy task, because the Company government realised that the very same native 
rights and legal institutions that the administrators of the Company were supposed to 
respect and protect became an obstruction to the expansion of commercial agriculture. 
Eventually, to make it easier for land to be commoditised, the Company government 
advocated a system of ‘legal pluralism’, in which the government supported some 
native customary laws, while those that obstructed the commercial exploitation of land 
were replaced with Western legal concepts.8
In 1883, the first Land Code for British North Borneo was promulgated. 
Ownership of land had to be registered by the indigenous population, and in return for 
land title, they had to pay an annual quit-rent. If within a three-year period the land was 
left uncultivated and no quit-rent had been paid, the land automatically reverted to the 
state.9 Additionally, disposal of land by any native group or individual was prohibited 
without authorisation from the Company. Instead of ‘protecting’ the indigenous people, 
the legislation paved the way for the categorisation of land, so that land could be 
alienated and sold to European planters. As Amity Doolittle notes, ‘native rights to land 
were incrementally reduced with each new colonial law and policy, while European 
rights to land were increasingly privileged’.10
Under land regulations of 1883, large tracts of land, from the vast majority of its 
12.8 million acres, were offered to investors at low prices on long-term leases.11 ‘Waste 
lands’ or lots of 100 acres and above, were offered to prospective planters on 999 year
7 S. Suyanto, T.P. Totnich and K . Otsuka. ‘Land Tenure and Farm Management Efficiency: the Case o f 
Smallholder Rubber Production in Customary Land Areas o f Sumatra. Agroforestry Systems. 52,145-160 
(2001). (http://www.sprmgerlmk.com/content/x02k3786wl 7m3515/fulltext.pdf?page=Q (Accessed on 21 
October 2008).
8 Am ity Doolittle. ‘ Colliding Discourses’ , p. 102.
9 For a detailed information o f  the land regulations, see SSA: N BC A 1428, Land Ordinance 1930; Land 
regulations 1883, 1894, 1904. For a summarised version, see Cleary. ‘Plantation Agriculture’ , pp. 173-
174.
10 Doolittle. ‘ Colliding Discourses’ , pp. 97-98.
11 Massey. ‘Political Economy’ , p. 28.
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leases, usually at a rental of one dollar ($1)12 per acre (although by the early 1890s the 
rate had fallen to 50 cents per acre), free of quit rent. Apart from liberal land grants, the 
Chartered Company also offered incentives, such as an absence of export tax and 
minimum authoritarian government supervision.13
Despite these land incentives, the economic development of British North 
Borneo during the initial years was slow, and response from planting circles on the 
whole remained lukewarm.14 The territory was considered as a new, indeed unknown 
terrain. Although extensive in area, it lacked a large population which could provide 
labour. Furthermore, it did not have any established sea communications. It involved 
higher risks compared to other accessible and more attractive colonies in Southeast 
Asia. In 1884, the territory’s imports amounted to $484,895, and exports to $367,240.15 
The Company was sustained economically by a continuation of earlier exports of edible 
birds’ nests and jungle produce, such as rattan, gutta-percha, dammar, kapok, illipe 
nuts, camphor, lakka wood, sago and elephants’ tusks.16
British North Borneo’s economy went through dramatic changes with the 
introduction of the tobacco plantation in the late 1880s. Tobacco estate agriculture was 
seen by the Company administration as a panacea to boost its revenue, and it adopted 
a policy to encourage investment. Applicants would be given a free grant of 1,000 
acres, on condition that they purchased a further 1,000 to 2,000 acres. Investors would 
then have to plant 80 fields (approximately 107 acres) with tobacco in the first season,
12 A ll dollar figures quoted (unless otherwise stated) are in Straits dollars. In the nineteenth century, the 
value o f the Straits dollar fluctuated, but in 1904, it was pegged to sterling at the rate o f  $1.00 to 2s 4d 
(about US$0.40-0.60 in pre-World War II  terms).
13 PRO: 00874/244. Treacher, the Land Regulations o f British North Borneo. 7 February 1883; See also, 
PRO: C0874/436. Land Regulations.
14 W. H. Medhurst. ‘B ritish North Borneo’ , in: Paul H. Kratoska (ed.). Honourable Intentions: Talks on 
the British Empire in South-East Asia Delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute 1874-1928. Singapore: 
Oxford University Press. 1983. p. 101.
15 PRO: C0874/239. Report by Acting Consul-General Treacher on the Commerce and Navigation o f the 
Sultanate o f  Brunei, the Territory o f  Sarawak and the Territory o f  British North Borneo for the year 1884, 
enclosure, Treacher to Alcock, 19 June 1885.
16 PRO: C0874/292. A lcock to Treacher, 18 May 1882; A lfred Dent to Treacher, 19 October 1882; 
Alcock to Treacher, 8 December 1882. See also, Tregonning. A History o f  Modern Sabah, p. 82.
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while the remaining acreage would be taken up and paid for within two years of the free 
grant. These incentives were given until 1 August 1887.17
Such incentives were considered to be more attractive than those pertaining to 
either the Outer Provinces of the Dutch East Indies, or the nearby Federated Malay 
States (FMS). Encouraged by them, the high price of tobacco in the world market 
(London tobacco prices had been stable at around 23d per pound for the last five 
years), and the recognition by experts in London and Amsterdam that tobacco leaf 
produced in British North Borneo was equal to the best cigar leaf in the world, the 
territory was eventually invaded by tobacco planters. Tobacco estates were opened up 
mainly in remote areas, such as the Kinabatangan, Sugut, and Labuk on the east 
coast, and the Marudu Bay region to the north. By 1890, about twenty companies were 
involved in the production of tobacco; eight were Dutch, one German, and the 
remainder English.18 The London Borneo Tobacco Company, the Amsterdam Borneo 
Tobacco Company and the Darvel Bay Tobacco Company were the three most 
important companies, controlling about 150,000 acres (around one quarter) of the total 
concession area.19 These companies were ‘large, hierarchically organised ... with 
salaried managements and hired workforces with integrated connections to external 
markets’.20
The tobacco industry not only stimulated the revenue of the Chartered 
Company government, gathered from export duty (which was introduced in 1890) and 
land sales, but also increased employment opportunities within the territory. It led to 
coolie immigration into the territory, sponsored by the tobacco companies, which 
eventually contributed to the expansion of other export industries. For example, in 
1909, the Darvel Bay Company and Batu Puteh Syndicate on the east coast employed
17 Massey. ‘Political Economy’ , p. 29; PRO: C0874/243. ‘Governor British North Borneo. 17 December 
1885’ .
18 Cleary and Eaton, Borneo. p. 61.
19 Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo. 1890.
20 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change, p. 39.
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2,082 and 925 Javanese and Chinese coolies respectively.21 However, the tobacco 
boom was short-lived, mainly because of the restrictive measures (the Mackinnon tariff) 
imposed in 1893 by the United States on the importation of tobacco, and the advent of 
rubber, with its quick profits. After 1902, the tobacco industry was on the decline.22 In 
1910, only twelve tobacco plantations remained. Production had dropped from 807,336 
kg in 1915 to 290,902 kg in 1929. The year 1929 also witnessed the survival of only 
one plantation company, the Darvel Bay Tobacco Plantation. Accordingly, the 
Chartered Company tried to play its role in sustaining the industry by resurrecting an 
estate at Lahad Datu, and it encouraged capital investment from abroad (i.e. the 
Imperial Tobacco Company of Great Britain and Ireland) to be injected into the state. 
Nevertheless, the once flourishing tobacco industry never regained its former glory, 
and after 1960, it remained an exclusively smallholder crop.23
The decline of the tobacco industry did not imply a downturn in the territory’s 
economy, as it was offset by the rapid extension of timber. Indeed, timber became one 
of the bulwarks of the territory’s economy. By 1890, $44,584 worth of timber was 
exported from British North Borneo, and the figure had risen to $374,911 some twelve 
years later.24 From around 1910 onwards, larger European estates mushroomed to 
organise the export of timber in large quantities to Hong Kong, building on its earlier 
efforts to develop the industry around Sandakan.25 Until the formation of the British 
Borneo Timber Company (BBTC) in 1920, however, the trade lacked a central 
organising and marketing power.26 The BBTC, a subsidiary company of the BNBC, and
21 PRO: C0648/1-6. Administration and Annual Reports. 1908-1913.; Cleary. ‘Plantation Agriculture’ , p.
175.
22 David W. John and Janies C. Jackson. ‘The Tobacco Industry o f North Borneo: A  Distinctive Form o f 
Plantation Agriculture’ . Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies. IV , 1 (1973). pp.88-106.
23 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change, p. 41.
24 Tregonning. A Ilistoiy o f  Modern Sabah, p. 82.
25 A. Cook. ‘Notes on the Recent Development, Explorations and Commercial Geography o f British 
North Borneo’ . Journal o f the Manchester Geographical Society. 6,68-9 (1890), cited in, Cleary and 
Eaton. Borneo, p. 62.
26 Cleary and Eaton. Borneo, p. 62.
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with a capital of £1,000,000, was to have a virtual monopoly ‘to cut, collect and export’ 
timber for twenty five years.27 This provided a valuable stimulus to the timber trade.
It was rubber, however, that presented British North Borneo with the greatest 
boost to its economy. To make rubber 'the largest and most remunerative undertaking 
in the country’, the Company government decided to take ‘exceptional measures’ in an 
attempt to attract capital investment to British North Borneo.28 Instructed by the 
Chartered Company board, Governor William C. Cowie introduced special concessions 
at the end of 1905, to attract foreign investments. Companies were floated in England, 
and large concessions of land were taken up. As in the case of tobacco, the main 
incentive was the granting of land on long-term leases, with ‘no more than peppercorn 
rents’.29 The Company also proposed a scheme to guarantee dividends to planting 
companies. Lands were sold to planting companies at £12 7s per hectare, and the 
amount was used to guarantee interest on the working capital of these companies 
during the preliminary years.30 In addition, the rubber companies were exempted from 
export duty on rubber for a period of fifty years. However, in 1924 this exemption from 
export duty for all alienations of land for rubber, ceased.31
These favourable incentives meant that rubber growers in British North Borneo 
were better off as compared with their fellows in the major rubber-producing countries. 
Planters in Malaya and Sumatra had to pay quit rent on their whole estates, whether 
developed or not, as well as customs duty on all exported rubber. The North Borneo 
Rubber Commission reported on the encouragement given by the Chartered Company, 
namely to attract capital for rubber cultivation in the territory ‘without parallel’ in the 
industry.32 On comparing the colonial development of Southeast Asian colonies, Voon
27 Tregonning. A Histoty o f Modem Sabah, p. 82.
28 SSA: BNBH Vol. 24. 1906. p. 2.
29 C.E.T. Mann, et. al. Report o f  the North Borneo Rubber Commission. Singapore: V.C.G. Gatrell, 
Government Printer, 1949. p. 4
30 PRO: C0855/23/252 BNBHFR/27/21 2 November 1909.
31 Mann. Report o f North Borneo Rubber, p. 4.
32 Mann. Report o f North Borneo Rubber, p. 4.
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argues that these attempts, particularly the assurance to pay dividends, was 
exclusively found in British North Borneo, and was ‘a desperate measure to boost 
development’ in the territory.33
As a result of these domestic incentives, European estates were quickly opened 
up on the relatively densely populated west coast, at Menggatal, Papar, Beaufort and 
Tenom. As early as 1909, seventeen such estates had emerged on the west coast.34 
These companies had a combined concession area of about 100,000 acres and a 
nominal capital value in excess of one million pounds sterling.35 These estates were 
mainly concentrated on the west coast, and followed the construction of the railway by 
the Company government, from Jesselton to Tenom, in the interior residency.36 The 
construction of a railway, despite the Company government almost being bankrupted, 
facilitated capitalist expansion into the region, and opened up new areas for rubber 
cultivation. The rapid development of the American car industry, and the high demand 
for rubber tyres generated by the impact of the First World War, too, provided a major 
stimulus to the planting of rubber, on a plantation scale, in British North Borneo.
To reap large revenues from a prosperous rubber industry, the Department of 
Agriculture also pronounced most of the undeveloped lands beside the railway as 
being fit for this new crop, and alienated large tracts of prime native land to European 
companies. This drew condemnation from the indigenous Kadazandusun communities. 
They accused the Company’s government of classifying the lands as state lands, when 
they were supposed to be traditional communal lands for grazing and burial purposes, 
and should be treated as native reservations.37 In 1910, attempts by the indigenous
33 Voon Phin Keong. Western Rubber Planting Enterprise in Southeast Asia 1876-1921. Kuala Lumpur: 
Penerbit Universiti Malaya. 1976. p. 110.
34 PRO: C0648/2. Administration and Annual Reports 1909. p.2.
35 PRO: C0648/4. AR. Agriculture 1911 by W .H. Penney. Administration and Annual Reports 1911.
36 For a more recent and detailed study o f the development and significance o f  the railway in the area, 
refer Am arjit Kaur. “ Hantu5 and Highway in Sabah: Transport in Sabah, 1881-1963’ . Modern Asian 
Studies. 28,1 (1994). pp. 1-49.
37 PRO: C0531/2. Simon X  to Sir John Anderson. The Humble Petition o f  the Dusun Inhabitants o f the
D istrict o f  Papar. 20 July 1910.
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communities to reverse the decision met with failure.38 Instead, the rush for rubber land 
concessions continued. From 1909 to 1911, foreign companies acquired sufficient land 
to last them for the next two decades. The expansion of the rubber industry during the 
period 1910 -1933 is shown in Table 2.1. Towards the end of 1912, more than 25,000 
acres were planted with rubber. In the twelve years between 1912 and end of 1924, the 
acreage more than doubled. Rubber exports also increased from 24 tonnes in 1910, to 
4,620 tonnes in 1924.39 No doubt, this development was stimulated by the high market 
price ruling in the First World War period (see Table 2.2).40
Table 2.1
Acreage and Estimated Net Exports of Crude Rubber in British North Borneo,
1910-1934
Year Area (Acre) Export (tonnes) Export (£)
1910 14,755 24 34,315
1912 25,600 - n.a
1915 31,046 1,050 374,422
1920 51,865 4,105 689,403
1921 57,371 3,121 289,634
1922 49,251 3,749 310,368
1923 62,366 4,239 560,770
1924 63,290 4,620 553,019
1925 70,466 5,425 1,397,562
1926 88,000 6,096 1,259,624
1928 96,037 6,698 580,487
1929 122,235 7,381 590,115
1933 128,590 7,783 178,999
1934 126,640 n.a n.a
Sources: Handbook of the State of North Borneo, 1934. pp. 68 & 105; Mann. Report on 
North Borneo Rubber, p. 4; HCCP: Cmd. 3086. Tables and Diagrams Relating to the 
Rubber Industry. 1928. p. 3 & 7; Amarjit Kaur, Economic Change, p. 43.
Table 2.1 shows that the greatest planting activity occurred immediately after 
1924, with its rubber acreage doubling. At the end of 1928, a total of thirty large 
companies (mostly European-owned, with the exception of a few Japanese and 
Chinese), representing capital approaching £4,000,000, were engaged in cultivating 
rubber, on an area encompassing 67,000 acres, while numerous plantations owned by
18 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Correspondence on the Subject o f  Allegations.
Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo, 1934. p.68 &  105; Am arjit Kaur, Economic Change, p. 43; 
PRO: C0648/14-16. State o f North Borneo Administration Reports. 1929-1934.
40 Mann. Report on North Borneo Rubber, p. 4.
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smallholders contributed more than 29,000 acres to planting rubber.41 The period 
between 1930 and 1934 was marked by a severe slump in market prices. Some 4,400 
acres were planted in five years, totalling 126,640, by the end of 1934. Although 
exported rubber (in tonnes) had increased every year since 1921, its value plunged 
drastically as a result of the slump in the early 1930s.
Table 2.2 
World Rubber Price
Year Average Price per Pound (pence)
1905-1909 68.05
1910-1919 43.68
1920-1929 16.88
1930-1939 6.04
Sources: J.H. Drabble. Rubber in Malaya, 1876-1922. 1973. p. 213; McFadyean. The 
History o f Rubber Regulation, 1934-43. 1944. p. 239.
Nonetheless, Table 2.3 depicts the fact that the increase in large estate 
plantings was less than half.42 The decrease in rubber output by estates could, to a 
certain extent, be blamed on the restriction imposed by the Stevenson restriction 
scheme. Between 1922 and 1928, this scheme was imposed in many rubber-producing 
countries, including Ceylon and Malaya. The scheme did not prohibit new planting, but 
was officially discouraged. New planting could only be undertaken on lands that had 
already been issued with a title, but had yet to cultivate rubber. By this, rubber could 
only be cultivated on land with other crops, or on unplanted land held in reserve.43 
British North Borneo was a voluntary appendage of the scheme, and the Company 
government took no steps to introduce legislation. Following protests in 1923, the 
exportable quota of 60 per cent of her previous output was raised to 75 per cent. It was 
left to the discretion of the operating rubber companies to impose their own method of 
restriction.44
41 Handbook o f  North Borneo. 1929, p. 52.
4“ Mann. Report on North Borneo Rubber, p. 4
41 Bauer. The Rubber Industry, p. 3.
44 Tregonning, A History o f  Modern Sabah., p. 90.
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Table 2.3
British North Borneo: Areas of Rubber Planting (acre)
Holdings over 
100 acres
Holdings under 
100 acres
Total
Planted up to 1924 49,442 13,848 63,290
Planted after 1924 till 
end of 1934
21,426 41,924 63,350
126,640
Source: Mann. Report on North Borneo Rubber. p. 4.
Meanwhile, smallholdings increased threefold after 1924. It is imperative to note 
the emergence of smallholdings as a salient feature of the development of rubber in 
British North Borneo, and its impact on rubber production. There were usually four 
types of smallholdings in the territory, owned by both indigenous population (i.e. the 
Kadayan of Sipitang and the Kadazandusun of Papar and Kimanis), and Chinese 
individual owners. These included holdings of two acres or less, larger smallholdings of 
up to 10 acres, miniature estates of up to 25 acres, and smallholdings of more than 25 
acres.45 The smaller holdings were normally owned by indigenous peasants, while the 
two latter smallholdings were Chinese-owned. The number of Chinese smallholders 
mushroomed after November 1923 following the promulgation of new land terms, 
which offered land rent-free for the first six years, if cultivated within six months of 
occupation.46 Chinese ex-coolies (mostly Cantonese and Hakkas) and migrant settlers 
(Hakkas) secured lands which developed into smallholdings.47
Rubber became an ideal crop for smallholders because it could thrive under 
various conditions, even if slightly neglected after planting. Furthermore, upon maturity, 
a tapping schedule could be adjusted flexibly, to suit the demands of other activities. It 
also needed simple and cheap equipment for its production and processing.48 The 
relative efficiency of rubber smallholdings could also be seen in the utilisation of labour. 
The smaller smallholdings usually used either family members as labourers, or
4? Mann. Report on North Borneo Rubber, p. 1.
4<’ Tregonning, A History o f Modern Sabah, p. 150.
47 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1931). Labour in North Borneo.
48 Colin Barlow. The Natural Rubber Planting Industry: Its Development, Technology, and Economy in 
Malaysia. Oxford and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 1978. pp. 39-40.
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occasionally assistance from outside workers on a share-cropped and profit-sharing 
basis.49 The medium sized smallholding of 25 acres employed paid labour, or engaged 
tappers to tap on a share basis. Larger holders of more than 25 acres normally tapped 
with the aid of outside labour, either on a share basis, or on piece rates, where a 
labourer was paid based on the amount of rubber brought in.50 Even when 
smallholdings employed outside labour, their dependence on it was appreciably less 
than that of large estates. Additionally, not only did they not have to face expensive 
overheads compared to their larger counterparts, the discipline in smallholdings too, 
was less rigorous compared to estates, thus making it more attractive to estate 
deserters.51
Additionally, in his study on rubber production in Malaya, Bauer has shown that 
the decrease in estates' output was not only the direct consequence of imposed 
restriction, but was also due to the low level of bark reserves on the estates. He argues 
that output on big estates was compromised because of soil erosion, which severely 
affected the bark renewal process. Erosion was caused by clean weeding, excessive 
silt pitting and other mistaken methods of cultivation, and from the depletion of the 
stand. On the contrary, smallholdings produced higher yields at all times, because bark 
reserves were plentiful. Trees were planted closer together, and there was better 
erosion control because smallholdings were rarely clean-weeded, thereby restoring 
their top soil. The dense cover had improved the soil’s water retention, and helped 
maintain a low temperature. Combined with high humidity near the ground, this created 
ideal conditions for bark renewal.52
49 SSA: Despatches (Gov., to President, 1931). Labour Conditions. No. 1361/30. 24 January 1931.
50 Mann. Report on North Borneo Rubber, p. 1; Bauer. The Rubber Industry, p. 4
51 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1931). Labour Conditions. No. 1361/30. 24 January 1931.
52 Bauer. The Rubber Industry, pp. 58-59; Alec Gordon. ‘Contract Labour in Rubber Plantations: Impact 
o f  Smallholders in Colonial South-East Asia. Economic and Political Weekly. 36,10 (March 10-16, 2001). 
p. 858.
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Despite being described as the ‘Consols of the East’,53 the planting of coconut 
on a plantation scale was sidelined by European companies, owing to the greater 
attractiveness of rubber. Compared to rubber with its quick profits, the drawback in 
coconut planting was the ten-year period one had to wait for a substantial return. 
Enthusiasts in British North Borneo had nonetheless predicted that in the long term, 
coconuts would be a better investment of the two, due to the fact that vegetable oil 
would inevitably become one of the world’s prime necessities. Copra, the meat of the 
coconut, from which vegetable oil was extracted, would play its part as one of the 
principal sources of supply.54
Hence, by taking advantage of the low price of land, and the suitability of the 
territory in terms of soil, situation, and climatic conditions necessary for the cultivation 
of the crop, some European companies and smallholders began to plant coconut on a 
larger scale.55 Coconut plantations were opened in Tawau and Lahad Datu on the east 
coast, and in Kudat in the north. On the latter, coconuts were extensively cultivated on 
an annual basis by Chinese smallholders. By 1914, some 11,700 acres of land were 
under coconut cultivation, and exports of copra were reported to be 982 tons, valued at 
£17,630. As predicted by the enthusiasts, the importance of, and demand for coconut 
oil gained momentum after the end of World War One. Due to a shortage of fat, butter 
substitutes and animal fats were used, but these were in short supply. What followed 
was a substantial rise in coconut prices, and the owners of coconut estates began to 
reap rich harvest. The acreage increased to approximately 25,000 acres in 1919, and 
by the end of 1933, a total of 53,706 acres was planted with coconuts, reaping 9,464 
tons of export copra, valued at £40,556.56
53 H. Hamel Smith and F.A.G. Pape. Coco-nuts: The Consols o f the East. London: ‘ Tropical L ife ’ 
Publishing Dept. 1912.
54 Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo. 1921. p.76
55 Smith and Pape. Coco-nuts. p. 464
56 Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo. 1934. p. 70.
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Apart from tobacco, rubber and coconut, other crops such as, manila hemp 
were also cultivated for export. Manila hemp (the chief fibre in the manufacture of 
cordage), was extensively cultivated in Tawau by Japanese-owned companies, namely 
the Kubota and Kuhara estates.57 Following a glowing assessment in 1924 on the 
quality of hemp produced in Tawau by the Bureau of Plant Industry in Washington, 
many smallholders of the same locality began to plant this product.58 Additionally, crops 
such as, rice, cotton, sago, coffee, gambier, pepper and tapioca were cultivated, but 
this was mostly undertaken by smallholders.
The development and growth of plantation agriculture in British North Borneo 
had thus brought about a profound impact on the economic development of the 
territory. The expansion of plantations for the planting of rubber, tobacco, coconut, 
manila hemp, and other crops into previously uncharted areas ensured a steady 
demand for new workers. However, one obvious challenge for plantation agriculture to 
succeed was the availability of labour. This problem constantly confronted planters in 
British North Borneo for decades.
Labour Problems in British North Borneo
The problem of adequate supply of labour has always been a major concern of 
colonists and planters everywhere. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, in most plantation economies in the Americas and the Caribbean islands, 
labour was supplied by African chattel slaves. After the abolition of slavery in the 
1830s, some freed African slaves continued to work on plantations under paid wages, 
but the majority of them rejected gang-labour, and began new lives as smallholders. 
Consequently, ‘free’ labour from Asia was brought in, to work under indenture contract, 
and to fill in the labour vacuum left by freed African slaves.
57 Mohd. Shafie Abdul Karim. Jepun di Borneo Utara: Migrasi dan Kegiatan Ekonomi 1884-1941. Kota 
Kinabalu: Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sabah. 2007. pp. 107 and 119.
58 Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo. 1929. p. 57.
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In the context of British North Borneo, there was no history of slaves on 
European plantations. Instead, slavery was a typical Brunei and Sulu tradition. Prior to 
1881, large-scale slave-raiding was rampant, particularly in the coastal areas of the 
west and east. Natives were captured by pirates, and later sold as slaves in Brunei and 
Sulu. In contrast to coastal areas, there were very few slaves in the interior. The interior 
natives were mostly pagans, and they were either too poor, or too normadic to retain 
slaves.59 Amarjit Kaur contends that slaves in British North Borneo performed at least 
three main types of duty. Firstly, they rendered services to and for their masters, such 
as, participation in expeditions, inclusion in entourages, household and domestic 
service, looking after children and granting of sexual favours. Secondly, they worked on 
the agricultural gardens, and collected bird’s nests, jungle produce and tripang (sea 
cucumber), for their masters. Lastly, they were used as income earners for their 
owners by working for others.60 Other than labour, slaves were also used for other 
purposes. In the interior, in particular, a slave was handed over to the enemy, and his 
death would even the score of a feud. The Murut people acquired slaves periodically 
for sacrificial purposes, to communicate with dead relatives or friends. Finally slaves 
were used to satisfy another custom; no woman would accept a man as her partner 
unless he showed a skull as a sign of his manliness.61
During the early years, free labour was almost unknown. W.B. Pryer, pioneer 
and founder of Sandakan discovered the most impoverished of free men offered to 
work for him, only if he would buy them, it was considered more degrading to labour for 
wages than to be a slave.62 Nevertheless, slavery as a whole was abolished outright 
from British North Borneo by 1903.63 Its gradual abolition was legislated in 1881 and
59 See, J.F. Warren. The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898: The Dynamics o f  External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in 
the Transformation o f a South-east Asian Maritime State. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 1981.
60 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change, p. 94.
51 G.C. Woolley. The Timoguns: A Murut Tribe o f  the Interior, North Borneo. Jesselton: Native Affairs 
Bulletin, 1, Government Printer. 1962. pp. 27 and 31; J.F. Warren. Sulu Zone. p. 199; Tregonning. A 
History o f  Modern Sabah, p. 189.
62 PRO: C0874/229. Pryer to Treacher. 5 October 1881; Treacher to Chairman BNBC. 8 February 1882.
63 SO AS: MS 283792. Private papers o f  E. Gueritz. Ordinance X V II o f  1902, in The Ordinances o f the 
State o f  North Borneo.
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1883 by W.B. Treacher, the first Governor of the Chartered Company. It took over 
twenty years to eliminate the institution of slavery, because it was hampered by the 
continuing demand for slaves, both in the Sulu archipelago and Brunei. Furthermore, 
since it was a long-standing tradition, and permitted by religion, especially along the 
coasts, eradicating slavery was a delicate process, and had to be tackled gradually and 
carefully. Any rushed policies to force its immediate abolition would have led to large 
scale opposition, and might have proved disastrous to the Company administration.64
If economic slavery, as described above, existed in the territory, why was it 
difficult to use ex-slaves as labourers for estate plantations? It seems that instead of 
increasing the labour available in the free market, the abolition of slavery in British 
North Borneo had removed the only known source of labour available to the economy. 
The situation was, in fact, typical of the labour crisis when slavery was abolished in the 
West. Due to the psychological and sociological effects of the institution of slavery, the 
majority of the ex-slaves in the West rejected the plantations to escape the memory of 
the brutality of slavery. Arguably, the desire for autonomy and greater control over 
one’s own destiny, and the opportunity to become peasant producers or smallholders, 
became a motivational factor for ex-slaves to reject plantation labour.85 The same could 
be said of the ex-slaves in British North Borneo.
Likewise, the rest of the British North Borneo population could not provide the 
cheap labour force essential to the development of plantation agriculture in the territory. 
Although extensive in area, the territory was sparsely populated, and relatively 
speaking, too meagre to supply the labour force, as compared to the rapid 
development in its economy. Official censuses taken on the population since 1891
64 Ranjit Singh. The Making o f  Sabah, p. 149.
65 Walton Look Lai. Indentured Labour, Caribbean Sugar. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 1993. p. 4.
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have revealed that the indigenous people remained the largest element.66 Yet, the 
relatively high proportion of native population does not correlate with the statistical data 
on indigenous labour, working on plantations. The mushrooming of rubber 
smallholdings had made indigenous labour less available to European plantations. The 
1921 census gave the government the first accurate number of the people it 
administered. Of a total population of 257,344, the indigenous people numbered 
203,041. The Chinese, mainly Hakkas and Cantonese, numbered 37,642, while the 
natives of the Netherlands East Indies presented the total of 11,223 (See Table 2.4).67
Table 2.4
Population of British North Borneo, 1891-1931
Race Year
1891 1901 1911 1921 1931
European 245 195 355 415 340
Eurasian 54 40 57 210 236
Chinese 7,156 12,282 26,002 37,642 47,799
Japanese 129 149 246 441 450
Natives of India 
and Ceylon
319 442 902 1,185 1,298
Natives of NEI 
(Javanese)
2,232 3,960 5,511 11,223 9,854
Philippine
Islanders
74 291 449 2,849
Malays 1,488 1,138 1,612 1,837 953
Natives of 
Borneo
59,049 81,044 172,584 203,041 205,218
Total 67,062 104,257 208,183 257,344 270,223
* The first census was conducted in 1891, followed by the 1901 census, but both were 
incomplete because the Company was still trying to establish a systematic government, and 
large areas of the interior had yet to be brought under effective administration. The 1911 
census may be considered as the first reliable population count, although there were 
incomplete returns for the Pensiangan district.
Sources: PRO: C0874/646. Census 1910-1929; HCPP: Cmd. 4393. Statistical Abstract for 
the several British Overseas Dominions and Protectorates, p. 19’; PRO: C0874/647. 
Census 1929-1940; D R. Maxwell. State of North Borneo: Census Report. 24 April 1921. 
pp. 1-65; A.N.M. Garry. State of North Borneo: Report on the Census. 26 April 1931. 
London: Circa 1932; Sullivan and Regis. ‘Demography’, p. 561; Ranjit Singh. The Making of 
Sabah, p. 27.
Table 2.5 depicts the total number of labourers in British North Borneo based 
on ethnicity, from the years 1915 to 1933. During the earlier period of economic
66 See, J. H. Walker ‘Census o f British North Borneo and Labuan 1891’ . British North Borneo Official
Gazette (BNBOG). 1 February 1892. pp. 19-35; ‘Census o f British North Borneo 1901’ , Supplement, 
BNBOG. 5 October 1901; D.R. Maxwell. State o f North Borneo: Census Report. 24 April 1921. 
Jesselton: Government Printer, c l922. p. 2.
1,7 PRO: C0874/647. Points from Mr. Garry's Report on the North Borneo Census. 26 April 1931.
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expansion, the utilisation of indigenous labour was minimal, but their numbers 
increased throughout the years due to significant changes in the world economy, which 
severely hampered the importation of overseas labour. From the early days of the 
Com pany’s advent, they were employed on task contracts to clear jungle and to 
construct bridle paths.68 The shortage of indigenous labour during the earlier period 
was compensated by the arrival of alien labour from China and Java.
Table 2.5
Total of Labourers Based on Ethnicity, 1915-1933.
Year Ethnic Total
Chinese Javanese Natives
1915 7,814 4,925 2,774 15,513
1917 10,703 5,278 4,959 20,940
1919 10,230 5,925 5,350 21,505
1921 7,145 6,056 3,339 16,540
1923 7,184 5,276 3,719 16,179
1925 5,470 6,062 4,085 17,630
1927 7,311 8,714 4,376 20,401
1929 6,839 7,846 4,349 18,534
1931 4,714 3,127 2,435 10,276
1933 3,368 1,982 3,345 8,695
Source: PRO: C0648/7-15 Annual Report, State of North Borneo, 1914-1933
By the time rubber began to supplant tobacco around 1908, European planters 
found it essential to employ the natives and import Javanese labour because hiring the 
Chinese became increasingly costly, and they preferred working on Chinese estates 69 
Initially local labour came from the surrounding villages on the west coast, where most 
of the rubber estates were concentrated. Soon after, a long drought resulting in bad 
harvest in the interior districts of Tambunan and Keningau drove out young men to the 
estates on the west coast.70 A major attraction was the pull of advance money and high 
wages paid by the estates.71 The number of natives employed in the rubber industry 
increased significantly due to the outbreak of the First World War, when estates found 
it cheaper to employ local labour, in contrast to expensive foreign labour which was 
more difficult to obtain during war conditions.
08 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932.
60 PRO: C0648/1. AR. Immigration and Protectorate Department 1908, by W.H. Penney.
70 PRO: C0648/4. AR. Agriculture 1911, by W.H. Penney, Acting Commissioner o f  Lands.
71 PRO: C0648/2. AR. Agriculture 1909, by A.C. Pearson, Acting Commissioner o f  Lands.
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However, the Company government’s policy pertaining to indigenous labour 
was ambiguous. The Company administrators, on the one hand, were reluctant to allow 
the mobilisation of the indigenous people for estate employment. They contended that 
the indigenous peoples were to be ‘undisturbed in their traditional economic pursuits 
and social organisation, while the brunt of economic modernisation should be borne by 
imported labour’.72 On the other hand, the Company government had no qualms relying 
on indigenous groups to provide unpaid labour services on government projects, 
particularly in the construction of bridle paths and railroads.73
Government’s opposition to native labour recruitment was based on several 
reasons. First and foremost, the bulk of the new native labour came from the interior 
rice growing districts of Tambunan and Keningau. This was a major cause for concern. 
As they were the granaries of the interior, the government wished to prevent further 
disruption to rice cultivation.74 Secondly, the exodus of young men to work on rubber 
estates on the west coast reduced the available labour for government construction 
projects (such as bridle paths), thus seriously affecting the improvement in 
communications. Furthermore, this allegedly contributed to the low birth-rate among 
natives in the interior.75 Thirdly, there were widespread complaints from village 
headmen that men were leaving their kampongs to work on the estates, and that these 
migrants made no provision for wives and families left behind. This had been a 
continuous problem facing the Company government.76 Fourthly, large-scale migration 
reduced the authority, and thus, the taxation potential, of chiefs and headmen.77
72 Black. A Gambling Style o f  Government, p. 116.
73 Am arjit Kaur, Economic Change, pp. 104-105.
74 SSA: Despatches (Court to Gov., 1918). Assistant Secretary BNBC to Governor Pearson. 15 August 
1918.
SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Bunbury to Government Secretary. 4 June 1918, 
enclosure, Pearson to Chairman, 19 June 1918.
76 PRO: C0874/249. Governor Creagh to Sir Rutherford Alcock. 9 A pril 1890; PRO: C0874/249. 
Governor Creagh to Alcock, 26/7/90; SSA: N BC A 497. Extract from letter no.34, 36, 16, from Resident 
o f  the West Coast. April 1936.
77 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Extract from letter from the D istrict O fficer o f  Tambunan, 
D.R. Maxwell.
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Bearing all these factors in mind, the recruitment of natives was discouraged 
and permitted only under licence.78 The Court of Directors, in 1922, also instructed the 
state government to introduce measures to recall interior natives back to their villages. 
Estates, too, were notified to assist the government in discharging as many native 
workers as possible, and to reduce the monetary advances made to new recruits to 
$5.79 Opposition from the planting community which was taken up in 1923 by the North 
Borneo Chamber of Commerce (NBCC), West Coast branch, saw the government 
reaching a compromise in 1924. The government issued regulations that only monthly 
contracts were to be offered to workers, and every worker was also expected to return 
to his village for a minimum duration of three months annually.80
Even with these ‘carrot and stick’ policies, indigenous labour, generally, was 
difficult to obtain. The native population was still scanty and inaccessible, and the rate 
of increase of the native population as a whole was very small. For example, from the 
years 1922 to 1931, there was only an increase of 4.6% for the Kadazandusun and 
3.2% for the Bajaus; whereas the Muruts and Sulus suffered a 19.5% and 4.8% 
decrease respectively. For the rest of the population, there was an increase of only 
1.1%. Also, some natives, especially the Kadazandusun and Muruts, were peasant 
proprietors and did not readily let their labour out for hire. They would not desert their 
villages, disturb the life of the villages, or endanger native agriculture. Very few were 
available to work as labourers. Those who did become labourers were keener to work 
for smallholders since the discipline on smallholders was not as rigorous, and the 
labourers enjoyed the popular basis of payment known as ‘bagi dua’. In other words, 
they were share-croppers.81
78 SSA: N BC A 1201. Employment o f Natives by Estates.
79 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1923). The Protector o f Labour to the Government Secretary. 31 
July 1923, p.3. enclosure in Governor to President, 26 September 1923.
80 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). Governor to President. 11 A pril 1924, and enclosures. 
Government’ s despatch 272/1924, pp. 1-3.
81 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932, to advise on certain matters 
relating to labour.
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By sharecropping, the natives could benefit from larger harvest when times 
were good. The potential of working for their own personal benefit proved more 
attractive, and they had an incentive to work harder. Since they could not share-crop 
on European plantations, plantation labour remained unattractive to the indigenous 
population. At the other end of the scale, European plantations rejected sharecropping 
because they could not benefit from economies of scale if the land was divided into 
many individual croppers. Sharecropping was thus looked upon as economically 
inefficient compared to gang agriculture on European plantations. Moreover, European 
plantations rejected it because they perceived sharecropping as ‘backward’ and 
‘regressive’. At the same time, it weakened their control of labour, threatened their 
economic security, and promoted a sense of partnership which was still unacceptable 
during colonial times.82 Hence, the European-owned plantations found it hard to accept 
economy of this kind because the mentality of being the more superior race than the 
natives still prevailed.
Most employers had the perception that the quality of indigenous labour did not 
reach the standard required by employers in certain industry. Employers of indigenous 
labour were aware that twice a year, at the time of planting and harvesting, one third, or 
half of their indigenous native force would give notice to return to their villages. From 
the perspective of employers, such an exodus of labour was detrimental to the smooth 
working of an estate. As late as 1930, despite government encouragement, some 
employers were still reluctant to employ native labourers due to their excessive samsu 
(alcohol) drinking. One manager complained, ‘after a recent harvest, it was difficult to 
find a sober man among them for weeks at a time’.83 To the native people, estates 
were looked upon as places, at which they could, by a short spell of work, conveniently
82 Ian Ochiltree. ‘Mastering the Sharecroppers: Land, Labour and the Search fo r Independence in the US 
South and South A frica ’ . Journal o f  Southern African Studies. 30,1 (March 2004). p. 42.
83 SSA: N BC A 1201. Problems Employing Native Labourers.
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acquire a few surplus dollars to pay their taxes, or to meet some immediate 
requirements. The transient nature of such labour militated against its usefulness.84
Efforts to Obtain ‘Outside’ Labour
The obstacles faced in acquiring local labour prompted the Company to analyse its 
labour policies. With the majority of British colonies and protectorates importing 
indentured labours to fill in labour vacuums, British North Borneo hoped to emulate a 
similar policy for its plantations. The inefficiency of the plantation industry needed the 
support of the colonial state. The Company government knew it had to become 
involved in the recruitment of labour, to ensure the success of plantation agriculture.
In 1882, Governor William Treacher adopted the legislation of the Straits 
Settlements regarding labour contracts for the territory. This was followed by the 
adoption of the Estate Coolies and Labourers Protection Proclamation of 1883.85 The 
regulation was similar to that of the Straits Settlements Labour Ordinance in regards to 
the aspects of working conditions and the protection of labour on the estates. It gave 
power to the Governor to appoint a Protector of Labour, and furthermore, made 
provision for examining newly introduced estate labourers at the port of entry. This 
legislation was meant to satisfy British colonial administrators in Asia and other colonial 
authorities, through whose guidance the Company hoped to import labour. In Malaya, 
the ordinance had the effect of bringing over thousands of Tamil migrants, and the 
Company believed that it could do likewise for British North Borneo.
With tobacco taking its place as the bastion of the state’s economy, the 
government wrote to Madras in February 1884 to request permission to recruit in India, 
under the same terms and conditions as those applying to Indian coolie immigration 
into the Straits Settlements and the Protected Native States of the Malay Peninsula.
84 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932.
85 Tregonning. A History o f Modern Sabah, p. 104.
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The Company provided six reasons to justify its application. Most significantly, it 
claimed that planters and capitalists should be able to procure suitable labour at fair 
rates to develop the territory. Secondly, the superiority of Indian labourers for sugar 
and other planting, and road making, was proven after the success of the experiments 
with Indian labourers in Province Wellesley and Singapore. The Company also clarified 
that the BNBC had been incorporated by the Royal Charter, and the policies 
undertaken, and yet to be implemented by the Company, were subject to the approval 
of Her Majesty’s Government. To convince the Indian government of British North 
Borneo’s credibility and suitability as an importer of Indian labour, the Company 
updated the Indian government on the territory’s legal apparatus, particularly the 
establishment of regular courts of law throughout the territory, the adoption of the 
Indian Penal Code, and the codification of existing customs of the natives. A copy of 
the labour ordinance promulgated in the territory in 1883 was also attached, to 
strengthen the Company’s application. The BNBC assured its Indian counterpart of its 
willingness to make modifications to the laws should the need arise to meet the 
requirements of the Indian Government.86
As the labour ordinance of 1883 was identical to that of the Straits Settlements’, 
and as the Indian government was satisfied with the information pertaining to the 
constitution of the Chartered Company,87 the Indian government sanctioned the 
emigration of Indian indentured labourers from the Port of Negapatam in British India, 
to British North Borneo and Labuan, in 1891.88 An Indian Immigration Proclamation 
was published the same year, and J. Hamilton-Hunter was named the Indian 
Immigration Agent. The Government of Madras had gone further, by approving the 
appointment of an officer without medical qualifications, on the understanding that the 
government of British North Borneo would arrange for annual or biennial inspections of
86IOR: IOR/L/PJ/6/118, File 307. Chairman Alcock to Earl Kimberly. 13 February 1884.
87 101: 10R/L/PJ/6/212, File 1759. Emigration to British North Borneo. Letter from Foreign Office. 28 
September 1887.
88 IOR: IOR/L/PJ/6/303. File 1298. E.C. Buck, Secretary to the Government o f  India, to Colonial 
Secretary. 19 June 1891.
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the estates employing Indian labour, and arrange for a report on their condition by a 
competent medical officer.89 The ambitious plan, although approved by the Indian 
government, never materialised. The permit to recruit expired soon after this. Further 
negotiations and attempts in 1913 and 1926 by the Company government to secure 
Southern Indian labour, under the kangany system resulted in identical failure.90 Under 
the system, a kangany or an Indian agent would be send to his village to recruit labour 
for respective estates, it was alleged that the Tamil labourers preferred to go to 
Malaya, which was 'more developed1, connected by regular shipping lines, and not a 
‘far-flung outpost’.91 However, it appears that certain estates in the territory successfully 
obtained Tamil labourers on their own initiative. In 1912, the Bukau Estate procured 25 
Tamil men, women and children to work on the rubber estate. Although the estate 
manager claimed that they were obtained from Madras, there were also rumours that 
the group was crimped from Malaya, Brunei or Labuan.92 There was no further proof to 
substantiate the original place of embarkation for these Indian migrants, but it is 
sufficient to mention that there were indeed a small number of Indian labourers working 
on British North Borneo plantations.
Concurrently, the Company government was looking towards China to provide 
a source of labour and settlers for its under-populated territory. The Chinese were 
labelled as an ‘industrious’ race, and since there was ‘room for half-a-million Chinese 
... without crowding out the natives’, a rapid and large flow of immigrants was seen as 
the best means of quickly supplying cheap labour and generating surplus revenue.93 A 
Commissioner for Chinese Immigration, Sir Walter Medhurst, appointed by the Court of 
Directors in London, was dispatched to the East in 1882 to put into place a system of
89 IOR: lOR/L/PJ/6/321, File 829. Buck to Acting Secretary to Government, Sandakan. 26 A pril 1892; 
See, Emigration to British North; appointment o f  an Indian Immigration Agent.
90 PRO: C0531/5. Secretary BNBC to Under Secretary o f State, CO. 3 January 1913; Secretary BNBC to 
Under Secretary o f State, CO. 26 May 1913.
91 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change, p. 104; Tregonning. A Histoiy o f Modern Sabah, p. 134.
92 PRO: C0874/475. F.W. Fraser to Sir West Ridgeway. 20 July 1912; Memorandum on Importation o f 
Coolies from Singapore, by F.R. Ellis. 3 July 1912.
93 Report o f  the First Half-Yearly Meeting o f  the BNBC. 27 June 1883. pp. 3-7, c.f. Ranjit Singh. The 
Making o f Sabah, p. 150.
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Chinese migration of labourers and agriculturalists for the new territory, and to lure 
Chinese investors.94 He offered free passages to British North Borneo for those willing 
to settle in the territory. Medhurst’s ‘scheme’ of recruiting immigrants from China was 
combined, at least in part, with the activities of the Basel Mission Church (through the 
agency of Rev. Lechler), which then assisted the persecuted Protestant Christian 
Hakkas to emigrate from their country.95 Measures undertaken by the administration 
and private enterprises to attract immigration from China proved to be instrumental in 
their attempt to populate and secure labour for the plantations, or to meet their specific 
needs. The various immigration schemes introduced over the years saw the rapid 
growth of the Chinese population from seven thousand in 1891 to over fifty thousand in 
1931.96
The tobacco industry remained the main employer of Chinese coolies. During 
the tobacco boom from 1888 to 1890, British North Borneo was a formidable rival of 
Deli, Sumatra in producing tobacco wrapper leaves for cigars in Southeast Asia. This 
gave rise to the need for a bigger labour force within the territory. On the estates, 
imported Chinese labourers outnumbered non-Chinese by approximately two to one. 
The origins of the non-Chinese are not clear. In 1891, 7,329 labourers were listed as 
Chinese, 4,010 as ‘Malay’, and 270 as ‘other’.97 The death rate among the Chinese 
coolies was very high, since they had difficulty in adjusting to the pioneering conditions 
and harsh treatment.98 In 1905, tales of flogging and high mortality rates among 
Chinese coolies in the territory’s tobacco estates were raised in the British Parliament. 
The well-publicised tales of the ill-treatment of labour earned the territory a bad
94 PRO: C0874/231. Treacher to Sir Walter Medhurst, Commissioner o f Immigration, Hong Kong, 23 
July 1882, enclosures; Treacher to Alcock, 27 July 1882.
95 R. Dumartheray. ‘Message for the Centennial Celebration from the Basel M ission’ . The Basel Christian 
Church o f  Malaysia, Centenary Magazine, 1881-1982. Hong Kong: Tat To Printing Company. 1983. p. 1. 
For a detailed information on the Hakkas and the involvement o f  Christian missionaries in China, see, 
Jesse Gregory Lutz and Rolland Ray Lutz. Hakka Chinese Confront Protestant Christianity, 1850-1900. 
M.E. Sharpe. 1998.
96 Walker. ‘Census’ . BNBOG. 1 February 1892. pp. 19-34; Ranjit Singh. The Making o f  Sabah, p. 150.
97 PRO: C0874/252. Labour Returns for H a lf Year Ending Dec 31, 1891. p. 809.
98 PRO: CO874/250. Governor Creagh to Sir Rutherford Alcock, Chairman o f  BNBC. 18 October 1890; 
PRO: C0874/248. List o f  desertions from estates during the first ha lf o f  the year 1889. 9 October 1889; 
BNBH. 1 February 1889. p. 46.
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reputation among the Chinese in Singapore, Hong Kong, and China. Many Chinese 
were reluctant to leave for British North Borneo after hearing about the sordid life in 
that destination."
Conditions greatly improved in British North Borneo after the amendment of its 
labour regulations in 1908. In 1911, Chairman Sir West Ridgeway appointed W.S. 
Young Riddell as Chinese Immigration Commissioner, and ordered him to proceed to 
Hong Kong, to organise a system of labour immigration. The system for which he 
negotiated lasted only a short while and private enterprises again took the lead in 
importing, through the services of their Hong Kong agents. From time to time, the 
Government instituted schemes to bring Chinese families to the land. Examples of this 
were in 1913, when the North Chinese settlement at Jesselton was established, and in 
1920 when the free passage scheme for friends and relatives of Chinese already 
settled in the country began. These schemes, however, were associated with land 
settlement, rather than with labour immigration for employers.100
Attempts to employ NEI labourers were also initiated in the late nineteenth 
century. For centuries, the natives of the NEI, particularly from Java and its surrounding 
islands, were a part of the migratory movement in the Malay Archipelago, which did not 
recognise political boundaries in a straitjacketed sense, as a special barrier to 
settlement, whether temporary or permanent. Reputed as the ‘Liverpool of the East’, 
and serving as the clearing house of Asia, Singapore was tapped for its supply of these 
labourers.101 Since three-quarters of NEI immigrants in Singapore from the nineteenth 
century onwards were of the Javanese linguistic group of Central and East Java, it 
could be the case that the remaining minority of Sundanese (of West Java), Banjarese 
(of Kalimantan), and Madurese and Baweanese (of Madura and Bawean islands) were
99 PRO: FO l 2/129. Assistant Secretary to Under Secretary o f State for Foreign Office. 9 August 1905.
100 PRO: CO874/1061 Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932.
101 The Malay Mail. 8 February 1904. p. 3.
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categorically lumped together as ‘Javanese’, simply to place a convenient label to 
them.
The first 70 ‘Javanese’ labourers traced in British North Borneo, in 1882, were 
recruited by W.H. Read, the Company agent in Singapore, and shipped to the 
experimental agricultural centre in Silam, Lahad Datu.102 During the tobacco boom 
period a few batches of Javanese were recruited privately, to work at the tobacco 
estates. In 1887, upon arrival from Singapore, 33 Javanese boarded the S.S. Royalist 
from Sandakan to Lahad Datu, and were placed at a tobacco estate.103 Meanwhile, J.P. 
Netscher of Tamimisan, Teluk Marudu, obtained 80 Javanese labourers to begin 
operation at his estate, while New Darvel Bay (Borneo) Tobacco Plantation Ltd, the 
biggest tobacco estate in the territory, had 275 Javanese labourers in 1895.104
Up to the 1930s, Singapore became a coolie market for ventures in British 
North Borneo, Sarawak, the Riau archipelagos, and Malaya.105 The Labour Association 
of Singapore, a European recruiting agency, privately recruited Javanese laukehs or 
old hands for employers, many of whom were ex-indentured labourers of Malayan 
plantations who had rejected the offer of repatriation, or were deserters.106 Additionally, 
it has been argued that professional middle men, known as ‘labour sheiks’, had 
clandestinely diverted Javanese labour, recruited for Dutch plantations in Sumatra, to 
the estates in British North Borneo.107 These recruits embarked on Chinese vessels at 
Belawan (Deli) and headed towards Singapore, where they would be distributed among 
those desperately seeking labour.108 Those Javanese coolies recruited illegally would,
102 Tregonning. A History o f  M odem Sabah,, p. 142.
103 SSA: BNBH. 1887. p. 185
104 SSA: BNBH. 1888. October, p. 259
105 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. E lfde Verslag ban de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten. 1926. 
Weltevreden: G. K o lf f  &  Co. 1927. p. 17.
106 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from A.C. Pearson’s Report on Labour in the Federated Malay States. 27 
October 1913. See chapter four for further information on the Labour Association.
107 Ernst Spaan. ‘Taikongs and Calos: The Role o f Middlemen and Brokers in Javanese International 
M igration’ . International Migration Review. 28,1 (Spring 1994). p. 95.
i°8 j£antoor y an Arbeid. Elfde Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten. 1926. 
Weltevreden: G. K o lf f  &  Co. 1927. p. 17.
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after arrival in Singapore, be traded on the pasar orang for 70-90 Straits dollars.109 
Likewise, former pilgrims to Mecca also found their way to British North Borneo 
estates. Debt-ridden pilgrims who utilised the services of pilgrim brokers or sheikhs, 
had to work as orang tebusan, or bonded labourers, to enable them to repay the 
travelling costs incurred by the agents.110 Meanwhile, efforts by the Company 
government to recruit Javanese labour from Java were initiated in the early 1890s. To 
provide a more balanced treatment to the thesis, this section will be explained further in 
the next chapter.
Apart from Tamil, Chinese and Javanese labour, efforts to secure Japanese 
labour started as early as 1893, when Governor Creagh corresponded with the Foreign 
Minister of Japan, Menemitsu Mutsu, following the failure to secure labour from India 
and Java.111 The Japanese government sanctioned agricultural immigration, and during 
the year, the Herald reported the arrival of several Japanese into the territory. 
However, they became more engaged in searching for camphor, and other 
occupations, than working on plantations.112 On 30 November 1894, representatives of 
the Southern Emigration Association (SEA) led by M. Inoue, arrived in Sandakan with a 
small group of settlers. After that, a small trickle of Japanese, predominantly women, 
continued to migrate, benefiting the brothels of Sandakan.113
The potential of British North Borneo to be a settlement colony and as an 
investment possibility augmented, following official Japanese visits to the territory in 
1909 and 1910. In 1913, planters pressed the Company government to introduce 
Japanese labourers, who were ‘diligent and clean’, and ‘whose wages were expected
109 Houben. “ Before Departure’ , p. 28.
110 Vredenbregt. ‘The Haddj: Some o f its Features and Functions in Indonesia.’ Bijdragen. 118,1 (1962). 
p. 128; Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Orang Jawa di Selangor. 1984. p. 74.
111 Details o f this correspondence can be found in PRO: CO874/703. Japanese Immigrants. Negotiation 
w ith the Dutch in Java w ill be explained in Chapter 3.
112 SSA\BNBH. 1893.
113 Tregonning. A History o f  Modern Sabah .p . 153.
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to be cheaper than those of Chinese or Javanese coolies’.114 To the displeasure of the 
Foreign Office, Governor A.C. Pearson, on his own initiative, made an unofficial visit to 
Japan in 1914 and coaxed the Governor of the Nagasaki Prefecture to consider a 
scheme of assisted emigration (from whom labour could be derived) and Japanese 
agricultural venture into the territory.115 However, the agricultural colony scheme 
submitted by Toyo Imin Goshi Kaisha was shot down by the Court of Directors, even 
though the Company government had initially given its approval for such a scheme.116 
The Court and the British government were wary of the Japanese intentions, because 
the latter’s foreign policies had reflected a threatening attitude. It had defeated Russia 
in a military conflict in 1905, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a 
European power. It was on the verge of seizing German western Pacific islands (the 
Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls), and her maritime expansion southwards was 
hostile. The Foreign Office held that the Japanese should not be encouraged into the 
British protectorate.117 The policy was faithfully observed. No Japanese labourers were 
ever imported by any European plantations. Nevertheless, Japanese economic 
ventures expanded during the war period. The Kuhara Company took over Tawau 
Rubber Estate and acquired a sub-lease from the British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate 
for oil prospecting rights in 1916. By mid 1918, Kubota Estate (of the Mitsubishi group) 
and Bilit Estate (Borneo Shokusan Kabushi Kaisha) were established.118 These 
enterprises were, however, put to intense surveillance by the Director of Military 
Intelligence of the Foreign Office.119
By the late 1900s, the labour problem on plantations in British North Borneo 
remained critical, but economic ventures expanded with the development of rubber.
114 Hara Fujio. ‘Japanese Settlement Projects in Tawau and the Labour C onflic t’ . Borneo Review. 111,2 
(1992). p. 270.
115 PRO: C0531/6. Secretary BNBC to Under Secretary, C.O. 20 May 1914.; Sabihah Osman. ‘Japanese 
Economic Activities in Sabah from the 1890s to 1941’ . Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies. 29,1 (1998). 
pp. 24-43.
116 Mohd. Shafie Abd. Karim. Jepun di Borneo Utara. p. 63.
117 Tregonning. A Histoiy o f Modern Sabah, p. 153.
118 PRO: C0531/12. Pearson to Sir Arthur Young, Governor o f Straits Settlement. 5 February 1918; 
Japan’s potential threat and its foreign policies were discussed further in, PRO: C0531/13.
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The indigenous people, Chinese and some remaining Javanese, formed a skeletal 
force, working under verbal or written contracts. The labour problem was exacerbated 
with developments in the outside world. There was a loud outcry to abolish the system 
of indentured labour in the late nineteenth century. It was a system where thousands of 
Asians (Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and Javanese) and Pacific Islanders had been 
recruited under indenture to work on plantations and mines in the Americas and the 
Caribbean islands, for a stipulated period. The harsh working conditions, the gruesome 
punishments inflicted on labourers and the high mortality rates of indentured labourers 
on these plantations had brought about criticism of the system. Abolitionists denounced 
the system as a disguised form of slavery.120 Rising nationalism in India and China, 
with these countries expressing concerns over their subjects in overseas colonies, 
hastened the demise of the system in some colonies. Following the trend in many 
British colonies, in July 1914, Chinese indentured labour was abolished in the Straits 
Settlements and the FMS.121
This decision severely affected estates in British North Borneo, which all this 
while had depended heavily on Chinese indentured labourers from Singapore and 
Hong Kong. With the informal relationship that existed between the Colonial Office and 
the Chartered Company Board of Directors in London, the Company government 
accepted the new labour law pertaining to the abolition of Chinese indentured labour. 
Agents were allowed to recruit under the indenture contract in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, up to 30 June 1914. An extension for a period of twelve months was 
requested by the Company government, but this request was rejected by Sir John 
Anderson, Governor of the Straits Settlements.122 When the Colonial Office in Malaya 
abolished the Chinese indentured system of recruitment, British North Borneo halted all 
importations of Chinese indentured labourers from the British colony.
120 Suzanne Miers. Slavery in the Twentieth Century. 2003. p. 7; Tinker. A New System o f  Slavery. 1974.
121 PRO: C 0 5 3 1/5. Indentured Coolie Labour fo r North Borneo, p. 226.
122 PRO: C0531/5. Secretary BNBC to Under Secretary o f State, CO. 6 January 1913.
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The signing of indenture contracts was now forbidden in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, but this did not herald the end for British North Borneo planters. They could 
still fall back on the territory’s local contract. Under legislation passed in 1911 (and 
consolidated in Labour Ordinance 1916), all written contracts had to be signed when 
the labourers arrived in the territory. An exception could only be made by signing 
indenture contracts outside the territory, with the sanction of the British North Borneo 
Governor. To this, the British authorities in Singapore offered no objection because the 
signing of contracts in the territory would remove some of the abuses associated with 
the broker system. It meant that administration could exercise authority over payment 
and conditions from the very beginning.123 Therefore, individual estates could still 
import Chinese labourers from China and Hong Kong, or Javanese from Malaya, but 
these migrants were free to abstain from signing the contract once they reached British 
North Borneo, should they change their minds.
Yet, given this latitude, the labour situation in British North Borneo was still 
precarious, and the ‘locally1 recruited labour was not enough to supply all the 
requirements of the planting industry. Acute labour shortage persisted, and labour was 
hard to come by. Plantations everywhere in Southeast Asia were clamouring for 
labourers, and competition was stiff. The situation was exacerbated by conditions 
pertaining to Chinese indentured labour, and the limited availability of indigenous 
labour. Employers thus continued to look to other markets for the labour necessary to 
sustain and develop the economic profits of the plantations and other enterprises, and 
establish new areas of development. Urged by planters, the Company government 
turned to Java once again. The fact that the NEI government had yet to abolish the 
system of indentured labour in their colonies indicated a different perception of the 
system as compared to their British counterparts. In late 1913, after a new courtship 
with the NEI authorities for almost a year, British North Borneo finally secured 
Javanese labourers to fill the labour vacuum. Most importantly, the supply of Javanese
123 PRO: 00874/754. Memorandum Regarding Labour in North Borneo 1918.
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labourers was guaranteed, because they were Indentured under a special permit, 
sanctioned by the NEI authorities, and under the name of the Company government.
Conclusion
The attractive, liberal policies of the BNBC played an important role in the growth of 
plantation agriculture within the territory. The planting of rubber thrived, making British 
North Borneo one of the most important rubber producing areas of the time. 
Nevertheless, the rise in economic activity in the territory produced overwhelming 
demand for labour. The expansion of land, capital and technology affected the use of 
labour. As plantation agriculture took hold, the wage labour market expanded. Western 
interests did attempt to secure indigenous labour, but the restrictive policies of the 
government pertaining to the utilisation of indigenous labour, and the local people’s 
preference to sharecropping and working in smallholdings, rendered it necessary for 
plantations to seek outside labour. Various governments, such as India and Japan 
were approached relentlessly by the Company government to supply labourers from 
their areas, but without success. Chinese and Javanese labourers (partially from 
Singapore) formed the bulk of the labour force during the first decade of the twentieth 
century, but their dependence was severely hampered by conditions beyond the 
planters’ or the BNBC government’s control. The crisis relating to the abolition of 
Chinese indentured labour severely affected the labour supply needed to develop the 
plantation industry within the territory. Nevertheless, the Company government 
continued to search for labour supply for its planters. The words of Governor A.C. 
Pearson summarised the situation well: The  Government had adopted a paternal 
attitude to employers of labour, bringing labour to the very gates of their Estates and 
smoothing over every difficulty, ...[and] in the interests of the country, will continue to 
use its every endeavour to maintain their labour forces at the required strength’.124 In 
1913, the Company government was finally assured of a new supply of Javanese 
indentured labourers from Java, to be recruited under official permit.
124 PRO: C0874/744. Governor to Chairman. No. 494. 12 June 1917.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE IMMIGRATION OF JAVANESE INDENTURED LABOURERS TO BRITISH
NORTH BORNEO (1914-1932) 
Introduction
The imminent abolition of indentured labour in Malaya and other British colonies, and 
the dwindling supply of labour from these places, rendered it necessary for the 
Company government to look towards Java for its supply of labourers. The Javanese 
had been part of the migratory movement in the Malay Archipelago for centuries. 
Plantation and indentured labour were also not uncommon among the Javanese by the 
late nineteenth century. The Javanese immigration into British North Borneo was but a 
small fraction of a much larger global dispersal of Javanese labour in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century.1 This chapter attempts to analyse the organisation of the 
Javanese indentured labour system in British North Borneo, by looking at the extent to 
which the receiving and sending colonial governments were involved in the introduction 
and prolongation of the system, the issues inherent within the system, and the course 
of Javanese indentured labour immigration in British North Borneo.
Negotiation of the ‘Dutch Contract’
In 1890, realising that a constant source of labour was badly needed in order for 
agriculture to succeed in the territory, Governor C.V. Creagh approached Batavia 
officially for the first time for the procurement of Javanese labourers, under conditions 
similar to those obtained by Sumatra.2 In April that year, the Foreign Office in London 
also recommended Creagh’s application to Monsieur Harteen, the Netherlands Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, who promised to discuss the matter with his colleague, the Minister 
of the Colonies. Monsieur Harteen, however, warned the Company government that
1 V J . Houben. “ Menyang Tanah Sabrang’ : Javanese Coolie M igration in- and outside Indonesia, 1909- 
1940’ , c.f. Emmer and Shloniowitz. ‘M orta lity and the Javanese Diaspora’ . Itinerario. 21,1 (1997). p. 
125.
2 PRO: C0874/249. Governor Creagh to Chairman BNBC, Sir Rutherford Alcock. 4 July 1890,
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the Javanese, by nature, were reluctant to leave their homeland due to their 
attachment to it. Furthermore, being opium addicts, he considered them unsuitable as 
coolie labourers, and instead, their own government sought Indian labourers from 
British India for their West Indies colony, rather than depending on Javanese labour.3 
Both applications from Governor Creagh and the Foreign Office resulted in failure. The 
Dutch government was unprepared to allow the recruitment of Javanese for 
destinations outside the boundaries of the Netherlands East Indies (NEi), as stipulated 
in an 1887 law. Although the Governor-General could allow dispensation in exceptional 
cases, the alleged ill treatment of coolies (including Javanese) in British North Borneo, 
reported by the Dutch Consul in Singapore, halted any such decision. Furthermore, 
Deli and Java planters also lobbied against the Company’s case.4
The success of individual Malayan planters in recruiting labourers from Java 
(including Javanese and Madurese) in 1902 encouraged the Company to look towards 
Java yet again. The Superintendent of Immigration, Mr. Penny, noted in his Annual 
Report that it would be advantageous if the territory could arrange for a permanent 
supply of Javanese, which he considered to be as good, if not better than Chinese 
labourers for work on rubber estates.5 The Batavian government finally conceded in 
1907, after negotiations between the two parties in 1903 and 1906 respectively, to 
permit individual estate managers to recruit Javanese labourers over a three-year 
contract, in what was perceived to be an over-crowded Java. The granting of this 
permit was subject to the recommendation of the Dutch Consulate in Singapore.6
In July 1907, the British North Borneo Herald (henceforth BNBHJ newspaper 
reported the arrival of 200 Javanese coolies by s.s. Marudu en route to the tobacco
3 PRO: CO874/105. Foreign Office to Secretary BNBC. 12 A pril 1890.
4 PRO: C0874/249. Governor Creagh to Sir Rutherford Alcock. 4 July 1890.
3 SSA: F /l (3). Report o f the Forty-Ninth Half-Yearly Meeting o f the BNBC. 23 July 1907. p. 3.
6 ARA: Mailrapportan 2257/13. E. Moresco to W.D. Consul Generaal der Nederlanden te Singapore. 18 
November 1913.
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plantations at Darvel Bay.7 In the same month, the manager of the Manchester North 
Borneo Rubber, Ltd., arranged for the shipment to his estate of a considerable number 
of Javanese men, accompanied by their wives and children.8 Four months later, 
another batch of Javanese coolies consisting of 42 men and 42 women arrived by s.s. 
Darvel, to be divided amongst four estates, owned by New London Borneo Tobacco 
Company (NLBTCo).9 The supply of Javanese labourers came to a halt after the expiry 
of the existing contract in 1910. The Javanese were transient, returning home when 
their contract ended. By the end of 1909, the Official Gazette reported the numbers of 
Javanese and Malays recruited as 8,449, and the numbers returned home as 5,068.10 
The rest remained, and formed part of the skeletal labour force in the territory.
Plans to secure Javanese labourers from Java were rejuvenated following the 
alarm to halt the importation of Chinese indentured labour. The idea took shape after a 
visit was made to the island by the BNBC Chairman, Sir West Ridgeway, in 1912. By 
then, Javanese ‘singkeh' (freshly recruited labourer) was a ‘drug in the market’, and 
colonies, from far and near, were already experimenting with this so-called ‘drug’.11 
Apparently, the diagnosis was relatively good. The Javanese were recognised to be 
very suited to the work of clearing the jungle for settlement, new agricultural plantation 
schemes and other agricultural tasks. They were also identified as being ‘honest, 
industrious, and law abiding’, disciplined and careful workers, capable of multi-tasking, 
as experts in the use of axe and chopper, and dedicated to their tasks.12 However, high 
ranking administrators in British North Borneo were sceptical about the quality of 
Javanese labour. The myth of the lazy Javanese lingered in most colonial minds, and
7 SSA: BNBH. 1 July 1907, No. 13, Vol. X X V .
8 SSA: F /l (3). Report o f  the Forty-Ninth Half-Yearly Meeting o f  the BNBC. 23 July 1907. p. 3.
9 SSA: BNBH. 16 November 1907. No. 22. Vol. X X V .
10 SSA: JKM  8. B il. 44. British North Borneo O fficia l Gazette 1910. Vol. X X I.
11 PRO: C0874/552. Comment made by West Ridgeway on 24 January 1917 on the discussion held 
during the NBCC Committee Meeting. No. 84.
12 PRO: C0874/744. Governor to Governor General NEI. 17 June 1912; Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. 1992. 
Javanese Labour and the Development o f  Malaya. Kertas Kadangkala B il. 6. U KM . pp. 1-2.
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Governor J. Scott Mason was no exception.13 Observations made in Malaya convinced 
him that Javanese coolies recruited for Malayan plantations were mostly ‘scum’. If the 
territory was to obtain Javanese coolies, Mason proposed the utilisation of the laukeh 
system, whereby Javanese settlers in the territory handled the recruitments in their 
native homes, so that a ‘certain degree of quality’ would be assured. Mason’s 
reservations concerning Javanese coolies were obvious, in that he preferred Banjarese 
(of Southeast Kalimantan) coolies, and likened them to the hardworking Chinese. He 
predicted that the Banjarese would be more likely to settle down in British North Borneo 
than the Javanese, since they lived on the same island of Borneo.14 Other sceptics, 
though, preferred Chinese coolies because of their reputation as diligent workers, on 
top of the commercial returns they brought being opium consumers’.15 Furthermore, 
with an acute demand for Javanese labour in Sumatra, sceptics knew that the NEI 
government would not actively foster emigration to foreign territories, because of 
internal pressure. The Deli planters were already agitated against Javanese indentured 
coolies being allowed to foreign countries when they were badly needed in Sumatra.16
Despite these reservations, Sir West Ridgeway corresponded with Batavia 
officially, exploring the possibility of acquiring Javanese settlers and indentured 
labourers for British North Borneo. The Company was prepared to provide ‘assisted 
passages, grants of land and financial assistance’ to would-be migrants, as they had 
done with the Chinese immigrants, and guaranteed that they were under no 
compulsion to perform labour.17 This notion had to be emphasised, because the 
administration in Java prohibited the recruitment of labourers in Java to work outside of 
the East indies, in accordance with Article 1, of the 9 January 1887 Ordinance
13 For an interesting insight into the image o f natives and its function in the ideology o f  colonial 
capitalism in, see, Syed Hussein Alatas. The Myth o f  the Lazy Native. London: Frank Cass. 1977.
14 PRO: C0874/744. J.S. Mason to Sir J. West Ridgeway. 16 November 1912.
15 PRO: C0874/744. Extracts from Sir J. West Ridgeway, Chairman’s letter to Governor Parr. 17 April 
1913.
!6 PRO: C0874/744. Report on Trip to Java by M .M . Clark. 15 March -  15 May 1913.
17 PRO: C0874/744. M .M . Clark to Ag. Directeur Van Justitie, Batavia. 24 A p ril 1913.
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(Staatsblad No. 8).18 Only the Governor-General could grant dispensation in 
exceptional cases. Knowing that other governments, such as the French government 
and the government of Dutch Guiana (Surinam) were also trying to obtain Javanese 
labourers, the Company government hoped to use this information during the 
negotiation as a lever to gain the same concession granted to the Company 
government.19 Earlier on, the French government had the privilege of getting 
indentured Javanese in their name to New Caledonia, and the Dutch government sent 
thousands of Javanese to Surinam as indentured coolies on sugar plantations. The 
Company government maintained that its intention to recruit Javanese labourers was 
not so much for the benefit of certain ventures in the area, but ‘in the interest of culture 
and industry1 in the territory in general. Hence, the entire responsibility for the 
distribution and the decent treatment of ‘contract coolies’ over the various companies in 
the territory, lay with the Company government.20
In March 1913, M.M. Clark (the Superintendent of Customs) arrived in Java to 
negotiate with the Dutch authorities. Since British North Borneo intended to acquire 
settlers, as well as coolies, M.M. Clark had to pacify the Dutch authorities that the 
potential settlers could ‘please themselves as to what line they take up’. They were free 
to enter the labour market, and could even work as coolies at agricultural estates, 
provided that the Company government strictly reserved the right to act upon them 
should they find nothing that suited them, or they were not of the right class. In such a 
situation, rather than becoming a burden on the public or the state, the Company 
government would either provide work for the Javanese, or repatriate them to their own 
country. However, the Dutch authorities, represented by Sonneveld (Acting Director of 
Justice) and E.J. Van Lier (Inspector of Labour), perceived this differently, and were
18 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. Elfde Verslag van de Arbeidsinpectie voor de Biritengewesten 1926. . 
(Weltevreden: G. K o lf f&  Co). 1927. p. 17.
19 PRO: C0874/744. Report o f  M .M . Clark. 15 May 1913.
20 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Moresco, Gouvemement-Secretaries, to Directeur van Justitie.
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against the idea of British North Borneo obtaining free labour or settlers.21 They argued 
that if Javanese natives were to be transported to the point of embarkation, in the same 
manner as newly contracted workers, the possibility of ‘settlers’ becoming ‘labourers’ 
was imminent. This, according to the Dutch authorities, would constitute ‘recruitment’, 
and therefore have to be signed on. In such a case, the Company also had to be 
subjected to the rules of the Wervingsordonnantie (Recruiting Ordinance) Staatsblad 
1887, No. 8; Staatsblad 1909, No.123 and 407.22
Despite being ‘antagonistic to any departure from the old order of things’, Van 
Lier and Sonneveld agreed that all applications had to pass through the office of the 
Dutch Consul in Singapore, who after giving his views, would forward the application to 
the Governor-General in Batavia for final sanction, or otherwise.23 This condition was 
similar to those imposed by the Dutch government for the recruitment of indentured 
labour in the Federated Malay States (FMS) during the same period,24 and to the one 
obtained by individual planters from British North Borneo back in 1907.25 After a further 
interview with H. de Graeff, the Governor Secretary of NEI on 24 April 1913, Clark had 
to wait for extended deliberations among the top Dutch officials before getting the 
desired results.
In May 1913 the Dutch authorities unofficially agreed to grant the Company 
government the desired dispensation, subject to the following terms and conditions. 
First, the Company government could appoint an agent, or send someone direct to 
Java to encourage settlers or free labourers to come to British North Borneo, if no 
obligation to perform labour was stipulated. Second, if the Company government were 
to recruit coolies, the contract in principle should not be such a rigid one, as prescribed
21 PRO: 00874/744. M .M . Clark to Ag. Directeur Van Justitie, Batavia. 24 A p ril 1913.
22 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Sonneveld, Act. Directeur van Justitie, to M .M . Clark. Batavia. 23 April 
1913.
23 PRO: C0874/744. Acting Directeur van Justitie to M .M . Clark, Batavia. 8 A p ril 1913.
24 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from A.C. Pearson’s Report on Labour in the Federated Malay States. 27 
October 1913.
25 K IT : Derde Verslag. Arbeidsinspectie en Koeliewei'ving in Nederiandsch-Indie. Weltevreden: Filliaal 
Albrecht &  Co. 1914. p. 84; See chapter two.
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for estate or other coolies currently working in the territory. Third, the recruitment 
should be in the name of the Company government or its attorneys, instead of the 
planters themselves. Fourth, the Company government could recruit without first 
referring to the Consul General at Singapore, as the permission to recruit had been 
granted locally, in Java.26 It was no longer in the interest of the NEI government to be 
kept informed of the labour conditions of each individual employer through the Dutch 
Consulate in Singapore.27
The negotiations between Clark and the NEI officials were considered a 
success. Not only did the NEI government, in principle, have no objection to granting 
permission for recruiting native labourers on behalf of British North Borneo, but it was 
not necessary to mention the names of the estates for which the coolies were intended. 
Furthermore, the permission to obtain free labour was an added advantage. So too, 
was the agreement to any form of modification on the labour contract if required by the 
Company government, provided that the Dutch authorities were informed of the 
particulars to be amended, and how such amended conditions be worded.28 Another 
plus point was the avoidance of the Dutch Consulate in Singapore in the recruitment 
application, as this entailed less bureaucratic paperwork, and a speedy transaction.29 
The acute population problem in Java made it imperative for the NEI to respond 
positively and swiftly to indentured migration generally, and the demands of the 
Company in particular, as well as to cut down unnecessary hassle.30
By decree No. 25 of 18 November 1913, the Company government was 
officially given a one-year permit by the Governor-General A.W.F. Idenburg (1909- 
1916) to recruit 2000 labourers from Java, to work on agricultural ventures in the
26 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Sonneveld to Clark. 3 May 1913.
27 ARA: Mailrapport 2257/13. E. Moresco, De Gouvernments-Secretaries to Wd. Consul-Generaal der 
Nederlanden te Singapore.
28 PRO: C0874/744. Van L ier to Clark. No. 291.
29 A N M : Report o f the Labour Commission, 1890. paragraph 221. p. 34.
30 Termorshuizen. ‘ Indentured Labour’ , p. 279.
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territory.31 Each shipment of emigrants was to include a proportion of women, equal to 
at least one-third of the number of men.32 The contract was set for two years. Javanese 
labourers bound for overseas destinations had to sign the labour contracts in Java, and 
needed the approval of the highest district official. Prior to giving his endorsement, the 
official had to make sure of two issues. First, he had to be convinced that each 
emigrant completely understood the contents of the contract. In other words, a coolie 
entered into a contract willingly. Second, individual emigrants were to receive their 
advance money in his presence.33 The contract would bind the labourer to a specific 
estate assigned by the British North Borneo authorities, upon his or her arrival in the 
territory.
The Company government modelled the ‘Dutch Contract’ on the Chinese one. 
Coolies were to sign the contract after being made to understand the rights and duties 
ascribed in the contract. The NEI government ruled that the emigrants were to receive 
an advance of 5 guilders upon recruitment, and 7 dollars at the place of 
disembarkation. The advance given could be repaid by monthly deductions from the 
labourer’s pay, not exceeding one dollar. Its other provisions dealt with the basic 
conditions of the engagement: the two-year term to be devoted to labour; the authority 
of the Protector of Labour to assign the labourer on arrival to a specific plantation; the 
length of the working day -  not exceeding ten hours daily (although the state’s Labour 
Ordinance 1916 permitted a maximum of nine hours working day); the amount of daily 
wages (minimum wage was fixed at 25 cents a day for men and 15 cents for women); 
and free housing, drinking water and, board and medical treatment. The following days 
were set aside as holidays - the native New Year and two days each month. Workers 
would receive ordinary pay for official holidays. After the expiration of the agreement, 
the Consul General of the Netherlands in Singapore had to be advised on the
31 K IT : Derde Verslag. Arbeidinspectie En Koeliewerving in Nederlandsch-indie. [Weltevreden: Filiaal 
Albrecht &  Co. 1914]. p. 84.
32 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. Dertiende Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie vooor de Btiitengewesten 1928. 
Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij. p. 38; ARA: Mailrapport 2257/13. Governor BNBC to Governor General 
N E I Afschrift. No. 1999/13. 23 September 1913.
33 Hoefte. In Place o f Slavery, p. 47.
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whereabouts of the labourer, whether the labourer had signed a new contract, left the 
state on his or her own account, or had settled somewhere else. Most importantly, the 
contract provided for free repatriation within 3 months of the expiration of a labourer’s 
agreement, and this free repatriation was assured during five years (although this was 
later reduced to one year)34 after the termination of the last (written or verbal) 
contract.35
After granting dispensation, the recruiting agent, Messrs. Soesman & Company, 
in Semarang recruited an initial group of 459 in 1914, consisting of 198 male and 261 
female. They were distributed among the various estates in the west coast (Kinarut, 
Kimanis, Mawao and Membakut Estates) and east coast (China Borneo Co., Batu 
Puteh, the NDBTCo. Ltd., and Telok Bukan Estates).36 By 1917, around 1,041 males 
and 750 females made their way to British North Borneo, totalling 1,791 labourers 
received of the 2000 allowed by the first permit.37 In March 1918, the Company 
obtained a fresh permit for another 2000. Around 1,155 Javanese coolies arrived 
between 1918 and 1919. The expiration of the permit on 23 January 1919 caused 
severe problems for the territory. The Dutch authorities in Batavia had delayed the 
renewal of the licence to import Javanese labour.38 On 22 February 1919, the permit to 
recruit the balance of 1,100 coolies from the previous permit was renewed.
The delay in extending the importing permit was blamed on high mortality from 
influenza and cholera, which was predominant in Surabaya and Semarang. Yet, British 
officials perceived the tardiness on the part of the NEI government as caused by the 
much-awaited outcome of J.G. van Hemert, the Dutch Labour Inspector’s report, who
34 See chapters five and eight.
35 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Model-Werkcontract. Tot de werving is vergunning verleend by 
Gouverninent-besluit van 18 November 1913. No. 25.
36 PRO: C0874/744, Extract from the Annual Report on the Protectorate Department for 1914. 
(Forwarded w ith No. 243 o f 5 May 1915).
37 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Department o f the Protector o f  Labour for 1917.
38 PRO: C0874/753. Governor’ s No. 129. 24 February 1919.
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in 1918, was making his rounds of the estates employing Javanese coolies.39 The visit 
of J.G. van Hemert in 1918 was the culmination of a project for the Dutch authorities in 
NEI, to appoint an agent of its own to inspect Javanese indentured immigrants on the 
estates in British North Borneo, and to attempt to protect their interests in the colony, 
as in the Dutch colonies. The report of the tour of inspection by van Hemert, as seen 
also in the reports of 1927 and 1928 involving Baron D.R.J. van Lijnden and M.B. 
Viehoff respectively, was significant in determining the direction of Javanese 
indentured immigration in British North Borneo. A positive and glowing report meant a 
speedy renewal of the recruiting permit, while a negative report meant a delay in 
obtaining a permit, or total suspension. In this case, the Company government was 
obliged to respond to the recommendations specified by the Dutch Inspectors of 
Labour.
On 20 April 1920, Governor A.C. Pearson appealed officially to the Governor- 
General of Batavia for additional Javanese labourers. John Maxwell Hall, a senior 
government officer, was delegated to Java to deal with recruiting agents and arrange 
terms that were agreeable to the NEI government. The timing of Maxwell Hall’s mission 
was conspicuous, not only for the procurement of a new permit to import Javanese 
labourers, but also to alleviate any concerns that the Dutch authorities might have 
pertaining to the indenture system adopted in British North Borneo. The Company 
government was in the midst of defending its policies, following allegations made by 
the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society (henceforth, the Society) in 1919, of 
prevailing abuses arising in the territory under the administration of the Company.40 
The alleged abuses fell under two main headings: the denial of justice to the 
indigenous natives pertaining to the seizure of their lands, and the desecration and 
destruction of their graveyards for capitalist interests. Of immediate concern to 
Governor Pearson was the corrupt system adopted in the treatment of imported
39 PRO: C0874/753. Fred N. Fraser to Chairman BNBC. 24 February 1919.
40 AS1: The Anti Slavery Reporter and Aborigines' Friend. Series V., 9,4 (January 1920). p. 114.
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labourers.41 The matter was initially raised before the Society in 1914, but owing to the 
outbreak of war, and the involvement of Britain, the matter lapsed. Holland, with its 
colonies, was neutral in this conflict.
The outcome of ‘exhaustive’ enquiries, led by Sir West Ridgeway, President of 
the BNBC himself, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, one of the Directors, justified the 
administration of the Company. It was exonerated from the serious charges brought 
against them by the Society. The Colonial Office opined that the charges made against 
the Company’s administration had been satisfactorily met, and no further action in the 
matter would be taken unless the Society managed to produce fresh evidence which 
would necessitate further investigation.42 Indeed this result greatly redeemed the 
Company’s image. A new permit to import 3000 Javanese coolies was granted by 
Governor-General J.P Graaf Van Limburg Stirum (1916-1921) in October 1920, shortly 
after Van Hemert submitted his investigative report.43 No doubt Van Hemert’s positive 
report had influenced the decision not only to renew the permit, but also to increase the 
quantity of coolies to be recruited under the permit.44
Concurrently, the modification of British North Borneo labour laws in 1920, 
initiated by the Company government, was a plus point. Under the new laws, no 
contract could be extended beyond its original term, by reason of the labourer being in 
debt to the employer.45 The minimum wage was also revised to counteract the 
increased cost of living due to the War. It was raised by 10 cents per diem for
Javanese labourers recruited under permit, making the new rate as 35 cents for men
and 25 cents for women plus free ration.40 Every employer was also compelled by law
41 HCPP: cmd.1060. Anti-Slavery Society to Colonial Office. 29 October 1919. p. 3.
42 HCPP: cmd. 1060. Grindle to Anti-Slavery Society. 24 August 1920. p. 25.
K IT : Verslag. Arbeidinspectie in Nederlandsch-indie. Over het jaar 1919. (Zesde Verslag) 
Welteveden: Boekh, Visser &  Co. 1920. p. 18; PRO: C0874/753. Maxwell H all to Government 
Secretary. 26 September 1920; See BNBH. 16 February 1921.
44 SSA: F /l (3). BNBC Reports o f  H a lf Yearly Meetings (1901-1939). p. 6.
45 ARA: Mailrapport 3051/20. Governor to Governor-General, G.S.C. No. 2198/19. 28 August 1920.
46 PRO: C0874/753. Governor’ s No. 596. 21 Oct 1920. See also PR0-C0874/753. Governor’ s No 43. 15 
January 1921.
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to provide his labourers with food, particularly rice, at prices cheaper than controlled 
prices. The new wage rate applied to 223 coolies that formed the balance of the 
existing permit, and to the new permit issued in 1920. Records show that 975 
Javanese coolies arrived in 1920, comprising 775 males and 200 females. The 
Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum, the Labour Inspection Chief, and the 
Government Secretary applauded the new rates on minimum wage enforced in the 
territory, although they preferred to have the rates fixed even higher, thereby freeing 
themselves from criticism, if the agreed figures failed to attract Javanese coolies.47
Demands for labour increased after 1924, with the expansion of rubber 
acreage. The Protector of Labour, C.D. Martyn, visited Java in early 1924, hoping to 
discuss two possibilities with the Labour Bureau. First, the possibility of utilising the 
services of the General Deli Emigration Bureau, Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor, 
(ADEK) to aid with the recruitment of Javanese coolies. Various enterprises and local 
governments had enrolled as external members of the ADEK so they could acquire 
labourers with ADEK’s assistance. Some British North Borneo employers were 
optimistic that the ADEK could bring the same success to the territory, chiefly in 
providing ‘a better class of labour’.43 Second, the Company government wanted to 
discuss the prospect of direct shipment, to cut down transportation cost for employers 
of labour. An efficient low-cost transportation was deemed necessary to connect the 
demand for labour in the territory, and the distant supply of recruits, from Java.
Since the Company government obtained its permit to recruit from Java in 
1913, coolies were transported by the recruiting agent in Semarang, to British North 
Borneo, via Singapore. At that time, this was the most economical route. Several steam 
liners were approached to proceed with direct shipment, but either their rates were too 
prohibitive, there were no steamers available for the journey, or the liners were not
47 PRO: 00874/753. Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary. 26 September 1920.
48 SSA: N BC A 1119. T .A . Ball to A.C. Pearson, Governor. 1 October 1925.
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favoured by the Dutch authorities.49 Ultimately, the only way for Company government 
to take advantage of the concession granted was to get orders from the estates, and 
transmit them to its agent, Messr. Soesman & Co., who then arranged for the British- 
owned Straits Steamship Company (SSC) to transport the coolies from Semarang to 
Singapore, and then to British North Borneo. The SSC maintained regular weekly 
services between Singapore and British North Borneo ports. Steamers such as, the s.s. 
‘Marudu’ (1,926 tons), s.s. ‘Darvel’ (1,929 tons), and s.s. ‘Kajang’ (2,082 tons) had 
been operating since December 1914, calling at ports at Kuching and Miri in Sarawak, 
and Labuan, Jesselton and Kudat in British North Borneo.50 Usually, the journey from 
Singapore to Jesselton would occupy 5 days; Kudat was about 9 hours’ steam from 
Jesselton, and Sandakan 12 to 15 hours steam’ from Kudat. From Sandakan, the 
Sabah Steamship Company Limited, whose vessels consisted of the s.s. ‘Kinabalu’ 
(429 tons) and ‘Klias’ (210 tons), linked with the SSC vessels (from Singapore), and left 
Sandakan for Lahad Datu, Semporna and Tawau in the east coast, and Kudat, 
Usukan, Jesselton and Labuan in the west coast.51 Shipments via Singapore meant a 
heavier expenditure derived from higher transportation cost and coolie depot charges. 
Monitoring charges at these depots too, had to be dealt with, apart from compulsory 
inspections of the coolies by the Dutch Consul General in Singapore. These hassles 
motivated employers to continue lobbying for direct shipment.
In his negotiation with the Dutch, C.D. Martyn argued that British North Borneo 
planters were short-changed because of the poor conditions of coolies arriving from 
Singapore. The coolies were alleged to be mostly unfit and ‘full of venereal disease’, 
which was claimed to have been contracted while on board.52 The Dutch authorities
49 See quotations from shipping companies in PRO: C0874/744, 753, 752; PRO: C0874/753. Maxwell 
Hall to Government Secretary. 19 October 1920.
50 For further information on the shipping problems in BNB on the eve o f  WW1, and the re-establishment 
o f  shipping lines between Singapore and British North Bornoe, refer, K.G. Tregonning. Home Port 
Singapore: A History o f Straits Steamship Company Limited. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1967. 
pp. 102-106; See Handbook o f  the State o f  North Borneo. London. 1934. p. 55.
51 Handbook. 1934. p. 56.
52 SSA: N BC A 1119. Harrisons &  Crossfield to F.W. Fraser, Government Secretary. 28 A pril 1923; 
Extract from H .E.’s dispatch No. 753 dated 27 November 1923. (Original in G.S.O. 1643/23).
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repeatedly denied the Company government the liberty of dealing with the suggested 
Osaka Shohen Kaisha of the Java-China-Japan line. The Koninkiijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij (KPM), however, agreed to extend its run to British North Borneo, on 
condition that they would be given a guarantee of 150 labourers at one time. Owing to 
the difficulty in ascertaining labour requirements for the territory, and the small numbers 
usually imported by individual estates, the private negotiations came to nothing.53 
Direct shipment was only sanctioned in 1928, but ironically, it was the Dutch authorities 
who demanded it.
In late 1925, the Company government negotiated with the NEI to introduce a 
three year contract, instead of the two year one (similar to the provision granted to 
employers in the Federated Malay States and Sarawak) to help employers reduce 
importation costs. It was approved by the Dutch authorities. The new contract, which 
came into force in 1926, made certain alterations in respect of wages and rations, with 
the scale of the latter being somewhat increased (see chapter 6).54 The new contract 
applied to 2,222 Javanese labourers arriving in 1926 (1,672 males, 550 females) and 
1,595 in 1927 (1,269 males and 326 females).55
The renewal of the permit was delayed in 1928 owing to Baron van Lijnden’s 
(the Dutch Labour Inspector) unfavourable report. The inspection by van Lijnden in 
1927 resulted in the blacklisting of five estates (Ranau, Langkon, Batu Puteh, Bettotan, 
and Sapong) for various reasons, and the managers of these estates were informed 
that further supply of Javanese labourers would be withheld, unless the problems were 
remedied.56 Conspicuously, Governor J.L. Humphreys sent a despatch to the 
Governor-General of Batavia in June 1927, urgently requesting the Dutch to send 
another labour inspector to take over Van Lijnden’s unfinished task. Van Lijnden was
53 PRO: CO648/10. AR, Protectorate Department for 1924. p. 60.
54 PRO: C0874/554. NBCC. Minutes o f  Meeting. 9 November 1925; PRO: 00874/752. F.W. Fraser to 
Government. 18 December 1926.
55 PRO: C0648/14. AR. Protectorate Department for 1926.
55 SSA: N BC A 210. Notes fo r Baron van L ijnden’s interview w ith His Excellency.
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taken ill prematurely in late May 1927. It was apparent that Governor Humphreys was 
apprehensive about Van Lijnden’s negative judgement of the territory. He hoped a new 
inspector would provide an optimistic assessment of the labour conditions in the area, 
and reassure the NEI government that Javanese immigrants were ‘well and justly 
treated ... and that their rights were carefully guarded by the Protectorate’. During the 
interval, pending the arrival of the second Dutch inspector, Governor Humphreys 
instructed employers of labour generally, and of Javanese indentured labourers 
specifically, to improve labour conditions in their respective areas, if they wished to 
continue enjoying the privilege of recruiting Javanese labourers under the government 
permit.57
Meanwhile, gazette notifications passed under the Labour Ordinance of British 
North Borneo in December 1927, which embodied almost all of Baron van Lijnden’s 
suggestions, were given to the Dutch authorities for further consideration. By then, the 
permit’s renewal depended upon M.B. V iehoffs report, who replaced van Lijnden in 
1928. M.B. Viehoff criticised the inconsistencies and loopholes in the Labour 
Ordinance, which he claimed were detrimental to the welfare of Javanese labourers. 
Accordingly, the ordinance subjected the Javanese labourers who re-engaged after 
expiration of their ‘Dutch contract’ to the ‘local contract’, which in several respects, and 
particularly with regard to the salary, was less favourable than the former, yet to which 
these labourers would often be tempted by the offer of advances.58 The advance gave 
rise to a dependency relationship between the employee and the employer. After the 
expiration of the contract, the coolie re-engaged again, under a local contract for one 
year, this time under a different wage scheme, and without a repatriation clause.59
To remedy the situation, Viehoff suggested that a ‘Netherlands’ Indian 
Labourers’ Protection Ordinance (NILPO), analogous to those existing in the Straits
57 SSA: Despatches 1927. Governor Humphreys to Governor General N EI. No. 1251/27. 8 June 1927.
58 PRO: C0874/752. Governor Batavia, to Governor British North Borneo. 16 September 1930.
59 Refer chapter 8.
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Settlements and Federated Malay States since 1908 and 1909, and to the one, which 
had been enforced in Sarawak, be edicted in the territory.60 Nevertheless, the 
unanimous feelings of the employers was that the existence of separate Labour 
Ordinances for the three groups of Javanese working in the territory (Java-recruited, 
Singapore-recruited, and locally engaged) were highly undesirable and misleading, and 
would create difficulties in operation. The NBCC collectively preferred a re-modelling of 
the existing Labour Ordinance 1929, to bring it into conformity with the NEI’s 
requirements, particularly relating to imported Javanese under the Dutch contract.61 
Finally, the Labour Advisory Board concluded in August 1930, that a separate 
ordinance for Javanese labourers was unnecessary, and Viehoff’s recommendations 
would be incorporated within the existing Labour Ordinance of the territory.62
In a twist to the matter, Viehoff proposed that a permit would only be granted 
subject to a novel condition that the labourers were transported to British North Borneo, 
and back to Java, direct and not via Singapore. The idea of direct shipment gained 
credence due to the fact that more Javanese recruits went ‘missing’ in Singapore. The 
Dutch authorities regarded the Singapore port as providing ‘too many opportunities for 
illegal recruiting or substitution en route.’63 They alleged that too often, the Javanese 
repatriates fell into the hands of labour sheikhs and haji sheikhs (pilgrim brokers), and 
these labourers would re-engage, either for estates in British North Borneo, or Malaya, 
without the guarantees and advantages offered by the Dutch Contract.64 With the 
unprecedented scale of repatriates re-engaging in Singapore, direct shipment was 
finally sanctioned in 1928.
60 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. Veertiende Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten. 1929. 
p. 36.
61 PRO: C0874/751. NBCC. Extract from Minutes o f  Committee Meeting. 1 May 1931; PRO: 
C0874/555. NBCC. Minutes o f  Meeting. 4 A p ril 1931, 1 May 1931.
62 SSA: Despatch (Oov. to President, 1930). Cost o f Labour. 6 October 1930.
63 SSA: N BC A 1119. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 March 1924. See Chapter 8 for further details.
64 K IT : Kantoor van Arbeid. Deitiende Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten 1928. 
Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij. p. 38.
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interestingly, it was not only direct shipment that became a novel condition in 
the renewal of the recruiting permit for 1928;65 the NEI government also insisted upon 
the despatch of the coolies using Dutch vessels flying the Dutch flag, by the eastern 
route, via Tarakan, and therefore, avoiding Singapore.66 The KPM had finally launched 
and maintained a monthly service between ports in the Dutch East Indies and Tawau in 
the second half of 1920. Thus, the responsibility to transport the coolies fell on this 
shipping company.67 From June 1929, the monthly service was increased to a 
fortnightly service.
The earlier paragraphs have shown that the transportation of Javanese 
indentured labourers to British North Borneo was dominated by a single carrier, Britain, 
whose regulations governed the departure, passage and landing of the indentured 
labourers. The ships carrying indentured migrants usually had a good safety record, 
because there was no record of vessels sunk, or unable to complete the voyage 
because of damage due to storms, or running aground. The transportation of labourers 
using British ships was usually highly regulated. However, as noted by Northrup, even 
on well regulated ships, comfort was at a premium. Sanitary facilities were rudimentary, 
and the quality of food and water could deteriorate considerably, the longer the voyage 
took.68 Batavia alleged that liners, other than those of the Dutch, failed to provide the 
basic necessities for their Javanese subjects while on board. Officials in Java criticised 
the passenger accommodation on the ships of the SSC, which was apparently inferior 
to that on Dutch vessels, particularly the KPM. They referred to the ‘insufficient supply 
of bathing and drinking water’. Allegedly, meals were provided twice a day, against 
three on board the KPM’s ships. They argued that any control by the NEI authorities on 
board British ships concerning the condition of the coolies, and the space and supplies
65 PRO: C0874/752. Macaskie to Government Secretary. 27 A pril 1928.
66 PRO: C0874/752. Governor to President BNBC. 10 June 1929.
67 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. Dertiende Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten 1928. 
Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij. p.38.
68 Northrup. Indentured Labor, p. 87.
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allotted to them, would be insufficient, if not altogether impossible.69 Proper control 
could only be accomplished if the coolies were carried by Dutch vessels.
Both the British and the Dutch were particularly concerned about being accused 
of continuing the slave trade under a new guise, and hence, attention was given to the 
transportation of coolies.70 Arguably though, the strict regulation of utilising KPM 
vessels could be due to protectionism on the part of the Dutch. From 1888, the KPM 
was granted greater power by the NEI government than had been given to its 
predecessors. A contractual agreement between the two parties, according to a 
Campo, converted the relationship from ‘competition to bilateral monopoly’, whereby 
the KPM obtained a monopoly on existing and future lines, while the government 
acquired firmer control of the KPM’s operation. Through this agreement, the KPM had 
to give priority to governmental freight and passengers, while retaining its private 
operations. The NEI government could demand access to instant requisition of as 
many ships as it wished, at concessionary rates, not to mention the other perks that 
came with it, such as access to shipping space.71 In the 1910s, vast expansion 
occurred within the KPM, and by around 1920, the shipping enterprise had 92 vessels 
that operated 50 services, with about 300 ports of call.72 After the outbreak of the First 
World War, cooperation between the KPM and the NEI government intensified, with 
‘the Paketvaart loyally supporting the government, and the government lending 
powerful support to the Paketvaart’. In fact, in 1925, the KPM’s monopoly extended 
even more when it called for the inclusion of an article in its contract with the NEI 
government, that the latter was bound to refrain from any ‘competition’ with the KPM. 
By this new clause, the NEI government could not transport even private travellers and
69 K IT : Kantoor Van Arbeid. Veertiende Verslag van de Arbeidsinspectie voor de Buitengewesten 1929. 
Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij. pp.36-37.
70 Termorshuizen. ‘ Indentured Labour’ , p. 303.
71 J. a Campo. ‘Steam Navigation and State Formation’ , in: Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in 
Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations o f  the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942. Leiden: K IT LV  
Press. 1994. pp. 13, 16-17. See sim ilar arguments in J.N.F.M. a Campo’ . Engines o f Empire: 
Steamshipping and State Formation in Colonial Indonesia. Uitgeverij Verloren. 2003.
72 Joshua Chia Yeong Jia. ‘Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (K P M )’ . Artic le written for the National 
Library Board Singapore on 16 June 2006’ . ( http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_l 182_2007-12-24.html).
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goods in the archipelago, thus illustrating the KPM’s zeal of obtaining a total monopoly 
with regards to the government.73
Hence, to fulfil its contractual obligation with the KPM, the NEI government 
gave total monopoly to the shipping line, to transport government-imported Javanese, 
to and from, British North Borneo,74 not to mention Sumatra, Surinam, New Caledonia, 
and other destinations. Despite employers in British North Borneo (under the NBCC) 
sending representations to the Java authorities criticising the unfair discrimination of 
British shipping, the NEI government refused to waive its decision. The British Consul 
General at Batavia, Sir Josiah Crosby, in a semi-official letter dated 15 March 1929, in 
fact deprecated the making of any further representations by the British North Borneo 
authorities, as it 'would... be not only useless, but might improbably annoy the Dutch’.75
The Company government disbursed £1,482.00 on a coolie depot in Tawau,76 
and on 13 October 1929, the KPM steamer, Roseboom, arrived with the first batch of 
Javanese labourers recruited via the new route. In all, there were 154 Javanese 
including dependants.77 By the end of 1929, 266 Javanese immigrants arrived under 
the permit, on four shipments. Martyn’s successor, C.F.C. Macaskie, limited the 
number of shipments to one a month, with shipments to occur quarterly or less frequent 
in times of depression. There was substantial delay in repatriation, but the Dutch 
authorities affirmed that any delay was considered preferable than risking repatriates 
re-engaging in Singapore while in transit.78 The permit to recruit another 2000 
labourers was renewed by the Dutch authorities in November 1929.
73 Campo. Engines o f Empire, p. 74.
74 PRO: C0874/555. Minutes o f  the 19th Annual General Meeting, 31 August 1929.
75 PRO: C0874/752. Maxwell to President BNBC. 10 June 1929.
76 PRO: C0874/752, Governor’s. No. 341. 10 June 1929.
77 SSA: BNBH. 16 October 1929.
78 PRO: C0874/752. Macaskie to Government Secretary. Prot. No. 148/28. 27 A pril 1928.
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Along with the renewal of the recruiting permit, a new contract form was 
approved by the Dutch government. Under the new ruling, Javanese indentured 
labourers were banned from working on timber enterprises, following the reported 
deaths of Javanese labourers while hauling or felling timber. The new Dutch contract 
restricted Javanese indentured labourer in British North Borneo to agricultural ventures 
only. Apart from the changes in type of work, the working hours for the 1929 contract 
were now synchronised with the territory’s labour laws, which was 9 hours. Monies 
given to the labourer in Java were now considered as presents, and an employer was 
prohibited from deducting them from the labourer’s wages. Deductions could only be 
made on the seven dollar advance the labourer received at the port of disembarkation, 
or destination. In addition to the three days of Hari Raya and two days in each month, 
three more holidays were added for the Javanese indentured, i.e. the twelfth day of the 
Moeloed month, the last day of the month Roewah, and the tenth day of the month 
Hadji.79
After the expiration of the permit in 1930, no renewal was made for the 
oncoming year. Since no action was taken by the Company pertaining to the NILPO 
proposed earlier, no recruiting permit was granted thereafter. Employers did not push 
the matter because a downturn in economic conditions prevented further importations 
of labour. It was the period of the Great Depression, and many enterprises were either 
closed down, or kept on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis. Simultaneously, in late 1931, 
the legislation concerning the abolition of indentured labour under penal sanctions was 
passed in British North Borneo, and took effect on 1 January 1933, after the expiration 
of the remaining contract in 1932. Meanwhile, the NEI government, too, passed a 
resolution ending the ‘Poenale Sanctie’ (penal sanctions) system for Javanese contract 
coolies in its colonies by 1934, and thus, was in the process of phasing out the 
indentured system of labour. The Dutch government was already considering
79 See a copy o f the 1929 Dutch Contract in, PRO: C0874/752.
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extending this ruling to other importers of Javanese labour, including British North 
Borneo.80
Throughout the negotiation to import Javanese indentured labourers into British 
North Borneo, it was clear that the relationship between the two colonial states showed 
an uneven balance of power. The Company government, being the inferior side, was 
totally dependent on the NEI for its continuous supply of indentured labourers, while 
the NEI government, as the superior party and the one with the ‘whip hand’, was free to 
manoeuvre the relationship to its own advantage.81 The Dutch adopted a policy of self- 
interest when it came to the question of Javanese indentured labourers in British North 
Borneo. From the terms and conditions of the contract, to the recruitment, 
transportation, and working conditions of Javanese indentured labourers, the NEI 
government was adamant that the organisation of the Javanese indentured labour 
system would be handled in the NEI’s terms. As noted, more often than not, these 
policies were guided by conditions in the NEI itself. For example, a change in policy, as 
in the case of direct shipment, was adopted when too many Javanese labourers 
decided against returning to Java, and instead, went ‘missing’ in Singapore. Too many 
coolies retreating to Singapore would mean fewer coolies arriving in Java. This would 
lead to a relative decline in potential recruits for the NEI’s own enterprises in Sumatra 
or the outer islands, which would eventually lead to further pressure from the planters’ 
lobby. Furthermore, the contractual agreement with the KPM reflected the attitude of 
NEI in protecting its self-interest. More examples of the NEI superiority vis-a-vis the 
Company government, at the expense of British North Borneo employers, may be seen 
in the forthcoming chapters.
80 PRO: C0273/567/4. Acting Consul-General to Arthur Henderson, P.C.M.P. 7 November 1930.
81 PRO: C0874/753. Governor to Chairman. 18 January 1919.
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Javanese Immigration Funding
A noteworthy feature of the Javanese indenture system to be examined is its method of 
financing. Employers of labour bore all expenses incurred in the immigration process, 
and the Company government acted solely as a coolie broker, on behalf of the 
employers. On top of being a governing body, the Company government hoped to 
profit from its trade, exploration and colonisation of the territory. Its dual role made it 
necessary for the Company government to regulate the importation, allocation, 
employment and repatriation of labour, and leave the financing of the immigration 
scheme by the employers themselves. Nevertheless, the colonial state provided 
financial assistance in the form of an advance to pay brokers and steamer lines in the 
first instance, and claimed from the employers afterwards, interest would be charged to 
employers for the use of the money advanced. The total cost of each batch of 
labourers, including commission, passage, and interest charged on the money 
advanced by the government, would be worked out and paid for by planters on the 
arrival of labourers. In any event, the government took no responsibility for loss through 
death or desertion.82 Revenues of the Protectorate Department came from other 
avenues, such as the sale of contract forms, the registration of contracts, recruiters’ 
licences, and coolie depot charges.83
In 1913, when the Company government first undertook the work of recruiting 
labour direct from Java under the permit granted by the NEI government, there was no 
formal agreement whereby the employers assumed full responsibility for any liability 
incurred on their behalf by the government acting as their Agent for the importation of 
Javanese labour. No formal agreement of the kind was entered into by employers with 
the government, although employers promised to pay all expenses in connection with 
their importation, and such a promise was necessarily implied by the requisition.
82 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from Governor’ s Confidential Letter to Chairman. 18 November 1913.
83 See Annual Reports o f the Protectorate Department in PRO: C0648/7-14.
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Estates which applied for government-imported labourers had to sign an undertaking in
the following form:-
'We...hereby guarantee to repay to the British North Borneo Government all 
expenses incurred in recruiting...Javanese labourers...in accordance with our 
request of . . . \84
Theoretically, the liability of the colonial state as the employer was transferred to the 
actual employer as soon as the contract was signed by the labourer. Nevertheless, in 
case of default on the real employer’s part, the government was both morally and 
politically bound to accept liability.85 Such risk made it imperative for the Company 
government to impose a five percent (5%) commission, to be added to the actual cost 
of each coolie landed in the territory, since it was considered impossible to estimate 
exactly the actual expenditure incurred by the government in recruiting the labour in 
question.86 The 5% charged was designed to cover incidental expenses such as 
telegrams, medical charges ($1.00 per labourer was paid for medical examination on 
arrival), and charges with regards to repatriation that was impossible to allocate to 
individual employers.87
On top of the 5% commission, the government also charged $4 per head, to be 
allocated to a ‘Rejection Fund’.88 The colonial government insisted that the 
establishment of a ‘Rejection Fund’ was critical, and it was entitled to take expenditure 
into account, and to consider it as part of the risk assumed in acting as coolie broker for 
employers of labour generally, and to place such expenditure against the proceeds of 
the 5% commission charge and the $4 rejection fee.89 In 1919, the sum of $4491 
(£524) was deposited as the nucleus for the 'rejection fund’ (or ‘repatriation’ fund as
84 PRO: C0874/751. Governor A. F. Richards, to President BNBC. 31 October 1930.
85 PRO: COS74/752. Acting Secretary W .J.W orthto Governor J.L. Humphreys. 22 November 1926.
85 PRO: C0874/752. Minutes o f Meeting o f  the NBCC. No. 188. 29 October 1926.
87 PRO: C0874/753. Acting Governor’s No. 234. Fund for Repatriation o f  Javanese Labourers. 28 March 
1918; PRO: C0874/752. OAG Fred W. Fraser to Secretary BNBC. 30 July 1926.
88 PRO: C0874/752. Minutes o f Meeting o f  the NBCC. No. 188. 29 October 1926.
89 PRO: C0874/752. Acting Secretary W.J.Worth to Governor J.L. Humphreys. 22 November 1926.
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later justified by the government). This amount was the balance standing to the credit 
of government account, in connection with the recruitment of coolies.90
For more than a decade, there was no opposition to this method of financing. It 
was agreeable to the employers because they believed they would probably have had 
to pay more had they dealt directly with a broker. Moreover, the system whereby the 
Government acted as coolie broker was considered beneficial to the planters' interest, 
as it carried within it a system of credit, which was not only of great convenience, but it 
was also one which would not be given by any independent broker. In 1926, the normal 
method of financing was severely questioned. An examination of the accounts for 1925 
showed that there was an average three months delay between the date on which the 
bank (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) made the payment for a 
shipment, and the date on which all bills on that shipment were collected from the 
employers. Since the number of requisitions for Javanese labourers for the oncoming 
year (1926) was considerably large, the Protector was authorised to demand a deposit 
of $50 or approximately 50% of the cost of importing each labourer, to be paid by the 
employers at the moment of their request. This took effect on 1 January 1926.91 Once 
enforced, the formal undertaking which was initially signed by employers was no longer 
demanded.92 Meanwhile, the commission of 5% charged by the government remained, 
and there was no increase to the $4 rate to be paid to the Rejection Fund.
This triggered a chain of events which questioned the role of government as a 
commercial enterprise and an administrative government. By April 1926, alarmed by 
the huge deposit they had to pay, on top of the usual charges imposed by the colonial 
state, employers under the auspices of the North Borneo Planters’ Association (NBPA) 
and the NBCC raised the question of the Rejection fee of $4 being too high, and
90 PRO: C0874/753. Acting Governor’ s No. 234. Fund for Repatriation o f  Javanese Labourers. 28 March 
1919.
91 PRO: C0874/752. Acting Secretary W.J.Worth to Governor J.L. Humphreys. 22 November 1926.
92 PRO: C0874/751. Governor A. F. Richards to President BNBC. 3 October 1930.
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demanded to know how the 5% commission was dealt with. This was further 
complicated by the way in which the accounts were justified by the government in its 
Annual Reports. The Protectorate Department recorded the balance standing from 
‘Javanese Coolies Advance Account’ for the years 1918 and 1919, as ‘profits’ derived 
from the recruiting fee of 5% and the Rejection Fund of $4.93 What struck the 
employers as odd (although these occurred several years back) were the right of the 
colonial state (in its commercial role) to make a profit out of its work as brokers, and 
the actual ownership of the monies resulting from the collection of these fees. The 
minutes of the meeting of the NBPA stated,
It was Government’s case that the $4 per head Rejection Fund was part of its 
remuneration and on this reasoning Government had refused to supply accounts of 
a fund in which there stood an admitted profit. If this was so, and the profit were 
indeed properly the remuneration of Government, on what grounds were 
Government entitled to include the $4 per head Rejection Fund in its gross total 
upon which the 5 per cent commission was levied. It did not seem logical or in 
common equity that an agent should be entitled to charge commission in respect of
94charges which were claimed as remuneration.
In August 1926 F.R. Carew, representing the NBPA, contested in the Sessions 
Court the charges levied by government on the importation of Javanese labourers. The 
verdict was in the government’s favour. The judge held that the government, although 
admittedly acting as an agent on behalf of estates, was fully entitled to charge a fee of 
5%, and that such fee should be considered as a proper and reasonable remuneration. 
He also ruled that estates were not entitled to a statement of accounts from the 
government. With regard to the charge of $4 per coolie levied in respect of a Rejection 
Fund, the judge held that any excess or profit accruing from ‘time to time was ipso facto 
the property of government’, and part of its remuneration. In defence, Carew accepted 
the 5% charge as fair for the services rendered by the government, and the risk 
involved, but he maintained that these charges were never legalised by Ordinance, or 
even indicated by circular. In response, the judge concluded that although these 
charges were not itemised in importers’ previous accounts, the gross totals were never
93 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate for 1918 and 1919; PRO: C0874/752. W.J. Worth to Governor J.L. 
Humphreys. 22 November 1926.
94 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting o f the NBPA. 11 September 1926.
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disputed in the past.95 The Company government defended its position by emphasising 
that government assumed the role of broker for the convenience of employers, and 
being a commercial as well as an administrative government, there was no reason why 
it should act without profit to itself. The government indicated that as long as the 
charges were reasonable, the employers had no ground of complaint.96
Subsequently, the government proposed two alternatives. Firstly, to reduce the 
$4 per head Rejection Fund fee to a flat charge of 2Vz% on the imported cost per 
coolie, with the proviso that any time this charge may be increased. Secondly, to 
allocate labourers to estates immediately on their arrival, and if a labourer was rejected 
by a Medical Officer as unfit, the individual estate should bear the repatriation cost of 
such labourer, through the Protectorate Department.97 The Governor also agreed, as 
an experiment, subject to concurrence of the District Surgeon, that any imported 
labourer returned by an estate within 10 days of arrival with medical certificate of 
unfitness, should come under the Rejection Fund.98 Government would use proceeds 
of the Fund entirely connected with rejection purposes, and for cognate matters in 
connection with imported labour, such as the Pauper Institution, which was to be 
established in 1927." In the end, the five per cent commission, formerly collected, 
ceased by 1927. However, it made little difference to the employers, because the 
amount was absorbed into the Rejection Fund. Employers now had to pay 7 >2 per cent 
charges, owing to increased rejections.100
Meanwhile, the Company government favoured the formation of a Labour 
Advisory Board in July 1927 (to replace the Advisory Immigration Board formed in 
January 1927), ‘to advise government on behalf of employers of labour, on all matters
95 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting o f the NBPA. 11 September 1926.
96 PRO: C0874/752. W.J.Worth to Governor J.L. Humphreys. 22 November 1926.
97 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from minutes o f  meeting o f the NBPA. 11 September 1926.
98 PRO: 00874/752. Governor’s No. 37. NBPA. 19 January 1927.
99 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1927), Notes o f interview between His Excellency the Governor 
and a deputation from the NBPA. 7 January 1927,
100 SSA: N BC A 1126. Report by Macaskie. 11 November 1927.
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connected with the recruitment and employment of labourers, and to assist in the 
administration of recruiting or other general labour funds’.101 Its members consist of the 
Protector, and a representative each from the NBCC and the NBPA. In November 
1927, it held its first meeting, and the views of the Board mainly dealing with the labour 
laws and a proposed cess on employers (known as the Javanese Immigration Fund) to 
subsidise importation of Javanese labourers were communicated with the Company 
government.102 However, by the time indentured labour was abolished both in British 
North Borneo and the NEI, no such fund existed. It was finally instituted in 1937, under 
Gazette Notification 370 of 1937, under the Labour Ordinance of 1936.103
Over the indentured labour period, employers of labour spent a hefty sum of 
more than $1.1 million to import Javanese labourers and their dependants from the 
island of Java. The yearly importation cost is shown in Table 3.1. The average cost per 
person was $117, much higher than the average coolie imported from Singapore 
(approximately $70 to $80).104 Forthcoming chapters shall show that this high cost of 
importation obliged employers to ‘value’ their labourers more by either squeezing the 
utmost labour from them, or making certain concessions with regards to working and 
living conditions.
Table 3.1
Cost of Javanese Indentured Labour, 1915-1932
Year Average 
Cost per 
Coolie
Total Estimated 
Cost of 
Importation
Year Average 
Cost per 
Coolie
Total Estimated 
Cost of 
Importation
1915 77 32,802 1924 117 10,530
1916 104 26,520 1925 109 92,759
1917 100 65,100 1926 117 259,974
1918 142 126,664 1927 106 169,070
1919 121 31,823 1928 0 0
1920 145 141,375 1929 107 28,462
1921 157 90,118 1930 105 6,825
1922 131 3,930 1931 0 0
1923 117 41,535 1932 0 0
Source: PRO: C0648/7-15, Annual Reports of the Protectorate Department, 1915-1932.
101 PRO: C0874/554. Minutes o f Meeting. NBCC. 1 July 1927.
I0~ PRO: C0648/14. AR. Protectorate Department for 1927.
103 PRO: CO874/1063. Governor Smith to Governor-General NEI. 31 October 1938.
104 PRO: C0648/7-15. AR. Protectorate Department, 1914-1932; PRO: C0874/744. Extract from report 
for August 1917 by Manager o f  Mawao Estate.
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Immigration of Javanese Labourers
The total number of Javanese indentured labourers imported to British North Borneo 
depended on several factors. In deciding how many immigrants to apply for, the 
employers were guided partly by their estimate of the requirements of the labour 
market for the following quarter of a year (no employer could foresee his requirements 
would be met beyond a month or two), the number whose indentures would expire, the 
number who might re-indenture, and the number of immigrants who might return to 
Java. But even more so, they were guided by their judgement of the probable size of 
the following crop, which in turn, depended in large measure on the level of prices. The 
market would dictate to the Boards of Companies at the home country the advisability 
of curtailing expenditure, or of extending operations on their estates. In addition, the 
number of imports depended largely on the costs of importation and repatriation. Any 
appreciable reductions in total costs would naturally result in increased demand for 
labour.105
Table 3.2 depicts the total number of Javanese indentured labourers imported 
into the territory between 1914 and 1932. The first permit granted by the Dutch secured 
a total of 459 labourers in 1914. Similar numbers were obtained the year after. 
Nevertheless, the fall in the price of rubber, followed by the financial difficulties created 
by the war, resulted in a drastic reduction in the labour force in 1916.106 The threatened 
curtailment of estate programmes at the outbreak of war had not prevented a gradual 
increase in labour forces. Importation during 1918 was far larger than from any 
preceding year under the Dutch Contract. After the war, owing to the general rise of 
prices caused by inflation, and combined with adverse rates of exchange, the cost of 
imported labour rose higher (see Table 3.1 above). Less immigration took place in 
1919.
105 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from a memorandum by the Acting Protector on a meeting o f  the NBCC; 
SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 December 1923; Martyn to Elphinstone 
(BNBC). 5 October 1925.
106 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1916.
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Table 3.2
Total Importations of Javanese Indentured Labourers in British North Borneo, 1914-1932
Year Dutch Contract (DC
Male Female Total
1914 198 261 459
1915 142 284 426
1916 152 103 255
1917 549 102 651
1918 667 225 892
1919 193 70 263
1920 775 200 975
1921 443 131 574
1922 10 20 30
1923 120 235 355
1924 0 90 90
1925 626 225 851
1926 1672 550 2222
1927 1269 326 1595
1928 0 0 0
1929 93 173 266
1930 0 65 65
1931 0 0 0
1932 0 0 0
Total 6909 3060 9969
Source: PRO: C0648/7-15 Annual Report Protectorate Department, 1914-1933.
Comparatively, very few Javanese were imported after 1920, regardless of the 
permit to recruit 3000 labourers, due to instability in the price of rubber. In 1921, the 
principal decrease was accounted for by the rubber slump. Importation of Javanese 
labourers to the west coast practically ceased. Managers were unwilling to engage 
indentured labourers, not knowing whether further reductions might be necessary. With 
more unemployment resulting from the rubber slump, importation was kept to a 
minimum. Most places of labour either temporarily closed down, or reduced to less 
than twenty labourers. Immigration of Javanese indentured labourers would have been 
smaller still had it not been for labourers imported by timber, tobacco and coal 
companies.107 By 1922, planters desired to recruit locally, rather than incur the heavy 
cost of importation. The total number of importation under the Dutch permit fell 
drastically to just 30 labourers. According to the Protectorate Department, the decrease 
was a sign of poverty, because an imported coolie would give a better value in the long 
run than the class of alien labour obtainable locally.108
1 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Department o f  the Protector o f Labour for 1921.
108 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Department o f  the Protector o f Labour for 1922.
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In 1925, there was a remarkable revival in the planting industry. Owing to a rise 
in the price of rubber, the interest in the cultivation of rubber increased. More than
12,000 acres were alienated for rubber cultivation in the west coast residency alone, 
with the numbers of Chinese and native smallholders gradually increasing. Throughout 
the indentured labour period, the three years from 1925 to 1927, witnessed an 
unprecedented number of Javanese indentured labourers imported into the territory, 
with a peak of more than 2000 labourers recorded in 1926. In fact, as indicated in 
Table 3.2 the numbers of Javanese indentured labourers imported during the three 
years were almost half of the entire Javanese labourers combined, from the first year of 
the experiment in 1914, until the abolition of the indentured labour system in 1932. The 
high dependence on Javanese indentured labourers from Java during this time was 
due to the shortage of Chinese and native labourers. Many Chinese labourers were 
more interested in better wages and conditions offered by smallholdings, while some 
became smallholders themselves. Likewise, the policy of recalling natives to their 
villages proved problematic because many who were recalled failed to return to work 
when their leave expired.109
The recruiting permit was renewed by the NEI authorities in November 1925, 
but eight months later, in July 1926, the number was fully utilised. In September 1926, 
a further permit of 2000 labourers was granted. Overall, twenty nine enterprises 
throughout the territory took advantage of the permit in 1926, compared to only eight in 
1914.110 More than 4000 indentured labourers, or almost 60 per cent remained in the 
territory in 1926, compared to approximately 2500 five years before. No immigration of 
Javanese labourers under the Dutch permit occurred in 1928, due to ‘unsatisfactory’ 
labour legislations.111 Only after the decision to adopt direct shipment using Dutch 
vessels did importation resume under the ‘Dutch Contract’ in 1929, with the arrival of 
266 labourers from Java under a permit granted in 1929. Overall, the adverse effects of
109 Refer chapter two.
110 See PRO: C0648/7-14. AR. Protectorate Department, 1914-1926.
1,1 PRO: C0874/752. Governor General Batavia to Governor A.F. Richards. 16 September 1930.
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the trade depression continued to be felt throughout the year, as shown by the 
gradually decreasing number of imports. Most Javanese due for repatriation were re­
engaged whenever possible as free labourers under verbal agreements (liable to 
termination at one month’s notice) in order to save the expense of passages. 
Employers were naturally reluctant to recruit more labourers from outside sources than 
was absolutely necessary, with a skeletal force being retained on many estates. Only 
65 indentured labourers were imported under the Dutch permit in 1930, as compared to 
266 in 1929.
Owing to the prevailing trade depression in 1931, no labour was imported from 
Java. The immigration of Javanese indentured labourers finally ended with the 
expiration of the remaining contract in 1932. In total, 9,969 Javanese labourers arrived 
in British North Borneo under the indentured system of labour. Approximately 1,490 
settled there, the majority being women who married locally. All the others had been 
repatriated except for 710 who had died, and 317 who had absconded and had not 
been recovered.112 The immigration of Javanese indentured labourers was heaviest 
during the period of rubber boom, and lowest during the slump of the Great Depression 
and the fail in the price of rubber.
The proportion of women indentured labourers imported from Java was 
relatively high. Throughout the indentured labour period, almost 31 per cent were 
females compared to 69 per cent males. In other words, the crude sex ratio was 2.3 
men per woman. The number of Javanese women imported far exceeded their male 
counterparts between 1914 and 1916. Even though the overall percentage of women 
gradually decreased throughout the years, from 36 per cent in 1914-1919, to 31 per 
cent in 1920-1925, and 27 per cent in 1926-1932, there was a significant increase in 
the absolute numbers imported between 1925 and 1927. Another obvious distinction 
was that the reduction in coolie employment did not mean a drop in the recruitment of
1!2 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese A ffairs for 1932.
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Javanese women. As compared to Deli, Sumatra, where absolute numbers were 
reduced to almost one half between 1920 and 1923, the situation in British North 
Borneo was the opposite.113 There were more women imported than men during 
severe restrictions to the economy, particularly between 1922 and 1924, and between 
1929 and 1930.
Hence, the number of men per woman first rose from 0.5 in 1915 to 5.4 in 1917. 
Following this, more women were recruited again, so that the sex ratio felt to 2.8 in 
1919. From then on, there was a fluctuation in the number of women recruited. In 1920 
and 1921, the sex ratio increased to above 3.0 (3.9 and 3.4 respectively), before the 
number fell drastically to zero in 1924. Only female indentured coolies were recruited 
for that year. During the rigorous planting season, the sex ratio of men per woman 
again increased to 3.9 in 1927, with more men recruited, to take advantage of rising 
rubber prices. The number then drop from 1929 onwards. The trend towards the 
importation of female Javanese indentured labourers reveals that apart from 
supplementing the labour force, female coolies were employed to create a contented 
labour force. The presence of women was seen as a stabilising force for male coolies, 
keeping them away from ‘unnecessary evils’, such as labour unrest.114
End of Javanese Indentured Labour
After 1929, the main trends in coolie labour were effectively reversed, with demand 
declining instead of rising, and free coolies on verbal contracts, instead of contracted 
coolies being engaged. On 31 December 1931, there were 10,276 labourers employed 
in the larger places of labour in British North Borneo (20 or more labourers) of whom 
only 1,438 or 14%, were on written contracts, the remainder being on verbal (month to 
month) contracts.115 Together with the slump in the price of rubber, the demand for 
contract labour declined drastically, by more than 7,200 persons, or almost 91%
113 Lindblad. ‘Coolies in D e li’ , p. 58.
m  PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922. p. 58.
115 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department fo r 1931. p. 22.
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between 1929 and 1932 alone. The shift from contract to free labour status during this 
period is shown in Table 3.3. The shift from contract coolies to free coolies was faster 
than the government had expected. Employers were anxious about the new working 
environment that blanketed estates and plantations throughout the world that used the 
system of indentured labour. Many felt vulnerable because the abolition of penal 
sanctions and the old system of labour would diminish their hold on the coolies.116 They 
prepared themselves for the inevitable, as penal sanctions and the whole system of 
indentured labour and any formed of forced labour were doomed to extinction by 
international action, under the auspices of the International Labour Office.117
Table 3.3
Total Number of Coolies in British North Borneo, 1927-1932
Year Contract & Indentured (%) Free (%) Total
1927 9,997 49 10,404 51 20,401
1928 8,800 47 9,924 53 18,724
1929 7,987 42 10,547 58 18,534
1930 3,851 31 8,712 69 12,563
1931 1,438 14 8,838 86 10,276
1932 732 9 7,663 91 8,395
Source: PRO: C0648/15 AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese Affair for 
1930, 1931, 1932; PRO: CO874/505. Governor to President. No. 367. 30 June 1930.
The abolition of indentured labour in the territory, and the decision taken by the 
Dutch in not renewing the permit, at the same time, abolishing its own Coolie 
Ordinance, coincided with major developments in the international economy. First, the 
early 1930s were an extended slump period, particularly in the production of rubber. 
There was a decline in the demand for labour, and employers sought to reduce labour 
cost by lowering wages, dismissing workers, or by repatriating Javanese indentured 
workers under the auspices of the Javanese Rejection Fund. Second, protectionism 
and restrictive trade policies adopted by the United States (US) during the period of the 
Great Depression hastened the demise of the system of indentured labour in British 
North Borneo, as well as other places, that adopted the labour system. Section 307 of 
the US Tariff Act, 1930, called for the ‘exclusion from American imports of products
116 PRO: CO874/1061. Extract, Minute Sheets X I and X II -  D .1060/1. Minutes. Forced Labour and 
Contract Labour. 7 March 1929.
117 PRO/273/567/4. Acting General to Arthur Henderson. 7 November 1930.
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produced with forced labour working under penal sanction’, effective from 1 January 
1932.118 Since the US was a major market for Southeast Asian primary commodities, 
this amendment propelled many colonial governments to abolish penal sanctions and 
indentured labour altogether.
Employers under the umbrellas of the NBPA and the NBCC both confirmed in 
writing that they ‘fully approved’ the suggested abolition.119 However, they questioned 
the future acquisition of Javanese labour in the state, emphasising that abolition 
brought with it the disappearance of the principal means by which foreign coolies were 
induced to leave their homes in the first place, vis-a-vis the offer of advances.120 They 
suggested the establishment of an alternative recruiting system for future recruitment. 
The end of indentured labour meant that employers had to sign recruits as free 
labourers on monthly contracts, and this according to the employers, enabled labourers 
to freely leave their employers at a month’s notice. However, with no proper 
recruitment scheme, the labour problem in the territory continued until the outbreak of 
World War 2, although its severity varied.121
Conclusion
The Javanese indentured labour system was regulated through a two-way 
collaboration and interaction between the Company government and the NEI 
government. Both colonial states scrutinised the well being and security of the 
indentured workers. Periodic inquiries were made as to the operation of the system, 
and the permission to recruit was granted based on the outcome of such inquiries. 
Nevertheless, the NEI authorities held a superior position in the negotiation process, 
and the course of Javanese indentured labour experiment in British North Borneo was 
shaped to correspond with the needs and vested interests of the Dutch authorities. The
118 PRO: C0874/761. NBCC. Minutes o f Meetings. 20 December 1930 and 16 January 1931. Goods 
Produced by Indentured Labour.’
119 PRO: CO874/1061. Governor’s No. 420. Indentured Labour: Suggested Abolition of. 3 October 1932.
■20 p r q .  CO874/1014. Report o f  the Committee Appointed in November 1932.
121 PRO: CO874/1061. Minutes, Cable from the Governor, New Labour Ordinance. 3 October 1932,
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Company government introduced regulations and recommendations by the NEI 
government to ensure a well-organised operation of the system, ranging from the 
amount of wages to be given, to health and medical care, food allowances, housing 
conditions, and what sort of punishments were permissible. As for the Dutch 
authorities, failure to adhere to the regulations where their subjects were concerned 
would result in a blacklisting of the employer or enterprise concerned, or in a worst- 
case scenario, in the termination of the indentured contract. However, all these 
appeared superficial. Although the Company government attempted to ensure a 
smooth flow of labour through its policies and its role as agent of the planters, and the 
NEI government exercised vigilance over its colonial subjects overseas, all these 
indirectly ensured the prevailing of the indentured system of labour in British North 
Borneo.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RECRUITMENT OF JAVANESE INDENTURED LABOURERS FOR BRITISH
NORTH BORNEO, 1914-1932 
Introduction
The negotiation to import Javanese indentured labourers under the government permit 
to British North Borneo enterprises was a tremendous success. Yearly permits were 
awarded by the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) authorities to the Company government, 
to recruit thousands of Javanese coolies from Java. Nevertheless, the recruitment of 
Javanese coolies depended upon the domestic dynamics involved in Java, which this 
chapter attempts to explicate. The extent to which ‘push factors’ were salient in 
promoting the immigration of Javanese indentured labourers to British North Borneo is 
the first question to be analysed in the chapter. Second, this chapter seeks to 
understand the mechanisms involved in the recruitment operation. Both aspects of the 
discussion serve to ascertain whether or not the recruitment of Javanese labourers for 
British North Borneo enterprises was conducted on a voluntary basis.
Push Factors of Javanese Migration
The migration of the Javanese to British North Borneo has to be seen in both specific 
and global comparative terms, particularly in any discussion of the ‘push’ factors that 
propelled the migrants out of their original societies and into the expanding economic 
system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is a strong correlation between 
push and pull factors when analysing the propensity for the Javanese to become 
indentured immigrants. However, the so-called ‘push factors’ had more to do with 
migrant’ decisions to indenture themselves abroad than did the ‘pull’ factors of 
promised opportunities. The Javanese propensity to be indentured was connected to 
the changing economic, political and social circumstances in their homeland in Java, 
and to local and regional patterns of migration.
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For Java, indentured labour overseas was an extension of much larger patterns 
of local and regional labour migration. It was noted that circular migration from within 
Central and East Java was a very common feature. Within Central Java, there was 
substantial circular migration from Kedu, Cilacap, Tegal and Purwakarta in the western 
part, whereas in the east, the bulk of the movement was to major cities, such as 
Semarang, Surakarta, and Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, the most mobile group in East Java 
were the inhabitants of the small island of Madura, many of whom had either 
permanently or temporarily moved to mainland east Java, or other parts of Java.1
Many Javanese contract and indentured labourers were recruited in the three 
main coastal cities of North Java, i.e. Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, but the 
majority of the Javanese that emigrated came from inland Central and East Java. 
Scholars of Javanese migration observe that most coolies originated from areas 
surrounding Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In particular, this was from the corridors of 
Purworejo-Kutoarjo-Karangayar in the western part of South-Central Java, and the 
Jombang-Pare-Blitar in the Brantas Valley near Surabaya, in East Java.2 Likewise, for 
British North Borneo, the bulk of the coolies were obtained from these agricultural 
districts.3 In 1915, Karang Tembok and Kapasan produced the majority of the territory’s 
migrants, under the official Dutch permit, whereas 1916 and 1917 were dominated by 
immigrants from Pati, Purworejo, Semarang, Yogyakarta in Central Java, and Blitar in 
East Java (See Map 2). During the 1920s, statistical data lean heavily towards 
Kebumen as one of the main origins of Javanese emigrants. Despite heavy 
dependence on recruits from Central and East Java, labour returns also registered a 
proportion of Sundanese-speaking labourers, recruited from districts around Bandung 
and Batavia, and Madurese-speaking ones.4
1 Graeme J Hugo. ‘Circular M igration in Indonesia’ . Population and Development Review, 8,1 (March 
1982). pp. 59-83
2 V.J.H. Houben. ‘Before Departure: Coolie Labour Recruitment in Java, 1900-1942’ . in: Houben, 
Lindblad, et al. Coolie Labour, p. 30.
3 PRO: C0874/744. Report on Trip to Java by M .M . Clark.
4 SSA: N BC A  980. Data obtained from the ‘Returns o f  Javanese Labourers imported under the permit o f  
His Excellency the Governor General o f  the Netherlands, 1914-1927; Interviews w ith Surip
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The decision to migrate depended heavily on the domestic situation in Java. It 
has been argued elsewhere that the strong attachment of the Javanese to their village 
made them detest any form of permanent displacement, even in the face of bleak 
economic circumstances.5 Many were reluctant to leave their homes and families, 
preferring to stay on their small plots of land in the village. Nevertheless, during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, there was a growing 
desire to leave. Many Javanese began to accept commuting and non-permanent forms 
of mobility. Indentured labour was perceived as one form of the latter.6
This change in attitude was due primarily to the rising tide of population in Java, 
and consequent decline in the standard of living and economic opportunities. Most 
areas of supply were experiencing over-population and impoverishment. The 
population growth in nineteenth century Java was so rapid that the term ‘population 
explosion’ was used to define the phenomenon.7 Java’s population grew from
3,500,000 in 1795, to 25,370,000 in 1895, and 40,890,000 in 1930 (see Table 4.1).8 
Although studies conducted in the 1960s claimed that the rate of population growth had 
been overestimated, owing to unreliable figures, scholars did agree that there was a 
relatively high rate of increase.9 Thompson shows that the density of the population in 
Java in 1930 ranged from 800 to more than 2,000 persons per square mile, compared 
to the average density of 10.5 in Kalimantan, 58 in Celebes, 31 in Sumatra, and a 
much lower figure in the Moluccas.10
Scholars explain that this growth was due to the increasing influence of the 
Netherlands colonial system, where ‘repressive factors’ were removed, and ‘positive
Wongsusatiko. 12 March 2007, Imam Sarji Kartamawijoyo 14 March 2007, and Salamah Sajiran. 14 
March 2007.
5 Id a  B .  M a n tra .  Population Movement in Central Java. Y o g y a k a r ta :  G a d ja l i  M a d a  U n iv e r s i t y  P re ss . 1 9 8 1 . p . 9 .
6 Hugo. ‘Circular M igration’ , p. 69.
7 Peper. ‘Population Growth’ , p. 71; Keyfitz. ‘ Indonesian Population’ , p. 504.
8 Pelzer. ‘Tanah Sabrang’ . p. 133.
9 Koentjaraningrat. Javanese Culture. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1985. p. 4.; See studies by J. 
C. Breman (1963), Hilde Wander (1965) and W idjojo Nitisastro (1970).
10 Thompson. Labor Problems, p. 118.
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checks’ were enforced.11 Famines, internal wars, epidemic diseases, insect pests in 
crops, floods, and infant mortality, were gradually eradicated or controlled, through 
effective government organisation, and the introduction of modern Western principles 
and technology (e.g. transportation, hygiene and sanitation, irrigation).12 In other words, 
the level of living of the indigenous population had been greatly improved, with the 
introduction of better health services and the establishment of peace and order by the 
NEI administration. There was a decline in mortality and an increase in fertility.13 The 
obligation of the Dutch was further underpinned in 1899, when the Dutch 
parliamentarian C. Th. Van Deventer called for the Netherlands to repay ‘a debt of 
honour’ by putting the welfare of the natives first. Under this Ethical Policy, as it was 
known from 1901, the colonial authorities in Java pursued a policy of direct state 
intervention in economic life, in order to raise the prosperity of the natives. The policy of 
the Dutch served to enhance ‘irrigation, emigration, and education’.14
Table 4.1
Java and Madura: Population Growth, 1795 -1 9 3 0
Census
Year
Population size (in 1000’s) Census'Year Population size (in 
1000’s)
1795 3,500 1870 16,233
1802 3,647 1880 19,541
1810 3,770 1890 23,609
1815 4,499 1900 28,386
1830 7,005 1905 29,979
1845 9,374 1920 34,429
1860 12,514 1930 40,890
Source: Keyfitz. Indonesian Population’, p. 504.
This high population growth, as a reaction to this western penetration, was 
temporarily counteracted by the existing pattern of cultivation of virgin land. This was 
achieved by an increase in the lands’ productivity, and by the development of 
plantation economy. All this required labour forces.15 Irrigated rice cultivation, which 
spread outwards to both west and east from its ancient focus in Central Java, appeared
11 Pelzer. ‘Tanah Sabrang’ . p. 133; Peper. ‘ Indonesian Population’ , p. 71.
12 Pelzer. ‘Tanah Sabrang’ . p. 133.
13 Peper. ‘Population Growth’ , p. 71; A.J. Gooszen. A Demographic History o f  the Indonesian 
Archipelago, 1880-1942. Singapore: Institute o f  Southeast Asian Studies. 2000. pp. 4-5.
14 Lindblad. ‘The Late Colonial State’ , p. 117.
15 Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement, p. 165; Thompson. Labour Problems, p. 118.
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capable of absorbing the burgeoning population. Simultaneously, sugar came to be
intimately associated with subsistence agriculture in Central and East Java.18 The
situation in Java was best described by Geertz:
The expansion of one side, sugar cultivation, brings with it the expansion of the 
other, wet-rice growing. The more numerous and the better irrigated the terraces 
are, the more sugar can be grown; and the more people -  a seasonal, readily 
available, resident labour force (a sort of part-time proletariat) -  supported by 
these terraces during the non-sugar portion of the cycle, can grow sugar...The 
pleasing symmetry of this picture assumes that population increase was at least 
matched by the intensive or extensive growth of sawah [wet-rice cultivation].17
The situation changed in the interwar period. While on the one hand, the 
population problem was rapidly becoming a critical matter, on the other, unused arable 
land for cultivation was scarcely available. In some areas, cultivation had contributed to 
a serious soil erosion problem.18 Table 4.2 shows the ratios between the population 
and the cultivated area in Java and Madura. In Central and East Java in particular, 
where overcrowding was at its worst, the problem was more serious. Statistics reveal 
that there was an average of 535 persons per square kilometre of cultivated land in 
1930.19 In these densely settled areas, cultivated land was partitioned among individual 
freeholders. However, the extent of the partition was so great that the size of a farm 
was insufficient for the maintenance of one peasant family.20 In comparing the desa of 
Pekalongan within the regency of Pati, and in the residency of Djapara-Rembang in 
1868 and 1928, Burger revealed that the average peasant-proprietor had about 0.7 to 
1.1 hectares of sawah (rice field) in 1868, but only 0.5 hectares in 1928.21 Even here, 
the yield from the land depended upon the mercy of natural disasters, such as volcanic 
eruption and famine, notably in Pekalongan, southern Cirebon and Bodjonegoro.22
16 Keyfitz. ‘ Indonesian Population’ , p. 505.
17 Geertz. pp.55-58, cited from, Keyfitz. ‘ Indonesian Population’ , p. 506.
18 Thompson. Labor Problems. p. 118.
19 Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement, p. 164.
20 Wibo Peekema. ‘Colonization o f  Javanese in the Outer Provinces o f  the Netherlands East-Indies’ . The 
Geographical Journal. 101,4 (A pril 1943). p. 146.
21 Cited from Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement, pp. 166-167.
22 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. OrangJawa di Selangor, pp. 35-36.
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Table 4.2
Java and Madura: Densities of Native Population, by Residencies, 1930
Residency Per sq. km. 
of total area
Densities 
Per sq. km. of 
cultivated land*
Per sq. km. of 
sawah
West Java 244 496 1,038
Bantam 130 383 886
Batavia 329 452 784
Buitenzorg 191 551 1,205
Priangan 253 506 1,544
Cheribon 381 569 851
Middle Java 396 570 1,261
Banjuemas 386 562 1,635
Pekalongan 468 759 1,310
Kedu 457 548 1,485
Semarang 373 537 1,047
Japara-Rembang 311 466 961
Jogjakarta 492 615 2,351
Surakarta 425 554 1,328
Klaten 535 769 1,569
Surakarta 379 475 1,217
East Java 314 531 1,364
Bodjonegoro 291 469 805
Madiun 314 459 1,198
Kediri 351 605 1,597
Surabaya 540 762 1,198
Malang 310 551 1,769
Besuki 206 531 1,341
Madura 359 443 2,647
Java and Madura 316 535 1,248
Source: Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement, p. 164
In order to feed more mouths from the produce of a given territory, most of the 
farming land was either sharecropped or under intensive forms of agriculture. 
Sharecropping was usually associated with rice cultivation due to its steady market, 
and its ability to maximise a man and his family’s labour during cultivation. The system 
worked like this: an owner would hand over an area of sawah to another farmer, in 
exchange for a percentage of the yield. Hence, landless individuals, or those without 
sufficient land of their own, were permitted to grow a staple food crop, without having to 
become wage earners or leave their place within the life of the community.23 Likewise, 
sharecropping served as another source of income for the landowners. Risks were 
shared, and both parties were equally interested in the outcome. To some extent, plots 
of land previously yielding one crop a year were made to yield two; to those with two
23 Thompson. Labor Problems, p. 133.
crops, a third was added.24 This reflected to some extent the flexibility and adaptability 
of the system. It also meant that the peasant and his children were free to move back 
and forth between rice and an export crop. Simultaneously, it could accommodate a 
greater amount of labour.25
This mode of production and social system, whereby two households were 
largely dependent upon the agricultural output from a single piece of land, and living 
slightly above subsistence level, was what Clifford Geertz has termed ‘shared 
poverty’.26 Wertheim and The Siauw Giap identify it as ‘disguised unemployment’.27 On 
the surface, the labour intensive character of sharecropping portrayed an admirable 
picture of a high employment rate, but the reality was anything but. The scarcity of land 
and other means of earning an income meant that Javanese landowners were not 
reluctant to offer employment to a non-family member, although the land could do with 
fewer workers. The reason for this phenomenon is clear. To a Javanese farmer, apart 
from his village and land, he was also tied to the other members by kin and 
neighbourhood relationships, which defined a complex of reciprocal rights and duties 
between everyone in the village.28
The government also encouraged the industrialisation of Java. This meant 
providing a new earning capacity for large numbers of the population. Nevertheless, 
the industrialisation programme in Java had to be controlled carefully, because its 
development depended heavily on the demands of the importing countries. As Wibo 
Peekema notes, ‘Java, like the Netherlands East-1 ndies in general, principally exports 
agricultural and mineral raw materials, and is to a great extent dependent on its 
customers, such as some European countries, America, Japan and India, who are only
24 W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap. ‘ Social Change in Java, 1900-1930’ . Pacific Affairs. 35,3 
(Autumn 1962). p. 228.
25 Keyfitz. ‘ Indonesian Population’ , p. 506.
26 C lifford  Geertz. The Social Context o f Economic Change: An Indonesian Case Study. M.J.T., 
Cambridge Mass. 1956. p. 13.
27 Wertheim and The. ‘Social Change’ , p. 228.
28 A lice G. Dewey. ‘Trade and Social Control in Java’ . The Journal o f  the Royal Anthropological Institute 
o f  Great Britain and Ireland. 92,2 (Jul. — Dec. 1962). p. 178.
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willing to pay for their imports by profitable exports of industrial commodities’ .29 
Moreover, even when industrialisation did take place, this happened at a slow pace, 
and was limited to urban areas. This exposed the unwillingness on the part of the 
Dutch to sponsor industrialisation to ‘sponge up’ excess population beyond certain 
carefully defined limits. Internal migration from rural to urban areas occurred on a large 
scale. However, job opportunities in the cities were insufficient to absorb the 
burgeoning population, thereby contributing to increased unemployment.30
In his study on circular migration in Java, Hugo concludes that less than half of 
the rural population in Java owned, or had direct access to sufficient agricultural land, 
in order to obtain subsistence. Many of the households were unable to earn sufficient 
income, neither in the city nor the village, to support themselves and their 
dependents.31 With this little amount, they had to pay their taxes, and at the same time, 
obtain basic supplies, such as salt, kerosene and salted fish. The types of food 
consumed, i.e. rice, tauhu or tempe (soya-based food), vegetable, and sambaI (spicy 
sauce), reflected the low standard of living of rural Javanese. During the harvest 
season, it was noted that Javanese peasants ate twice daily, but in difficult times, a 
small amount of rice, corn and vegetable was sufficient to satisfy hunger pangs.32 
Neither industrialisation, nor the plantation economy, were able to solve their problem, 
whose numbers were increasing yearly.
The colonial administration felt that some parts of Java had become so densely 
populated that only organised mass emigration to scarcely populated areas would 
remedy the problem. The government considered it wise to resettle the Javanese in 
agricultural villages in the Outer Islands, particularly Sumatra and Kalimantan, so as to 
relieve the pressure on the population. The first colonisation experiment took place in
29 Peekema. ‘Colonization’ , p. 146.
30 Houben. ‘Before Departure’ , p. 29
31 Graeme J. Hugo. ‘Circular M igration in Indonesia’ . Population and Development Review. 8,1 (March 
1982). p. 70.
32 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Orang Jawa di Selangor, pp. 35-36; Interview w ith Surip Wongsusatiko. 12 
March 2007.
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1905. A group of Javanese from the residency of Kedu were settled in the Lampung 
Residency of South Sumatra, where conditions appeared more favourable .33 Not only 
was the place considered to be in close proximity to Java, but it had a plentiful supply 
of fertile virgin soil. Furthermore, the risk of infringing on established land rights of the 
sparse local population was small or non-existent.34 After Lampung, many more 
experiments were organised in the ensuing years.
Under this government sponsored emigration scheme, the Javanese settlers 
were provided with free transportation and financial assistance during the first years in 
their new environment, under the supervision of experienced civil officials. The 
objective of this experiment was two pronged. First, the government hoped that this 
sponsored settlement programme would relieve the population pressure. Second, it 
hoped to change the labour system in the Outer Islands, particularly by replacing 
contract workers with free workers drawn from among emigrants to the Outer Islands, 
and former Javanese coolies who settled in peripheral villages.35 By the end of 1940, 
despite the high costs involved and the extensive preparations and government 
encouragement of migration, the total number of government-sponsored Javanese 
farming migrants, including children, in the Outer Islands, was slightly above 210,000 
(See Table 4.3) .36 More than half were in Lampung, and the rest were scattered around 
Borneo and Celebes. The total was just a small fraction of Java’s population growth, 
between 1901 and 1941.
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the development of 
plantation agriculture in the Outer Islands, Malaya and British North Borneo, amongst 
others, saw the recruitment of Javanese coolies to supply the labour force, which the 
indigenous population would and could not supply. Indentured labour thus provided an
33 Gooszen. A Demographic History, p. 35.
34 Peekema. ‘Colonization’ , p .146.
35 Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement, p. 191.
36 Gooszen. A Demographic History, p. 35.
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alternative for the poverty-stricken Javanese. The difficult conditions in rural Java 
provided a solid ‘push’ for emigration to British North Borneo. The unbearable situation 
in Java, which put a ‘stress on the Javanese food supplies’, and which led one to 
question whether to live or die, made the decision to emigrate far from difficult.37 
Hence, it was not surprising that the majority of Javanese indentured labourers who 
arrived in British North Borneo were ‘amongst the poorest and least nourished portion 
of the Javanese population’ .38 Thousands of able-bodied peasants, who had to go 
without their own land in Java had preferred to eke out a precarious livelihood as 
indentured labourers. To them, the total sum of money income they could earn as 
wages for plantation work was probably greater than the sum that could be derived 
from indigenous cultivation. This income, too, could feed more people.39 Some even 
took their entire family with them .40 Nevertheless, a point to note was that the demand 
for plantation labour under indenture did not increase at the same rate. Indeed, the 
demand rapidly dwindled in times of strict economy, or even temporarily ceased to 
exist.41
Table 4.3
Population of Transmigration Colonies, 1910-1940
1910 1920 1930 1935 1940
Sumatra 5,414 19,814 40,141 70,333 185,004
Borneo - - - - 2,896
Celebes - - - - 22,779
Total 5,414 19,814 40,141 70,333 210,679
Source: Gooszen. A Demographic History, p. 35.
Overall, the immigration of Javanese indentured labourers to British North 
Borneo can be well explained by economic theories of migration. These theories apply 
classic supply and demand paradigms to migration at an individual level, the household 
unit, and in determining where employment opportunities are for migrants.42 With 
problems such as land scarcity, over-population, poverty, and high levels of
17 PRO: C0874/753. Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary. 26 September 1920.
<s PRO: 00874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting o f the NBPA. 11 September 1926.
,l' Peekema. ‘Colonization’ , p. 146.
40 Interview with Imam Sarji kartamawijoyo o f M ile 12, Sandakan, Sabah. 14 March 2007.
41 Peekema. ‘ Colonization’ , p. 146
42 Douglas S. Massey, et al. ‘Theories o f International Migration: A Review and Appraisal’ . Population 
and Development Review. 19,3 (September 1993). pp. 433-438
unemployment in Java, desperate or upwardly mobile Javanese looked at migration as 
a ‘cost-benefit decision’, a movement undertaken to maximise income, whether at the 
individual level, or as a collective decision, where it minimised risk to family income.43 
For the desperate Javanese, indentured labour became an option, as the system 
guaranteed jobs to the indentured for a specific period, regardless of what happened in 
the economy as a whole .44 The standard practise of offering advances upon agreeing 
to be recruited also strengthens this argument. Advances were used to provide for the 
family left behind, or to pay off accumulated debts. Signing a contract of indenture was 
a decision made by the Javanese emigrants after weighing up the labour opportunities, 
or lack of it, in Java, and those in British North Borneo. The move was supposed to be 
an investment in their economic future.
To complement the economic factor, social linkages with family and friends also 
played an important role in Javanese becoming indentured emigrants. This network 
theory, or the concept of ‘chain migration’, reflects the fact that there was interaction at 
the level of the individual and community. According to Price, chain migration focuses 
on the contacts of immigrants with relatives and friends in their home countries as an 
important source of further immigration. In other words, migrants establish 
interpersonal ties in their place of origin and destination that increased the likelihood of 
others migrating to the same destination.45 This explains why a significant number of 
emigrants to British North Borneo came from specific areas of Java, particularly Karang 
Tembok, Kapasan, Blitar, Purworejo and Kebumen. Massey observes that networking 
decreases the risk of migration by making it more likely that employment can be gained 
through connections in the place of origin, in this case, Java .46 Having family members 
or friends in British North Borneo, or having had interactions with returning migrants 
from the area, increased the likelihood of potential Javanese emigrants actually
43 Stephen Castles and Mark J. M ille r. The Age o f  Migration. Third Edition. Hampshire: Pal grave 
Macmillan. 2003. p. 22.
44 P. Emmer. ‘European Expansion and Unfree Labour: An Introduction’ . Itinerario. 21,1 (1997). p. 13; 
Engerman. ‘Contract Labour, Sugar and Technology’ , pp. 645 and 647.
45 Charles A. Price. Southern Europeans in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 1963. p. 122.
46 Massey, et al. ‘Theories o f  International M igration’ , p. 449.
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migrating to that location. Moreover, as argued by Castles and Miller, networks based 
on familial ties, or country of origin provide social support and ‘make the migratory 
process safer and more manageable for the migrants and their families '.47
Aside from this economic basis, Javanese emigration was also generated for 
socio-political reasons. Simultaneous economic exploitation and population pressure 
gave rise to social and political unrest in many parts of rural Java. The penetration of 
the colonial economy, (particularly under the Cultivation System and Libera! System) 
and its impact on rural Java reached a climax during the course of the nineteenth 
century, resulting in increased social movements.48 Between 1900 and the 1920s, 
sporadic movements of peasant unrest were prevalent, notably in Tanggerang, 
Pamanukan, Sukabumi, Ciasem, Kuningan (West Java); Pekalongan, Gombong, 
Semarang (Central Java); Modjokerto, Sidoarjo, Kediri, and Jember (East Java).49 
Some resulted in violent clashes with the colonial authorities. The policies of the 
colonial rulers introduced a new legal and social relationship pertaining to agrarian and 
labour matters, which affected the lives of the indigenous people. Most significantly, the 
excessive demands for unpaid services and the levying of new taxes contributed to the 
feeling of discontent among the Javanese people.50 Tirtosudarmo argues that the 
tendency to impose sugar cultivation on some land, and the compulsory contribution of 
labour-tax (i.e. rice and other products, and labour services) by peasants, had a direct 
bearing on social unrest among the population.51 The extreme pressure and burden 
might have taken its toll, and subsequently many Javanese, particularly peasants from 
rural Java, left for destinations that were free from similar predicaments.52
47 Castles and M iller. The Age o f  Migration, p. 28.
48 Sartono Kartodirdjo. Protest movements in rural Java: a study o f  agrarian unrest in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. London: Oxford University Press [for] the Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore. 1973.
49 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo. ‘Cross-border Migration in Indonesia and the Nunukan Tragedy’ , in: Aris 
Ananta, et. al. International Migration in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS. 2004, p. 314.
50 Vincent Houben. ‘Java in the 19th Century: Consolidation o f a Territorial State’ , in: Howard Dick, et al. 
The Emergence o f a National Economy. 2002. pp. 64-67.
51 Tirtosudarmo. ‘ Cross-border’ , p. 314.
52 W idjojo Nitisastro. Population trends in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1970. pp. 39, 51- 
52
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in connection with social unrest and popular protest, the rising tide of 
nationalism served as a push factor for Javanese emigration. Some Javanese left their 
homeland for political reasons, ranging from flights from justice due to political 
affiliation, to fear of persecution for ‘criminal’ activity. Political parties began to emerge 
in 1908, and the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), formerly known as Sarekat Dagang 
Islam (Islamic Trading Union), developed into ‘popular political consciousness of a 
radical tendency’, whereas the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI (Perserikatan, later 
Partai Komunis Indonesia) ‘quickly became prominent in the young trade union 
movement’ .53 Mounting tensions during the 1910s exploded with Communist uprisings 
in Java and Sumatra in 1926-27, resulting in a much more stringent approach 
undertaken by the colonial government towards such political organisations and people 
affiliated with them .54 Uprisings and demonstrations were violently suppressed, and all 
forms of opposition to Dutch rule were curtailed through intense surveillance and 
repression by the Political Intelligence Service (Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst).55
Under extreme pressure, some Javanese escaped persecution, and sought 
refuge by becoming indentured labourers overseas. Some even assumed new 
identities at the receiving country.56 It was discovered that certain riots organised by 
Javanese indentured labourers in British North Borneo were instigated by runaway 
political criminals from Java. Some of the coolies involved in the 1928 fracas at 
Sandala Estate in Sandakan, for example, were former school educators or 
intellectuals, and were probably associated with the Sarekat Islam or the PKI. They 
were accused of being political criminals who had committed the killing of white men 
during a communist uprising in Java .57 Hence, the system of indentured labour served 
as a blessing for these people. As Emmer noted, there could be the possibility of
53 Lindblad. ‘The Late Colonial State’ , pp. 121-122.
54 John Ingleson. ‘ Sutomo, the Indonesian Study Club and Organised Labour in Late Colonial Surabaya’ . 
Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies. 39,1 (2008). p. 31.
55 H.A. Poeze. ‘Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies’, In Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial 
State in Indonesia, pp. 229-245.
56 Interview w ith Muslim bin Samsudin o f  Malaysia Palm Oil Board Kota Kinabalu Branch, the son o f 
indentured labourer, Amat Salikin (a.k.a. Amat Samsudin bin Sastrowijoyo). 16 March 2007.
57 PRO: C 0874/511. OAG to the President o f  BNBC. 5 October 1928.
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indentured labourers viewing their contract of indentureship as an ‘alternative to the 
death penalty, long periods of imprisonment or social mistreatment at home.’58
Another vital push factor involved personal reasons normally associated with 
Javanese social norms and cultures. Some migrated, because of behaviour that defied 
traditional norms, in this case, breaking of social and moral codes. They felt ashamed 
and many took off from their villages, either temporarily, or permanent, and sought a 
fresh start somewhere else. ‘Vices’ included being forced into marriage, forbidden love 
affairs, stealing, losing in the iocal village election, and at the extreme end, ‘breaking 
wind’ at the wrong place and at the wrong time .59 Among the Javanese, migration of 
this kind was called minggat, whereby an individual left the village without the 
knowledge of the village community. Travelling tended to be light, taking whatever was 
sufficient for the journey.60
Personal reasons also involved the spirit of adventurism, the desire to travel 
and explore, and the search for new experiences. This was embodied in their concept 
of merantau, which has been defined as ‘leaving one’s cultural territory voluntarily 
whether for a short or long time, with the aim of earning a living, or seeking further 
knowledge or experience, normally with the intention of returning home’ .61 Although 
merantau was a very popular notion among the Minangkabau people of Sumatra, it 
was also notable among the Javanese. In his extensive study of mobility in two villages 
in Yogyakarta, Central Java, Mantra explains that non-permanent migration was of 
such significance among the Javanese community there that merantau, among other 
concepts, emerged to describe the movement.62 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin further 
emphasised the notion of merantau among the Javanese indentured labourers in
58 Emmer. ‘European Expansion’ , p. 10.
59 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Orcing Jctwci di Selangor. pp. 52-54.; Hoefte, In Place o f  Slavery, p. 52.
60 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Orang Jawa di Selangor, p. 52.
61 M . Naim. ‘Voluntary Migration in Indonesia’ , in: Daniel Kubat and Anthony H. Richmond (eds.) 
Internal migration: the New World and the Third World. London: Sage Publications [for] the 
International Sociological Association, p. 150.
62 Ida B. Mantra. Population Movement in Central Java. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press. 1981. p. 9.
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British North Borneo. In his study of the settlement patterns of the Javanese in the east 
and west coast of British North Borneo, Khazin contends that the temporary movement 
embodied in the merantau tradition, for the purpose of seeking employment, including 
inter-island and overseas circulation, was one of the main reasons for Javanese 
migration to Sabah. This was due to perception that the territory was part of the tanah 
sabrang, or the ‘Outer Islands’ in the Malay archipelago.63
Recruitment of Javanese Labourers
The introduction of Javanese indentured labour in British North Borneo witnessed the 
distinct role of the NEI government as a mobilising agent for colonial capitalism, and 
the concurrent role of the Company government as an arbiter of the local labour 
market, and a dependent importer of Javanese labour for the plantation industry. 
Theoretically, the states functioned as controllers and regulators of the conditions of 
the coolie trade between the source country and the colonial labour market. 
Nevertheless, in reality the role of both governments was mainly of a supervisory 
nature, and the responsibility to recruit, contract, and transport the Javanese 
indentured labourers were entrusted to private entrepreneurs. In order to control abuse 
prevailing in the recruiting industry in Java, the NEI government issued the 1909 and 
1914 Recruitment Ordinances (Wervingsordonnantien).64 The Recruitment Ordinance 
of 1914 was amended in 1915, 1920 and 1927. The observance of the rules was the 
task of officials of the Labour Inspectorate, namely the recruitment commissionaires 
(wervingscommissarissen). Recruiting in Java could only be carried out by licensed or 
professional recruiters, and to be eligible for a licence as a recruiting agent or 
henchman, the applicant had to be of a good reputation.65
The hierarchy of emigration officials involved the Labour Inspectorate and the 
recruitment commissionaires (responsible to the government of NEI), the emigration
63 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. ‘Perantau Jawa di Sabah’ , pp 229-243
64 Houben. ‘Before Departure’ , p. 32.
65 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from A.C. Pearson’s Report on Labour in the FMS. 27 October 1913.
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agent paid for by the Company government, with its cadre of licensed recruiting officers 
(and field recruiters known as wereg), the medical officers at the depot, the Dutch 
Consul in Singapore, and the emigration agent for British North Borneo in Singapore. 
Meanwhile, at the receiving end, in charge of the allocation and distribution of the 
immigrants after arrival in British North Borneo, was the government Protectorate 
Department. It was headed by a chief immigration officer, who went by the title of 
Protector of Labour, and was assisted by a Deputy Protector, a number of Assistant 
Protectors (cum District Officers), plus clerical officers and interpreters. On the scene 
too, were the Principal Medical Officer (PMO) whose job specification was to inspect 
the health of coolies upon arrival, and a Javanese orderly who lived at the government 
coolie depot, and was responsible for meeting all newly imported Javanese 
(government-recruited) on arrival and escorting them to the estates on the west coast 
and interior.66 The activities of the British North Borneo immigration officials were 
regulated by local labour and immigration ordinances.
The decision on the size of the quarterly requisition for Javanese indentured 
labourers for the territory was made in three to four stages. Sometimes employers, 
through the agencies of the Chambers of Commerce and Planters’ Association, were 
asked by the Company government to state their requirements.67 However, most of the 
time, individual employers would send in their application for immigrants for the 
following quarter to the Protector of Labour, indicating their demands for the next two 
months or so .68 After this, the Protector of Labour had to decide how many to 
requisition from Java based on the numbers permitted by the NEI government, and on 
any outstanding orders from the previous quarter.69 Third, the approval of the Governor 
had to be obtained for each requisition. These sets of calculations were made solely 
with reference to conditions in British North Borneo, without considering how far Java
66 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate and Labour Department for 1914.
67 PRO: C0874/744. Governor. Pearson to Chairman BNBC. 14 A pril 1913.
68 PRO: C0874/753. Governor to President BNBC. 15 January 1921; C0874/552. Minutes o f Committee 
Meeting o f the NBCC. 25 November 1916.
69 See Statistics o f  Requisitions in, PRO: C0874: 744, 753, 752. Javanese Immigration, relevant years.
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was able to supply the numbers desired. Once approved by the Governor, the 
Secretariat proceeded to place the orders with the recruiting agent in Java or 
Singapore .70 The labourers were recruited on the Governor-General’s permit, in the 
name of the Company government, without the necessity of mentioning the names of 
the estates for which the coolies were intended.71 On arrival in British North Borneo, 
they were distributed to the estates that requisitioned them.
Recruiting for British North Borneo was undertaken by several private licensed 
professional firms (often Europeans) throughout the indentured labour period. Messrs. 
Soesman & Co. of Semarang was the first private recruiting firm to recruit Javanese 
coolies for the territory in 1914. The president commissioner was F.J.H. Soesman. 
Established in 1898, with a capital of 300,000 guilders, Soesman dealt with various 
kinds of businesses, including auctions, commission sales, second-hand furniture, 
cattle for slaughter, beast of burden, and coolies.72 Hence, the company was chosen 
by British North Borneo, based on its reputation as an established firm, and ‘they know 
the business right through ’ .73 Soesman dominated almost all recruitment in Central 
Java.74
In 1915, the Labour Association Ltd. of Singapore joined the bandwagon in 
procuring Java-recruited labourers after opening a recruiting establishment in Batavia. 
With the motto ‘We never lose a client’, the Association built its reputation by supplying 
all types of contract labourers (among others, the Javanese, Chinese and Banjarese) 
to needy planters in the Far East.75 For the Company government, the Labour 
Association became an alternative source in obtaining Javanese labour, thus
70 PRO: C0874/753. Governor to President BNBC. 15 January 1921; SSA: N B C A  1119. C.D. Martyn to 
Government Secretary. 14 December 1923.
71 PRO: C0874/744. J. van L ie r to M .M . Clark. No 291. 1913.
72 Campo. Engines o f  Empire, p.358; Yoko Hayashi. ‘ Agencies and Clients’ , pp. 6-7.
73 PRO: C0874/744. Report on Trip to Java by M .M . Clark, 15 M a rc h - 15 May 1913.Para 11.
74 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate and Labour Department, 1914.
75 See advertisement in the BNBH. 1 February 1913. p. ii.
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preventing the territory from dealing exclusively with Soesman & Co .76 Recruiting 
agents in Java forwarded the recruits to the Association, rather than to Messrs. 
Mansfield & Co. (controlled and principally owned by a British firm, Alfred Holt & Co., 
based in Liverpool),77 as in the case of the coolies recruited directly by Soesman. 
Coolies for the Association were recruited either in Batavia, or in Semarang. In the 
1920s, the Labour Association remained the main recruiting agent for British North 
Borneo. There was a short stint with Messrs. A.F. Hildebrands of Semarang in 1929. 
Since commercial recruitment only served to enrich the respective agency, A.G. 
Vreede, the head of the Labour Office in Java, proposed the abolition of this type of 
recruitment altogether.78 In 1930, both Soesman and Hildebrands companies fell into 
the hands of the General Deli Emigration Bureau, Algemeen Delisch Emigrati- Kantoor, 
(ADEK), which utilised the system of ‘personal recruitment’ through laukeh labourers 
(old hands) 79
Initially, the ADEK recruited exclusively within the boundaries of the NEI. When 
most of its Sumatran members insisted on singkeh (new) labourers, it decided to 
undertake recruiting for foreign countries in order to provide an outlet for laukeh 
recruits.80 The regions covered by the ADEK expanded beyond east Sumatra after 
World W ar 1, and various enterprises and local governments enrolled as external 
members, so that they could acquire labourers with ADEK’s assistance. Likewise, at 
the urge of its own Planters’ Association, the Company government instructed its 
officer, C.D. Martyn, and the offices of James Morton of Messrs. Harrisons and 
Crossfield (Medan), to look into the possibility of utilising the services of ADEK to aid 
recruitment.81 The employers in British North Borneo (apart from the NBCC, west coast
76 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from Governor’ s Confidential Letter to Chairman BNBC. 18 November 
1913.
77 W.G. H uff. The Economic Growth o f Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century. 
Singapore: Cambridge University Press. 1994. p. 146.
78 Houben, ‘Before Departure’ , p. 34.
79 PRO: C0874/752. Governor to President BNBC. 10 June 1929.
80 PRO: C0874/752. C.F.C. Macaskie to Government Secretary. 27 A pril 1928.
81 PRO: C0874/753. Governor to President BNBC. 2 April 1924.
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branch, who still preferred the services of the Labour Association) 82 believed it could 
bring the same success to the territory, especially in providing ‘a better class of 
labour’ .83 In January 1926, the ADEK agreed to accept British North Borneo as an 
external member, but the Dutch authorities refused to endorse the arrangement, and 
deliberated on the idea of allowing ADEK to ‘recruit for foreign countries’ .84 Sanction 
was finally given in 1930. Since ADEK had offices to conduct business, and to 
accommodate emigrants in the ports of Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, and in the 
hinterland, it became the sole recruiting agent for British North Borneo under the 
government permit.
The European recruiting agents were sometimes able to despatch substantial 
numbers of emigrants, although the measure of their success in relation to the 
numbers requested by British North Borneo varied. The search for recruits was 
intensified through competition between the several agencies seeking emigrants from 
Java. One weakness in the system was that official recruitment was not a job which 
attracted those of the highest character, and many of the better class firms in Java 
‘would not touch it with a 40 foot pole’ .85 Since it was necessary to make a deliberate 
effort to induce people to emigrate from Java, the system of recruiting depended on a 
body of licensed professional recruiters, with the help of henchmen (handlangers or 
wereg) and Javanese assistants, to move through the towns, and more particularly, the 
villages and rural areas of the appropriate regions of Java, enlisting volunteers. The 
recruiters were paid by results, and as time passed, they came to operate over an 
increasingly wide area, especially around Central and East Java.
Since the recruiters had a financial incentive to provide as many recruits as 
possible, it was inevitable that some forms of deception and forceful methods would be
82 SSA: N BC A 1119. R.K. Hardwick to C.D. Martyn. 28 September 1925.
83 SSA: N BC A 1119. T.A. Ball to Governor Pearson. 1 October 1925.
84 PRO: C0874/752. Govr’s 351. 18 June 1928.
85 PRO: C0874/744. Report on trip to Java by M.M.Clark. 15 March - 15 May 1913.
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reported. Their Javanese henchmen, or wereg, were largely unsupervised, subject only 
to a very loose and informal control by the recruiting agent for whom they worked. 
Greed motivated them, because they were paid approximately 40 to 50 guilders per 
labourer as a premium .86 Some Javanese emigrants claimed they had been deceived 
and tricked into signing indenture contracts. However, there were no complaints of 
kidnapping.87 There were also recruits who claimed that they had been ‘charmed’, and 
that the use of black magic accounted for their departure from Java. They claimed no 
recollection of the recruitment process itself, and were only aware of their 
circumstances when they had been shipped away. In the end, accepting one’s fate 
may have seemed easier than retracing the steps taken .88 Although there were coolies 
who happened to prefer working at these estates, there were those who would not 
have made the journey, had they known the facts.89
Complaints of misrepresentation by recruiters were apparently common, as 
weregs no doubt exaggerated the conditions of service in British North Borneo. 
Potential recruits were informed that they were going to ‘rich’ destinations, and they 
embarked on the journey because of the ‘chances of making money’ .90 In fact, the 
weregs normally operated with promises and happy stories about the supposedly 
wonderful life in tanah sabrang, which became the characteristic tool of their trade .91 
Recruits were also promised a comfortable life, high wages, and the opportunity to 
become rich.92 Women were enticed with promises of marriage, and many availed 
themselves of recruitment. On the latter, to some extent the weregs were telling the
86 Yoko Hayashi. ‘ Agencies and Clients: Labour Recruitment in Java, 1870s-1950s\
87 C.W.C. Parr. Report o f  the Commission appointed into the conditions o f  Indentured Labour in the 
Federated Malay States. No. 11 o f  1910. p. 2.
88 Sim ilar accounts o f  abuses, deception and other malpractices on the recruitment o f  Javanese to 
Sumatra, Surinam, and the Federated Malay States, had been reported by various authors. See writings o f 
Stoler. Capitalism and Confrontation 1985; Breman. Taming the Coolie Beast 1989; de Waal Malefijt. 
The Javanese o f  Surinam. 1963; Hoefte. In Place o f Slavery. 1998; Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Orang Jawa di 
Selangor. 1984.
89 See the contradictory preferences in, Evidence No. 8 and Evidence No. 10 o f Appendix B. Report o f 
Commission by C.W.C. Pan’. 1910. p. 17.
90 See Evidence No. 6 and Evidence No. 9 o f Appendix B. Report o f the Commission by C.W.C. Parr. 
1910. p. 17.
91 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. ‘Javanese Labour and the Development o f Malaya’ , p. 29.
92 Interview w ith Salamah Sajiran (67 years old). Kg. Gum-Gum, Sandakan. 14 March 2007.
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truth because the majority of Javanese women recruits ended up married to Javanese 
men or local men during their life time in British North Borneo.93
Such descriptions of malpractices, abuses, black magic and other negative 
circumstances probably applied to a distinct minority of indentured emigrants, whereas 
most indentured labourers were recruited because of the ‘push and pull’ factors. The 
conditions in rural Java show that most Javanese indentured labourers for British North 
Borneo had been victims of economic and social misery rather than of deceit and 
abuse. Indeed as Northrup argues, there were probably many potential recruits who 
attempted to deceive recruiters about their qualifications.94 Depressed with the situation 
in Java, desperate emigrants signed up voluntarily due to the guaranteed jobs being 
offered and a fresh start of life in a new place. Likewise, the recruitment of some 
Javanese was made even easier by the fact that recruits received advances before 
sailing, which enabled them to buy themselves out of debt (mostly incurred by 
gambling, opium smoking, tax, marriage, etc.), and provide for the family members left 
behind. The amount of advances given was 5 guilders to a single coolie and 10 
guilders to a married coolie.95 An additional advance of $7 awaited them upon 
disembarkation in British North Borneo.96 Hence, it was not so much a case of being 
‘coerced’ into signing indentures, but more of need, gullibility and the lure of cash in 
hand through advances that propelled the Javanese to emigrate .97 In a worst case 
scenario, they could still fall back on the free repatriation clause at the end of their 
contracts, and return to Java should they find British North Borneo undesirable to live 
in.
93 See Chapters 7 and 8 fo r more details.
94 Northrup. Indentured Labor. p. 57.
95 PRO: C0874/744. Copy o f  despatch. 11 May 1914.
96 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Article 4 o f Model-Werkcontract. 18 November 1913; PRO: C0874/752. 
Article 4 o f  W orking Contract 1925.
97
PRO: CO874/1061. Minutes, Cable from the Governor, New Labour Ordinance. 3 October 1932.
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All potential migrants had to be brought by the recruiter before the local colonial 
official. The officer was required to examine each intending emigrant as to his 
comprehension of the proposed engagement and willingness to fulfil it. The terms of 
the agreement would be explained to them in their native language .98 The officer would 
refuse to register the proposed emigrant if he felt that the latter did not understand the 
nature of the engagement, or had been induced by fraud or misrepresentation to enter 
into it. The coolie had to sign a declaration in the presence of the local colonial official, 
agreeing to the contents of the work contract, and indicating that he or she was 
emigrating voluntarily. However, Houben contends that this procedure was not free 
from misconduct. Some coolies were presented before a colonial officer of a different 
district, instead of to the one in the coolies’ district. Therefore, this practice had 
‘thwarted control of the willingness to emigrate of the person concerned and on his or 
her true identity right from the outset’ .99
The potential emigrants were then assembled in coolie sheds in the interior of 
Java, or in one of the towns. According to the law, the treatment of coolies inside the 
depots had to be proper, and the coolies had to be provided with a suitable transfer to 
the coastal depot. Yet, regardless of the law, the coolies were confined and intimidated 
by the personnel of the depot by making them believe that the police would arrest them 
if they ran away. Moreover, the depot master had actually segregated the coolies into 
those who were mateng or ‘mature’, to face the interview with the local colonial official, 
and then signed the contract, and those mentah or ‘immature’ ones who had still to be 
prepared to minimise the chances of them rejecting the contract.100 Malpractices by 
depot masters where the coolies were housed were understandable, as they earned 
around 20  guilders per capita each from guarding the coolies.101
98 See this declaration in Appendix 1, 2, and 3.
99 Houben. ‘Before Departure’ . 1999. p. 31.
100 Houben. ‘Before Departure’ . 1999. p. 31.
101 Yoko Hayashi. ‘ Agencies and Clients’ , p. 9.
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The migrants were then transported by train to selected government-approved 
depots in the port of departure. Again, the depot master would act as a guard to keep 
them from deserting. In the coastal depot, a medical inspection ensued, at the cost of 
the recruiting agent. Usual tests involved the heart, lungs, spleen and eyes. There was 
no detailed examination for venereal disease, although if acutely obvious, venereal 
disease would disqualify the applicant. After the first general examination, every 
labourer had to be vaccinated against typhoid, cholera and meningitis, and given 20 
grams of quinine. Once passed as fit by the doctor, the coolie was provided with a suit 
of clothes, rice bowls and plates for his food, and had his or her photograph taken .102 
There were reports that the medical officers sometimes had to check more than one 
hundred people in ninety minutes, and at other times, they were absent during the 
check-ups, and supplied pre-signed medical certificates.103 This often compromised the 
health quality of the migrants, as evidenced by the constant grumbling by British North 
Borneo employers of the poor health conditions of the indentured coolies recruited from 
Java.104
The coolie had to counter-verify the medical certificate with finger prints. The 
photographs and finger prints were scrutinised by officials in charge of the records. 
Should they suspect any applicant of being undesirable, it was easy to check the 
records to ascertain whether the coolie had previously been rejected, or whether he 
had been repatriated as an undesirable. If irregularity occurred, the recruiter who 
forwarded him from the interior recruiting station would be fined f. 1 0 , of which half went 
to the ‘scrutineer’. This system was supposed to prevent re-engaging ‘undesirables’. 
After the medical check-up, the coolie was subsequently examined by a government 
officer at the time of signing the contract. The authorities read the contract to the 
recruits in the Javanese language, and once again, the recruits had to profess their
102 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. Prot 9/24. 14 March 1924.
103 Vincent Houben. “ Menyang Tanah Sabrang’ : Javanese Coolie Migration in-and outside Indonesia 
1900-1940’ . Paper presented at the Conference ‘The Malay Archipelago and the W orld Economy, 1790s- 
1990s’ . Canberra, 23-27 November 1992, p. 5, c.f. Hoefte. In Place o f  Slavery. 1998. p. 54.
104 SSA: N BC A  1119. Memo. Re Javanese Labour (from Java). Bandoeng. From T.A. Ball.
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willingness to be recruited. Once all the necessary documentation had been signed, 
the recruit was yet again questioned at the port when embarking on his journey.105 
However, the assistant-resident of police at Semarang once declared in 1914 that most 
of the regulations imposed were worthless, since recruits were too uneducated to 
understand.106
Finally, the respective recruitment agency would arrange for the recruits to 
board the ship at Semarang port, and forward them to its agent in Singapore by the first 
available steamer. Soesman would contact either Messrs. Mansfield & Co., or the 
Labour Association. A week before the departure of the steamer, a cable would be sent 
to the agent in Singapore, stating the probable number of coolies to be shipped.107 In 
Singapore, the Javanese recruited by the Labour Association were temporarily housed 
at a coolie depot in Kallang.108 The coolies were normally dispatched to British North 
Borneo immediately after the formality of the last inspection by the Dutch Consul- 
General was over.109 However, if there was any irregularity in steamship services to 
British North Borneo, the coolies were quarantined at St. John’s Island, which at that 
time, was considered to be the world’s largest quarantine station after Ellis Island, New 
York .110 Here again, the coolies were subjected to intense monitoring to avoid desertion 
to the hustle and bustle of Singapore, which from the start, was the target destination 
for most Javanese. The containment policy of the Singapore agents were probably 
good, because reports from the Protectorate Department indicated that no incidences 
of desertions occurred, and voyages from Singapore to British North Borneo were 
reported as smooth sailing. Upon arrival in Jesselton, the coolies were temporarily 
housed at Victoria Depot or Gaya Depot before they were dispersed to the various 
estates in the territory.
105 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 March 1924.
106 Hoefte. In Place o f  Slavery. 1998. p. 54.
107 PRO: C0874/753. J. Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary. 19 October 1920.
108 See advertisement o f  the Labour Association in, the BNBH. 2 January 1917. p. iv.
109 PRO: C0874/744. Governor to Chairman. 12 June 1917.
110 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department for 1918; See, H uff. The Economic Growth, pp. 46-47.
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For all the malpractices involved in the recruitment of coolies, there was 
probably one systematic institutional deception entrenched in the whole recruitment 
system that needs to be emphasised. The intending emigrants were not formally 
informed (or were ever required to by law) about the harsh disciplinary laws imposed 
by the colonial legislatures contained in the labour ordinances, the whole apparatus of 
criminal penalties attached to any breach of contract. Although the terms of the 
indenture contract were generally carefully explained, they made no mention of the fact 
that the contract was a penal one, enforceable by criminal sanctions. Nevertheless, 
most emigrants were probably well aware of the penal nature of the contract before 
leaving Java, in view of the established nature of chain-migration, and the constant 
presence of re-emigrants in the Semarang depot. Therefore, since the majority of them 
enlisted as recruits because of economic and social misery, many might have chosen 
to endure temporary hardships, in the hope of a better life .111
Employers in British North Borneo remained divided as to the types of men 
recruited for their estates. Some employers registering with the NBCC had few or no 
complaints about the class of labour supplied from Java .112 Moreover, the NBPA 
stressed the superior abilities of the newly-recruited (sinkeh) Javanese, imported under 
license from the NEI government, and regarded them as most generally suitable for 
work on rubber estates.113 Yet, some employers complained about the quality of the 
emigrants and the unsatisfactory physique of the men recruited. The interest of the 
recruiting agents, they complained, concerned quantity, rather than quality.114 
Moreover, Soesman and Co. had an outstanding agreement with the Sumatra Planters 
to give preference to their orders.115 The Labour Association too was condemned by 
certain quarters for obtaining inferior labourers, with low qualities, and unfit for estate
111 David Northrup. ‘Free and Unfree Labor Migration, 1600-1900: An Introduction’ . Journal o f  World 
Histoiy. 14,2 (2003). p. 130.
112 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from a Memorandum by the Acting Protector on a Meeting o f the NBCC in 
Sandakan on 21 A p ril 1914.
113 PRO: CO874/1062. NBPA Labour Memorandum. Annex A.
114 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from A.C. Pearson’s Report on Labour in the Federated Malay States. 27 
October 1913.
115 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from Governor’s Confidential Letter to Chairman. 18 November 1913.
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work. Employers alleged that the health of the Javanese labourers recruited by the 
Association was poor, and a large proportion of them were said to be infected with 
venereal disease, especially syphilis.116 The Labour Association asserted this was 
usually contracted in Singapore, or on the voyage.117 In 1923, the Protectorate 
Department reported that over ninety percent of the women coolies who arrived in 
British North Borneo were suffering from venereal disease.
The type of labourer now being supplied by the Labour Association is nothing short 
of a disgrace. As regards the women, I think there is little doubt that we are being 
given the worst class of street women from the big towns. I submit it can be no 
accident of chance that practically every woman imported is suffering from 
venereal disease in advanced and chronic stage.118
Because the majority of recruits derived from ‘the poorest and least nourished 
portion of the Javanese population’, planters did not consider it unusual for a portion of 
their immigrants to be hospitalised for a few days after arrival, before being put to 
work .119 However, overall, employers still preferred Java-recruited coolies under the 
‘Dutch Contract’ as they tended to re-engage after the expiration of their first contract, 
thus reducing average wage over a period of three or four years. Employers classified 
these recruited from Singapore as inferior or second class, being discarded men from 
estates in Malaya. They were considered 'full of vice and much given to absconding, do 
not re-engage well’ .120
Despite this preference for Java-recruited labourers, obtaining coolies was 
difficult. Various reasons dampened the Company government’s efforts to obtain 
Javanese coolies under the Dutch permit. The main reason was competition from other 
labour-seeking colonies. Between 1914 and 1932, 9,969 coolies embarked from Java 
to British North Borneo, as compared to more than 100,000 leaving for Deli, East
116 SSA: N BC A 1119. Memo. Re Javanese Labour (from Java). Bandoeng. From T.A. Ball.
1,7 SSA: N BC A  1119. Extract from H.E. despatch No. 753 dated 27November 1923.
118 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 December 1923.
119 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting o f the NBPA. 11 September 1925.
120 PRO: C0874/755. Patrick Hadow to Sir West Ridgeway. 27 October 1920.
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Sumatra, between 1923 and 1925 alone.121 One of the contributing factors affecting 
this low figure was that the price paid for British North Borneo-bound labourers from 
Semarang had been fixed at 5 guilders less than the price paid for those recruited for 
Deli in 1914, thus the preference for Deli.122 The recruitment and transportation of 
Javanese labourers from Java bound for British North Borneo were also not as well 
organised as for Deli-bound labourers. The waiting period for embarkation for steamers 
to Singapore or British North Borneo in the unhygienic depots in Semarang was long, 
and coolies succumbed readily to illness.
Another main problem in the recruitment of coolies for British North Borneo was 
that of shipping. After securing the coolies, recruiting agents were unable to ship them 
at once when they arrived at the port, because of limited steamship services. 
Consequently, some coolies changed their minds about going away, or even escaped 
(for those who had agreed by signing the indenture contract) .123 So much prominence 
was given to this matter that in 1920, J. Maxwell Hall, a representative of the 
government visiting Java, directed the Company government’s recruiting agents to 
commence regular shipments via Singapore, from Batavia, to supplement shipments 
from Semarang. Hall asserted that coolies gathered at a depot in Batavia would not 
wait for the indefinite departure of a steamer from Semarang, and that it would be 
better if they were to be shipped by the first available vessel to Singapore. In 
comparison, coolies for Deli were shipped as quickly as possible by the constantly 
available KPM boats, taking with them any small and large quantity of coolies. The Deli 
Planters had even offered a higher deal of 125 guilders, for coolies per head, if they 
could be shipped at once.124 However, even with its logistic and financial inducement, 
the east coast of Sumatra still had an outstanding order of over 30,000 indentured
121 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese A ffairs for 1932. See also, 
Figure 3 Number o f coolies recruited by commercial, DPV-laukeh and A D E K /ZU ZU M A  recruitment, 
1923-1925, in Houben. ‘Before Departure’ . 1999. p. 37.
122 PRO: C 0874/744. Governor’s letter. 13 January 1914.
123 PRO: C0874/744. Report by M .M . Clark.
124 PRO: C0874/753. J, Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary. 19 October 1920.
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coolies yet to be delivered in July 1927.125 Likewise, as a result of the increased price 
of rubber in 1926, the demand for Javanese indentured labour was in excess of the 
supply. Until the third quarter of 1926, there was still an outstanding order of 1,052 (763 
males and 289 female) indentured labourers yet to be supplied for British North Borneo 
enterprises.126
Apart from Deli, competition for Javanese indentured labourers also came from 
other areas. South Borneo, for example, was part of the Outer Islands. Thus, it was 
closer geographically with Java, and had attracted a significant number of coolies. 
Surinam, although situated in the West Indies, and geographically further than British 
North Borneo, was a Dutch colony, and hence given considerable priority. When such 
a large number of coolies were required for the Dutch colonies, it was expected that 
substantial difficulties were experienced in recruiting for territories outside the Dutch 
colonies. A memorandum on labour reported that the Dutch government in Java was 
most unwilling to allow their coolies to develop British colonial possessions, when 
Sumatra and other Dutch islands were by no means, developed.127 Apart from the 
Dutch colonies, Malaya (including the Straits Settlements and the FMS) was also a 
favourite destination of the Javanese indentured labourers, because it was booming 
economically. Many stayed permanently in Malaya at the termination of contract, and 
opened their own smallholdings. They were viewed as part of the Malay race, and thus 
eligible to secure land within Malay reservations.128 At the same time, Javanese coolies 
were also desired by other colonial settlements such as, Sarawak, New Guinea, New 
Caledonia and New Hebrides. Rubber planters in Indochina Thailand and Australia had 
already imported a limited number of Javanese labourers.129
PRO: C0874/752. Protector to Government Secretary. 7 July 1927.
126 PRO: C0874/752. Statistics Report for 3rd Quarter 1926.
127 PRO: C0874/754. Memo on Labour 1918.
128 Barlow. The Natural Rubber Industry, p. 47.
129 Khazin Mohd. Tamrin. Javanese Labour and the Development o f  Malaya, p. 12; Termorshuizen. 
‘ indentured Labour’ , p. 262.
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The Javanese authorities preferred the recruitment of labourers using the help 
of former labourers, through the so-called laukeh system .130 This way, abuses 
perpetrated during recruitment would be reduced, since the individuals knew each 
other, and could be called to account. Indeed, this would be a good way to improve 
recruitment for the Outer Islands or overseas destination among the Javanese 
population, thus making them more willing to sign on for work in these places. 
Undeniably, the Deli planters would have a greater advantage, when compared to their 
British North Borneo counterparts, because more laukehs would return to Java from 
Deli to recruit family members and acquaintances. Exacerbating the problem for British 
North Borneo planters was the fact that returning migrants had, more often than not, 
depicted a negative picture of the area. A rosier portrayal of the territory could be seen 
only during the last few years of indentured labour.131 Inevitably, these reasons 
jeopardised British North Borneo’s chances of obtaining coolies. Furthermore, the 
utilisation of laukehs in the recruitment process in Java was not common for British 
North Borneo. In fact, it had not been attempted through official channels during the 
whole period of indentured labour.132 Due to the option of acquiring Javanese labourers 
from Singapore, employers preferred to send Javanese laukehs to the Straits 
Settlements and the FMS for this purpose, as it cut down considerably on travelling 
costs, and created less problem compared to sending the laukehs back to their villages 
in Java.
Difficulties in obtaining coolies for the territory were also caused by other 
factors. It became apparent that internal politics between the recruiting agents itself put 
British North Borneo at a disadvantage. This was exemplified by the relationship 
between the Labour Association and its recruiting representative in Java, Campbell 
McColl and Company. A distinctive method used by Campbell McColl was to lure
130 PRO: C0874/752. Governor to President BNBC. 10 June 1929.
131 PRO: C0874/752. Governor’ s 351. V is it o f  Protector to Java. 18 June 1928.
132 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932, to advise on certain 
matters relating to labour.
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Javanese emigrants through catchy slogans, such as recruitment for ‘British Estates 
beyond Singapore ’ .133 Many Javanese were attracted to the word ‘Singapore’ and 
availed themselves for indenture. However, upon reaching Singapore, they were 
divided between the FMS and British North Borneo. Apparently the Javanese coolies 
were reported to be rather apathetic as to the selected destination. Nonetheless, the 
supply of Javanese indentured labourers for British North Borneo took a blow because 
of the Labour Association’s ‘disloyalty’ to Campbell McColl. The former tended to jump 
its requisition from one broker to another, instead of adhering to its old business 
relationship with the latter. Consequently, Campbell McColl obliged its regular 
customers in preference to the Labour Association, at British North Borneo’s
134expense.
Another problem was bureaucracy. When the Labour Association instructed its 
agent in Java to increase shipment of labourers, the agent stated that its efforts to open 
up new depots in fresh recruiting districts were hampered by difficulty in obtaining the 
necessary permits from the Dutch authorities.135 Apart from government restrictions, 
the spread of education, labour unions and communism in Java posed considerable 
problems in obtaining indentured coolies.136 The 1910s and 1920s saw the emergence 
of forceful labour protests and strikes organised by labour unions against unfair 
treatment, throughout Batavia, Surabaya and Semarang. This indicated the changing 
consciousness of the Javanese wage earners.137 These labour unions and nationalist 
organisation played a crucial role in distancing the Javanese from the world of 
indentured labour. For example, Javanese seeking an affiliation with Sarekat Islam, a 
highly-charged and influential organisation sweeping through Java at that time, had to
133 PRO: 00874/753. Extract from Govr’ s 583. Javanese Labour. 2 October 1920.
134 PRO: C0874/753. J. Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary. 26 September 1920.
135 pj^Q. C0874/752. Protector to Government Secretary. 7 July 1927.
136 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting No.8 o f the NBPA. 3 A p ril 1927. See also, PRO: 
C0874/753. J. Maxwell Hall to Government Secretary, Jesselton. 26 September 1920.
137 For a detailed account o f  the emergence o f labour unions in Java and its impact on the Javanese labour 
force, refer John Ingleson. In Search o f  Justice: Workers and Unions in Colonial Java, 1908-1926. 
Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1986.
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swear that they ‘would not steal, would not recruit, and would not lie ’ .138 In relation to 
this, communist uprisings in Java also affected the recruitment of coolies for British 
North Borneo enterprises.139
Orders for indentured labourers during the harvesting periods faced severe 
delays during agricultural prosperity in Java. Many of the Javanese from agricultural 
districts were engaged in padi harvesting.140 Furthermore, with the sugar crop ready for 
harvesting, all available labour was required locally for this .141 Likewise, during major 
festivals such as Lebaran, which celebrated the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan, 
there was often a severe shortage of labour in the towns. Finally, diseases such as 
malaria, fever, typhoid, influenza, cholera and dysentery appeared prevalent in Java, 
and these affected the overall quantity and quality of Javanese recruits.142 In some 
areas, especially in Central Java, the plague had grown to serious proportion, and 
11,000 people succumbed to the malady in 1922 alone.143 There was a suggestion of 
attracting Javanese immigration by establishing agencies in Java to explain the special 
terms offered by the territory to potential immigrants. Nevertheless, this idea never took 
shape .144
Conclusion
The recruitment of Javanese indentured labourers intensified because of the domestic 
environment in Java. Deteriorating economic conditions made it difficult for Javanese to 
live above subsistence level, thus reinforcing the decision to become indentured 
labourers. Social and political developments also promoted Javanese immigration
538 Cited from, Hoefte. In Place o f Slavery, p. 52.
139 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f Meeting No.8 o f the North Borneo Planters’ Association 
held on 3 April 1927.
140 PRO: C0874/476. Various Matters. No. 323. 17 April 1916; PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes 
o f Meeting No.8 o f the NBPA held on 3 A pril 1927.
141 PRO: C0874/744. Report o f  M .M . Clark. 15 May 1913.
142 PRO: C0874/753. Fred N. Fraser to Chairman BNBC. 24 February 1919.
143 Department o f  Overseas Trade. Report on the Economic Situation o f  the Netherlands East Indies. To 
June 1923 by M r. H.A.N. Bluett, British Commercial Agent for the Netherlands East Indies, Batavia. 
London: Published by His Majesty’ s Stationery Office. 1923. p. 86.
144 PRO: COS74/752. Extract from NBCC. Minutes o f  Meeting. 1 July 1927.
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under the system of indenture. Significantly, push factors underpinned their decision to 
be indentured, and the majority of them became easy targets for recruiters. The 
practice of offering advances on their salaries upon recruitment was normally a 
decisive factor, and most effective in settling accumulated debts, and providing for their 
families left behind. In the recruitment process, the colonial government regulated the 
system by introducing legislations and stringent procedures to check abuses and 
inconsistencies inherent in the system. Nevertheless, the role of the government was 
limited, and it could not monitor the whole recruitment process. The system of 
recruitment involved multi layered personnel, from the official recruiting agent to the 
unofficial field henchmen, thus making it difficult to enforce recruiting regulations till the 
lowest level. Moreover, the system of paying by results rendered it impossible to 
eliminate abuses altogether. Therefore, the recruitment of Javanese indentured 
labourers for British North Borneo enterprises depicts both a picture of involuntary and 
voluntary migration, but incidences of ‘coercion’ which put pressure on the recruiting 
business in Java was still relatively small, compared to the majority who became 
indentured emigrants voluntarily.
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CHAPTER FIVE
APPARATUS OF PROTECTION 
Introduction
Javanese immigration, under the indentured system of labour, became the backbone of 
capitalist enterprises in British North Borneo, and the system was considered reliable 
as a mechanism for ensuring the regularity of much-needed labour in the territory. In 
such a case, government-regulated immigration was treated with care by the Company 
authorities, and they constantly ensured that the permission to recruit Javanese coolies 
under the permit granted by the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) government was not 
jeopardised by irresponsible employers. The Company administrators were aware that 
immigration depended on the soundness of labour laws of the territory, to which end 
they were able to provide protection to the Javanese coolies, while under indenture. 
This chapter looks more specifically into the legal framework which governed the 
Javanese indenture experiment in British North Borneo. It attempts to provide an 
analysis of the level of protection provided for the Javanese indentured labourers, as 
well as the employers, which in the latter case manifested itself in the form of labour 
control. In short, it attempts to ascertain whether the level of protection provided for 
government-imported Javanese was sufficient by law.
Protection for Javanese Indentured Labourers
The enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Dutch Contract was regulated by 
the labour laws of the territory, and specified in the territory’s Labour Ordinance. To 
improve the conditions for the coolies, a new consolidating labour law was published by 
the Governor Aylmer Cavendish Pearson in 1916, repealing the Labour Ordinance of 
1908. Ordinance No. 9 of 1916 formed the over-arching legislation that governed the 
overall relationship between employers and employees in the land, throughout most of 
the indentured labour period (before Labour Ordinance 1929 was introduced). Firstly, it 
stipulated the protective provisions for the labourers to be discharged by government
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officials, in particular the Protector of Labour; secondly, it outlined employers’ 
obligations towards their Javanese coolies (some of which were already covered in the 
Dutch Contract); and thirdly, it fixed the penalties against employers and employees for 
breach of Contract and Ordinance.1 Unless specifically mentioned, the protective 
provisions, as cited below, were taken from Ordinance No. 9 of 1916.
Experiences during the pioneering period, as described in Chapter 2, show that 
labourers needed protection from certain employers. The high rate of abuse and 
mortality rates among labourers, previously associated with British North Borneo, 
rendered it absolutely necessary for the government to provide a comprehensive 
protection scheme for Javanese labourers (and other labourers), in order to appease 
the NEI government. The preceding chapter also indicated that Javanese immigrants 
who signed on to work under indenture in British North Borneo hailed from areas with 
deprived economic opportunities, with many being poor and illiterate. Unsurprisingly, 
they were frequently bewildered at the new environment and strange conditions they 
encountered in British North Borneo as labourers under the indenture system. This 
vulnerability rendered them open to abuse, which was what the Company government 
intended to eradicate when it endorsed the new Labour Ordinance of 1916.
The machinery for monitoring the conduct of the employers, and protecting the 
Javanese indentured immigrants was established as early as 1883. The Protectorate 
Department, as it was called, was spearheaded by a Protector of Labour, who held the 
power to administer oaths, and whose duty was to supervise that both contracting 
parties would adhere to the obligations stipulated in the Dutch labour contract.2 The 
Protector of Labour was charged with all matters connected with the Javanese 
indentured immigrants, from their arrival in the territory to their allocation and 
distribution to individual enterprises, supervision over their progress and functioning
1 PRO: C0874/759. Ordinance No. 9 o f  1916.
2 PRO: C0874/759. See power and duties o f Protector under Section 5(ii) o f  Labour Ordinance 1916.
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during the period of indenture. An employer who engaged a Javanese labourer under 
an indenture contract had considerable powers over such a labourer, and to prevent 
abuse of these powers, was subjected to the control of the Protectorate Department.3
The wide scope of the Protector’s powers, and the level of protection provided 
for Javanese indentured immigrants, could be seen with reference to the ‘Protective 
Provisions’ in Part IV (Section 28 to 50) of the Ordinance. The task of the Protector of 
Labour was to supervise the arrival and allocation of new indentured immigrants. He 
was the first official that the Javanese immigrants met upon arrival in Jesseiton. He 
held the power to examine all newly arrived labourers at the port of entry, and together 
with a Principal Medical Officer, who had particular responsibility for the medical 
arrangements, ensured that the coolies were suitable, and physically fit for work in 
British North Borneo.4 The Protector could refuse to register the labour contract of any 
Javanese immigrant who appeared to him to be physically or mentally unfit. Upon 
certification by the Medical Officer, unfit immigrants were sent to the government 
hospital for examination and treatment. Javanese immigrants who were certified as 
permanently unfit were repatriated as soon as possible, at the expense of the 
employers.5 Meanwhile, fit coolies were ushered to the coolie depot pending an 
attestation of their contracts (within 10 days upon date of arrival), and distribution to the 
various estates in the territory. In the distribution, families (husband, wife or children 
under age) were not to be separated. In the event of this occurring, the Protector held 
the power to re-unite family members.6
Moreover, the Protector’s responsibility was to register changes in the social
life of the immigrants. Employers of twenty labourers or over, who employed Javanese
indentured labourers were requested to keep a register of their labourers, containing
3 SSA: N BC A 1126. Section 9 ( iii) , (iv), (v) on Comments by Legal Adviser on Minutes o f  the Meeting 
o f the Labour Advisory Board held in Jesseiton on 22 April 1929.
4 PRO: C0874/759. Section 28 o f  Ordinance 1916.
5 PRO: C0874/759. Section 29 ofOrdinance 1916.
6 PRO: C0874/759. Section 37 ofOrdinance 1916.
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the details and particulars of the labourers employed by him and their accommodation,7 
A copy of this return was forwarded to the District Officer cum Assistant Protector. The 
Assistant Protector submitted the quarterly Labour Returns to the Protectorate 
Department, where these Returns concerning individual enterprises were summarised, 
and eventually sent to the Dutch Labour Bureau (Central Office for Inspection of 
Labour in Out-stations), established in Batavia. This was done through the agency of 
the Consul General of the Netherlands in Singapore. In 1928, the Labour Returns were 
sent to the Consul-General of Great Britain at Batavia, who served as an intermediary 
between the Company government and the Head Office of the Labour Inspection 
Department for the Outer Possessions at Batavia.8
The Returns indicated the name of the coolie, the date and number of the 
Semarang contract, the last place of residence in Java, and a Borneo registration 
number for anyone who settled into the territory.9 It contained important information as 
to the current status of the Javanese coolie, whether a discharged coolie signed a new 
contract, or was repatriated (and if so, the shipping details), transferred to another 
estate, absconded, or settled within the state. Included in the Labour Returns was 
information, such as the mortality rates amongst the labourers, the cause of death, and 
the number of sick labourers on the last day of every month, together with an 
explanation of the causes of the sick rate, if it exceeded five percent.10 A high rate of 
illness would send the Protector and Medical Officer to the enterprise for further 
investigation. Significantly, by constantly monitoring the life of the immigrants through 
the Labour Returns, any discrepancy would be detected and probed.
Crucial to the protection of the Javanese labourers were the rights given to 
government officials (Protector, Health Officer, the Principal Medical Officer,
7 PRO: C0874/759. Section 39 ofOrdinance 1916.
8 PRO: C0874/752. Article 11 o f Labour Agreement 1929.
9 SSA: N BC A 980. Quarterly Labour Returns.
10 PRO: C0874/752. Article 8 o f Dutch Contract 1925; and Article 11(2) o f  Dutch Contract 1929.
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Magistrate) to enter any enterprise (estate, mine, factory, saw mill) and inspect the 
labourers and premises where the labourers worked, or resided.11 They had the power 
to require any employer to muster and produce all labourers for inspection. Indeed, 
these inspections gave the Protectors, and other government officials, further insights 
into the welfare of the Javanese coolies, so that they were treated justly by the 
management and were provided with sufficient and proper amenities. These included 
housing, water, sanitary arrangements, medical care, food rations, and a food supply 
depot. If an enterprise was reported as being sanitarily unfit for the residence or 
employment of labourers by the Protector or the Health Officer, then the Governor 
could prevent labourers from working there, and ban the enterprise from further 
employing labourers in the future if the problem was not rectified.12 Occasionally the 
Protector would use a ‘private detective’ to spy on estates prior to visits, and would 
base his investigation on the information given by the spy.13
During this inspection visit, every facility was provided for the Javanese 
immigrants to complain to the Protectorate officer (or other government officials). 
Complaints were taken directly from the Javanese coolies themselves in the presence 
of the employer.14 If any irregularities came to his notice, the Protector would make an 
official report, and initiate a criminal investigation. While a further enquiry was going on, 
the Protector could order the complainant to be removed from the work place and kept 
at a Police Station or other suitable place, pending the results of the enquiry.15 
Moreover, Section 42(iii) authorised the Protector to undertake a closer investigation, if 
there was ill-treatment or a breach of any of the provisions of the Labour Ordinance 
was suspected, irrespective of whether he had received a complaint or not.
11 PRO: 00874/759. Section 41(i) ofOrdinance 1916.
12 PRO: C0874/759. Section 38 o f Ordinance 1916.
13 SSA: N BC A  231. Prot 469/17. Lok Kawi Estate Riot.
14 PRO: C0874/759. Section 41 (i) ofOrdinance 1916.
15 PRO: C0874/759. Section 41 ofOrdinance 1916.
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Additionally, a Javanese labourer could go straight to the local Protector, or 
magistrate to make a complaint, and his manager had to afford him every facility in 
doing so within 48 hours of making the complaint, or at the earliest opportunity.16 
Employers found guilty of not facilitating a coolie making a complaint were liable to 
fines of up to 100 dollars. If it was a well-founded complaint, the local Protector would 
start proceedings on behalf of the aggrieved complainant. The aggrieved labourer 
could agree to receive payment for an offence by his superior, and the matter would be 
settled out of court. However, under Notification 157 of 1921, although a coolie 
consented to this kind of settlement, the Protector could still prosecute the offender in 
respect of such offence, if he deemed it necessary.17
The Protectors, as well as the judiciary, ensured that Javanese coolies were 
able to make their voices heard, and made sure that the coolies had access to court at 
least once a week in most areas. For instance, in the Tempasuk district, Thursday was 
court day, provided the district officer was not away. To ‘kena Khamis’ (to be 
Thursdayed) was a pleasing euphemism for an appearance in Court, whether under 
the civil process of law, or otherwise. Since 1914, in the district of Beaufort, Tuesdays 
and Fridays were appointed regular court days from 9am till 5pm, with cases being 
continued on the days that followed, where necessary. This was found to be a 
satisfactory arrangement for all parties concerned, and avoided abundant 
correspondence with Estates as to the dates of the hearing.18 With nine large estates in 
the district of Beaufort in the West Coast Residency, offences under the Labour 
Ordinance comprised about 50% of the cases in the Beaufort Court in 1914.19 
Accessibility to court provided the coolies with the assurance that they could voice their 
complaints and seek justice, if they were exploited.
16 PRO: 00874/759. Section 42(i) ofOrdinance 1916.
17 PRO: 00648/9. AR, Protectorate Department fo r 1921; PRO: C0874/759. Governor’ s No. 199. Labour 
Ordinance: Amendment to Section 42. 5 March 1921.
18 Bruce. Twenty Years in Borneo, p. 76.
19 PRO: C0648/7. AR. West Coast Residency, by D,R. Maxwell. 1914.
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Most importantly, the Protector of Labour was empowered by the Governor to 
ascertain that employers fulfilled their part of the indenture contract, and any breach of 
contract could lead to prosecution. Usually, employers of Javanese labourers were 
obliged to provide suitable dwellings free of charge for all government-imported 
Javanese, to give rations according to the diet set forth in the official Dutch contract, 
and to install suitable hospital accommodation at the workplace.20 Hospitals had to be 
built in open clearings, as far removed as possible from jungle and swamps. Health 
officers prohibited employers from cultivating within 200 feet of a hospital to prevent 
interference with the ventilation, or general sanitary condition of the hospital. Estate 
hospitals, too, should provide a sufficient number of beds for patients, and the 
proportion should be between four and eight beds for every one hundred labourers 
employed on the estate.21
As for the food supply depot or estate shop installed in the enterprise, each was 
required to keep inspection cards for the perusal of the protectors of labour (Notification 
116 of 1917).22 A reliable price list had to be exhibited in either Malay or Javanese, as 
indicated in the labourers’ contracts.23 Javanese coolies got their daily rations and 
other necessities from this estate shop. Plantation officials were forbidden to be 
financially involved with the management of this estate shop, and violation of this 
prohibition made offenders liable to prosecution under trafficking offences. On 
conviction, a person could be fined a maximum of five hundred dollars, or imprisoned 
for up to six months.24 For a second or subsequent conviction, the penalty doubled. 
Exemption from this penalty would only be allowed if the workplace was far from the 
nearest shop, and there was a written authorisation from the Protector of Labour.25
20 See articles o f Dutch Contract in PRO: C0874/752.
21 SSA: N B C A  1126. G.S.O. No. 01918. p. 19.
22 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department by R.G.L. Horton, Acting Protector, 1917. p. 4.
23 PRO: C0874/759. Sections 35-36 ofOrdinance 1916.
24 PRO: C0874/759. Section 36(i) ofOrdinance 1916.
25 PRO: C0874/759. Section 36(ii) o f  Ordinance 1916.
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Other employer obligations included the payment of appropriate wages for a full 
day’s labour, either by task, or by day, weekly or fortnightly, according to fixed 
procedures. Labourers who received monthly wages had to receive their pay no later 
than ten days after the expiration of the preceding month, if the labourer requested half 
monthly pay, the employer had to acquiesce. Overtime, to be paid per hour, should be 
paid on the first payday. The calculation for overtime was to be made on the basis that 
the wage, in proportion to the wage per hour in the contract, was at least one and a half 
times the amount.26 From 1929 onwards, overtime was to be paid per hour or part of an 
hour. The wage received should be 50 per cent more than the equivalent per hour of 
the ordinary daily wage.27 Deductions from a labourer’s wages could only be made for 
monies given in advance, and to repay accumulated debts contracted by the 
indentured coolie 28 Employers were prohibited from paying coolie wages through the 
agency of any overseer.29 Disputes over amount of wages due or over an employer 
withholding of wages were settled in court. However, absent from the law was a 
provision safeguarding labourers’ wages in the event of insolvency of the employer, 
and as to the manner of payment of wages (although the government approved the 
usage of estate tokens to pay labourers’ wages for estates far from the local 
Treasury).30
Instead of working the full hours stipulated in the contract, an employer could 
demand a coolie to perform task work provided that the labourer was under no 
compulsion to work more than nine hours in any day. Assignments under task work 
needed the approval and endorsement of the Protector of Labour. Payment for task 
work was to be made rateably, in proportion to the amount performed.31 When allotting 
task work, employers had to put this down in writing, in a language understood by the
26 PRO: 00874/752. See Appendix 2. Dutch W orking Contract 12 November 1925.
27 PRO: C0874/752. See Appendix 3, Labour Agreement 1929.
28 PRO: C0874/752. See Appendix 2. Dutch W orking Contract 12 November 1925.
29 PRO: C0874/759. Sections 24-26 ofOrdinance 1916.
30 PRO: C0874/759. Revised Labour Ordinance. 17 June 1921.
31 PRO: C0874/759. Section 25 ofOrdinance 1916.
147
Javanese coolies. The notice had to be posted in a conspicuous area, either in the 
labourers’ quarters, or elsewhere on the premises.
If a Javanese indentured coolie was discharged by the employer due to illness, 
and while still serving his or her contract, the employer was still obligated to pay all 
hospital expenses. If the health condition of the coolie deteriorated, and he or she was 
proven to be permanently unable to work, an employer was obliged to meet all 
expenses incurred for the coolie’s repatriation to Java, within six months from 
discharge.32 Meanwhile, at the end of the written contract, the employer had to provide 
the labourer with a discharge certificate,33 and a free repatriation to Java for the 
labourer and his or her family, at the latest three months after the expiration of the 
contract. This provision was assured for one year after the termination of the last 
contract (although the original Dutch version of the contract signed in Java stipulated 
duration of five years).34 Finally, while the Protector of Labour was responsible for 
administering the estates of deceased labourers (Section 32), an employer was legally 
bound to pay a sum not exceeding five dollars, and provide, within six months, a 
decent burial for any deceased labourer still under contract (Section 31).
An employer found guilty of mistreatment of coolies was liable to a fine not 
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100). Offences included arresting or detaining a 
coolie on insufficient grounds, failing to facilitate labourers in making complaints, non- 
complying to rules set forth by the Protector or Health Officer, separating a labourer 
and his family, allowing labourers to dwell in unsanitary conditions, and refusing a 
labourer to leave his service although the contract had been determined. A continuing 
offence could lead to fines of up to ten dollars ($10) everyday, during which the offence 
continued (Section 51). A further punishment to supplement Section 51 would be the
enforcement of Section 45 of the Labour Ordinance 1916, which stated that the third
32 PRO: C0874/759. Section 30 o f Ordinance 1916.
33 PRO: C0874/759. Section 19 ofOrdinance 1916.
3<t PRO: C0874/752. Article 8 o f Dutch Working Contract 1925.
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and subsequent convictions of ill-treatment by superiors against a labourer would give 
the Court and the Protector the power to cancel and determine the said contract, and 
award compensation to the labourer.35 This power of cancellation was extended to the 
Protector of Labour, under Notification 236 of the Gazette 2 November 1917.36
These were the main consolidating laws passed during the mature phase of the 
indenture experiment, before the promulgation of a new consolidating Ordinance in 
1929. A certain amount of streamlining took place in 1927, following criticisms made by 
Baron Van Lijnden, the Dutch Labour Inspector, who made a tour of inspection to 
places where Javanese labourers ‘live and work’. Among the most notable changes 
were those concerning the law pertaining to inspection visits, and the presence of an 
employer during an enquiry. The presence of the employer during inspections deterred 
and intimidated Javanese labourers from voicing their complaints against their 
superiors, for fear of future victimisation.37 Usually, the more humane and considerate 
employers made no use of the right, having no reason to fear exposure by their coolies. 
This was a right which, in general, was exercised only by ‘tyrannical’ managers who 
had cause to fear that their labourers would complain, and who hoped to impose 
silence on aggrieved coolies by the mere fact of their (the managers’) presence.38
In stating that the right given to the employers was taken advantage of by some 
managers, C.F.C. Macaskie, Protector of Labour, omitted this very right during the 
drafting of the new Labour Ordinance in 1927. However, the Court of Directors finally 
sanctioned that the presence of the manager was not required during an enquiry but 
‘the employer shall have the right to be made aware of and answer any complaints that 
have been made against him’.39 In other words, during the actual enquiry, the presence 
of the employer was not needed, but he was required to be within the estate’s premises
35 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on the Amendments to Labour Ordinance.
36 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department for 1917, by R.G.L. Horton, p. 4.
37 SSA: N BC A 906. R.G.L. Horton, Acting Protector, to Government Secretary. Prot. 167/16. 27 May 
1916.
38 PRO: CO874/760. Interview w ith Macaskie. 19 December 1929.
39 PRO: CO874/760. Minutes. Inspection o f  Estate. 7 November 1929.
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to answer any question that the inspecting officer might have, and to clarify matters. In 
relation to this, on 23 May 1927, the Protector circulated a memo instructing all 
Assistant Protectors to report any estate which failed to carry out its contract with the 
government imported Javanese, and to provide every legitimate facility to labourers 
desiring to complain. Complaints should be fully enquired into whether or not a labourer 
had previously notified his employer of his complaint.40
Other amendments to the law included Gazette Notification 212 of 1927, in 
which all estate hospitals had to be furnished with equipment, nets, clothing, blankets 
and mats. Hitherto, failure to furnish hospitals adequately could only be dealt with by an 
order of the Health Officer, and delay and evasion sometimes resulted 41 With the 
publication of the Notification, such failure rendered the employer liable to immediate 
prosecution. Additionally, as a consequence of Van Lijnden’s recommendation, by 
Gazette Notification 357 of 1927, there was a modification of task work through a 
provision that if a Javanese labourer remained at work for nine hours, he should be 
paid the prescribed minimum daily wage, even if his task was unfinished.42 In other 
words, deduction for unfinished tasks was made illegal if the labourer had worked for a 
full day. A discharge certificate was also given to the labourer within 24 hours of the 
date of determination or expiration of the written contract, regardless of whether the 
Javanese labourer claimed repatriation or continued to work under verbal contract.43
With regards to the punishment for employers for offences stipulated under 
Section 51, the government imposed a hefty fine of five hundred dollars, to act as a 
strong deterrent to employers who were inclined to treat their labourers harshly.44 
Additionally, a headman, or mandur convicted of ill-treating any labourer could be
40 SSA: N BC A 210. C.F.C. Macaskie to Assistant Protector. No 2-395/27. 23 May 1927.
41 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department fo r 1917, by R.G.L. Horton, p. 4.
42 PRO: 00648/14. AR. Protectorate Department for 1927, by B.W. Burrell, p. 33; PRO: 00874/759. 
Labour Law Reform.
43 SSA: N BC A 210. C.D Martyn to Manager, British Borneo Timber Co. (Bettotan Camp).
44 PRO; C0874/759. Governor's No. 679. Amendments to Labour Ordinance. 28 November 1927.
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dismissed from service under direct order of the Protector of Labour.45 Moreover, 
amendments were made to Section 45. This time, cancellation of contracts could be 
imposed on the first offence itself, and only the Protector held the power to cancel 
contracts in cases of ill-usage under this Section. The Court was given a similar 
privilege under Section 51, if an employer was convicted of any of the offences referred 
to in that section (most of which was deemed to be tantamount to ‘ill-usage’). Formerly, 
the Court, if it acted under Section 51, could only fine the employer.
Except under Section 38, where the Governor was legally vested with a 
discretionary power superior to that of the Protector, the Protector was given the 
permission by the Ordinance to act in a specified manner, in most circumstances.46 
Generally in matters concerning the formulation of the labour laws, and the protection 
of the welfare of the immigrants, the Governor never overruled the Protector’s advice. 
Nor did the Governor undermine the sometimes strict decisions taken by the Protector 
in punishing employers whose actions towards their labourers were contradictory to the 
laws stipulated in the agreement and the Labour Ordinance. In a way, the Protector of 
Labour was given a free hand in exercising his powers within the confines of the 
Ordinance.
However, the powers which could be legally exercised by the Protector of 
Labour were seriously questioned in 1927. The controversy started in May 1927, 
following the Protector at the time, C.F.C. Macaskie’s decision to exercise the powers 
vested in him by Section 45, to cancel contracts in connection with a number of 
Javanese labourers employed on Sapong Estate.47 When Macaskie visited the estate 
in the company of the Dutch Inspector, Van Lijnden, he was confronted with a large 
number of complaints from the Javanese labourers employed there. No other course 
was open to him but to make exhaustive enquiries into the complaints, and to deal with
45 Section 56 o f Ordinance 1929
46 See Section 38 o f Labour Ordinance 1916.
47 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum regarding the Amendments to the Labour Ordinance.
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them as expeditiously and effectively as the powers entrusted to him permitted.48 After 
removing several Javanese labourers from the estate for the purpose of the enquiry 
(Section 41), the Protector acted under Section 42 (iii) and instituted judicial 
proceedings in the cases of Javanese labourers complaining of assault. In the cases of 
other labourers who complained of harsh treatment not actionable in the courts (e.g. 
‘too long hours of work, cutting of rations, prohibition of marriage of female labourers’), 
the Protector acted on his own account, and cancelled the contracts of a few labourers 
involved in the assault proceedings. Thirty one contracts were cancelled altogether.49
The legality of the Protector’s action in removing the labourers from the estate 
and cancelling the contracts was disputed by the estate manager and other employers 
of labour. The Company government refused to admit that there had been anything 
illegal in the Protector’s proceedings, although the higher officials admitted that this 
was done under extraordinary circumstances. Hitherto, the industrial development of 
the territory had depended on large numbers of Javanese coolies, imported under 
special Dutch permits issued yearly. This had heightened the government’s concerns 
that the facilities granted were not to be withdrawn. Hence, Governor Humphreys 
defended the Protector for taking such course of action. Under the watchful eye of the 
Dutch Inspector, and influenced by the urgent character of the matter, Humphreys 
attested that Macaskie was prevented from giving as much formality to his proceedings 
as he would otherwise had done. The Court of Directors, too, fully supported the view 
of the local authorities, that the Protector’s proceedings were perfectly legal.50
Nevertheless, the case brought into prominence the exceptionally wide nature 
of the Protector’s power. Employers of labour accused the Protector of being a law 
unto himself (although within the scope of the Ordinance). Usually an employer who 
objected to an order by the Protector could force legal proceedings, followed with an
48 PRO: C0874/759. Under Secretary to Messrs. Stephenson, Harewood &  Tatham. 3 February 1928.
49 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on Amendments to the Labour Ordinance. 25 January 1928.
50 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on Amendments to the Labour Ordinance. 25 January 1928.
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appeal from the Magistrate’s Court to the higher court. However, few employers cared 
to pursue such a course.51 They demanded that the government should make provision 
for the right to appeal in the Labour Ordinance. Unless this was done, employers 
contested that those aggrieved at the Protector’s orders would continue to face 
hardship.62
The responses towards the employers' demand were perplexing. On the one 
hand, the local government rejected any proposal to belittle the Protector’s power. As 
Governor Humphreys remarked,
So long as indentured labour is legal in this State it is essentia! for the Protector to 
have extensive and unimpaired powers; 1 should deprecate any amendment of law 
that might be interpreted either as an adverse reflection on their use in the past or 
as a reduction of their scope in the future.53
On the other hand, the Court of Directors wanted to make a provision for the right to 
appeal by employers, not to the High Court, but to the Governor.54 The necessity for 
this was considered imperative by the Court, for the mere fact that employers’ costs 
were high in importing Javanese labourers from Java. An employer would suffer 
considerable financial loss, due to the premature termination of such contracts by the 
Protector.
The Court of Directors viewed that the existing labour laws permitted the 
Protector to act in a specified manner. In circumstances where the exigencies of the 
case did not allow for any consultation with the Governor (as it would cause further 
delay), any decision taken by the Protector in regards to his own responsibility (e.g. 
enforcing Section 45), had the force of law, and could not be legally upset by a contrary 
ruling made by the Governor.55 This was made possible in the absence of such a legal 
right to appeal, regardless of whether the Protector was executively under the
5' PRO: 00874/759. Minutes. 28 November 1927.
52 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on Amendments to Labour Ordinance. 25 January 1928.
53 PRO: C0874/759. Governor Humpreys to President BNBC, No. 1263/27. 4 December 1927.
54 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on Amendments to Labour Ordinance. 25 January 1928.
55 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum on Amendments to Labour Ordinance. 25 January 1928.
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Governor’s authority. Finally, in 1929, in order to provide leeway for employers to 
appeal, Section 49 of the consolidating ordinance stated that any person aggrieved by 
any order or decision of the Protector of Health Officer, under the Ordinance, could 
appeal to the Governor, whose decision in regards to such an appeal would be final. 
Notice of appeal was to be given to the Government Secretary within 30 days of the 
date of the order or decision appealed against, to be accompanied with a twenty-five 
dollar ($25) fee.66
Indeed, the execution of the major functions of the Protectorate Department 
was often influenced by the personality of the particular Protector of Labour. Certainly 
the confidence placed in the Department by the Javanese immigrants depended often 
on this factor. Ironically, the first Protector for the government-imported Javanese in 
1914 performed way below par in terms of protecting the rights of the coolies. One 
would have expected H.C. Ridges (1914-1915) to be meticulous in assessing the 
Dutch Contract and ensuring that the terms of the contract was carried out. Instead, he 
failed to rectify a faulty translation (although he was aware of the error) of the English 
version of the Dutch Contract, provided by Messrs. Soesman & Co., which wrongly put 
the obligation for repatriation to Java one year after the termination of the last contract, 
instead of the stipulated five years in the original Dutch Contract signed in Java.57 
Aside from Ridges, also insignificant was F.J. Moysey, who held this position for two 
months in 1919 without leaving any noteworthy changes on the department. His 
successor, W.C. Moores Weedon (May 1919 -  January 1920), held the position of 
Postmaster General at the same time, and hence, was too busy to perform the routine 
task of inspecting places of labour, and protecting labourers’ interests.58
56 PRO: CO874/760. Labour Ordinance 1929.
57 PRO: C0874/752. Governor to Chairman, BNBC. Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919. 
See Chapter 8 fo r further details.
58 PRO: C0648/8, AR. Protectorate Department for 1919.
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In the history of the indenture experiment, certain officials stood out more than 
others in terms of their image as humane and impartial administrators. Such, for 
example, were people like R.G.L. Horton (April 1915-May 1918; February 1920-March 
1921) and D.R. Maxwell (January-March 1915; June 1918-February 1919; March 
1921-March 1922) who held this post in the 1910s and early 1920s. R. G. Horton, for 
instance, was assertive in protecting Javanese coolies, and most of the time, 
complained about the light sentences sometimes meted out to the planters.59 His 
reputation for favouring the coolies was regarded as harmful by some employers, and 
they would gleefully agree to any suggestion, which kept Horton from having the 
‘opportunity of doing much harm’. Conversely, Horton’s successor, D.R. Maxwell, was 
depicted as unbiased in his judgments, and employers were assured that they would 
be given a fair treatment in any question that might arise from labour disputes.80 Other 
influential figures who held this position in the later period (1920s until the end of 
indentured labour) included C.F.C. Macaskie (March 1922-October 1923; June 1925- 
October 1928) and C.D. Martyn (October 1923-June 1925; October 1928-March 1930). 
Both served almost 10 years as Protectors of Labour. C.F.C Macaskie, as a member of 
the Bar of England, was highly regarded as ‘a singularly capable and trustworthy 
officer’, and had been subjected to criticism (as described in the earlier paragraphs), 
notwithstanding his habitual caution in discharging Protectorate duties.61
Ail four (Horton, Maxwell, Martyn and Macaskie) had the greatest influence over 
the immigration and adjustment of indentured coolies in the territory. On the one hand, 
they were known for their willingness to employ tact and discretion in their dealings with 
the planters, and on the other, they took their role as protectors seriously. They stood 
up against planters, immigration business was handled promptly, and complaints were 
fully investigated and followed up. Macaskie went even further, by cancelling labour
59 SSA: N BC A  906. R.G.L. Horton, Acting Protector, to Government Secretary. Prot. 167/16. 27 May 
1916.
60 PRO: C0874/438. G.S. Plummer, Acting Manager, to Secretaries, Lok Kawi Rubber, Ltd. No. 21/18. 
15 September 1918.
61 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum regarding the Amendments to the Labour Ordinance.
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contracts on suspicion of the ill-treatment of Javanese labourers. Understandably, the 
philosophy behind the Protectors’ strict enforcement was that, ‘the NEI Government 
...are in no way interested in North Borneo and that permission to recruit is a favour’.62 
Therefore, ‘ ...it is important that nothing in working conditions here should cause 
reluctance by the Government of that country to allow the export of labourers.’63 Hence, 
as one planter once reiterated, inspecting officials generally ‘as a rule are ‘all out’ for 
the coolies without considering the Estate’.64
The Protector of Labour was backed by the staff of the Protectorate 
Department, who grew in the course of time. When the immigration of Javanese 
indentured labourers began in 1914, the Protectorate was manned only by the 
Protector of Labour and two Chinese clerks, who took up all tasks concerning 
translation, registration, repatriation, interpreting, typing and all statistical work of the 
department.65 Additional staff was employed on a temporary basis during periods of 
preparing Labour Returns. Two years later, a depot orderly was appointed, with 
knowledge of the Javanese language. He was designated to meet all newly 
government-imported Javanese on arrival, and to escort them to the respective estates 
on the west coast and the interior.66 With the increasing amount of immigration in the 
1920s and the wide range of official posts simultaneously held by the Protector of 
Labour, an expanding workload pressed heavily on him from time to time. This usually 
meant that inspections would be less thorough, and more infrequent in some parts of 
the territory (especially the east coast), until the pressure had eased. Fortunately, two 
new posts were inaugurated in 1923 to enhance the general efficiency of the 
Protectorate Department. An Assistant Protector post was introduced in the Jesselton
62 PRO: C0874/752. F.W. Fraser to Francis. 18 December 1926.
63 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Assistant Protectors, ProtNo. 752/26. 8 November 1926.
64 PRO: C0874/438. Copy o f  Report from Hadow &  Pinckney. 3 April 1918.
65 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1914.
66 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1916, by R.G.L.Horton. p. 5.
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headquarters, and J.A. Steuart held the post for the first time, followed by G.L. Gray, 
B.W. Hurrell, G. Robertson, and G.W. Bullock, throughout the years.67
Meanwhile, in the eastern part of the territory, a Deputy Protector was installed 
in Sandakan, with A.N. Garry serving as the first Deputy Protector. With the Protector 
finding it difficult to leave the Jesselton Office for long periods of inspection, the Deputy 
Protector controlled all matters connected to immigration and repatriation, as well as 
the Paupers’ Institute established in 1924, for the eastern side of the territory.68 In June 
and August 1927, two Javanese interpreters, Marto and Lamat, were hired for the 
Protectorate’s headquarters in Jesselton, and the Deputy Protector’s Office in 
Sandakan, respectively. Their appointments proved to be useful, as their presence 
during the inspection visits of places of labour had undoubtedly brought to light 
grievances and complaints by Javanese labourers that would not otherwise have been 
disclosed.69
The Protector was aided by an Assistant Protector of Labour in each district. 
The person could either be the District Officer, the Assistant District Officer, the District 
Magistrate, the Collector of Land Revenue, the District Treasurer, or another 
government officer working in the district.70 His task involved almost everything, 
including collecting taxes, compiling statistics, registering births, marriages and deaths, 
rounding up deserters, preparing summons for trials, executing sentences, and being 
the adviser and friend of all the remote villages he regularly visited. Since the Assistant 
Protector of Labour held multiple portfolios, he had to perform his role as protector 
tactfully. He needed to be fair to both coolies and employers, and while being fair to the 
coolie, he had to bear in mind that he should uphold the prestige of the Europeans. 
With a limited police force and a large coolie population, he could not afford to be
67 PRO: C0648/9-14. AR  Protectorate Department for 1923-1929.
68 PRO: CO648/9-10. AR. Protectorate Department for 1923 and 1924.
69 PRO: C0648/14. AR Protectorate Department for 1927, by B.W. Burrell, p. 28.
70 SOAS: MS283793. The Ordinances o f the State o f  North Borneo, A .D . 1881-1914. Ordinance IV  o f 
1908 — Labour Appointments, pp. 286-287.
157
mealy-mouthed. He looked to the Europeans on estates to support him by treating their 
coolies fairly.71 He performed similar responsibility as the Protector of Labour, within his 
jurisdiction. As Assistant Protector of Labour, he attested and stamped all coolie 
contracts in his district;72 made quarterly inspections at every place of labour, except 
lumber companies which were inspected half yearly,73 investigated any complaints 
made by labourers, and settled coolie troubles generally. Simply put, he was the official 
most in touch with the Javanese labourers.
Another important individual who played the role of protector to the government- 
imported Javanese was the Dutch Labour Inspector of the Labour Inspectorate 
(,Arbeidsinspectie) agency in Batavia. A significant improvement to the lives of the 
government-imported Javanese was visible soon after visits of inspection by an agent 
of the Labour Inspectorate. This process of actual labour surveillance of labour 
relations on the enterprises employing Javanese labourers in British North Borneo was 
an extension of the function performed by the Labour Inspectorate (later, in 1921, 
Labour Office, Kantoor Van Arbeid) for the entire Netherlands East Indies, which dated 
back to June 1908.74
The Company government ‘welcomed’ visitations by the Dutch Labour 
Inspectors, and provided all assistance to ensure inspections ran smoothly. Being 
guests of the government, the hospitality provided was the very best the government 
could offer, and this was possibly given with the sole intention of flattering the Dutch 
officials. Indeed the officials administering the government and the employers had 
much to fear from the Dutch Labour Inspectors because they would not want to 
jeopardise the granting of recruiting permits, which were renewed yearly by the Dutch
71 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 152.
72 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1915, by R.G.L. Horton, p. 220.
73 PRO: CO648/10. AR. East Coast Residency 1924.
74 Houben. ‘ Introduction’ , p. 16.
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authorities. Efforts were made to portray the territory as a suitable place for Javanese 
labour.
Throughout the years when the system of Javanese indentured labour was in 
operation, four labour inspectors were dispatched to British North Borneo to inspect the 
welfare of their Javanese subjects. The first to arrive was J.G. Van Hemert in 1918, 
four years after the system of Javanese indentured labour migration was in operation. 
Van Hemert was diplomatic in his relationship with the Company administrators. He 
found little to criticise, apart from a few ‘inconsistencies’. He was particularly concerned 
with the failure by certain employers to give rations on the contract scale, the re­
engagement of Dutch indentured labourers on local contracts, the failure to inform 
labourers that their contracts had expired, the lack of payment on rainy days when no 
work was done, the declaration of rainy days as holidays, and the recommendation to 
improve the supply of pure drinking water.75 Hemert believed the necessary 
improvements could easily be effected, and his overall view of the indenture system in 
the territory was favourable. No alteration to the territory’s labour laws was 
suggested.76 In regards to the Protectorate Department, he was very ‘pleased’ with the 
supervision exercised by the department, and he regarded the organisation and system 
of inspections and reports as ‘very efficient’.77
Trusting Van Hemert's encouraging report, nine years lapsed before a second 
Dutch Labour Inspector, Baron D.R.J. Van Lijnden, was dispatched by Governor- 
General Jkhr. A.C.D. De Graeff (1926-1931) on 1 April 1927.78 A year later, M.B. 
Viehoff arrived in Jesselton to complete the work started by Van Lijnden, who left 
prematurely due to a nervous breakdown. Van Lijnden and Viehoff arrived to grim 
conditions, contradictory to Van Hemert’s visit almost a decade ago. Both Dutch
75 PRO: C0847/753. Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert. Governor No. 38. 18 January 1919; SSA: NBCA 
210. Protector to Manager o f  Estates. Prot. No. 752/26. 8 November 1926.
76 yerslag. Arbeidsinspectie in Nederlandsch-Indie. Over het jaar 1919 (Zesde Verslag). 1920.
77 PRO: COS74/753. Governor to Chairman BNBC. 11 January 1919.
78 SSA: N BC A 210. Governor to President BNBC. No. 218. Sandakan. 8 A p ril 1927.
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inspectors blacklisted several enterprises for various reasons. Among the general 
complaints were abuses and ili-treatment by management and overseers, inadequate 
filing systems which led to irregularities in the conditions stipulated by the NEI 
government, and the inadequate outlet for voicing complaints. Also noticeable were 
complaints pertaining to deplorable medical and housing conditions, poor wages due to 
the high cost of living, illegal wage deductions and fines, insufficient rations, and the 
exorbitant prices at estate shops with their low quality of stock.79 Both Van Lijnden and 
Viehoff called for recommendations to be made in all areas. The ration scale received 
particular attention, as did the call for more freedom of mobility.80
Any negative reports by the Dutch Labour Inspectors to their government 
proved detrimental to the interests of British North Borneo, as they delayed the renewal 
of the recruiting permit. The Company authorities counteracted this, as far as 
possible.81 Naturally, the recommendations made by Van Lijnden and Viehoff were 
promptly carried into effect by Company officials. The Protector of Labour was 
expeditious in instructing all Assistant Protectors to report any estate, which failed to 
carry out its contract with government-imported Javanese.82 Managers of enterprises 
were also cautioned that their local Assistant Protectors had been given directives to 
ensure that the recommendations made by the Dutch Labour Inspectors (Van Lijnden 
and Viehoff) were rigidly enforced. Failure to do so by any employer, in any respect, 
would result in immediate prosecution, and where possible, in the withholding of further 
government-imported Javanese. If this failure persisted, the most drastic move would 
be the cancellation of contracts of immediate labourers, and their removal from the 
estate.83
79 SSA*. N BC A 210. Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’ s interview w ith His Excellency; Deputy Protector to 
the Manager British Borneo Timber Company. Prot. 372/27. 12 A pril 1927.
80 SSA: N BCA 210. Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’s Interview with His Excellency.
81 SSA: N BC A 210. Minute Paper. Unknown Author. 8 May 1927.
82 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Assistant Protector. No. 2-395/27. 23 May 1927.
83 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Manager. No 1-395/27. 23 May 1927.
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Viehoff also suggested certain amendments to be made to the Labour 
Ordinance. However, if these amendments were found to be unsuitable to other 
classes of labourer, then a separate Netherlands Indian Labourers Protection 
Ordinance (NILPO), applicable only to labourers recruited in Java, was 
recommended.84 Instead of introducing a separate ordinance for government-imported 
Javanese, the Company government amended the Labour Ordinance 1916 in 
accordance with Van Lijnden and Viehoff’s suggestions. These amendments were 
consolidated under Labour Ordinance 1929. Meanwhile, in March 1931, C.G. Frohwein 
arrived from the NEi and inspected all estates employing government-imported 
labourers. Twenty-nine places of labour were visited, in addition to several public 
institutions. A large number of minor complaints were received from Javanese coolies, 
and Frohwein expressed dissatisfaction with labour conditions on two enterprises, 
particularly the Bettotan Timber Camps.85 Nevertheless, overall, he was satisfied with 
the general conditions, and there was no call to amend the territory’s labour laws.86
Theoretically, the Javanese indentured labourers were protected by provisions 
stipulated in the Contract and Labour Ordinance. The Dutch Labour Inspectors were 
responsible for monitoring and making recommendations to the Company government, 
while the Protectors and Assistant Protectors were responsible for enforcing these 
recommendations where necessary, and the labour law proper. Generally, the 
protective provisions were supposed to be a guarantee that the law would be properly 
administered and the welfare of the immigrants properly secured. However, the 
progress of the state was dependent upon an influx of capital and labour, and to attain 
that progress, there should be adequate protection, not just for the employees, but also 
for the employer. The next section deals with the protective provisions designed for the 
employers, which manifested itself in the form of labour control.
84 PRO: C0874/752. Governor Richards to President BNBC. 6 October 1930.
85 PRO: CO874/1062. Governor General A.W .L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh to Governor C.R. Smith. 27 
January 1939.
86 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department fo r 1931. p. 130.
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Protective Provisions for Employers of Javanese Labour
The existence of the indentured system of labour, and the heavy expense that 
individual employers incurred in importing labourers from Java, rendered some form of 
control over labourers necessary, and recognised by law, to ensure that employers got 
value, in the shape of satisfactory work from their coolies. Employers of Javanese 
labourers were protected by the legal mechanism of the territory, which served as the 
most important form of labour control. To control the labour force, criminal punishments 
(fines, whipping and imprisonment) were formulated to reinforce the formal civil 
contractual agreements contained in their formal contract of indenture. These were 
automatically applicable for various breaches of work discipline and other violations. 
Scholars observed that penal sanctions were indispensable to ensure the regularity of 
labour supply, to continue its labour intensive character and to provide employers with 
a prominent instrument with which to discipline and control the labour force. They 
became ‘an integral part’ of the market revolution.87 in British North Borneo the 
existence of the penal clauses rendered the labourers physically bound to the 
workplace during the whole term of indenture. It also restricted their mobility and 
diminished their control over their own labour power. The bottom line was that the 
legalisation of criminal penalties under the Labour Ordinance protected the employers 
against the risk of imported labour cancelling their contracts, or simply absconding.88
The notion of imposing penal sanctions for breach of a civil contract was clearly 
a mechanism for regulating and controlling the supply of labour for rubber and tobacco 
production. Many of the enterprises in British North Borneo were located in isolated 
areas, and work was carried by a few white men, amongst many hundreds of Asiatics. 
This isolation generally worked to the disadvantage of the labourers, and the existence 
of criminal punishments sanctioned by the law made it easier for employers to control
87 Shula Marks and Peter Richardson, eds. International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives. 
Hounslow, Middlesex: M . Temple Smith, pp. 11-12; Robert J. Steinfeld. Coercion, Contract and Free 
Labor in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001. p. 47.
88 PRO: C0874/752. Minutes.
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the coolies, and confine them within the enterprise. Enterprises grew into a frontier 
society, with rigorous discipline and a rigid code of behaviour. The management 
succeeded in establishing and maintaining a pattern of dominance within the 
boundaries of the enterprise. Due to the high cost of importation, aspects of a 
Javanese labourer’s life under the government scheme were controlled by the 
employers. The threat of penal sanctions was sometimes enough to subdue the 
labourers.
Protection for employers began right after the coolies landed. As soon as the 
labourers arrived, they were to be ushered to a detention depot while waiting for the 
attestation of their contracts. If the Javanese coolie failed to adhere to orders of 
government officials to proceed to the depot, the labourer was liable, on conviction, to a 
fine of up to ten dollars, or to imprisonment not exceeding one month, or both.89 Similar 
penalties would be inflicted on the Javanese coolie if he refused to proceed to a 
government hospital after being certified to be unfit for work, upon arrival. In the case of 
a labourer leaving the hospital without permission from the Medical Officer, he would 
be prosecuted, and would receive the same punishment if convicted.
Once the indentured Javanese arrived at their workplace, they were physically 
bound to the estate environment by provisions to keep them tied to the estate. They 
were prohibited from switching employers without the consent of the Protector, or 
underwritten authority from the Governor.90 Time expired Javanese labourers were also 
required to carry Discharge Certificates, and to produce them on demand by a 
competent authority, as the only means of protecting themselves against arrest for 
vagrancy. Immigrants could be labelled as a deserter, prosecuted for breaches of 
contract, and imprisoned as a result of failing to carry certificates. A Javanese coolie 
found wandering outside the estate grounds without permission could be apprehended
89 PRO: C07874/759. Section 52 o f  Ordinance No. 9 o f 1916.
90 PRO: C0874/759. Section 16 o f Ordinance No 9 o f  1916.
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without a warrant, not only by the authorities (i.e. police, magistrate) but also by the 
employer, manager, and overseer of the estate. Section 46 of the Labour Ordinance 
authorised the employer or anybody nominated by him, on sufficient grounds, to arrest 
coolies without warrant within his own premises, or in public places, and to turn them 
over to the nearest Magistrate as soon as possible.91 The fate of the arrested coolie 
depended on the discretion of the magistrate, whether he was returned to the estate or 
prosecuted.
Technically, the Javanese indentured immigrant was entitled to absent himself 
or herself if, with the permission of the employer, the intention was to go to the 
authorities with a reasonable complaint. But complaints deemed frivolous could still 
leave the coolie open to prosecution, on which the complainant could be fined any sum 
not exceeding ten dollars ($10), and the same amount to be paid to his employer. The 
sum was to be added to the coolie's contract.92 Inevitably, the restriction on the mobility 
of government-imported Javanese was condemned by Van Lijnden in 1927 and Viehoff 
in 1928, who indicated that the government-imported Javanese should be allowed to
leave an estate outside working hours without permission being required, although the
estate office was to be notified of such a plan.93 Furthermore, they should be allowed to 
complain without giving prior notice to the employer.94 Substantia! revisions were made 
to the Labour Ordinance 1929, following Viehoff’s recommendations.95
Javanese labourers found straying away from the workplace could be 
prosecuted under the Labour Ordinance for desertion, attempting to desert or 
absenteeism. Section 53 constituted the legal basis for the overall regimentation 
imposed on the movements of the Javanese indentured labourers. Under this section, 
a coolie could face imprisonment of up to three months, or whipping not exceeding
91 PRO: C0874/759. Section 46 o f  Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
92 PRO: 00874/759. Section 42(ii) o f  Ordinance 9 o f 1916.
93 SSA: N BC A 210. See item No. 15 on ‘Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’s interview w ith His Excellency’ .
94 SSA: N BC A 210. See item No. 6 on ‘Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’s interview w ith His Excellency’ .
95 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f  V ie h o ff s Recommendation.
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twelve strokes, or both. Labourers were also liable to pay for expenses incurred in their 
recovery not exceeding fifteen dollars ($15), to be assessed by the Magistrate, and 
which would be recovered as an advance.96
Apart from desertion laws, protection for employers was also extended through 
the laws affecting the work performance of their indentured coolies. For disobeying an 
order, refusing to work, injuring property and carelessness in guarding property, the 
penalty would be a fine up to twenty five dollars ($25), and in default of the fine, a 
maximum of eight strokes (of whipping), without the option of imprisonment.97 A similar 
fine, but with a maximum of twelve strokes (of whipping), was reserved for coolies 
prosecuted for ‘wilfully disabling himself or herself, refusing, or omitting to enter on 
service or absence without permission, ‘being insolent or misconducting himself, and 
disposing of rations for cash.98 Not only this, but a Javanese coolie who was absent 
from work through his or her own fault was not entitled to wages, except on the days 
declared as holidays in the Dutch Contract.
Offences such as causing riots and posing danger to life or property, and 
resulting in work stoppages, could result in a fine up to one hundred dollars ($100), or a 
maximum of six months imprisonment, and up to twelve strokes of whipping.99 There 
was always a possibility that both a fine and imprisonment could be imposed together 
in some cases. For more serious offences, such as molesting, hindering, and 
threatening other labourers in his work performance, or persuading the labourer to 
commit a breach of contract or the Ordinance, there were higher penalties: fines of up 
to two hundred dollars ($200), or a prison term of up to six months, or both.100
96 PRO: C0874/759. Section 53 o f Ordinance No. 9 o f 1916.
97 PRO: 00874/759. Section 54(i) o f  Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
98 PRO: C0874/759. Section 54(ii) o f  Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
99 PRO: C0874/759. Section 55 o f  Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
100 PRO: 00874/759. Section 58 o f Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
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Crimping resulted in the highest penalty. Any labourer or person caught and 
convicted for seducing, or attempting to seduce another labourer, or concealing 
another labourer under contract to another employer, was liable to a fine not exceeding 
two hundred dollars ($200), or to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. 
Subsequent conviction would double the penalty. The penalty worsened if the seduced 
or concealed labourer had advanced money outstanding, for which the offender was 
liable to a fine of up to five hundred dollars ($500), or a maximum of twelve months 
imprisonment, or both, and had to pay to the employer double the unpaid portion of 
such an advance, to be recovered as a fine.101 This law came into being following 
rampant incidences in 1915, whereby crimpers offered higher wages to induce 
experienced men and women to leave their workplaces. Crimpers from Bukau and the 
island of Labuan especially were reported to have advanced money to coolies working 
on certain estates within the Beaufort district, to pay off their debts in the case of ‘free’ 
coolies, and abetted indentured ones to abscond. False discharge certificates were 
supplied to the runaways so that when they embarked on Weston, the police could not 
interfere. Apparently, there was an illegal racket dealing with old discharge certificates, 
whereby certificates were sold and passed from one hand to another. Since the 
certificate had no method of identifying an individual, it was utilised repeatedly by 
crimpers to get labourers out to Labuan. A coolie had only need to call himself, or 
herself, by the name stated on the certificate, and he or she would be let off. Employers 
felt that the ‘abuse’ had become so prevalent that crimping laws should be instituted to 
protect labourers.102
These were the protective provisions available to employers of labour, and 
major penalties affecting the government-imported Javanese under indenture, and 
other labourers under local contracts. They tended to change over time. For example, 
sentences of imprisonment were served only in government gaols, since the Company
101 PRO: 00874/759. Section 59 o f Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
102 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1915). J. Hatton Hall to Secretary, Beaufort Borneo Rubber Ltd. 
9 October 1915.
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government outlawed estate gaols in the territory in September 1914.103 However, due 
to the distance of some estates, the government allowed a system whereby estates 
were able to keep aside a suitable place for detaining recalcitrant or violent coolies, 
pending their removal under suitable escort to the nearest government office, at the 
earliest possible moment.104 Detention under such circumstance was limited to one 
night only, and this provision was essential ‘in the interests of good order and public 
security’.105
The punishment of whipping or flogging also changed in the course of time. 
Prior to 1920, whipping was commonly used in British North Borneo for industrial 
offences, and to control the labour force. The instrument used for this purpose was a 
light rattan, not less than half an inch in diameter.106 Sentences ranged from three to 
twelve strokes on the buttocks, with the small of the back being protected by a blanket. 
Sentences were carried out in the presence of a European government officer or 
Commissioned Officer of Constabulary. Whipping could only be carried out after the 
offender had been examined by a Medical Officer, and was deemed fit to receive a 
certain number of strokes.107 If a labourer was certified as being unfit to undergo a 
sentence of whipping, then a Magistrate could impose a period of imprisonment not 
exceeding one month on the labourer, whether or not such imprisonment was to be 
added to any period already awarded.108
Officials of the Company believed that in certain circumstances, whipping was 
better and more sensible, and a coolie sometimes preferred six strokes of rattan to
PRO: C0531/14. Travers to Under Secretary, 1920.
104 SOAS: MS283793. The Ordinances o f  the State o f  North Borneo. Section 21 (i) o f  Proclamation II o f 
1914. Prison Ordinance by Cecil W illiam  Chase Parr, Governor.
105 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Annexure F, Report o f Committee on Estate Abuse, p. 24.
106 ASI: Parliamentary Debate. 2 March 1921. ASI. A pril 1921, Series V, 11,1; See PRO: C0874/759. 
Whipping. Section 392 o f the Indian Case o f  Crim inal Procedure.
!07 PRO: C0874/759. Memorandum enclosed w ith a letter from, W illiam  Rycroft to G. Grindle, CO. 1 
March 1921.
108 PRO: C0874/759. Section 56(i) o f  Ordinance No 9 o f 1916.
167
imprisonment, or even a fine.109 The proponents of flogging as a form of punishment 
believed that it was a ‘win-win’ situation; the coolie escaped long term rigorous 
imprisonment and the loss of wages, while the employer retained the services of the 
coolie.110 The Governor himself personally favoured the retention of flogging, According 
to him, ‘imprisonment ...only punishes the employer by depriving him of the labourer’s 
services, while a fine only means increasing the labourer’s debt; in other words does 
not punish the man immediately.’111
Various parties wanted to see whipping as a form of punishment abolished for 
breach of contract. In 1918, Van Hemert informed the Company government that 
whipping as a judicial punishment had been abolished in Java, and consequently, the 
Dutch government might recommend a similar course be adopted as regards Javanese 
labourers in British North Borneo.112 Two years later, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines 
Society attacked the authorisation of whipping of labour under the Labour Ordinance, 
as practiced in the territory, whereas, in all other parts of the British Empire, including 
the Straits Settlement and Federated Malay States (which were closest to British North 
Borneo), the punishment had been abolished.113 Pressure from the Society resulted in 
the Company government (through Notification 183 of 1921) adding sub-section (ii) to 
Section 56 of the Labour Ordinance, making the sentence of whipping optional, except 
for offences involving violence, riots or disturbance of the peace.114 Some civil servants 
and estate sympathisers could not hide their prejudices and disappointment concerning 
the decision to abolish whipping for breach of contract. Owen Rutter, an ex-civil servant 
and planter wrote:
As a rule, however, whipping is reserved for estate coolies, but it can only be 
administered at the option of the offender, who has to be given his choice between 
imprisonment and whipping. It is probable that before many years have passed
PRO: C0531/16. Forbes to Anti-Slavery Society. 19 April 1922.
110 Cook. Borneo, p. 110-115.
111 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1916). Secretary BNBC to Acting Governor. 27 January 1916.
112 PRO: C0874/753. Memorandum o f  Van Hemert Inspection. 10 January 1919.
113 PRO: C0874/759. H.G.F. Secretary BNBC, to OAG. No. 647. 7 September 1922. PRO: C0531/16. 
Buxton and Harris, to Secretary BNBC. 17 March 1922.
114 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1921.
168
corporal punishment in North Borneo will be abolished together, through the efforts 
of those well-meaning busybodies whose experience of the Oriental does not 
extend beyond four miles’ radius of Charing Cross. When that happens it will be a 
sad day for the country, because in the opinion of all planters and most magistrates 
whipping is the only adequate punishment for estate labourers. A coolie malingers, 
refuses to work, deserts or commits some other offence punishable under the local 
Labour Ordinance: if he is sent to gaol the estate loses labour it needs while the 
coolies, with the exception of being deprived of liberty and tobacco, receives little 
punishment, for the district lock-up is looked upon ... as a haven of rest; if a coolie 
is fined the estate pays and the amount is added to the man’s debts, so that he 
hardly feels his lesson at all. With a sentence of half-a-dozen strokes with the 
rattan the estate does not lose its labour nor the coolie his pay; the coolie, on the 
other hand, receives a lesson he is likely to remember for some time, even though 
the punishment be little more than the “swishings" most of us got at school and is 
performed with a similar instrument.115
Meanwhile, this issue was also debated in the House of Commons. In a 
parliamentary debate in 1921, Lt.-Col. Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
was confronted by Robert Richardson as to whether the former would pester the 
Company government to provide annual returns regarding the punishment of whipping 
for breach of contract. Richardson was among those (i.e. the Anti-Slavery Society) who 
were keen to know the number of floggings inflicted on coolies by the territory’s law, by 
whom the coolies were medically examined, the industrial offences for which they were 
flogged, and the number of strokes inflicted on the coolies. Amery, nonetheless, 
deemed it unnecessary to call for returns indicating the rate of whipping since the law 
of British North Borneo had recently been amended, which made the punishment of 
whipping optional for industrial offences, except in grave cases of riot and public 
disturbance.116
The pressure, however, continued. Finally, in 1922 Notification 255 was passed 
calling for the abolition of whipping altogether for any offence under the Labour 
Ordinance, except one involving riot or danger to life and property. With the abolition of 
most forms of whipping, a labourer who committed a breach of contract for desertion or 
attempting to desert was now liable on conviction to three months imprisonment, and a 
maximum fine of fifteen dollars ($15) for the cost of his recovery. The penalty for 
offences under Section 54 was reduced to a fine up to twenty-five dollars ($25), and if
115 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 168.
116 ASI: A p ril 1921. Series V, 11,1. Parliamentary Debate. 9 March 1921.
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unable to pay the fine, the labourer could be imprisoned for a period not exceeding two 
months.117
In 1926, the North Borneo Planters’ Association (NBPA) criticised the 
inadequate penalties for these offences. Owing to the increased numbers of deserters, 
the NBPA called for tougher penalties, and for the Company government to render 
more concrete assistance to estates in recovering absconders.118 In particular, the 
NBPA urged more police protection at the wharf, to prevent absconding coolies from 
boarding steamers. Allegedly, this had been a constant problem since the 1910s.119
Like the NBPA, certain sections of employers in the territory felt that whipping 
as a form of punishment served a useful purpose, but others felt that corporal 
punishment as it previously existed laid the Company administration open to 
criticism.120 This was true enough, because the labour laws in British North Borneo 
were still not in accordance with modern standards. Once again, the Colonial Office 
interfered in 1927. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Gilbert Grindle, 
proposed that the punishment of whipping for labour offences be abolished completely. 
After delaying the process for more than three years, the Company government finally 
succumbed to pressure in 1931.121
In relation to penal sanctions, controlling labour was made easy by laws relating 
to contract extension. An extension of the contract was justified in order to prevent any 
damage to industrial interests. Employers were able to extend the contracts lawfully, 
because they were protected by Section 22 of the Labour Ordinance 1916. Section 22 
permitted the extension of indenture contracts for time lost by the labourer, owing to 
imprisonment, for breach of contract, a criminal offence, detention in hospital, absence
117 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922.
118 PRO: 00874/752. Extract Minutes o f Meeting NBPA. 11 May 1926.
119 SSA: N BC A 1126. Extract from the NBPA. Minutes o f Meeting. 27 October 1928.
120 PRO: C0874/553. NBCC. Thirteenth Annual General Meeting. 25 August 1923.
121 PRO: C0531/12/16. Gilbert Grindle, CO, to Cecil F. Collins, BNBC. 17 October 1927; PRO: 
C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department. 1931.
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without leave, or desertion,122 In other words, the days lost due to the reasons 
described above were not taken into consideration when determining or calculating the 
number of days the coolie had worked, or the duration of the contract. Hence, a 
conviction did not release the coolie of his obligation. With this provision, employers 
were encouraged to more readily prosecute defaulting immigrants, even for minor 
infractions of the law, because they would gain the same number of working days later. 
On the contrary, Javanese coolies felt that they were punished twice for the same 
offence.
In late 1925, the Dutch authorities offered a slight ‘recompense’ by stipulating in 
the new contract form that the total duration of service under the contract, including the 
period of prolongation to make up for the absence, would not exceed four years. A 
provision in the Dutch Contract ordained that the protracted length of time of the 
contract was limited to only one-third of the duration of the contract. It carried a 
maximum extension of eight months for a two-year contract, while a three-year contract 
permitted an extension of 12 months.123 The Company government also proceeded to 
amend Section 22 of its Labour Ordinance, a year later. In August 1927, Governor 
Humphrey asserted that extensions of contracts for days spent in hospital or prison 
were only allowed if the employer kept a proper register of such claim. Additionally, for 
the purpose of such extensions, no contracts should continue in force beyond twelve 
months from the date of normal expiry, with one exception, i.e. if the imprisonment was 
for some offence other than an offence under the Labour Ordinance, such as 
imprisonment under the Criminal Code (which could last several years).124 The effect of 
the amendment of Section 22 would be that a Javanese labourer who repeatedly 
deserted from an employer would in due course be free to leave that employer,
122 PRO: 00874/759. See Section 22 o f Ordinance 9, 1916.
123 See Appendix 2.
124 PRO: 00874/759. Memorandum Regarding Amendments to the Labour Ordinance.
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because his contract could not now be extended for more than 12 months to cover 
periods of imprisonment.126
Legalised methods of labour control were made difficult from then on. During 
the last few years of indentured labour, following on from the recommendations made 
by the Dutch Labour Inspectors, and in the context of growing criticisms of the whole 
indenture system of immigration, more late modifications to the Labour Ordinance were 
made, which accentuated difficulties of employers.126 Long time practices, such as 
punishing deserters for each desertion offence, were curtailed by the practices of 
Protectors in their judicial capacities. Exacerbating the matter was the judgment of the 
High Court in the case of The State vs. Kechi’ (High Court No. 557), where a labourer 
who refused to perform his or her contract could be convicted and punished once only, 
and that no second conviction could be sustained in law.127 Eventually, orders from the 
High Court were read out in the local court, reversing sentences on Javanese men who 
had deserted for the second time. To the chagrin of employers, not only had these men 
been liberated from prison sentences, but they had been told that they could leave their 
employers. However, not long after that, the ruling was again overturned, with men who 
had repudiated their contracts returning to their respective estate.128
Owing to the confusing situation surrounding labour in the territory, employers 
described the Labour Ordinance as practically ‘ineffective and a farce’. They contended 
that it was impossible to enforce discipline if coolies could desert and repudiate their 
contracts. Ostensibly, such a scenario would inevitably place the employers in a most 
‘dangerous’ position, and as long as indentured labour was permitted in the territory,
125 PRO: C0874/759. Governor’s No. 679. Amendments to Labour Ordinance. 28 November 1927.
126 PRO: CO874/760. Extract from Minutes o f the Eighteenth Annual General Meeting o f the NBCC. 1 
September 1928.
127 PRO: C0874/759. Enclosure 2. Paragraph 5 o f  Governor’ s despatch o f 679. 28 November 1927.
128 PRO: C0874/759. Extract from Precis o f Interview w ith Representatives o f  the Sapong Company. 1 
November 1927.
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they argued that they were entitled to a fair protection in this respect.129 An amendment 
of the law was, therefore, considered necessary by the Company government. The 
Court finally sanctioned and legislated, in the consolidating Ordinance of 1929, that the 
conviction of a labourer under any offence committed in Sections 52, 53 and 54 of 
Labour Ordinance 1916, should ‘be no bar to subsequent conviction under the said 
section during the same contract’.130
An important development in connection with labour control occurred in 1928, 
when government emancipated labourers on verbal contracts by legislating that they 
were no longer liable for prosecution for disobeying a lawful order or refusing to work. 
Although this encouraged the use of indentured labour, employers were anxious about 
further developments in the international arena, which called for the abolition of any 
regulations relating to contract labour in any part of the world, ‘which have the 
appearance of placing the labourer in a servile relationship to the employer’, i.e. penal 
clauses, debt bondage, etc. The International Labour Office had labelled indentured 
labour as a form of forced labour and slavery, and was championing ‘voluntary labour 
only’.131 Meanwhile, the USA too imposed measures to halt the importation of products 
from territories using forced labour. As a consequence of these developments, the NEI 
government contemplated the abolition of penal clauses in its own Coolie Ordinance in 
1930, which indirectly implied that there would be a ‘curtailment’ of the penal clauses in 
British North Borneo, ‘as far as Javanese labourers were concerned’.132 Predictably, 
employers in the British protectorate feared that this drastic change would bring ‘evil 
consequences’ and they no longer had the advantage if Javanese indentured labourers 
were not punishable for desertion or other violations.133 Their greatest fear came true, 
as the most important form of labour control approved by law, i.e. the penal sanctions,
129 PRO: 00874/759. W.D. Goldsmith, Secretary o f Sapong Rubber and Tobacco Estates, Ltd. to 
Secretary, BNBC. 29 November 1927.
130 PRO: CO874/760. See Section 60 o f Labour Ordinance 1929.
131 PRO: CO874/1024. Minutes. Forced Labour and Contract Labour.
132 PRO: C0874/753. Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert.
133 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1921.
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were abolished in 1932, at the same time as the government legislated on the abolition 
of indentured contracts in the territory.
Conclusion
To be sure, the fact that British North Borneo depended upon a continuous supply of 
Javanese indentured labourers rendered it important for the Company administrators to 
provide ample legal protection for the immigrants, under the supervision of the 
Protector of Labour, and the watchful eye of the Dutch Labour Inspectors. Manifested 
within the Labour Ordinance, the protective provisions provided a sense of security for 
the Javanese labourers when they signed on, and in adjusting to the working 
environment in the territory. However, it was clear that the Labour Ordinance 
simultaneously provided protection for the employers. The philosophy underpinning all 
of the labour ordinances introduced in the territory before 1936 was that indenture 
imposed civil obligations, with penal sanctions, on labourers who violated their 
contracts. Indeed the law also outlined the obligations and duties of the employers 
towards their government-imported Javanese coolies, punishable in similar manner. 
Noticeably, however, the scale of penalties involved differed. Not a single offence led to 
the punishment of flogging (before it was outlawed) on the employers, and only for one 
single offence (i.e. trafficking, and this too was subjected to the Protector’s discretion) 
did the threat of imprisonment exist in the law for an offending estate official. The rest 
were punishable fines, cancellation of contracts, and a potential ban from future 
importation, which did not lead to the closure of the enterprise. This situation 
contrasted with that of the Javanese immigrant labourer, who was vulnerable to 
potential whipping or imprisonment for major or minor infractions of the labour 
ordinance, in addition to the monetary penalties imposed. In this sense, it is fair to 
conclude that there was an imbalance central to the labour laws of the territory. Despite 
recognising the mentality prevalent at the time, which regarded indenture agreements 
by labourers to work as enforceable only by criminal penalties, there were continuous 
efforts on the part of the Protector of Labour to improve labour conditions by enforcing,
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amending and introducing new laws to the benefit of government-imported Javanese in 
particular, and other labourers, in general.
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CHAPTER SIX
LIFE AND LABOUR: MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF 
JAVANESE INDENTURED LABOURERS 
Introduction
The preceding chapter has shown that the Dutch Contract and the territory’s Labour 
Ordinance had made ample provisions for Javanese indentured labourers, so that they 
would be secure in the knowledge that their welfare was well protected. They were 
repeatedly promised, upon recruitment, that they would receive proper material 
conditions in terms of sufficient wages and rations, food and water, housing, sanitary 
and medical facilities, in return for services rendered for a certain defined period. It 
would seem that the territory’s labour laws would punish any employer who failed to 
adapt to these rules. This chapter aims to analyse the actual relationship between the 
formal laws and the way in which the institution of Javanese indenture operated. It 
attempts to draw out any tension and discrepancy between theory and practice, 
particularly concerning the material conditions of Javanese indentured labourers in 
British North Borneo.
Labour Schedule
The Dutch Contract stipulated that Javanese indentured labourers were tied to an 
enterprise for two to three years, and that they would be paid based on the number of 
days worked. Prior to 1929, they were also required to work 10 hours a day, with no 
more than six hours to be worked consecutively. Statutory rest days included two days 
of each month. Some employers were quite generous by allowing four days of holidays 
in a month.1 Sundays were usually chosen as one of the rest days for coolies. 
Therefore, coolies working on estates within the proximity of districts and towns were 
allowed to visit friends, and the tamu (local native market), where social interaction with
1 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). ADO to Resident West Coast. March 1918.
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other labourers and native folks occurred.2 Also, Javanese indentured labourers were 
entitled to a holiday on the first day of the Islamic New Year. From 1929 onwards, on 
top of the two monthly holidays, Javanese workers under the Dutch Contract were 
given rest days on Hari Raya, Hari Mulud (the birthday of the prophet Mohammed), the 
last day of the month Roewah, and the tenth day of the month of Zulhijjah, known as 
Hari Raya Korban.3
The majority of the Javanese were employed as tappers. Tapping was a male- 
dominated industry, due to the arduous nature of the job. The roll-call for labourers 
(tappers and weeders) was at 5.30 a.m, where they were called before the overseers, 
in the presence of the Assistant Managers. At the first crack of dawn, Javanese coolies 
were already out in the field to begin tapping. The coolness of the early morning air 
encouraged the latex to flow, thus improving yield. Coolies used a tapping knife to 
shear off a thin layer from a rubber tree’s bark. This had to be done with precision, 
because too deep a cut could injure the tree. A mistake would be costly to the coolie. 
Latex oozed out, and trickled down into a cup, attached to the tree. By 10 a.m., the 
coolie would go around with his buckets, and poured the latex from each cup. On most 
estates, coolies also carried a bucket of water to wash up the cups, and put them back 
in their places. On a hilly estate, coolies did not need to carry water. Most tappers 
finished their task between 10.30 -11.30 a.m.4 The collected latex would be brought to 
the factory, where it would be coagulated with acetic acid, and transformed into pure 
white rubber. Later it was put through a marking roller and made into a sheet, or crepe. 
The sheets of rubber were then dried in the smoke house, and later sold.5
To ensure that sufficient work was performed every day, employers preferred to 
give coolies task work. Each coolie was given a definite number of trees to tap, varying
2 Cook. Borneo. p. 122; Johan M . Padasian. ‘ Cultural Progress and the A rts ’ , in: Sullivan and Leong. 
Commemorative History. p. 534.
3 PRO: 874/752. Labour Contract 1929. Refer Appendix 5 for more information on the Javanese calendar.
4 PRO: C0874/438. Copy o f  report for 3rd A p ril 1918, by W. Perry Pickney.
5 PRO: C0874/438. Report by Maurice Maude to Directors o f Lok Kawi Estate. 23 November 1918; 
Rutter. British North Borneo, pp. 248-249.
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from almost 300 on a hilly estate like Lok Kawi Estate to 500 on flat land, such as 
Langkon Estate.6 Some estates also experimented with a numbering task. In each task, 
the number of the task was put on every tree. Apparently, this was to prevent a coolie 
from leaving a number of trees untapped, and claiming that they were ‘not in his task’.7 
A coolie earned a piece rate by tapping the number of trees allocated to him. Wages 
were calculated on the basis of such piece rates.
Together with their female counterparts, some male Javanese also undertook 
weeding work. Although not a skill-oriented job, weeding could be a tedious affair. 
Coolies had to keep the planted part of the estate clean by eradicating the coarse 
lalang grass (weeds) with its poisonous roots that grew between the rubber trees.8 
Task work was arranged by filling a sack of roots a day. The task of a female labourer 
was three quarters of the average task of a male labourer.9 At some estates, after 
completing the task work for the day, the estate would put coolies on day work over the 
same ground to clear odd blades that were overlooked, and small pieces of roots left in 
the ground that had been broken up.10
Javanese indentured labourers were also employed to work on tobacco estates, 
although the number was sparse. The nature of their jobs varied. They were not 
involved in the planting process (this was done by Chinese coolies), but their 
involvement began with the drying of the leaves in the drying sheds. Once this had 
been completed, bundles of around 20 leaves were packed in rattan baskets, and sent 
to the fermenting shed. Usually, the services of Javanese women were utilised in the 
fermenting shed.11 The fermenting process would take between six days and a month. 
After that, Javanese coolies were used to sort the tobacco leaves, under close
6 PRO: C0874/ 438, Copy o f report fo r 3rd A pril 1918 by W. Perry Pinckney; Rutter. British North 
Borneo, p. 248.
7 PRO: C0874/438. Plummer to the Secretaries, Lok Kawi Estate. 15 September 1918.
8 SSA: KSP.24/M/3. A llan Y in  Chin Foh. ‘Early Days in the Kinarut Estate’ .
9 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1931). Labour in North Borneo.
10 PRO: COS74/438. Plummer to the Secretaries Lok Kawi Estate. 15 September 1918.
11 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 253.
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supervision by overseers. Once the tobacco leaves were sorted, they were packed into 
square mat bales (weighing 1771b.), uploaded onto steamers, and were ready to be 
dispatched to London or Amsterdam.12
The question of labour schedules however, became a persistent source of 
conflict. The territory’s Labour Ordinance permitted only nine hours of work a day. But 
some employers of Javanese labour went beyond that, on the basis that the Dutch 
Contract apparently gave them the right to demand an extra hour of labour. Many 
Javanese indentured workers protested against working longer hours, and preferred 
working on a piece-work, basis with shorter hours of work. Some employers were also 
in the habit of declaring a rainy day as one of the two monthly holidays or rest days. 
The authorities denounced this practice, whereby ‘the labourer was entitled to the luck 
of the weather for his holidays’. Rest days, according to the authorities, should be 
alerted a week ahead, so that Javanese coolies could make arrangements to visit 
friends outside their estates.13 For labourers on task work, a perennial source of conflict 
was usually what constituted a ‘task’, and the withholding of wages that the labourers 
were supposed to receive. A further discussion on the matter will follow in the next 
section.
Wages
An important aspect of life under indenture was the issue of wages and wage 
payments. When Javanese indentured labour began in 1914, the minimum wage for 
government-imported Javanese was 25 cents for men and 15 cents for women, which 
was supplementary to rations and housing, and came to around $10-12 per month, at a 
time when the exchange rate was pegged at S$1.00 to 2s 4d.14 No provision was made 
for further increase at the time of re-contracting. The average salary for locally
12 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 252.
13 PRO: C0874/753. Notes o f interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert. 10 January 1919.
14 ARA: M ailrappoit 1857/13. Model-Werkcontract. Tot de werving is vergunning verleend by 
Gouvernment-besluit van 18 November 1913. No. 25.
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contracted labourers was 33 cents for men and 25 cents for women, as stipulated 
under Ordinance No. 9 of 1916.
Reforms in nominal wages were made in 1920 for the government-imported 
Javanese, following the developments taking place in the region after the First World 
War. There was a shortage of rice crops in the East, and owing to the competitive 
buying by the Federated Malay States (FMS), the Dutch and the Japanese, rice prices 
soared sharply. From 1 April 1919, exports of Rangoon rice from Singapore (from 
where the territory obtained its supply of rice) to British North Borneo halted, while 
exports for both Siam and Saigon rice deteriorated. The Singapore Food Controller 
attributed this to the frenzied buying by the Japanese and the Dutch.15 In July 1919, 
rice cost $19.64 per picul,™ and by 1 February 1920, it was $26.00 per picul, an 
increase of more than 32%.17 The situation was made worse by the failure of the local 
rice crop in the land due to a combination of factors; the long drought; the crops being 
attacked by a species of rust; and the influenza epidemic, which retarded planting and 
prevented proper attention being paid to the planting areas.18 Since rice was the most 
important staple commodity, an increase in rice prices influenced the price of other 
food. As Table 6.1 shows, the price of basic necessities at the two main administrative 
centres of British North Borneo rose tremendously in 1919, compared to pre-war times, 
with the cost of living increasing by 100%.
Fluctuations in the price of rice, and the increased cost of living, necessitated 
adjustments to wage rates in Sumatran plantations. A similar development in the 
economy in British North Borneo forced the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) government 
to call for similar actions to be taken by the Company government if the latter wanted a 
renewal of the recruiting permit. As a result, the minimum wage of the government-
15 SSA: F /l (3). Report o f the Seventy-Third H a lf Yearly Meeting o f  the BNBC. 22 July 1919. p. 11.
16 Picul is units o f weight used in Southeast Asia and China, and equal to 100 katis.
17 See SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, and vice-versa), for various prices o f  rice.
18 SSA: F /l (3). Report o f the Seventy-Third H a lf Yearly Meeting. 22 July 1919. p. 12.
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imported Javanese was raised by 10 cents, making the new wage for men 35 cents, 
and 25 cents for women, plus free rations. This increment meant that government- 
imported Javanese coolies received the highest level of nominal wages, totalling 
between 50-60 cents a day (inclusive of free ration) against 33 cents received by 
coolies under local contract without ration. If there was no alteration to the nominal 
wages, as ordered by the NEI government, it would have meant a deterioration in 
material conditions for the government-imported labourers. In other words, with the 
increase in nominal wages, real wages remained the same. Therefore, the increase in 
nominal wages for Javanese indentured labourers, serving the Dutch Contract, was 
more a compensation for the rapid inflation, and pressure from the NEI government, 
than a sign that employers were prepared to pay better wages.
Table 6.1
Market Prices of Basic Necessities, Pre-War and 1919, for Sandakan and Jesselton
Article Sandakan Jesselton
Pre-War
(1913)
1919 Price
index
(1913=100)
Pre-
War
(1913)
1919 Price
index
(1913=100)
Beef 0.28 0.28 100 0.21 0.21 100
Blachan 0.08 0.15 187.5 0.04 0.10 250
Bread 0.10 0.10 100 0.10 0.12 120
Butter 0.65 0.90 138.5 0.65 1.05 161.5
Cigarette Paper 1.25 1.65 132 n/a n/a n/a
Cloth White 
Drill
0.30 0.80 266 0.25 0 .8 0 -0 .9 5 320 -  380
Coffee 0.75 0.95 126.7 0.75 1.05 140
Eggs 0.02-0.25 0.04 200 0.02 0.045 225
Fish (Fresh) 0.08-0.14 0 .1 8 -0 .2 4 1 7 1 .4 -2 2 5 0.12 0.16 133.3
Fish (Salt) 0.18 0.24 133.3 0.10 0.28 280
Lard 0.32 0.60 187.5 0.28 0.75 267 8
Matches 0.12 0.20 166.6 0.15 0.25 166.7
Oil, Ground Nut 0.20 0.48 240 0.21 0 54 257.1
Kerosene 4.00 6.75 168.9 2.90 7.20 248.2
Salt 0.03 0.07 233.3 0.35 0.70 200
Sugar (White) 0.12 0.36 300 0.12 0.35 291.7
Tea (Ceylon) 0.60 0.65 108.3 0.36 0.65 180.5
Tobacco 0.95 1.70 178.9 1.00 1.50 150
Source: Prices of goods obtained from, SSA: Despatches Governor to Chairman 1919.
There was no legislated increase in nominal wages for locally contracted 
labourers, apart from a bonus of 7 cents a day, or $2 a month, as a ‘subsidy on food 
stuff other than rice’ granted voluntarily by some estates to coolies, during the month of 
May-July 1920.19 In May 1920, the North Borneo Chamber of Commerce (NBCC)
|l) PRO: C0874/755. Memorandum on Wages.
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committee unanimously agreed that owing to the high cost of living, the minimum pay 
of an estate labourer was to be $12 per month.20 High prices had naturally affected the 
coolies, particularly those with families. To help the coolie population, the Company 
government made it compulsory for employers to sell rice to estate labourers below 
cost price, i.e. a coolie was charged 9 cents a kati, or 54 cents per gantang21, for his 
rice.22 Notably, employers preferred a temporary loss than a permanent, increased 
expenditure that came with increased wages for labourers under the local contract.23
In 1925, a reduction in the cost of living also saw a decrease in the minimum 
wage for government-imported Javanese. The new wage rate was decreased to 30 
cents for men and 25 cents for women. The duration of the contract, too, was extended 
from 2 years to 3 years. This new development was accepted with mixed feelings by 
the employers. Although they were happy with the wage reduction, it made little 
difference to cost, when the NEI government increased its provision for rations. 
Employers considered the latter to be ‘on the lavish side’, and the scale was 
considerably in excess of what was laid down in the territory’s Labour Ordinance, as 
approved by the government medical department.24 In lieu of this ration, the 
government-indentured Javanese received extra 25 cents supplementing the wages, 
making it 55 cents for men and 50 cents for women.25 Therefore, real wages increased 
for Javanese indentured labourers under the government permit.
On 1 December 1927, when the Company government legislated under 
Notification 359 a new minimum wage scale for its labourers, Javanese labourers who
20 PRO: C0874/553. NBCC Minutes o f Committee Meeting. 22 May 1920.
21 Gantang is 'A o f  a picul.
22 SSA: N BC A 639. Government’s no 639. Rice Subsidy, Proposal o f  Chamber o f  Commerce. 29 October 
1920; PRO: C0874/755. Governor to President BNBC. No. 644. 29 October 1920. SSA: N BC A 1194. 
Feeding in Estates.
23 SSA: N BC A 639. Minutes o f an interview granted to a deputation o f the Beaufort and D istrict Planters’ 
Association by His Excellency the Acting Governor to discuss the price o f rice sold to labourers as Fixed 
Notification in the O ffic ia l Gazette dated 1 May 1919.
24 ARA: Mailrapport 2593. Fraser, Government Secretary, to D irector o f  Labour in the Justice 
Department. Kantoor Van Arbeid. Weltevreden 8 September 1925.
25 PRO: C0874/755. Rates o f  Wages o f  Labourers in North Borneo, Sumatra and the FMS.
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continued to work under the Dutch permit were not affected. However, the Dutch 
Labour inspector, Van Lijnden, adamantly insisted that no government-imported 
Javanese should sign on any contract that paid less than 50 cents daily. Consequently, 
a Javanese coolie who initially came to the territory under the government scheme, but 
re-engaged under the local contract, was now allocated with a higher minimum wage of 
50 cents per day with no free food, against the 33 cents paid previously. Chinese 
labourers were given similar provision, but all other labourers, including those 
Javanese recruited in Singapore and natives, were paid 45 cents for men and 35 cents 
for women, also against the old rate of 33 cents and 25 cents, with no free food.26 
When recession occurred in the late 1920s, rigorous efforts were made by employers 
to demand a reduction in the minimum wage paid for government-imported Javanese. 
The members of the NBCC and the North Borneo Planters’ Association (NBPA) 
unanimously agreed that in view of the substantially reduced cost of living in 1930, as 
compared to five years before (the comparison in shop prices is shown in Table 6.2), 
the contract wages for Java recruited labour were excessive.27 The Labour Advisory 
Board (established in 1927 to advise government pertaining to issues on labour) finally 
agreed that a reduction in the existing minimum wage to a level of 40 cents for men, 
and 35 cents for female, for all coolies under written local contracts, was reasonable, 
and would not ‘endanger the health and well-being of the labourer’.28 As for the 
indentured Javanese, under the Dutch Contract, the NEI authorities did consider 
reducing wages in future Javanese contracts, but no reduction was made to existing 
contracts.29
Overall, nominal wages under the Dutch Contract remained markedly higher than 
those for other labourers under the Local Contract (Figure 6.1). Apparently, the 
Javanese needed more wages than other labourers (i.e. the Chinese) because a
26 PRO: C0874/755. Massey H ill, Surrey, 14 February 1928.
27 PRO: C0874/756. Wages, NBCC. No. 24. Extract from Minutes o f Committee Meeting. 1 May 1931.
28 SSA: N BC A 673. Minutes o f the Extract from the Labour Advisory Board Meeting. 3 October 1930.
29 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1930). Acting Consul General, Batavia to Government Secretary. 
16 September 1930.
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majority of them had dependants to provide for.30 A government-imported Javanese 
received $7.50 per month in wages, and food allowance of around $4.50-$5.00, in 
lieu.31 The wages laid down in the contract were a ‘minimum wage’, and theoretically 
every labourer was in a position to earn that minimum. The Dutch Contract required a 
minimum number of hours, (10 hours from 1914-1925; 9 hours post-1925). As long as 
a labourer fulfilled the required 9 hours work, as stipulated by the territory’s labour law, 
(despite the wordings of the Dutch Contract), he or she was able to earn that minimum 
wage. As for piece work, once the task had been completed, the coolies were given the 
minimum wage or more.
Table 6.2
Comparison of Shop Prices for 1925 and 1930
Item 1925 1930 Price index (1925 = 
100)
Bean Stick per kati 0.62 0.40 64.51
Ground nuts 0.68 0.50 73.52
Ground nut oil 0.19 0.15 78.9
Lard 0.45 0.30 66.66
Chinese tea 0.14 0.10 71.42
Salt eggs (each) 0.22 0.14 63.6
Matches (box) 0.06 0.05 83.3
Salt (kati) 0.02 0.02 100
Assam Java 0.06 0.05 83.33
Blachan 0.17 0.15 88.23
Flour 0.18 0.22 122.2
Coffee 0.14 0.11 78.57
Cigarette Paper 0.68 0.50 73.5
Coconut oil 0.01 0.01 100
Sugar 0.14 0.12 85.7
Kerosene Oil (bottle) 0.16 0.18 112.5
Salt fish 0.17 0.16 94.11
Eggs 0.05 0.04 80
Source: Despatches Governor to President 1930.
Extra pay often took the form of piece rates, overtime, commission and bonuses. 
Both Javanese and Chinese coolies earned considerably more by overtime, 
commission and piece work, and the wages went as high as $15 to $18 a month, from 
the usual $10 - $12 monthly.32 Coolies were encouraged to work overtime. For 
Javanese indentured labourers, the rate for overtime was 50% above ordinary pay, 
whereas other contract coolies received eight cents per hour, or at rates mutually
30 PRO: C0874/755. Memorandum on Wages.
31 PRO: C0874/753. Memorandum o f Van Hemert Inspection. 10 January 1919.
~ PRO: C0874/744. Wages; A.C. Cowie to Pearson. 26 April 1921.
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agreed upon earlier.33 Therefore, a person of average physique and industry could 
receive a higher wage.34 Healthy young workers used this opportunity to earn more 
than the official daily wage stipulated in the contract. In 1917, tapping task in the 
Sekong Estate was at a rate of 40 cents for 400 trees. Most coolies finished the task by 
10.30a.m, giving them time to take another task, i.e. a weeding task in the afternoon. 
For this, they got extra pay.35 In the same year, the Lok Kawi Estate tapped 80,000 
acres with 320 tappers, giving an average of 250 trees per coolie. The coolies started 
with a task of 200 trees on the hills, which was gradually increased as the tappers 
became efficient. No commission or bonus was paid to a coolie whose task was under 
300 trees. For 300 trees, they were paid $2.00 commission. For over and above 300 
trees, they were paid two cents per tree per month; i.e. a task of 340 trees earned the 
coolie $2.80 commission. Weeders received no commission. As for bonuses, $2 per 
month was usually paid to tappers.36 Some planters were in favour of paying more than 
the average wage, provided that the coolie earned it. Every encouragement was given 
to induce the coolie to earn as much as he or she possibly could. This was encouraged 
to keep the coolie contented and senang (happy), at the same time, to keep costs 
down to a minimum, and to promote stability and productivity.37
However, in terms of real wages, a Javanese coolie sometimes received less 
than he or she earned on paper. Advance money given upon recruitment had to be 
repaid, and each Javanese indentured would be deducted 10 cents per working day in 
repayment of advances and debt recoverable, not exceeding $15.38 Although 
government-imported Javanese were not concerned about deductions for poll-tax 
(which was paid by employers), meals, rice or food coupons (for those who were fed by 
the estates), there were other deductions. Sometimes coolies even had to pay for the 
equipment they used in their work. Or if a coolie attempted to desert, and was caught,
33 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1931). Labour in North Borneo.
34 PRO: COB74/753. Memorandum o f  Van Hemert Inspection. 10 January 1919.
35 PRO: C0874/477. Governor Pearson to Chairman. No. 609. 16 July 1917.
36 SSA: N BC A 231. Lok Kawi Estate Riot. Prot. 469/17 by Horton.
37 PRO: C0874/755. Wages in North Borneo.
38 PRO: C0874/744. Cowie to Pearson. 26 A pril 1921.
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he had to pay for the expenses incurred for his recovery, which would be recovered as 
an advance. On top of this, the Protector contended that the wages were often 
miscalculated owing to illegal deductions made for not finishing tasks or other 
infractions. Arbitrary deductions were made, amongst others, to pay for the cook’s 
wages; for tools lost, such as latex cups; fines for spilling latex; court expenses 
charged to a labourer without authority; and the salaries of coolie line-sweepers.39 In 
Lok Kawi Estate, fines for a coolie per month ranged from $3.00 down to 50 cents. The 
usual fine for having the mark (K) for malingering, or lifting cups before time, was 
$1.00, while for bark scrap shortage, a labourer was fined between 50 cents and $2.00. 
A coolie being half a day sick in hospital was fined $1, while a coolie admitted to 
hospital was fined 50 cents.40
Figure 6.1
Base rates of coolie wages in British North Borneo, 1914-1930
■ " ■ - '■■
« 4013
« 30
1914 1920 1925 1927 1930
Year
DC (m) - m -  DC (f)
LC (gov recruited Javanese - m) — LC (gov recruited Javanese - f)
— LC (others - m) — LC (others - f)
DC = Dutch Contract; LC = Local Contract; m = male; f = female
Source: PRO: C0648/7-14 Annual Report of the Protectorate Department, relevant years.
Complaints regarding wages were excessive. As late as 1927 and 1928, 
Javanese indentured labourers at Bettotan Camp (owned by the British Borneo Timber 
Company, BBTC) grumbled at not receiving the full day’s wages for the remaining days
g SSA: NBCA 465. Macaskie to Manager, Lower Segama. 11 July 1928; SSA: Despatches (Gov. to 
President, 1928). Memorandum by V iehoff on Sapong Estate. Enclosure 2.
40 SSA: NBCA 231. Lok Kawi Estate Riot. Prot. 469/17, by Horton.
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prescribed in the contract.41 Moreover, a customary practice among certain estates 
was to refuse to pay wages on rainy days where out-door work was impossible.42 At 
Batu Puteh Estate, Lahad Datu Cultuur Maatschappij, Sandala Estate, and Langkon 
Estate, Javanese labourers were not paid the minimum wage, even when they had 
worked for nine hours without completing their tasks. The Javanese indentured 
labourers maintained that the tasks assigned to them were too hard to finish in one 
day, and as a result, they could not earn the wages stipulated in their contract.43 Van 
Lijnden and Viehoff condemned this practice, and contended that only if a labourer 
stopped work before the completion of hours could deductions be made 
proportionately. Employers also had the tendency to withhold wages if a labourer fell 
sick during the course of the day, and they were not paid for the work done.44
Some wage rates even reached scandalous levels, as exemplified in the check 
roll for April 1916 at Bongawan Estate. The check roll revealed that Javanese coolies 
sometimes received no pay at all after fines and deductions by an Assistant Manager 
called Holman. Holman had deducted 142 full-days and 94 half-days pay from the 
wages of 36 Javanese coolies on his check roll. The total balance of wages earned 
after deducting an average of $4.60 each on food (in lieu of ration) was $35.71 for 36 
labourers -  less than an average of $1.00 each, which was written off from their debts. 
Eleven of these Javanese had debts of over $30.00 after six or seven months work 
under contract. A coolie who worked 30 days could be fined up to eleven whole days 
and six half days. Some had no balance of earnings to be deducted to clear debts, 
which could reach more than $50.45 The Dutch Labour Inspector contended that a 
situation such as this occurred due to a major defect in the organisational system of 
paying wages, whereby a proper standardised check roll was still lacking. Each estate
41 SSA*. N BC A  210. C.D. Mai'tyn to Manager British Borneo Timber Co. Prot: 372/27. 12 April 1927.
42 PRO: C0874/753. Memorandum o f  Van Hemert Inspection 10 January 1919; SSA: N BCA 210. 
Protector to Manager. 8 November 1926.
43 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Manager Batu Puteh Estate. Prot.: 287/27. 10 A pril 1927; SSA: NBCA 
465. Memorandum by V iehoff, under heading ‘Particular Matters’ .
44 SSA: N BC A 210. Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’ s Interview w ith His Excellency.
45 SSA: N BC A 906. Protector Horton to Government Secretary. Prot 167/16. 16 May 1916.
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allegedly operated a different system, thus rendering checking by inspecting officials 
difficult.46
Rations
The government-imported Javanese were also paid additional wages, in the form of 
food ration. This daily ration supplemented the daily minimum wage for coolies, to be 
paid fortnightly or monthly at the end of the month.47 The Dutch Contract agreed upon 
during the initial phase of immigration is shown in Table 6.3. This ration was increased 
in late 1925, in terms of variety and quantity.
Table 6.3
Diet Scale per person per day (Dutch Contract)
1914- November 1925 December 1925 -1932
Rice 25 oz Rice 1 1/ 2 lbs
Fish or 6 oz Fish (fresh of conserved) 6 oz
Meat 8  oz Tamarind 1 oz
Vegetables 6  oz Vegetables 6 oz
Condiments 1 oz Spices 1 oz
Salt Va o z Salt Vz oz
Coconut oil V /z  O Z Coconut oil 1 oz
Sugar 1 oz Sugar 1 oz
Tea 1 / 1 0  oz Tea 1 / 1 0  oz
Onions 1 oz
Trassie (Belacan) 1 oz
Green pepper 1 oz
Fresh coconut 1 oz
Source: PRO: C0874/752. Macaskie to Government Secretary. 4 October 1928.
Reports by estates and Protectors of Labour indicated that management had 
generally always given the stipulated rations in the Dutch Contract to all government- 
imported Javanese. Emphasis was placed on giving a balanced diet, particularly 
providing sufficient green vegetable ration to the coolies. With its history of beri-beri 
outbreaks, inspecting officials were insistent that employers paid particular attention to 
the vegetable supply.48 Yet there were the occasional estates that failed to follow the 
dietary requirements, as exemplified by the inadequate portion given by Langkon 
Estate for the Javanese coolies and their dependents. In 1927, a report showed that
4(' SSA: NBCA 465. Memorandum by Viehoff.
44 ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. Model-Werkcontract. 18 November 1913. No. 25.
45 SSA: NBCA 210. Notes from Baron Van Lijnden's Interview with His Excellency.
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each male coolie was only given 1 kati of rice, 2 34 tahil of fish and 1 tahil of 
vegetables, which after conversion, were equivalent to around 17.6 oz of rice, 4.4 oz of 
fish and 1.8 oz of vegetables. A female coolie received % kati rice and the same 
amount of fish and vegetables as the male coolie, the cost being approximately 12 
cents. The lack of rations, especially the appalling portion of vegetables, caused 
discontent among coolies, resulting in numerous complaints to the Dutch Labour 
Inspector.49
A common demand made by some Javanese indentured coolies was to cancel 
the free ration part of their contract. Based on comments made by three estates, 
Javanese labourers disliked being fed ‘cooked ration’ by the estate, known as ‘makan 
ransome’ or 'feeding in kongsi\ which was issued to all government-imported 
Javanese.50 They sometimes complained of the inadequacy of the ration, particularly in 
terms of rations of rice. During the period of high inflation following the end of the First 
World War, Javanese labourers at Sapong Estate complained that the substitutes 
(crushed wheat and sweet potatoes) given to them were unpalatable.51 Hence, most 
newly-recruited Javanese preferred to make their own cooking arrangements, much to 
their personal satisfaction.52 One way of doing this was to pay for the rations 
themselves, using a cash allowance given by their employers. From the start of the 
Javanese indentured labour experiment, some estates gave a cash allowance of 
approximately 10 to 15 cents a day to the Javanese coolies under the Dutch permit, 
instead of ration.53 The Dutch Labour Inspector, Van Hemert, who visited in 1918, had 
no objection to this practice, but demanded that the amount should be sufficient to 
enable the labourer to buy a complete ration, as laid down in the contract.54 According
49 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Manager, Langkon Estate. Prot 334/27. 3 May 1927.
50 PRO: C0874/755. Comments front Estates.
51 HCPP: Crnd. 1060. Annexure E. Report by Pearson and Elphinstone. 8 A p ril 1920.
52 PRO: C0874/755. Memorandum on Wages.
53 PRO: C0874/753. OAG to President BNBC. 17 September 1928.
54 PRO: COS74/753. Notes o f Interview w ith  Dr. Van Hemert.
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to him, employers had to acquiesce to the labourers’ demands for rations, instead of 
the cash allowance, should the latter feel that the cash amount was insufficient.55
Javanese coolies under the Dutch Contract also had the tendency to ‘voluntarily’ 
offer to cancel their contract, with its comparative high wages, and substitute it for the 
local contract with its low wages, to enable them to live like their comrades, i.e. 
Singapore-recruited Javanese.56 They favoured the usual estate ration bond (food 
bond), served twice monthly to labourers recruited locally, and from Singapore. The 
food bond was in the range of $5.10 to $5.58 per month, depending on estates. On it, 
the labourer obtained his or her rice ration for that fortnight, and the balance value in 
any other preferred food stuffs, such as salt fish, vegetables, yellow peas, lard, onions, 
garlic, tauchu (fermented soy bean), salt and beef.57
Apart from the satisfaction of preparing their own meals with the ration bonds, 
Javanese coolies also preferred the ration bond system to obtain extra cash. A regular 
practice among coolies was to obtain advances of wages in the shape of bonds, which 
were freely distributed by some estates. Coolies would then purchase goods from the 
estate shops with these bonds, and sell the goods at about half their value to the first 
person who would pay cash. By this, a coolie accumulated more debts. In 1917, a 
timber contractor living just outside Woodford Estate notified an enquiry commission 
that he sometimes purchased rice and sugar from coolies of the estate at very low 
prices. In one particular month, he purchased between 50 and 60 katis of rice, and said 
‘a great deal more was sold by coolies passing through my garden on their way to 
others’.58
55 PRO: 00874/753. Governor’ s No. 38. Interview with Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919.
56 PRO: C0874/755. Comments from Estates.
57 PRO: C0874/755. Comments from Estates; SSA: N BCA 533. Lease to Hallifax. 22 July 1923.
58 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917. Woodford Estate Enquiry. 14 February 1917.
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When Van Lijnden inspected the conditions of Javanese labourers in 1927, he 
asserted that giving ration bonds to labourers indentured under the Dutch Contract was 
one of the ploys instigated by estate management to coax the former into re-engaging 
to the local contract. According to him, the local contract provided less favourable 
terms for the labourers, particularly regarding wages and repatriation. Van Lijnden 
banned estate shop bonds from being given to labourers on the Java contract, and 
insisted that all allowances were paid in cash.59 Van Lijnden further reiterated that food 
allowance should be equivalent to the cost of rations, and that this payment should be 
kept separate from the wages account.60 He fixed 25 cents per day per adult as a fair 
compensation, and 10 cents a day per minor under fifteen years old. Labour Inspector 
Viehoff, who took over Van Lijnden’s inspection task, further declared in 1928 that the 
new food allowance scheme was effective from 1 June 1927 onwards.
This alteration to the food allowance scale did not go down well with the 
employers, even though it benefited Javanese indentured labourers tremendously. 
Employers had to pay an increased cost ‘per person’, without taking into consideration 
the difference between the appetite of an adult and a child.61 At the same time, 
employers had to settle food allowance arrears due to any labourer prior to 1 June 
1927. This was calculated at a rate of 15 cents a day. Labourers who were given less 
than that amount were to be given refunds.62 Aggravating the situation for the 
employers was the position of certain women ‘dependents’ . These Javanese women 
arrived on estates as dependents of labourers on the Dutch Contract, and were later 
engaged locally at the minimum wage of 25 cents per day, without rations. Despite the 
minimum wage received by these working women was similar to what a dependent 
woman who was not working should receive for food allowance, Viehoff was unhappy 
with this arrangement, and considered it as an unfair bargain. What infuriated him more
59 SSA: N BC A 210. Notes for Baron Van Lijnden’ s Interview w ith His Excellency.
60 SSA: N BC A 210. Protector to Manager. No. 1-395/27. 23 May 1927.
61 PRO: C0874/752. OAG’s No. 530. Minutes. 17 September 1928.
62 SSA: N BC A  465. Protector to Manager. 11 July 1928.
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was that even when some of them had ceased working, these women failed to receive 
the supposed food money. During his inspection of Ranau Estate (owned by 
Bongawan Ltd.), Viehoff called for the manager to compensate these ‘locally engaged 
dependents’ by paying them the food allowance, in addition to the wages received. All 
in all, they were to be refunded a total of $2.50.63 He was also insistent that dependent 
Javanese women should not be engaged on a written contract. If they did work, their 
pay had to be the same as those under the Dutch Contract, i.e. 25 cents a day and 
rations, or 25 cents in lieu.64
However, the Protectorate did not concede to the principle of paying for food 
allowance to dependents of labourers under the Dutch Contract who, on their own 
accord, engaged to work in the territory. To the understanding of government officials, 
once these Javanese ‘dependents’ entered the labour market and became wage- 
earners, they ceased to be dependents.65 The government did, nonetheless, consent to 
some of Viehoff’s recommendations. This was consolidated in the new 1929 Dutch 
Contract. The new contract stipulated that a labourer who preferred to buy his or her 
own food instead of accepting daily rations provided by the employer was entitled to an 
equivalent of 25 cents daily, in lieu of free food ration. The spouse received a similar 
amount. Children, however, were given a specified ration according to age. Young 
children between ages of 3 and 10 years received one-third of a ration or % cents per 
day, while children between ages 10 and 12 years received three quarters of a ration or 
18% cents. The older category of children (between 12 and 15 years) received a full 
ration or 25 cents per day.66
To ensure that Javanese indentured labourers received the specified amount, 
strict controls were exercised over communal kitchens to prevent shopkeepers and
63 SSA: N BC A 465. Memorandum by V iehoff.
64 PRO: C0874/752. OAG to President BNBC. 17 September 1928.
65 PRO: C0874/752. OAG to President BNBC. 17 September 1928.
66 See Article 7, Dutch Contract 1929. Appendix 3.
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cooks, in particular, from making illicit profits. The day’s rations were occasionally 
weighed by a European, and rice rations issued in the presence of a European. Where 
monetary payments were made in lieu of rations to labourers on the Dutch Contract, 
rice was issued in kind, and the balance given in cash.67
Estate Shop
Due to the remote geographical locations of estates, nearly every estate in British 
North Borneo had a shop. Food, such as rice, salt fish, beans, vegetables, coconut oil, 
lard, salt, flour, sugar, coffee, and beef were the major products sold, together with 
candles, matches, kerosene oil, tobacco, cloth, and cooking utensils,88 Most employers 
had no, or little interest in estate shops as commercial gains, for their main purpose 
was to tie workers to estates.69 Estate shops were usually run by Chinese 
shopkeepers, and shops owned by the same owner maintained the same price on 
each estate.70 Shop lists were posted for the benefit of coolies. The Assistant 
Protectors were responsible for counter-checking the prices of goods in the shop, and 
the prices of commodities were revised from time to time, to bring them in line with 
current prices at outside shops. However, a slight increase was allowed in cases where 
transportation costs were heavy.71
Yet some shops had no price list displayed, and in many cases, coolies were 
charged inflated prices.72 One striking example was the estate shop at Woodford 
Estate, near Beaufort. It purchased salt fish (ikan blanak) at $12.50 per picul (i.e. 12 
cents per kati) and retailed it at $24 per picul (i.e. 20-24 cents per kati). The same shop 
purchased vegetables at 3 cents per kati, and resold them to coolies at 4 cents per kati,
67 SSA: N BC A 465. Protector to Manager. 11 July 1928.
68 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1923). Report on Protector’ s v is it to Papar Estate. 6 March 1923.
69 See next chapter on coolie mobility.
70 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Report by Protector on New Darvel Bay Tobacco 
Company, visited on 17-20 November 1916.
71 PRO: C0648/12. AR. East Coast Residency for 1926.
72 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). ADO to Resident o f  West Coast. March 1918.
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making a profit of 33/4 % or $36 (£4.40) per month.73 The quality of goods sold by 
some unscrupulous shopkeepers also left much to be desired. The manager of 
Beaufort Estate rejected 50 bags of rice supplied by Hatton Hall & Co. in 1917 because 
the rice was full of maggots. The rice was then re-sifted and re-bagged, and displayed 
in the Woodford Estate shop, which was owned by J. Hatton Hail, the manager of the 
estate. The quality of the rice was in fact so bad that it was fit only for animals, being 
‘sent down as chicken food’. The balance was purchased by coolies at greatly reduced 
price. Because there was no other place where they could obtain their supplies, or 
where their estate bonds or tokens could be used, coolies had no option but to 
purchase from the estate shop.74 This method of controlling coolie mobility will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.
The actions by Woodford Estate were one example of profiteering by estate 
management, at the expense of the coolies. The estate management had even 
prohibited vegetable sellers from selling vegetables on the estate, and had the audacity 
to instruct its opases (watchmen) to clear off peddlers on public roads.75 Sometimes, 
overseers also became involved in the operation of the estate shop. Even though the 
shop at Woodford Estate was run by a person called Francis Low, he had no real 
authority over the affairs of the shop, because one of the assistant managers held the 
keys to the cashboxes, and received $30 for duties performed ‘to check the estate 
cash’.76 The term kedai krani (shop clerk) thus became a common estate phrase, 
describing a situation where the actual taukeh or shopkeeper, was not in full control of 
the shop.77
73 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Government Secretary to J. Hatton Hall. 18 January 1917.
74 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Woodford Estate Enquiry. 14 February 1917.
75 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917. Woodford Estate Enquiry. 14 February 1917.
76 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Francis, Government Secretary, to J. Hatton Hall. 18 
January 1917.
77 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Woodford Estate Enquiry. 14 February 1917.
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Mortality, Morbidity and Medical Facilities
The Annual Report o f the Protectorate Department records the number of Javanese 
(imported under the government scheme and those privately recruited), Chinese and 
native labourers working on enterprises in British North Borneo. However, information 
on the mortality rate of these labourers is only available from 1915 onwards, and the 
figures only presented a general death rate of the coolie population as a whole, and 
lack specific individual data according to ethnicity. Similar information could be found in 
the medical reports of the Medical Department. Since the Dutch authorities in Java 
insisted on receiving half-yearly or quarterly labour returns from British North Borneo, 
only statistical data on Javanese labourers imported under the NEI permit are 
available, and fairly reliable, with information as to the number of coolies servicing their 
contracts, the mortality rates, the causes of deaths, and the number of sick workers 
who were repatriated. Even here, statistics on morbidity were only partially reliable. The 
practice of admitting every sick coolie to hospital applied to certain estates, while on 
others, out-patient cases were not shown in the returns.78
Since importation began in 1914 until 1932, the Labour Returns disclosed that a 
total of 710 government-imported Javanese died, out of the 9,969 imported.79 The 
crude death rate during the nineteen-year period was in the range of 70-80 per 
thousand, which is extremely high. Table 6.4 presents the mortality they suffered while 
under indenture. The mortality statistics relate only to contracts initially entered into in 
Java (and these data were inclusive of seasoned workers on their second or 
subsequent contract). Mortality was high during the 1910s, averaging 18.6 per 
thousand between 1914 and 1918. The ‘bad’ years for government-imported Javanese 
coolies in the 1910s were 1917 and 1918, due to the outbreak of an influenza 
pandemic. A similar cause was ascribed to high death rates recorded between 1920 
and 1922. The Javanese indentured coolie population grew incredibly from 1926
78 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Labour Returns for 2nd Quarter 1916.
79 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Report fo r 1932. p. 30.
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onwards, and mortality increased from less than 10 per thousand in 1923-1925, to 14 
per thousand on average in the years 1926-1928. The figures for Javanese indentured 
labourers correlate to the overall mortality of coolies in the territory, as shown in Figure 
6 .2.80 Likewise, it is interesting to note that in the 1920s, mortality rates per thousand 
for labourers are more or less similar to, if not lower than, the mortality rates of the total 
population (See Table 6.5). The only exception was 1922, when a significant proportion 
of the coolie force became victims of the influenza epidemic.
Table 6.4
Mortality of Javanese Indentured Labourers in British North Borneo, 1914-193281
Year Population
at
1 January1
Population at risk2 Deaths Death Rate per 
1,000 
per year
1914 459 454.5 6 13
1915 450 654.5 8 12
1916 859 930.5 9 10
1917 1002 1256.5 30 24
1918 1511 1876 64 34
1919 2241 2254.5 21 9
1920 2268 2606.5 56 22
1921 2945 3055.5 77 25
1922 3166 2909 54 19
1923 2652 2599 23 9
1924 2546 2511 21 8
1925 2472 2791.5 22 8
1926 3111 4118 53 13
1927 5125 5769 100 17
1928 6413 6168.5 71 12
1929 5924 5633.5 43 8
1930 5343 4602 35 8
1931 3861 3356.5 9 3
1932 2852 2596 4 2
Source: PRO: C0648/7-15, Annual Reports of the Protectorate Department, relevant 
years; SSA: NBCA 980 Quarterly Labour Returns, Javanese Labourers
1 Total number of Javanese indentured labourers remaining in the territory, 
after excluding the number of deaths and repatriations.
2 Defined as mid-year population: population at 1 January plus population at 
31 December, divided by two.
The average annual death rate for government-imported Javanese in British 
North Borneo is 13.4 per thousand, higher than that suffered by Javanese contract 
workers in Surinam (8.2) but lower than in Malaya (29.8), calculated in the same 
period. From 1910, there was no separate data on the mortality suffered by Javanese
80 For raw figures, see Appendix.
81 This table draws the basic ideas o f calculation from Emmer and Shlomowitz. pp. 126-127.
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workers on Sumatra’s tobacco plantations, but the mortality data of the entire coolie 
population on two distinct periods provide the first indications of health conditions on 
Sumatra’s plantations. Between 1910 and 1921, the annual death rate fell to between 
10 per thousand and 25 per thousand, and between 1922 and 1938, the annual death 
rate was consistently below 10 per thousand.82
Table 6.5
Total Number of Deaths and Proportionate number per thousand of estimated 
 population and labourers in British North Borneo, 1922-1931._________
Year Total Population Labourers
Deaths Per thousand Deaths Per
thousand
1922 5426 20.9 426 27
1923 5881 22.4 359 22
1924 5410 20.3 299 18
1925 6131 22.7 358 21
1926 5439 19.7 298 16
1927 5864 20.7 399 20
1928 5982 20.3 376 20
1929 5375 18.3 291 16
1930 4711 16.4 218 17
1931 5270 19.4 155 15
Source: HCPP: Cmd.4393. ‘Statistical Abstract for the Several British Oversea Dominions 
and Protectorates in each of the years 1913 and 1925 to 1931; Cmd. 3198 
Statistical Abstract for British Self-governing Dominions, Colonies, Possessions, 
and Protectorates in each year from 1903 to 1925’.
Epidemiological factors, where mortality was associated with the movement of 
people from one disease environment to another,83 are the main explanation for the 
mortality differential affecting Javanese labourers in British North Borneo. Similar to 
Malaya and Surinam, the major scourge on the estates in British North Borneo was 
malaria, hence the high death rate. Onerous work requirements could be treated as 
secondary, because arduous work requirements do not necessarily explain the 
mortality differential between areas. For instance, work requirements on sugar cane 
plantations in Surinam were more onerous than on rubber plantations in Malaya, but 
the latter’s Javanese mortality figures are higher than that of the former. Moreover, as 
Emmer and Shlomowitz have noted, all Javanese recruits bound for destinations that
8~ Emmer and Shlomowitz. ‘M ortality and the Javanese Diaspora’ , pp 127-132. For a detailed analysis on 
the mortality o f  Javanese labourers in Sumatra, see Marieke Van Klaveren. ‘ Death among Coolies. 
M ortality o f  Chinese and Javanese Labourers on Sumatra in the Early Years o f Recruitment, 1882-1909’ . 
ltinerario. 21,1 (1997). pp. 111-122.
83 Shlomowitz. ‘ Epidemiology and the Pacific Labor Trade', p. 586.
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imported them, including British North Borneo, had to undergo a rigorous medical 
check-up before departure. Hence, the health condition of all potential recruits was 
almost similar.84
Figure 6.2
Mortality of Labourers in British North Borneo, 1915-1932
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Malaria was endemic throughout British North Borneo. The great influx of 
Javanese coolies from Java in the 1920s, particularly between 1925 and 1931, brought 
with them and disseminated a more virulent type of malarial infection -  the sub or 
malignant tertian. Sixty five percent of the Javanese coolies were found positive to sub- 
tertian malaria upon arrival.86 Prior to 1925, the predominating type of malaria on 
estates was a mild benign tertian. British North Borneo was thus a dangerous disease 
environment for people who lacked immunity through their exposure to malaria, more 
so with the arrival of the new virulent type. The indigenous Murut population, for 
example, was not accustomed to this new strain of malaria brought by Javanese 
indentured labourers. When Murut labourers returned to their villages after working on 
estates, they spread it amongst their people. As a result, the Murut population declined 
drastically from 30,355 in 1921 to 24,444 in 1931.86
84 Emmer and Shlomowitz, ‘M orta lity ’ , p. 128
85 Lee Yong Leng. ‘The Population o f British Borneo’ . Population Studies. 15,3 (March 1962). p. 230.
8t> L.W. Jones. ‘The Decline and Recovery o f the Murut Tribe o f Sabah’ . Population Studies. 21,2 
(September 1967). p. 133.
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Estate coolies became quickly infected with the new strain of malarial parasite 
brought by the Javanese due to the close proximity of the working and living 
environment.87 Dr. G.G. Campbell, the medical officer for estates on the Interior 
Residency, revealed that malaria was the principal cause of labourers’ low resistance 
to disease and ill-health on estates under his care. In Sapong Estate, twelve Javanese 
coolies, of an average labour force of 649, died within one month in 1930, and eleven 
of the twelve fatal cases suffered from chronic malaria. In fact, malarial parasites were 
found in the blood of 55.6% of the 673 labourers and dependants examined on 20-21 
March 1930, and that 66% had enlarged spleens (a sign of malarial infection), and 83% 
had either enlarged spleens, or were blood positive, to malaria.88
Aside from malaria, the territory did not escape the influenza pandemic, which 
swept the world in 1918. About 30% of coolies succumbed to the disease. No less than 
30 estates had a death rate of over 4%, and 17 estates had an excessive mortality of 
over 7%.89 Table 6.6 shows the spread of influenza among the peoples of British North 
Borneo, according to residencies, occupations and social environments. The statistics 
reveal that the number of cases and deaths among estate inhabitants were more than 
the other three groups combined. The social environment on estates and the close 
living and working conditions made it easier to contract the disease. Throughout the 
1920s, the majority of Javanese indentured labourers succumbed to spasmodic 
outbreaks of influenza, and in most cases, when left untreated, lung infections such as 
pneumonia, bronchitis, and asthma took over.90
Additionally, the quarterly labour returns submitted to the NEl authorities reported 
deaths of Javanese indentured labourers suffering from beri-beri (lacked of vitamin Bi). 
In the 1910s, beri-beri was prevalent among coolies employed on rubber and tobacco
87 SSA: N BC A 851. Report by the Managing Director o f  the Lingkungan Borneo Rubber Maatschappij. 
June 1927.
88 SSA: N BC A 37. G.G. Campbell to Manager o f  Sapong Rubber Estate, Tenom. 1 A p ril 1930.
89 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department fo r 1918.
90 SSA: N BC A 980. Quarterly Returns o f  Javanese Labourers Imported by Government.
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plantations, and timber camps. The main cause of beri-beri was the excessive use of 
polished rice (notably Saigon and Siam rice) and the lack of fresh vegetables. 
Apparently polished rice was the main staple diet for British North Borneo, yet it did not 
affect the general population to a great extent because they had a plentiful supply of 
fresh vegetables. On the contrary, coolies lived under non-natural conditions, and were 
unable, in many cases, to select and prepare their own food. Unless great care was 
exercised by their employers, the coolies often obtained insufficient or unsuitable 
dietaries.
Table 6.6
Influenza in British North Borneo, 1918
Government
Servant
Prisoners Public Estates
Clerical
Staff
Police
C D C D C D C D C D
West Coast 36 0 83 3 55 8 289 12 1922 35
Interior 10 0 3 0 10 0 117 0 971 74
Kudat 9 0 11 0 n/a n/a 76 3 1005 71
Sandakan 18 0 30 0 169 1 1955 121 373 31
East Coast 4 0 6 0 15 0 257 0 1357 0
C=Cases; D=Deaths;
Source: SSA: Despatches Gov to Chairman 1918. ‘Influenza Epidemic in the State of North 
Borneo’.
In 1916, R. Cobb, Principal Medical Officer, criticised certain estates for 
disregarding this part of the labourers’ welfare.91 An outbreak of beri-beri occurred from 
December 1915 to June 1916 at Woodford Estate, Kimanis Estate, Papar Estate and 
Kinarut Estate, through their excessive use of Saigon rice. Neighbouring Bongawan 
Estate was chastised for its lack of vegetables. In the east coast, three outbreaks of 
beri-beri occurred at Sekong Estate between 1914 and 1916, due to unsuitable rice. 
Coolies at Bode Estate and China Borneo Valley suffered from a lack of fresh meat, 
fish and vegetables. Abnormal rainfall in the east coast, causing heavy floods in 1918, 
again witnessed an outbreak of the disease on Lamag Estate, Bilit Estate and Tawau 
Kuhara Estate. Green vegetables were mostly destroyed during the flood, and for two 
months, dried vegetables and beans became the main source of vegetables. Five
11 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman. 1916). Cobb, PMO, to Government Secretary. 18 August 1916.
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government-imported Javanese died in 1918.92 Most free from the disease was Lok 
Kawi Estate, Sapong Estate and Melalap Estate. The respective managers of these 
estates had been very careful in their supervision of dietary matters.93
Ankylostomiasis or hookworm also infected a large majority of estate labourers in 
British North Borneo. It settled in the intestines and feasted on the host’s blood, 
producing anemia. This disease was allegedly brought from Java by the government- 
imported Javanese.94 However, prior to the migration of Javanese indentured labourers 
in 1914, the disease was already recognised as a problem by Dr. Dingle, then the 
Sandakan district surgeon. In 1913, Dingle recorded numerous cases of hookworm 
throughout the territory.95 The disease was probably brought by those Javanese 
immigrants who were independently recruited by planters back in 1907.
Other causes of mortality included nephritis and internal infection and maladies 
such as diarrhoea, hepatic cirrhosis, and gastroenteritis. Typhoid and amoebic 
dysentery were also causes of illness, due to contaminated drinking water and 
unhygienic conditions in terms of sanitary arrangements. Cases of deaths caused by 
exhaustion, debility and suicide were also reported, although the proportion of these 
was comparatively small. Consistently appearing on the labour returns were cases of 
septicaemia or blood poisoning. It is likely that labourers left wounds untreated, or they 
did not receive proper medical attention.96
Generally, employers gained a keener interest in the health conditions of their 
coolies out of economic concerns, such as the high cost of recruiting and the difficulty 
of getting new recruits. Additionally, greater care was taken of the health of the coolies 
and their families, since it was realised by the management that keeping its labour
92 PRO: C0648/8. AR. East Coast for 1918, by S.G. Holmes, A.D.O. p. 290.
93 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Beri-beri. 2 October 1916.
94 Handbook o f  North Borneo, 1921. p. 49
95 See Tregonning. A History o f Modern Sabah, p. 166.
96 SSA: N BC A 980. Quarterly Returns o f  Javanese Labourers Imported by Government.
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force in good health was in the interests of production. These reasons prompted 
employers of labour to work hand-in-hand with government administration to control the 
spread of notorious diseases and to eradicate them altogether, if possible. By 1916, 
malaria was under control in the Lok Kawi Estate, through the weekly administration of 
quinine.97 Most estates also carried out weekly oiling of all breeding-sites with an anti- 
malarial mixture, within a quarter mile radius of inhabited dwellings. They also executed 
permanent anti-malarial work such as mosquito proofing, levelling, draining, and tiling 
of drains in the immediate vicinity of dwellings to eliminate breeding sites. Additionally, 
they ensured the centralisation of labour in healthy coolie accommodation. At Bode 
Estate jungles surrounding the Javanese accommodation were cut; pools were oiled, 
mosquito curtains were given to coolies, and pools and watercourses which harboured 
the larvae of mosquitoes were sprayed. Mass anti-malarial and tonic treatment (a 
stimulant to the liver and blood regenerative organs) was also given to all inhabitants of 
estates. Coolies were given VA grains of quinine, three days consecutively, twice a 
month, as a precaution. Malaria patients were also given 10 grains of quinine for three 
weeks after discharge from the hospital. A proper register was kept to identify and deal 
with breeding grounds.98 As late as 1930, each adult (with corresponding smaller doses 
to children) at Sapong Estate was given 10 grains of quinine at muster in the morning, 
and 15 grains at night, together with a tonic drink. Coolies who refused treatment or 
spat out the quinine were taken to the estate hospital, and were given 20 grains of the 
medicine by intramuscular injection in the buttocks.99 Additionally, high fencing and 
barriers were erected on estate hospitals, to prevent delirious and refractory patients 
leaving the hospital at night to wander about and visit friends.100 These preventive 
measures proved successful in reducing the numbers of malarial infections.
97 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Orme, PMO, to Government Secretary. 8 March 1916.
98 SSA; Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917) R. Cobb, PMO, to Government Secretary. 9 February
1917.
99 SSA: N BC A 37. Campbell to Manager, Sapong Estate. 13 June 1930. pp. 10-17.
100 SSA: N BC A 37. G.G. Campbell to Manager o f  Sapong Estate. 1 A pril 1930. pp. 7-9.
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Efforts to reduce beri-beri were also on the agenda. The excessive use of 
polished rice, which was highly deficient in nutritive qualities, was substituted with 
Rangoon rice or parboiled rice. Coolies were also given an ample supply of green 
vegetables.101 As an added measure, medical officers were given discretionary powers 
to recommend a compulsory supply of cooked food, according to a prescribed diet, to 
estate patients and coolies. If an employer resented this form of control, the PMO 
would report the matter to the Governor, who would press for the estate management 
to take action. In the event of a refusal, the Governor would notify the Chairman, who 
would then communicate with the London Board, if the company was registered in 
England.102 What followed was a cessation of the disease.103 in 1928, Japanese 
doctors for large estates in Tawau (mostly Japanese-owned) successfully treated beri­
beri with injections prepared from rice bran.104 Following this success, the PMO 
obtained a supply of the extract (known as 'tiki-tiki’ abstract) from Manila, Philippines, 
and distributed it to all government hospitals in the territory.105
Additionally, employers of labour attempted to fight hookworm by providing shoes 
to coolies to prevent any contact with infective larvae, which could penetrate the skin. 
Coolies were also told to improve personal hygiene. Sanitary facilities were enhanced 
so that coolies would not defecate outside latrines and pollute soil and water 
sources.106 In January 1921, a campaign against hookworm was initiated by Dr. Clark 
H. Yeager of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. Out of the 
6,460 people examined in the West Coast Residency in 1921, 88.9 percent had the 
disease.107 Nearly all were cured after a rigorous campaign. From 1924 onwards, the 
hookworm campaign continued in many of the places of labour in the territory, under
101 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Beri-beri. 2 October 1916.
102 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Beri-beri. 2 October 1916.
103 The BNBH. 2 December 1916.
104 SSA: N BC A  1087. Acting Secretary to Governor Humphreys. No. 389. 6 June 1929.
105 SSA: N BC A 1087. Extract from H .E.’s dispatch No. 42 o f 23 January 1930. Treatment o f Beri-beri.
106 PRO: C0874/872. Hook-worm Campaign, 1916-1920.
107 Tregonning. A History o f Modem Sabah, p. 166.
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the supervision of the Estates Medical Officers.108 The results were immediate. 
Inspection by Dr. Bramley Moore of 51 children on Membakut Estate in March 1924 
revealed that there were no cases of hookworm.109 Almost all enterprises in the territory 
supported the campaign. In 1925, of 13 estates from the Interior and West Coast who 
wrote to the government in response to a Circular pertaining to the eradication of 
hookworm, 11 were enthusiastic about the benefits gained from the mass treatment. 
They opined that ‘the expense of such treatment was entirely justified’.110 By 1930, 
some estates administered hookworm treatment bi-annually to all labourers and their 
dependants.111
These efforts were, indeed, commendable, but it appears that the mortality of the 
Javanese in British North Borneo also lay in material and sanitary conditions within the 
enterprises. Some estates failed to comply with the provision of the Dutch Contract and 
Labour Ordinance to provide suitable accommodation and adequate medical 
arrangements for all employees. In his study of coolie labour in Sumatra, Lindblad 
argues that the material conditions of coolies suffered when there was influx of new 
coolies. An increase in demand for coolie labour resulted in mounting pressures on 
existing facilities within the enterprise. In other words, living standards would 
decrease.112 In the case of British North Borneo, periods where there were high 
importations of Javanese coolies saw a decrease in the standard of living for 
government-imported Javanese coolies. The health of coolies was compromised due to 
inadequate medical attention, particularly the lack of estate hospitals, the lack of 
surgical instruments and operating rooms, the lack of doctors or medical officers and 
irregular inspections by them, the unqualified dressers and the absence of a residing 
licensed dresser, deplorable hospital conditions, and poor transportation of sick coolies
108 SSA: F /l(3 ). Report o f the Seventy-Seventh Half-Yearly Meeting. 1 November 1921. p. 6; 
Administration Report fo r 1924. p. 6
109 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). No 477. 15 March 1924.
110 PRO: C 0648/11. Administration Report 1925 -  Medical, p. 19.
111 SSA: N BC A 37. Campbell to Manager Sapong. 11 June 1930.
112 Lindblad. ‘Coolies in D e li’ , pp. 47 and 60.
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to the nearest hospital.113 In the latter case, some estates were equipped with motor 
trolleys to serve as ‘ambulances’ to the nearest hospital. In other estates, wheeled 
stretchers, which were supposed to fit into a train or on a trolley, were deficient. Many 
of the estate hospitals in the west coast were also several miles away from the railway 
lines. Extremely ill coolies were seen to be transported to a central hospital, in all 
weathers, ‘sitting up on a bumpy trolley or carried huddled in a basket or sack 
suspended from a po/e’.114
Dr. G.G. Campbell once lamented that it was ironic that numerous patients 
contracted malaria while in the hospital. His investigation of the Beaufort Estate 
revealed that this was caused by a lack of attention given to patients at night. There 
were serious cases where patients with malaria, beri-beri, dysentery and pneumonia 
had died during the night. Campbell believed a night dresser would be able to ensure 
that patients slept under their mosquito nets. Likewise, the dresser could prevent 
unwanted visitors from bringing food and opium to patients, as had previously 
occurred. When Campbell made a plea to install a night dresser, an estate official 
retorted, ‘Oh what’s the use, the dresser would only sleep'.115
In 1918, the year when heavy floods and the influenza epidemic swept British 
North Borneo, estates like Labuk, Sungei Batang and Takeuchi were criticised by the 
PMO, Dr. Percival Dingle, for their significantly high mortality rates, and the respective 
managements’ inability to carry out preventive measures and provide proper medical 
attention for their coolie population.116 Dingle’s report on Sungei Batang Estate 
illustrates an example of the lack of attention paid by some estate managements to 
their coolie welfare.
113 See SSA: N BC A 210 and 465. Labour Reports by Dutch Labour Inspectors,
114 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1919). Memorandum. Estates Central Hospital Scheme, by A.C. 
Pearson. 23 August 1923.
115 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1918). Campbell, MO, to Thomson, Manager Beaufort Estate. 
10 October 1917.
116 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department for 1918, by D.R. Maxwell.
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The hospital is situated on the top of the hili completely surrounded by rubber 
trees, the branches of which actually touch and lie over the attap roof; it consists of 
a single room about 26 feet by 14 feet; a corner of which is partitioned off, for a 
dispensary. The building is old, very dirty and the floor sinks to one side; the 
accommodation provided is so inadequate as to be even ludicrous, there were 
eleven patients in hospital three of whom were lying in a corner on the floor, there 
were only four blankets provided and three mosquito nets, which the Conductor 
stated were too old to be used, there were no pillows, no temperature charts or 
history sheets. The hospital staff consists of one dresser who apparently had been 
carried into Sandakan 4 days previously ill, no cook, water carrier or attendants are 
provided, and once a man is in hospital, he has to look after himself, or get a fellow 
patients to do so...When we went around the hospital at 11 a.m. none of the 
patients had had any food nor had they had any medicine... I do not think there is 
any other Estate in the whole of North Borneo showing such an absolute disregard 
of the coolies welfare when sick.117
From the second half of the 1920s, particularly 1927 and 1928, to as late as 
1931, several estates were blacklisted from further importation of Javanese labour from 
Java. Van Lijnden, who visited the territory in 1927, denounced Bettotan Camp, Batu 
Puteh Estate and Langkon Estate for their inadequate supply of drinking water for 
patients; no suitable place for patients to bathe in the building, or no bathing area 
provided at all; old and dirty mosquito nets; insufficient diet scale; unsanitary and 
cramped latrines; and decaying hospital buildings.118 The hospital at the North Borneo 
Trading Company was deemed ‘disgraceful and should be condemned’, and 
Tenganipah Hospital and British Borneo Timber Company (BBTC) were admonished 
for ward sharing among male and female patients. Female patients also complained 
that they were not given proper hospital attires, and requested to be supplied sarongs. 
Also an issue was the ‘conspicuous’ nature of the hospital clothing provided, which 
made them feel like ‘objects of ridicule’.119
Additionally, instead of being treated and recuperating, Javanese patients in a 
certain estate hospital were forced to work. Food was also given twice daily, instead of 
three times. If a patient owned an unexpired food bond, the common practice of some
117 SSA: Despatches. (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Percival Dingle, PMO, to Government Secretary. 29 
November 1918,
118 Correspondence between the Protector and the respective estates can be found in SSA: N BC A 210 and 
465.
119 SSA: N BC A 210. C.D. Martyn to Manager British Borneo Timber Co. Prot 372/27. 12 April 1927; 
Protector to Batu Puteh Estate; PRO: CO874/1062. Governor General, A .W .L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh, 
to Governo C.R. Smith. 27 January 1939.
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estates was to refuse that patient’s ration in the hospital. Most estate hospitals gave 
rations equivalent to between thirteen and fifteen cents per day, yet Batu Puteh Estate 
hospital gave a meagre four cents. Javanese patients were also uneasy about their 
food being prepared by Chinese cooks.120 Lastly, Javanese coolies complained that 
they were not admitted to the hospital on demand, and that illness was often treated as 
malingering, or blamed on the carelessness of the coolies. Worse still, when a sick 
coolie was marked with the letter ‘K \ to mean ‘malingerer’, not only was the coolie 
ordered back to work, but the entry against his or her name would expose the coolie to 
intimidation by overseers, which eventually would lead to fines or a loss of income, 
especially their tapping bonus for the month.121
Housing, Sanitary Facilities and Water Supply
Employers provided free accommodation for their Javanese indentured labourers to 
fulfil their social obligation stipulated by the Dutch contract, and to control and tie the 
labourers to the estate. Coolies were housed based on racial lines so that coolies could 
live together with their own folk thus expediting the process of adjustment to the new 
living and working environment. From the perspective of employers, this form of 
segregation also promoted cultural incompatibilities amongst the pluralistic labour 
force, which were deemed advantageous since they presented employers with a 
convenient mechanism to control labour, particularly during periods of unrests.122
Two types of accommodation were usually provided for Javanese labourers. The 
first was kongsi-houses, built earlier for Chinese indentured labourers brought in from 
Hong Kong. The other was the ‘coolie lines’ , which consisted of a long building, roofed 
with nipah palm, tiles or corrugated iron. The house was divided down its length by 
partitions into rooms, not reaching the roof. In Kinarut Estate, a typical Javanese
120 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f Discussion w ith M r. V iehoff; SSA: Despatches. (Gov. to Chairman, 
1916). Report by Protector on New Darvel Bay Tobacco Company.
12' SSA: N BC A  210. Memoranda o f  discussion by Viehoff.
122 Cook. Borneo, p. 263.
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accommodation had between 20 and 24 rooms, in two rows, and back to back. Each 
room was 12 feet by 10 feet, and was occupied by a family, or a group of coolies. The 
building was well off the ground and typically also had a veranda.123
The number of occupants in each house varied. Javanese married couples would 
be accommodated together.124 A Javanese accommodation at Segama Hilir Estate and 
Papar Estate could house between 20 and 35 coolies at one time, whereas Javanese 
lines at Lingkungan Estate (134’ x 50’) had an overwhelming 100 occupants in each 
line.125 Likewise, Javanese accommodations at Kuhara Estate were so overcrowded 
that some coolies constructed sulaps (shacks) adjacent to the lines. These labourers 
preferred the privacy of the sulaps, but medical officers dismissed them as unhygienic, 
and ordered them to be demolished. There were also reports of Javanese coolies 
preferring to sleep in fowl houses than endure the cramped situations in the lines.126 To 
make matters worse, Javanese coolie accommodation at Kuhara Estate was built near 
a buffalo stable, which emitted a foul smell and became a breeding site for flies.127
Reports of deteriorating housing conditions were usually received during the 
period of strict economy, as a consequence of the war. During the time of war, housing, 
hospital and medical supervision were regarded as being as 'adequate as could be 
expected under war conditions’.128 The situation 'greatly improved’ after that. But post­
war conditions, which again saw rising inflation, witnessed a decline in standards of 
living. The Annual Report of the Protectorate Department for 1925 stated that the 
housing of labourers, especially on the West Coast, during the last few years had
SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Omie to Government Secretary. 8 March 1916.
124 PRO: C0874/438. G.S. Plummer, Acting Manager, to the Secretaries Lok Kawi Estate. 20 September
1918.
125 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Report by Protector on NDBTCo., visited on 17-20 
November 1916; Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Owen to Resident o f  West Coast. March 1918; 
Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1923). Report on Protector’s V is it to Papar Estate 1923.
126 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f Discussion w ith Viehoff.
127 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Extract from the Assistant Protector’s Report on the 
Kuhara Rubber Estate. 17 A p ril 1917.
128 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department for 1918. pp 51-52.
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deteriorated for reasons of economy,129 The deteriorating condition implicitly connotes 
that the authorities accepted the argument from the enterprises that financial 
constraints prevented the latter from making the necessary improvements.
Declining housing standards could also be seen during the sudden influx of 
Javanese coolies. In 1926 and 1927, there were repeated complaints by labour 
inspectors about overcrowded housing and deplorable housing standards. The 
bachelor lines, in particular, were usually cramped, and were in a bad state of repair.130 
The government-imported Javanese of the BBTC even complained that their houses 
were not ‘weather-proof, and that lightning often struck on the corrugated iron roofs of 
their accommodation.131 Protection from thefts and danger was also minimal. There 
was no wire netting on the windows to enable them to be left open without danger; nor 
were the tops of cubicles covered with wire nettings to prevent entry from above. 
Drains around coolie lines were often unsanitary, particularly kitchen drains, which 
were often choked and needed cleaning.132
Generally, the coolie houses were often poorly ventilated, although there were 
some exceptions to this. Coolie lines at Sapong Estate, for instance, were reported to 
have had too much ventilation, and when sudden changes in temperature with cold- 
piercing winds occurred, the corrugated iron which cooled off after sun down eventually 
contributed to increased pulmonary diseases.133 Additionally, housing on some estates 
was so bad that this made an ideal breeding area for malaria, resulting in a high death 
rate.134 These were indications that material facilities on occasions lagged behind the 
expansion of the coolie force in the late 1920s. The Dutch Labour Inspectors took the 
drastic step of suspending future importation of Javanese labour where estates failed
129 PRO: C 0648/11. AR. Protectorate Department for 1925, by C.F.C. Macaskie. p. 9.
130 SSA: N BC A 465. Kongsi Lines. Memoranda o f  V iehoff Recommendation.
131 SSA: N BC A 210. C.D. Martyn to Manager o f  British Borneo Company. Prot. 372/27. 12 April 1927.
132 SSA: N BC A 465. Kongsi Lines.
133 SSA: N BC A 37. G.G. Campbell to Manager Sapong Estate. 1 April 1930.
134 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Sandakan Residency for 1920’ . p. 100.
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to make radical improvements in terms of coolie accommodation, after they were 
advised to do so by the inspecting officers. Langkon Estate suffered this fate in 1927.135
There were two main systems of latrine used on estates in British North Borneo, 
the bucket system and pit latrines or trenches. On Papar Estate, Javanese coolie lines 
had bucket latrines for female labourers, and movable latrines for their male 
counterpart.136 Other estates, such as Sapong Estate, constructed trenches 
(18”x2”x6”), across which were laid a few pieces of planks on which to squat. They had 
bamboo walls but no roofs. Javanese coolies complained that latrines were constructed 
far away from the coolie lines, about 200 to 300 yards from living quarters. Employers, 
nonetheless, deemed this necessary as a safeguard to health.137 Membakut Estate 
installed the ‘bored-hote’ latrine system, recommended by Victor G. Heiser of the 
International Health Division, Rockefeller Foundation. This latrine system, which could 
last for eight to ten years, was usually made of planks, and a corrugated iron roof, with 
a cement floor, and was constructed within the vicinity of the Javanese coolie lines.138
The use of buckets and pit latrines was communal. Due to insufficiency, and as a 
result of heavy use, pits and buckets became full quickly, and at times could not be 
used. In 1916, night defecation of estate coolies at Lok Kawi Estate was simply 
dumped into open pits, and received little attention.139 The unhygienic condition of the 
latrines not only filled the air with a heavy stench, but also presented health hazards 
such as fly infestation and contamination of wells and water supply, causing illnesses. 
The problem could have been reduced if the latrines had been properly looked after. 
Yet the main challenge was to get sanitary workers.140 In Sapong Estate, a latrine
135 SSA: N BC A 210. Macaskie to Manager o f  Langkon Estate. Prot 334/27. 3 May 1927.
136 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1923). Report on Protector’ s v isit to Papar Estate 1923.
137 SSA: N BC A 37. Campbell to Manager Sapong. 11 August 1930. p. 23; SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda 
on Discussion w ith Viehoff.
138 SSA: N BC A 37. Campbell to Manager Sapong. 11 June 1930.
139 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Orme to Government Secretary. 8 March 1916.
140 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda on Discussion w ith Viehoff.
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attendant visited the latrines daily to cover night soil with Jeyes powder141 or ashes, 
which required removal every two months. However, a medical officer commented that 
despite daily cleansing and application of disinfectants, the latrine system used was still 
unsanitary and inefficient.142 The condition was made worse by the improper sanitary 
habits of the labourers themselves and their dependants. Apparently, their sense of 
cleanliness was so appalling that the government was forced to insert a special clause 
pertaining to this matter in the Labour Ordinance 1929. Failure to adhere to the sanitary 
rules would cost coolies a maximum of fifty cents fine, to be deducted from their wages, 
and the monies collected be placed into the Pauper Fund.143
Water supply for rubber estates and their coolie accommodation were 
comparatively in better condition than on tobacco estates. The West Coast rubber 
estates were, for the most part, well-supplied with pure water, distributed by pipes.144 In 
other parts of the territory, particularly in the east coast, many estates depended on 
streams or unprotected wells for their source of water supply. The latter estates were 
often reproached for not constructing wells and failure to use filters.145 On tobacco 
estates, where cultivation shifted from year to year, the provision of a water supply by 
pipe line to every division entailed heavy expenses, hence the reluctance of the 
management to invest in a proper pipe. The provision for pure drinking water while at 
work too left something to be desired on some estates. Tea was provided by these 
estates, but this did not meet the requirements of the Dutch authorities.146 According to 
Van Hemert in 1918, a thirsty labourer would frequently drink from the nearest pond or 
stream, in preference to drinking tea, which he or she was usually provided with. This
141 A patented disinfectant product since 1877, owned by John Jeyes o f England. See 
http://www.ieves.co.uk/aboutieyes.htm, [Access on 7 December 2008]
142 SSA: N BC A  37. Campbell to Manager Sapong. 11 August 1930. p. 23.
143 PRO: CO874/760. Section 35, Labour Ordinance 1929.
144 PRO: C0874/438. Report by Maurice Maude to Directors o f Lok Kawi Estate. 23 November 1918.
145 SSA: N BC A 465. Kongsi Lines.
146 PRO: C0874/753. Notes o f  Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert, Representative o f the Netherlands Indies 
Labour Department.
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would expose the labourer to potential illnesses such as typhoid and dysentery, caused 
by contaminated food and water.147
Conclusion
Although the protective provisions regarding the level of wages and basic amenities 
were clear, this chapter has shown that the material conditions in enterprises 
employing Javanese indentured labour were sometimes different in reality. The 
perspectives of both employers and employees regarding what constituted better 
material conditions often differed. Comparatively, indentured Javanese coolies were 
better-off in wages than other labourers, both in terms of nominal and real wages. A 
salient feature in the Javanese indentured labour system was the inability of employers’ 
organisations to flex their muscles when it came to determining the wages received by 
Javanese labourers imported under the government permit. The relatively strong 
bargaining power usually enjoyed by the NBCC and NBPA was thwarted by the Dutch 
authorities, and was restricted to locally recruited and contracted coolies. However, 
Javanese indentured labourers were also subjected to illegal deductions from their 
wages, thus reducing their monthly income. As for basic amenities such as housing, 
medical and sanitary facilities, these were sub-standard during the 1910s, and the 
Protectorate accepted the argument from the employers that financial constraints 
prevented them from introducing improvements. Nevertheless, throughout the years, 
mortality and morbidity decreased as government officials, employers, and international 
humanitarians became obsessed with improving health matters in the territory. The 
health standards of Javanese indentured labourers in particular, and the total 
population in general, greatly improved in the early 1920s as a result of investment in 
medical facilities.
147 PRO: 00874/753. Governor’s No. 38. Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LIFE UNDER INDENTURE: NON-MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF JAVANESE
INDENTURED LABOURERS 
Introduction
The description of material conditions in the previous chapter has shown that 
employers of labour generally tried to improve the standard of living of Javanese 
indentured labourers working on British North Borneo enterprises. Simultaneously, 
material amelioration became part of the deal to satisfy the authorities. Generally, 
wages were increased, and basic amenities which included housing and medical care, 
were greatly improved. Nonetheless, the contentment of the Javanese indentured 
labourers as a result of improved standards of living depended heavily on less tangible 
facets of the relationship between employer and employee. This refers to the non­
material conditions of life and labour within enterprises, for government-imported 
Javanese. This chapter aims to analyse the well-being of Javanese indentured 
labourers, focusing primarily on the extent of labour control utilised by employers, and 
the labourers’ response to that control.
Coolie Mobility and Labour Control
The Dutch Contract specified that indentured Javanese coolies had to perform labour 
at a specific place and times. In other words, one can be forgiven for presuming that 
after working hours, coolies were free to do whatever they wanted. In reality, this was 
not so, because the Dutch Contract and the territory’s Labour Ordinance placed 
Javanese indentured labourers under stringent social and disciplinary control. Leisure 
hours were restricted as employers attempted to limit social life and coolie mobility 
within the confines of the estates. A Javanese coolie working under indenture contract 
was not allowed to leave the workplace without permission from the employers, 
particularly on a working day. They were also prohibited from leaving the estate after 
working hours. This ruling was eventually phased out in the late 1920s, whereby
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Javanese labourers were permitted by law to leave an estate after working hours, on 
condition that they gave prior notice to the estate office of their plans.1
Permission to go outside the estate premises was seldom granted to prevent 
labourers from finding out the wage levels of other estates.2 Also, this served to deter 
coolies from drifting into small holdings where discipline was not as rigorous. Most 
importantly, permission to leave the enterprise was restricted, to prevent coolies from 
having access to the local Protector’s office to make a complaint. Wholesale visits to 
the local authorities by Javanese coolies, without prior permission from the 
management, did occur from time to time throughout the indentured labour period. The 
Protectorate Department recorded such visits as early as 1914, when the entire 
Javanese labour force of Lingkungan Estate marched to Beaufort to complain against 
their manager.3 Such visits were, however, discouraged, for security reasons.4
Most enterprises had very few escape routes if the Javanese coolies found life 
under indenture to be contrary to expectations. Leaving the plantation was difficult, 
because some estates’ compounds were surrounded with barbed wire fence making 
escape impossible.5 Estates also employed opases or estate watchmen (‘policemen’). 
Usually Pathans, they were armed with revolvers and rifles, although the firearms were 
supposedly used for emergency purposes only. They were responsible for guarding 
recalcitrant coolies confined within the estate ‘lock-up’, not to mention keeping a look 
out on anything that might seem suspicious, preventing desertions by coolies, and 
keeping away intruders, especially crimpers. Their presence served as a deterrent for 
coolies from deserting the enterprise.6 Likewise, estates, such as Sapong and Melalap, 
offered a three dollar bounty per head for each deserter. Therefore individuals had no
1 SSA: N BC A 210. Notes for Baron Van L ijnden’s interview w ith His Excellency — Item 15.
2 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1916). Extract on AR. Protectorate 1916. 19 October 1916.
3 PRO: C0648/7. AR, Protectorate Department for 1914. p. 4.
4 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 152.
5 HCPP: [Cmd. 1060]. Anti-Slavery Society to CO. 29 October 1919. Enclosure 2 in No. I. 20 August
1919. p. 5.
6 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Enclosure 3 in No. 1. In the matter o f the treatment o f  coloured employees on estates 
in British North Borneo.
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qualms about reporting or capturing an escaped coolie. An estate doctor in Tenom 
described how a Murut head hunter captured and beheaded three so-called Javanese 
‘deserters’ (they had with them discharged certificates and were on their way towards 
the port), and brought their nicely-cleaned skulls before the manager of an estate, 
demanding the bounty. Apparently, the estate manager paid the head hunter, and 
circulated the story among the coolie population on the estate. The philosophy behind it 
was that ‘While that Murut is at large we shall have no trouble from bolters on this 
estate!’ 7
Employers also retained control over the coolies, with the help of government 
machinery. The role played by the police and government officials saw to it that coolies 
stayed within the enterprise, and took suitable action when the coolies managed to do 
otherwise, either promptly shepherding them back with a police escort, or when 
required, punished any obstinate coolie.8 Watching for, and capturing absconding 
coolies, was recognised as a part of the work of the police. The Constabulary 
Department declared that it would do ‘its best to arrest every coolie whose desertion 
was reported’.9 In some cases, police barracks were installed on estates, such as 
Membakut Estate and Sekong Estate, to prevent disturbances.10 On other estates, the 
Company government made it obligatory for these estates to have telephone 
communication, either with the nearest police station, or with an estate which had 
telephonic communication with a police station.11 However, in the 1920s, the Company 
government was not keen on installing a police force in places of labour because the 
privilege had been abused in the past. Seemingly, some policemen had become slack 
in their duties, and were involved in money-lending transactions or ‘trafficking’ with the 
labourers.12
7 Maxwell Hall. Makan Siap. Table Tales o f North Borneo, (no date), p. 115.
8 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 152.
9 SSA: Despatches (Gov to Chairman, 1917). Governor to Chairman. 7 March 1917.
10 The BNBH. 17 February 1913. p. 38.
11 SSA: Despatches (Court to Govenor, 1918). Chairman to Pearson. No. 440. 20 June 1918.
12 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). Lower Segama Rubber Estate. 4 December 1924.
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Another form of controlling labour mobility included the role played by the food 
supply depot, or estate shop. Because they were prohibited from leaving the 
enterprise, Javanese coolies were forced to buy or to get their daily necessities at the 
estate shop.13 Certain estate shops, such as the one at Langkon Estate, also served as 
pawn-shops, thus further tying the coolies to the estate.14 Coolie wages and rations 
were also paid in the form of vulcanite estate tokens, which could be used at the estate 
store.15 However, the tokens apparently only possessed purchasing power at the 
estate shop, so the forced purchasing at estate shops continued. Coolies also received 
a far lower value in return. Estates too, seldom exchanged tokens for current coins, 
thus making it difficult for coolies to leave the plantation.16 The tokens became 
valueless to a coolie who wished to abscond, but they assisted managers immensely 
and strengthened their grasp on the Javanese indentured coolies.17
As early as 1914, Governor Pearson raised his concern over the use of estate 
tokens as one form of labour control, but the issuing of tokens continued, apparently for 
the convenience of estates that were remote from local treasuries.18 In 1916, the 
decision to scrap tokens again arose, but the planting community defended the system 
on two grounds. First, that there was no replacement in dollar metal coins or metal 
pieces for the tokens provided by the government. They argued that in most instances, 
notes could not replace tokens in the payment of coolies. Even if they could be used, 
most managers complained that they found it difficult to obtain notes in low 
denominations from the local treasuries due to the lack of supply. Second, coolies were 
allegedly accustomed to receiving the company’s ‘money’ tokens, and any alteration to 
the status-quo would be treated with suspicion by the coolies. Some managers claimed
13 PRO: C0531/14. Enclosure 3 in N o . l. Allegations against the Administration.
54 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f  Discussion w ith  Mr. Viehoff.
!5 PRO: C0531/14. Buxton to Under Secretary for the Colonies, Colonial Office. 8 February 1920.
16 PRO: C0531/14. Enclosure 3 in Number 1.
17 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1920). Copy o f Mr. Pearson’s letter to Secretary. 9 July 1914.
18 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1920). Copy o f M r. Pearson’ s letter to Secretary. 9 July 1914.
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that the changes to the status-quo had previously culminated in labour unrest.19 Hence, 
the usage of tokens continued by the government, on the basis that tokens had a par 
value in local currency and the labourer at any time, either on discharge from the estate 
or for any good reason, was able to exchange the tokens for money.20 When the 
‘scandal’ regarding the abuse of estate tokens was brought to the fore by the Anti 
Slavery Society in 1920, the Company government gradually abolished tokens by 
1921.21 There were government administrators who were not keen on the idea, as 
shown in a confidential dispatch to the Colonial Office, 'If coolies were seldom able to 
leave the plantation it was difficult to see what advantage would be gained by the issue 
o f cash instead o f tokens'22 Nevertheless, on the whole, the decision to scrap tokens 
does reflect the attitude of the Company government taking law enforcement seriously, 
to the benefit of the labouring class.
The management did everything in its power to prevent a Javanese coolie from 
taking his or her discharge certificate. One of the most common and effective methods 
used was by getting the coolie into debt. Little inducement was made to encourage 
thrift among coolies in British North Borneo. For the less thrifty Javanese, after the 
expiry of their two or three year contract, no alternative was open to them but to sign on 
for another term. Debts were initiated at recruitment and inflated on the enterprise 
through various means, such as gambling, brothels, and opium smoking. The 
Company government looked at these institutions as lucrative revenue earners, and 
effective means of 'keeping the population from being idle and of channelling the 
labourers’ extra energies away from creating labour unrest’.23 However, they served 
colonial capitalism more, as they tied indentured labourers for a longer period than 
stipulated in the agreement.
19 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1916). ‘Forbes to Pearson. 25 May 1916; Strutt to Forbes. 22 
May 1916.
20 PRO: C0531/14. Annexure F. Report o f  the Committee o f Estate Abuses. 3 May 1920. p. 24.
21 PRO: C0874/759. Minutes. Revised Labour Ordinance. W.J.W. 17 June 1921.
22 PRO: C0531/14. Despatch No 12041. 16 March 1920.
23 Danny Wong. Historical Sabah, p. 99.
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In spite of restricted laws enforced by the government to control gambling in the 
1910s (it was allowed only in public halls at certain hours under strict supervision), the 
vice was still prevalent in places of labour. Company administrators admitted that it was 
impossible to suppress gambling completely on estates, but this could be achieve if 
controlled gambling was enforced. Ostensibly, by confining it to a definite place or 
ensuring sufficient safeguards, dangers normally associated with gambling, such as 
quarrels and fights, could be reduced, if not eliminated.24 But the truth of the matter 
was that gambling was inherent among Asiatic labourers generally. Some coolies were 
chronic gamblers, and gambled wherever, and whenever, they had the opportunities, 
either in the coolie lines, fowl houses, or jungles within estates’ boundaries, especially 
at night.25 Popular gambling games amongst the Javanese labourers were ‘chekih’, a 
type of card game, and dominoes.26 Management of estates argued that having the 
coolies gamble within the confines of the estates was better than having them fall 
victim to crimpers, who were constantly lurking at gambling dens outside the estate.27 
These practices could easily be monitored if they were restricted to the premises of the 
enterprises.
Essentially, the management used gambling as a method of labour control. Any 
strict containment of the habit by the management could rapidly diminish the labour 
force, since the labourers could pursue the habit elsewhere.28 Hence, most estates, for 
instance, Sapong Estate, Papar Estate and Mawao Estate, installed their own gambling 
houses, while others invited gambling dens to ‘open table’ inside the estates.29 
Incongruously, gambling activities became more frenzied on payday or on ‘advance’ 
day.30 In 1925, out of the 41 places of labour, all were involved in gambling activities.
24 PRO: C 0531/14. Annexure F. Report o f  the Committee, p. 24.
25 SSA: N BC A 465. Kongsi Lines -  Memoranda o f V ie h o ff s Recommendation.
26 See Baron van Lijnden’s report in SSA: N BC A  210; PRO: C0531/14. Annexure F. Report o f the 
Committee on Estate Abuse 3 May 1920. Interview w ith Salamah Sajiran, 14 March 2007.
27 PRO: C0531/14. Annexure F. Report on Committee.
28 Richard Lind. ‘An Estate’ . Daily Express, 25 July 1993.
29 PRO: CO874/590. Hadow and Pinckney, to Directors, the Sables North Borneo Rubber Ltd.; PRO: 
C0531/14. Enclosure 3 o f No. 1.
30 SSA: KSP.24/M/3. Allan Chin Y in  Foh. ‘Early Days in the Kinarut Estate’ .
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Licensed gambling was not permitted on 17 enterprises, but the remainder were given 
consent in writing, verbally, and through payment, to the gambling farmer.31 The 
headmandur or headtandil, who held sub-licences to these gambling houses, drew 10 
to 20 percent for each of the proceeds of gambling houses, and divided the profits 
among the other mandurs or tandils.32 Monetary advances were freely given to coolies, 
while they were in a ‘gambling fever’. These advances were afterwards debited to the 
coolies in the estate books.33 At estates owned by the NDBTCo, every coolie who re­
engaged was given $2.50 by the overseers.34 Apparently, addiction to gambling forced 
some desperate coolies to pawn their clothing to obtain extra money. Disgusted by the 
prevalence of the ‘gambling evil’ in British North Borneo, one contemporary observer 
wrote:
I can thoroughly endorse all they say about the trouble and poverty caused by it 
amongst the coolies. Anyone paying visits to any of the estates in the country at 
the present time (1920) cannot help being struck by the disreputable rags worn by 
the coolies, rags often quite insufficient to hide their nakedness... I would suggest 
that it be made illegal for any pawnshop to take any clothing in pawn...35
Another common method of inflating debts was by opium smoking. A fairly large 
proportion of the labouring classes were regular to moderate consumers of the drug.36 
In a study conducted on estates owned by the NDBTCo in 1920, an average coolie 
with a daily earning of one dollar a day would spend 10-19 cents on two hurt of opium 
daily. Also, there was a strong correlation between the intensity of workload and opium 
usage; the higher the workload, the higher the demand for opium. Chinese coolies 
were the main users of opium. Nevertheless, the prevalence of the drug among 
Javanese labourers should not be dispelled. It has been argued elsewhere that 
Javanese coolies had picked up the habit while working on British North Borneo
31 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1925). Gambling on Estates. 21 September 1925.
32 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1923. Report on Protector’s V is it to Papar Estate. 6 March 1923; 
PRO: CO874/590; PRO: C0531/14. Enclosure 3 o f No. 1. Allegation against the Administration.
33 PRO: C0531/14. Annexure F. Report on Committee.
34 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1915). Report by Protector on NDBTCo., visited on 17-20 Nov. 
1915.
35 SSA: Despatches (Court to Gov., 1920). Extract from T he  Straits Budget’ . 16 July 1920. Gambling in 
British North Borneo, by R.J. Hitchcock to Editor o f  the Straits Times.
36 PRO: C 0531/11. Secretary to Under Secretary o f  State, CO. 30 March 1917.
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estates.37 Rush’s study, however, has shown that opium smoking was not new to a 
native of the NEI. Opium was already a common feature in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Java, and the vast majority of its customers were not the labouring 
Chinese but native Javanese.38 The highest concentrations of opium use and opium 
farm profits were derived from the residencies of Semarang, Surakarta, Madiun and 
Kediri of Central and East Java, the same places that indentured labourers for British 
North Borneo enterprises originated from.39 Hence, it was possible for Javanese 
indentured coolies to resume the habit when they came to British North Borneo. 
However, their usage of the drug was minute compared to the Chinese coolies.
To decrease the usage of opium among coolies, the price of opium was 
increased throughout the years, and estates were only allowed to sell opium to 
confirmed and registered smokers. In 1917, a packet containing two hun of opium 
would cost approximately 13 cents, but by 1920, it was increased to 17 cents.40 
Ostensibly, inspection by Protectorate officials in 1917 revealed that at some estates, 
the majority of the coolies obtained a great deal more than their authorised allowance 
of four two hun packets per week.41 In 1918, the shop at Beaufort Estate recorded a 
sale of around 3000 two hun and three hun packets of opium each month for the 
consumption of its more than 400 Javanese and 60 Chinese coolies.42 Weekly rations 
were given to confirmed smokers, to whom bonds were given, and the value of which 
was deducted from the coolies’ wages. According to the Anti Slavery Society, the 
practice was contrary to the spirit of the International Opium Convention of 1912, which 
restricted the use of opium (and other drugs) to medical and legitimate purposes only.43 
Yet the Company administrators were adamant that the weekly ration should not be 
regarded as an encouragement, if strictly administered, or as an illegitimate use of the
37 Danny Wong Tze-Ken. Historical Sabah: Community and Society. 2004. p. 97.
38 James Rush. Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860- 
1910. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 3
39 Rush. Opium to Java. p. 28.
40 PRO: C0874/394. Dingle to Martyn. 29 October 1925.
41 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Report on Protectorate Enquiry Into Woodford Estate.
42 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Owen to Resident o f  West Coast.. 1 March 1918.
43 PRO: C0531/14. Anti-Slavery Society to Under Secretary, CO. 5 February 1920.
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drug. As one official sarcastically remarked, ‘It is difficult to understand how professed 
philanthropists can press for such a cruel act as the complete cessation of supplies to a 
confirmed smoker’.44
Closely related to gambling and opium was the question of estate brothels. 
They were an integral part of the plantation. Japanese and Chinese prostitutes worked 
on these brothels, and they plied their trade on various estates, usually during the time 
of estate pay day. This occurred when women on estates were few and far between. A 
visit to brothels would cost a coolie $2.00,45 and again, the foreman or headman would 
receive a commission of 10 percent on all proceeds of the brothels.46 Male Javanese 
labourers who had no money would eventually resort to gambling or borrowing, to 
satisfy their sexual desires.
The prevalence of debts among coolies in British North Borneo was deemed so 
chronic that in 1920 the Anti-Slavery Society took the liberty to champion the coolies’ 
welfare. Backed by testimonials of a former Judicial Commissioner, an ex-estate 
manager, and a former estate medical officer of the territory, the Society accused the 
Company’s administration of improper treatment of imported labourers.47 Allegedly, the 
Company adopted a corrupt system of coolie labour, whereby coolies were held at the 
plantations in debt bondage ‘at a point beyond the possibility of redemption’ .48 The 
Society contended that coolies were ‘held in virtual slavery’.49 Before long, a 
Committee of Estate Abuse was formed at the instigation of the Colonial Office, to 
enquire and report upon the allegation. The Commission refuted the existence of such 
a system in the territory by asserting that Javanese indentured under the government 
permit were entitled to an advance of $10 per coolie, partly payable in Java and 
repayable to the estate within months. Meanwhile, Javanese coolies under the local
44 PRO: C0531/14. Alleged Mal-administration. 16 March 1920.
45 PRO: C0531/11. Secretary to Under Secretary o f  State, Colonial Office. 30 March 1917.
46 HCCP: Cmd. 1060. Enclosure 2 in No. 1. North Borneo. Testimony by de la Mothe. 20 August 1919.
47 PRO: C0531/14. Burrant’ s Press Cuttings. Alleged Scandals in North Borneo.
48 PRO: C0531/14. Travers to Under Secretary o f  State. CO. 5 February 1920.
49 HCPP: Cmd 1060. Enclosure 2 in N o .l. Testimony by de la Mothe, 20 August 1919. p. 5.
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contract were considered free labour, and as such, ‘free’ from debt on arrival in the 
state from Singapore. They were, however, entitled to receive an advance in wages not 
exceeding $30 on accepting employment, and repayable by the coolie. Again, with the 
total amount of recoverable advances not exceeding $30, it was construed that the 
system of repayment by monthly deductions imposed no real hardship on the coolies, 
since deduction was limited to one-third of the earnings of that month.50
Evidently, since the Commission was partly made up of members of the 
planting community (i.e. R.K. Hardwick and J. Cooper), it came as no surprise that the 
outcome of the report was biased towards the employers and their capitalist 
enterprises, and disregarded the problems of accumulated debts discussed earlier. For 
example, the check roll for the entire coolie force at Papar Estate on 31 July 1915 was 
$4,041.45 but the amount of outstanding debts was $5,006.92. The debt situation in 
Lok Kawi Estate was more chronic whereby the check roll dated 28 February 1918 
recorded a figure of $4,788.22 and the outstanding debt as $6,415.10.51 On the 
financial position of coolies in British North Borneo, a Company civil servant depicted, 
The  average Chinese or Javanese coolie is never in a position, or likely by his 
instincts, training and earning capacity, to be in a position to repay his debt or 
unworked off expenses. The money he gets he spends with little thought or care for to­
morrow’.52
Management of estates found it imperative to provide as close to a normal life 
as could be possible for their indentured coolies, within the confines of the estate, 
because ‘this goes far in ensuring a contented labour force’.53 Most of the estates in 
British North Borneo had a strong desire for balanced sex ratios in imports, to create a 
permanent and contented labour force. An enquiry held on several estates in Beaufort
50 PRO: 00531/14. Annexure F. 3 May 1920.
51 PRO: CO874/590. Report by Hadow and Pinckney to the Director o f Sablas North Borneo Rubber Ltd. 
9 September 1915; PRO: C0874/438. Copy ofReport by W. Perry Pinckney. 3 A p ril 1918.
52 Cook. Borneo, p 109.
53 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1919). Secretaries for Tenom (Borneo) Rubber Co. Ltd. to 
BNBC. 8 October 1919.
222
in 1917 revealed that Javanese labourers were generally more content than their 
Chinese counterparts, because they were ‘provided’ with more women.54 Individual 
‘immoral’ women, both married and single, had become mistresses of coolies or 
overseers who were temporarily in affluent circumstances.55 Tacitly, this means that 
due to insufficient means of livelihood, some women used their sexuality to earn extra 
cash or to live ’comfortably’. The authorities, however, justified such ‘immorality’ as a 
'safeguard against social evils of a much more serious character’.56 As discerned by 
Governor Pearson in 1922, conditions on estates with a huge Javanese labour force 
were excellent when there were 'sympathetic ladies’ on the spot.57 Shortages of 
unmarried Javanese women, as in the case of Kinarut Estate, would cause sexually 
deprived male Javanese labourers to temporarily desert the estate, and voice their 
frustration to the local Protectorate officer.58 Occasionally, individual crimes on estates 
were related to women, i.e. from jealousy to Javanese wives caught cheating on their 
Javanese husbands. Clashes between Javanese and Chinese labourers also occurred 
caused by women thus further widening existing cultural differences between the two 
main groups of labourers in British North Borneo.59
Over the years, family life was greatly promoted.60 Most of the Javanese got 
married and brought up families. The majority of Javanese women got married to their 
men folk. Marriages between kontrakkan and Singapore-recruited Javanese also 
occurred. So did inter-marriages with local men.61 The similarities in religion and culture 
made inter-marriages easier. Most of these women did not re-engage at the expiration 
of their indenture contract, but remained as free women on the estate, and took care of
54 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922. p. 58.
55 PRO: C0874/358. Sandakan Police Report 1915.
55 HCPP: Cmd 1060. Annexure F. Committee on Estate Abuse. 3 May 1920. p. 24.
57 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922. p. 58.
58 SSA: Despatches (Court to Gov., 1918). Desertion from Kinarut Estate. Secretary to Pearson. 13 March
1918.
59 PRO: COS74/358. Sandakan Police R eport 1915; PRO: C0874-511. Governor to President BNBC. 
1 December 1927.
60 HCPP: Cmd 1060. Annexure F. Committee on Estate Abuse. 3 May 1920. p. 24.
61 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f Discussion with V iehoff; Interview w ith Tarmin Marsoh. 27 
December 2006.
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their families’ comforts.62 But for working mothers, their busy schedules sometimes 
posed problems with regard to child care. To tackle this issue, the Dutch Labour 
Inspector finally suggested that married women with children should be housed 
together in the same vicinity so that the estates could provide a baboo (a local term, 
probably meant a ‘child-minder’) to see to the children while their mothers worked.63 
Meanwhile, one estate that prohibited marriage among the female coolies was the 
Sapong Estate. Manager Frank Lease claimed that being in loco parentis, he had such 
a right to protect himself against the loss of labour entailed by the pregnancy of female 
labourers.84 The British Borneo Timber Company (BBTC) and the Batu Puteh Estate 
were also reported to have separated Javanese couples without the labourers’ 
consent. One coolie, Wongsosoe Karto, of the BBTC, had his wife repatriated to 
Java.65 No reasons could be found in the sources to justify these irregularities.
Additionally, various forms of entertainment were offered such as the 
establishment of a cinema theatre in Beaufort for the benefit of labourers on several 
estates around the area.66 In 1922, Governor Pearson called for the installation of a 
cinematograph at Ranau and NDBTCo. estates for the use of their coolies, and 
assumed that the coolies would not resent a monthly reduction of pay to subsidise the 
installation.67 Football grounds were also provided so that coolies ‘could work off any 
superfluous energy and not give them so much time to loll about and gossip’.68 
Likewise, schools were established in the 1920s for children of estate labourers. The 
Sablas Company opened a school for the children of Papar Estate in 1920.69 Several 
other estates followed suit, such as Bongawan, Lingkungan, Langkon and Sapong.
62 PRO: C0874/755. Memorandum on Wages.
63 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f  Discussion w ith Viehoff.
64 PRO: COS74/752. Notes o f  interview between the Governor and a deputation o f the NBPA. 7 January 
1927.
65 SSA: N BC A 210. Martyn to Manager BBTC. 18 April 1927; Protector to Manager Batu Puteh Estate. 
10 April 1927.
66 SSA: Despatches (Gov., to Chairman, 1917). Report on Protectorate Enquiry into Woodford Estate by 
Horton, M orrell and Maxwell Hall.
67 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922. p. 58.
68 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1918). Owen to Government Secretary. 1 March 1918.
69 SSA: Despatches (Court to Gov., 1920). Extract from M r. Graham’s letter o f  13 July 1920 to Sablas 
Board.
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Sapong Estate was the most noteworthy, having two schools, one for each sex. Well 
attended, both schools taught estate children to read and write Malay. The girls were 
also taught needlework.70 Due to lack of support, some schools were closed down 
within a few years of operation.71 In 1926, only three schools were maintained by 
employers of Javanese indentured labourers, i.e. Sapong Estate (17 pupils), 
Bongawan Estate (27 pupils) and Kinarut Estate (6 pupils). Another school was 
maintained by Cowie coal mines at Silimpopon, for the offspring of Chinese coolies. 
Also, child-welfare work was carried out at Membakut Estate in 1926.72
The Javanese indentured labourers and all Muslims in the territory were of the 
Sunni order. Employers were not keen on religious instruction, because there was no 
evidence in the sources mentioning of any provision for mosque or surau (a proper 
place to pray) on any of the estates. They did not ban Javanese coolies from practising 
their religion, but spiritual growth was not one of their main concerns. This could be 
seen from the comment made by the Protector of Labour on a visit to Papar Estate in 
1923, namely that ‘ample provision for Mohamedan religious ceremonies’ could be 
obtained at Papar district, but none was mentioned on the estate itself.73 Usually, pious 
labourers doubled up as Imams by night and became spiritual leaders among the 
Javanese coolie population on estates.74 Since all matters concerning adat and Muslim 
law in the territory were left in the hands of the respective native village headmen and 
elders of the particular community,75 any decision on matters pertaining to religion 
among labourers was left to the Protector of Labour. Any appeal against the Protector’s 
judgement was made to the Governor himself. As late as 1927, the territory was still
70 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Court, 1925). PMO to Government Secretary. 22 January 1925.
71 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Court, 1923). Report on Protector’s v is it to Papar Estate. 6 March 1923.
72 PRO: C0648/14. Administration Report 1926. Reported by C.F.C. Macaskie, Inspector o f  School.
73 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1923). Report on Protector’ s V is it to Papar Estate. 6 March 1923.
74 Johari Alias. Pameran Hasil Sumbangcm Islam. Kota Kinabalu: MUIS. 1981. p. 79; Interview with 
Muslim  bin Samsudin. 16 March 2007.
75 D.S. Ranjit Singh. ‘The Development o f  Native Administration in Sabah 1877-1946’ . in: Sullivan and 
Leong. Commemorative History, p. 102.
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deprived of properly qualified authorities on Islamic law, such as kadi, mufti, and sheikh 
ukls iam 76
However, employers did see religious instruction and custom as another 
method of social control. During religious occasions, estates with a huge Javanese 
labour force would organise a big celebration for them, and it became ‘a time of much 
feasting’. On Hari Raya Korban, some employers provided buffaloes as korban 
(sacrifice) for their Muslim coolies.77 Likewise, although couples had to seek permission 
to wed from the estate management, marriages still followed traditional Javanese 
practices. The wedding ceremony itself took place before a wakil Imam (a 
representative of the Imam). At night, great drumming and dancing could be heard at 
the Javanese lines. Sometimes, estate officials attended these ceremonies, particularly 
to watch the ronggeng, which was a type of Javanese social dance.78 Festivities on 
estates were usually followed with gameian music (an ensemble featuring a variety of 
musical instruments) which accompanied the wayang kulit or shadow puppets theatre, 
and the ketoprak, a staged play by the coolies. Employers encouraged such social 
events and supplied them with a venue and musical instruments, i.e. gongs.79 As 
illustrated by Lind, entertainment on Sapong Estate was provided in a 'rough building, 
set up as a kind of theatre where the Javanese workers and their wives would perform 
dance drama, and other plays depicting their culture and customs.80
Most employers also strove to give a decent Muslim burial to Javanese 
indentured labourers who were unfortunate enough to die whilst working on British 
North Borneo estates. A long standing custom on most estates, prior to 1914, was to
76 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1927). Notes o f interview between the Governor and a deputation 
for the NBPA. 7 January 1927.
77 Cook. Borneo, p. 24.
78 PRO: C0874/511. Protector to Resident Sandakan. 7 November 1927; Interview w ith Salamah Sajiran. 
14 March 2007.
79 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Court, 1923). Report on Protector’ s v is it to Papar Estate. 6 March 1923; 
BNBH. June 1891. p. 220; Richard Lind. My Sabah: Reminiscences o f  a Former State Secretary. 2003. p. 
6; Interview w ith Salamah Sajiran. 14 March 2007.
80 Lind. ‘An Estate’ . Daily Express. 25 July 1993.
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dump the bodies of dead coolies wherever convenient, without a proper cemetery, or to 
leave any record behind.81 With the increased number of Javanese indentured 
labourers working on estates, and since they were legally bound by the Dutch Contract 
to give a proper burial,82 most employers sectioned a part of their estates’ land to serve 
as a burial ground for Muslim labourers. The grave-yards were properly fenced, and 
each burial ground was placed with a termasu (a post) with the number of the coolie 
written on it. These burial sites were only reserved for Muslims because employers 
knew this would produce a feeling of satisfaction for Javanese labourers working there 
if they knew their cemetery had been consecrated according to their custom.83 
Employers also provided the necessary adjuncts such as coffins and white fabrics, at 
the cost of the estate. The length of the textile, however, was sometimes short of the 9 
yards recommended.84
Another way of controlling labour was to erect labour settlements or 
colonisation huts within the vicinity of the enterprises, or on lands adjacent to them.85 
Rigorously enforced in the 1920s and 1930s when estates were at the centre of critical 
economic junctures, labourers still servicing their contracts were allotted miniscule 
plots, under direct supervision of the estates, until the contract expired. Only a small 
number of Javanese applied for these allotments and a majority of them felt disinclined 
to do further agricultural work in their spare time.86 Nonetheless, according to Stoler, by 
doing this, the companies benefited tremendously. Firstly they maintained their 
‘sovereignty over land and labour’. Secondly, the supply of labour was continuous, in 
the sense that the coolies remained ‘economically dependent on and available to the 
estates. Thirdly, the maintenance cost was greatly reduced, such that the management 
of estates indirectly transferred the responsibility of maintaining the costs of labour
81 SSA: N BC A 647. R.K. Hardwick to DO, Beaufort. 14 October 1914.
82 See variations o f Dutch Contracts in Appendix 1, 2, and 3.
83 SSA: N BC A 647. Hardwick to DO, Beaufort. 14 October 1914.
84 PRO: C0874/552. NBCC. Minutes o f  Committee Meeting. 13 October 1918; SSA: NBCA 465. 
Memoranda o f the Discussion w ith V iehoff.
85 PRO: CO874/1061. Extract from the Twenty-third Annual General Meeting o f  Sablas-North Borneo 
Rubber Ltd. 27 October 1933.
86 PRO: C0874/761. Minutes -  Extract front the BNBH dated 1 February 1934.
227
power to the labourers themselves, if the alternative option of dismissal was not 
favoured by the management.87
Employers also controlled the labour force by interpreting the loosely formulated 
regulation on contract extension to their own advantage. Some employers readily 
prosecuted defaulting immigrants, and at the same time, tightened estate discipline in 
order to force an extension of their contract. Moreover, the normal practice of some 
estates, such as the Lower Segama Estate, was to calculate the beginning of indenture 
on the day the Javanese coolies arrived on their respective estates, and not on the day 
of signing the contracts in Java.88 Out of ignorance, some Javanese indentured 
labourers continued to work even when they were entitled to a discharge, because they 
were unable to make the calculations for extension which permitted only 1/3 of the 
number of days of the original contract. Employers were obliged to notify a Javanese 
indentured labourer when his or her contract expired,89 but the situation failed to 
improve in the ensuing years. By 1928, the visiting Dutch Labour Inspector had 
received so many complaints by Javanese coolies that they were not notified of the 
date of expiry of their contracts. Consequently, notices were posted monthly in each 
coolie accommodation, giving information of a coolie’s contract position.90
Statistics revealed that 45 percent of government-imported Javanese re­
indentured when the system was in operation, totalling 4,459 (of the 9,969) altogether 
between 1914 and 1932.91 This averages more than 200 re-indentured per year. The 
years with more than 400 re-indentured per annum are 1920 (417), 1929 (636) and 
1930 (492).92 The majority of government imported Javanese re-engaged under the 
auspices of the local contract, which had a different wage scheme, and did not have a 
free repatriation clause to Java. Apart from increasing coolie debt, the strategy
87 Stoler. Capitalism and Confrontation, pp. 39-41.
88 SSA: N BC A 465. Macaskie to Manager, Lower Segama Estate. 11 July 1928.
89 PRO: C0874/753. Notes o f  Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert.
90 SSA: N BC A 465. Protector to Government Secretary. 25 May 1928.
9! See SSA: N BC A 980. Quarterly Labour Returns.
92 Refer Table 8.2 in Chapter 8.
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employed by planters was to treat the labourers ‘well’ during the first term of their 
contract, so that they re-engaged under the local contract. Additionally, Javanese 
coolies were given bonuses when they signed up for a new contract. A popular trend 
was also to give fresh monetary advances to coolies and write off small debts.93 
Ostensibly, a coolie would jump at this cancellation, the prospect of a clean sheet, and 
some cash in the pocket94 In 1918, Dr. Van Hemert contended that many Javanese 
were deceived into signing the local contract because they were ignorant and illiterate, 
and unaware that the new contract contained different terms of agreement, most 
importantly, the absence of a repatriation clause to Java.95 Therefore, attempts by 
Sekong Estate in 1919 to induce their government-imported Javanese coolies into 
signing a new one year contract (by dismissing old debts) three months before their 
two-year contract terminated, were prevented when D.R. Maxwell, Acting Protector, 
refused to register the new contracts, on the basis that they would ‘prejudice 
Government recruiting of Javanese labour from Java’.96
Abuses and Physical Violence against Javanese Indentured Labourers
An ever-present underlying reality in the social relations of life under indenture was the 
question of abuse and physical violence against Javanese labourers. Humanitarians 
believed that cases of abuse of power, which sometimes ended in physical violence, 
were far more frequent than the authorities acknowledged, and not all of them 
ultimately reached their attention.97 Unpublished reports of protectorate officers and the 
Dutch Labour Inspectors indicated that abuses of power were more intense on some 
estates than in others, and that these estates were comparatively few.
A form of physical abuse which is likely to have aggravated tension on a minority 
of estates in British North Borneo was the sexual exploitation of Javanese indentured
93 PRO: C0874/753. Minutes. From Sekong Rubber Co. 17 May 1919.
94 PRO: C0874/753. Notes by Governor. 28 September 1923.
95 PRO: CO874/753. Notes o f Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert, See chapter 8.
96 PRO: C0874/753. Minutes. From Sekong Rubber Co. 17 May 1919.
97 See accusations made by the Anti Slavery and Aborigines Society in, PRO: C0531 series.
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women. One of the sources revealed that women coolies at Kinarut Estate were 
vulnerable to the sexual advances of their superiors. A former assistant manager of the 
estate had this to say about the Irish manager, E. Fitzgerald Day:
His greatest claim to fame seems to have been his exploits with the female 
weeders. These weeders whose job it was to keep down the weed growth between 
the rubber trees, moved from one ‘field’ to another as the work progressed. Day 
had an attap shelter in each field and when he rode up to inspect the work, he 
would dismount, neigh and paw the ground like a restive horse, then choose a girl 
and take her to the shelter.9
It is interesting to note, however, that very little is found in the sources about this form 
of abuse, where female labourers were forced against their will, and became sexual 
objects of European employees on estates. Indirectly, this suggests that it was not a 
common feature in the indentured labour experience of Javanese women in British 
North Borneo. A major factor could be the presence of European women on estates. 
Unlike the marriage prohibition on incoming European employees on tobacco 
plantations in Deli during the late nineteenth century, plantations in British North 
Borneo accepted married European applicants, and single European men were also 
allowed to marry while in service.99
Some estates’ authoritative figures also took matters into their own hands and 
exercised their own judicial powers towards the coolies for purely industrial purposes, 
in order to bring them into line. Javanese coolies were beaten, kicked, punched, and 
slapped. These usually occurred after a verbal reprimand was ignored.100 Some 
estates erected a whipping post, where ‘recalcitrant’ coolies were stripped and 
whipped.101 Coolies were flogged publicly to deter other coolies from committing the 
same offences or misbehaving.102 Whipping was alleged to be of ‘the most brutal kind', 
and was inflicted by managers of estates, or by their orders, without magisterial
98 SSA: KSP.24/M/3. Allan Y in  Chin Foh. ‘Early Days in the Kinarut Estate’
99 Ann Stoler. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. 
University o f California Press. 2002. p. 29.
100 HCPP: Cmd 1060. Enclosure 2 in N o .l. North Borneo. Testimony by de la Mothe. 20 August 1919. p. 
5.
101 SSA: KSP.24/M/3. A llan Y in  Chin Foh. ‘Early Days in the Kinarut Estate’ .
102 Lind. ‘An Estate’ . Daily Express. 25 July 1993.
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conviction and authority. A manager admitted he once flogged a coolie using a rubber 
tube.103 Javanese coolies also complained of being ill-treated by the estate ‘police’, 
being subjected to beatings, extortion and threats.104 For instance, every so often, at a 
nod from the manager, the opases at Sapong Estate administered floggings and 
brutally assaulted coolies by striking them in the face and knocking them down.105
Estate gaols were outlawed in the territory in 1914, but a twenty-four-hour 
detaining area was allowed in the estate where recalcitrant or violent coolies were kept, 
before they were removed to a government lock-up. Allegedly, there was a flagrant 
abuse of this provision, because a Company official disclosed that in some estates, 
coolies were left incarcerated for days as a punishment for industrial offences.106 
Pillories were used in the estate lock-up. Some of them spent long terms in the gaol, 
during which time they were compelled to do estate work, even on Sundays and public 
holidays, under the watchful eyes of the estate private ‘policemen’.107
Throughout the period of indenture (1914-1932), the Protectors of Labour 
occasionally reported episodes of abuses inflicted on Javanese coolies (and other 
coolies) in British North Borneo. Reasons for physical abuses included being late for 
muster, unfinished tasks, poor quality of tapping, insubordination, malingering, 
absenteeism and desertion.108 As early as 1914, constant ill-treatment and physical 
violence towards Javanese coolies culminated in the death of F.C. Pauw, the Manager 
of Melalap Estate.109 In April of the same year, A. Hoffman, Manager of Lingkungan 
Borneo Rubber Maatschappij, was fined $400 under Section 438 of the Indian Penal 
Code for wrongfully incarcerating a Javanese coolie for the purposes of extorting
i°3 ]-i£pp ; Cmd 1060. Enclosure 2 in No. 1. North Borneo. Testimony by de la Mothe. 20 August 1919. p. 
5.
104 Examples can be found further in the chapter.
105 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Enclosure 3 in N o .l. ‘ In the matter o f the treatment o f coloured employees on 
estates in British North Borneo’ , p.6.
106 Cook. Borneo, p. 33.
107 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Enclosure 3 in N o .l. ‘ In the matter o f the treatment o f  coloured employees on 
estates in British North Borneo’ , p. 6.
108 See, SSA: N BC A 906; SSA: N BC A 465; SSA: N BC A  231.
109 BNBH. 2 March 1914. p. 38.
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information regarding a theft committed on the estate. This case came to light when the 
estate’s entire Javanese labour force marched to the District Officer’s office in Beaufort 
to make the complaint.110 Two years later, the ‘Holman Affair’ stood out. In May 1916, 
the Assistant Manager of Bongawan Estate, O.C. Holman, and his subordinate, 
Mandur Ali (of Bajau origin) were convicted at Papar Court for causing hurt to 12 
Javanese men and women coolies.111 Holman had urged Mandur Ali to beat both men 
and women, and on occasions when the mandur’s efforts were not sufficiently drastic, 
Holman took the stick from him and continued the punishment himself.112 Mandur Ali 
was charged with striking Javanese women with a stick and kicking them in the 
stomach. He was imprisoned for three months and fined $30. Meanwhile, Holman was 
fined $135. On six cases of assault, each complainant agreed to a compound, $15.00 
for each woman, and $10.00 for each man.113 By the late 1920s, the anxiety 
concerning reports of abuse on Javanese labourers imported from Java became more 
acute. In 1929 the Resident of Kudat reported four cases of assault and hurt on four 
Javanese labourers (Abdul, Kromotaruno, Kartoredjo, Madsari) by H.A. Somerville, an 
Assistant Manager of Pitas Estate. The accused, deemed quick-tempered, was 
sentenced to a fine of between $1 and $5 by Magistrate E.W. Morrell.114
Following the imposition of bans on particular estates by the Dutch Labour 
Inspector, pending the removal of certain bad characters accused of abusing their 
power, Worth (Officer Administering the Government) instructed Martyn (Protector of 
Labour) to inform the respective estate managements that they were to do as ordered if 
they wanted the ban to be lifted. Should they fail to take any action, the government 
would not recommend them as suitable importers of Javanese labourers.115 All estates 
complied with the NEI requirements. Problematic individuals were discharged, and the
110 PRO: C0874/587. Governor to Chairman BNBC. No. 1636/14. 24 May 1914.
111 SSA: N BC A 906. Ill-treatment o f Javanese Coolies at Bongawan Estate.
112 SSA: N BC A  906. R.G.L. Horton, Acting Protector o f Labour, to Government Secretary. Prot 167/16. 
16 May 1916.
113 SSA: N BC A  906. Horton to Government Secretary. Prot 167/16. 16 June 1916.
114 SSA: N BC A 533. Copy o f encl. 2, G.S.O. 1160/29. Extract from H .E .’ s despatch No. 415.20 July 
1929.
1,5 SSA: N BC A 465. Minutes to Protector. G.S.O, No. 1144-28. Memo N o .l.
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welfare conditions of Javanese coolies were improved. Most significantly, Frank E. 
Lease, who single-handedly managed Sapong Estate since 1905, a formidable and 
vocal figure within the planting circle, was sacked in 1928 by the estate headquarters in 
London.116 Dutch Inspector Viehoff had initially suspended the supply of Javanese 
labourers to Sapong Estate, as long as Lease retained the management.117
The mandurs posed the greatest threat to the well-being of the coolie population, 
because they were in direct contact with Javanese indentured labourers. Each mandur 
was in charge of 15 to 20 coolies, and his tasks were to divide the workload among the 
coolies, and to supervise the execution of the work.118 Their power was enough to 
control and intimidate coolies. Since their earnings depended on the achievement of 
their subordinates, they were frequently accused of oppressing and ill-treating 
Javanese coolies, to the point of physically abusing them, to force them to perform 
harder. Such was the case reported to Dutch Labour Inspector Viehoff in 1928. Two 
Javanese coolies, Dul Sajoeran (No. 987) and Estat (No. 402) of Sapong Estate, 
reported that they were slapped by Mandur Rakim on different occasions in April that 
year while working the field, and the slap was so severe on the latter that he fell to the 
ground. Two other Javanese labourers accused Mandur Rakim of extortion. A coolie 
called Kastari borrowed $5 from the mandur, and had to repay $9.50, while Kardi had 
to repay $5 instead of the $1.50 he borrowed.119 Hence, a mandur not only expected 
hard work from his subordinates, but also controlled their financial position. Some 
overseers had the tendency to disburse small loans to desperate members of their 
gangs, or induce labourers to purchase gold ornaments on credit. Coolies were 
expected to repay the lender at exorbitant interest, when a bonus had been received 
for re-engagement.120 Both acts were punishable offences under Section 36 of 
Ordinance 9/1916. Sometimes, an overseer was entrusted to pay a coolie’s wages,
1!6 Lind. Daily Express. 25 July 1993.
117 SSA: N BC A 465. Macaskie to Acting Manager o f  Sapong Estate. Prot. 336/28. 29 June 1928.
118 PRO: C0874/437. Copy o f letter from Hadow and Pinckney. 10 A pril 1916.
119 SSA: N BC A 465. Complaints to Mr. V ieho ff against Mandore Rakim o f  Sapong Estate.
120 SSA: N BC A 465. Macaskie to Acting Manager o f Sapong Estate. Prot. 336/28. 29 June 1928.
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thus further controlling the coolies. It was not surprising that overseers were, more 
often than not, accused of physical abuse, theft, extortion, blackmail and other forms of 
abuse.
The reaction of persons of authority (estate management and government 
officials) towards accusations of ill-treatment committed by estate overseers was quite 
ambivalent. On the one hand, an overseer was not fully accepted and trusted by the 
management because he still, after all, belonged to the labouring class. On the other 
hand, since an overseer linked the world of the coolies with the world of the 
management, in what Breman termed a ‘relationship of dominance and 
subordination’,121 employers did not want to give the impression that any complaint to 
the local protectorate office would lead to the dismissal of the overseer. Such action 
was seen as undermining the credibility of the managerial staff. Similarly, it became 
significant, and obvious, that the Company government was generally more lenient 
towards the estate and its staff if the victim was not a Javanese coolie. This was 
exemplified by Governor Pearson’s advice to a manager of an estate to gradually 
replace his staff of overseers involved in a fracas with Chinese labourers because ‘any 
wholesale dismissal ... would ... be regarded by the labour force as a direct result of 
the disturbance, and would encourage every man with a grievance to take the law into 
his own hands’.122
Conversely, the policy of the colonial state relating to Javanese, particularly 
government-imported indentured labourers, was very precise. Javanese indentured 
labourers were to be protected, not on moral and humanitarian grounds, but owing to 
the business arrangement with the Dutch authorities, and the economic future of the 
territory. When the ‘Holman Affair’ occurred in 1916, the Court of Directors viewed the 
matter seriously. Indeed, the Court was nervous that the affair would reach the ears of
121 Breman. Taming the Coolie Beast. 1989. p. 136.
122 SSA: N BC A  231. Governor Pearson to Chairman BNBC. 22 November 1917.
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the NEI authorities or the Governor of the Straits Settlement, and compromise the 
future recruitment of Javanese labourers for the territory, from both Java and 
Singapore.123 The case was never mentioned in the year’s published annual report, 
and its exclusion was probably premeditated, to avoid this potential problem. The 
punitive punishment inflicted on Holman by the Beaufort magistrate was deemed 
insufficient by the Court, even though the presiding magistrate, D.R. Maxwell, was 
renowned for his diligence and fair judgement.124 Further chastisement awaited Holman 
out of court, and his attempts to secure another position in the territory were obstructed 
by the Company’s administration. A few potential employers received letters from the 
government, ‘advising’ them against employing Holman. Holman was almost banished 
from the territory by law, but eventually, his status as a British subject saved him.125 He 
was provided with a free ticket to Singapore at the government’s expense, and left the 
territory in September 1916.126
As a result of this incident, the government became even more vigilant in 
stemming potential abuse. The affair offers a convincing argument that the BNBC 
would not compromise on the matter of labour supply provided by Javanese indentured 
migrants. One could not help but think that Javanese indentured labourers in the 
territory were ‘untouchable’ in certain areas, having more privileges and bargaining 
power than their coolie contemporaries of different ethnicity. Every assault inflicted on a 
Javanese labourer had to be reported to the Governor, who would then relay the matter 
to the Court of Directors in London. Each estate was required to submit labour returns 
specifying the number of instances of abuse inflicted by Europeans on Asiatics.127
The Protectors of Labour, as well as the judiciary, constantly asserted that every 
facility was provided for the Javanese immigrants to complain to the protectorate
123 SSA: N BC A 906. ‘Harington G. Forbes, Secretary BNBC, to The Secretaries, Bongawan Rubber Ltd. 
10 January 1916’ .
124 See Chapter 5.
125 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Court, 1916). Governor to Chairman. 16 October 1916.
126 SSA: N BC A  906. Governor to Chairman. 22 September 1916.
127 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov., 1918). Secretary BNBC to Governor Pearson. 2 May 1918.
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officers when they visited the estates, or through the agency of the management. 
Nevertheless, on occasions, illegal methods of labour control escaped the attention of 
the authorities, because employers omitted to facilitate Javanese labourers in making a 
complaint.128 Moreover, very few Javanese immigrants brought formal complaint 
against their employers, and in common with other non-Javanese labourers, often 
declined the offer of the Protector to bring a prosecution.129 The lack of complaints, 
however, did not necessarily mean the absence of grievances. The presence of the 
employer during inspections discouraged Javanese labourers from testifying against 
their superiors, and coolies normally complained in their absence. Moreover, ‘...when 
coolies were seen in the presence of Estate officials whose guest the Inspector is for 
the time being, they would be very unlikely to have the courage to state any 
grievances.’130
Numerous complaints by government-imported Javanese, and Javanese 
coolies generally, were only received in the presence of the Dutch Labour Inspectors, 
whom they believed could be trusted to protect their welfare. When scores of 
complaints were received in 1927 by Baron van Lijnden, and Macaskie (Protector) who 
accompanied him, the latter took the liberty to withhold the rights given to employers to 
be present during an inquiry. Employers only had to be within the estate’s vicinity to 
answer any allegations thrown at them.131 Nevertheless, it did little to allay fears of the 
government-imported Javanese because the whole system put coolies under constant 
pressure not to complain for fear of retaliatory action by the estate officers. Even if a 
coolie did bring a formal complaint, sometimes his or her case was dismissed from the 
lack of evidence and witnesses.132
128 SSA: N BC A  906. Horton to Government Secretary. Prot 167/16. 27 May 1916.
129 SSA: N BC A 231. Pearson to Chairman, BNBC. 1839/17. No. 914. 22 November 1917.
130 PRO: C0531/14. Buxton and Harris, to Under Secretary. 5 February 1920.
131 Refer Chapter 5 for more details.
132 SSA: N BC A  465. Complaints to V ieho ff against Mandore Rakim o f  Sapong Estate.
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Also, they looked at the court as an extension mechanism for labour control. 
The magistrates were generally depicted as pro-management, and this assumption 
was linked by similarities in race, class, social interactions, and cultural prejudices 
against the Asians. Owen Rutter described that he had occasionally fined a planter for 
assault, and later made amends by inviting the planter for a tiffin (a courtesy snack).133 
Hence, when a coolie was punished by the magistrate for breach of contract, 
indentured coolies viewed the magistrate-cum-Assistant Protector of Labour as a foe 
rather than a friend, more so after witnessing close fraternisations between the 
supposed ‘protectors’ and their employers.134 Additionally, the coolies were 
disadvantaged by legal procedures because they were illiterate, and unable to 
communicate effectively with the magistrate because of language constraint. Few of 
the newly-arrived immigrants were proficient in the local Malay language, which was 
spoken in court. The unavailability of a Javanese or Sundanese interpreter (although 
this was rectified in 1927) provided by the Protectorate Department also placed the 
immigrant Javanese at a serious disadvantage before the magistrate. Worse still, the 
patience of magistrates was also compromised because of language problems. A 
European magistrate once remarked that after listening to evidence given in a foreign 
language, sifting through it and mentally recording potential questions, he was left 
weary of the whole situation.135 It would not be surprising if this culminated in 
sentences that were prejudicial to the coolie. As noted by Bernard A. Platt, the 
territory’s Judicial Commissioner in 1916, there were a ‘rare few’ magistrates who 
showed ‘a little laxity’ in administering justice.135
Nonetheless, as described in earlier paragraphs, the rights of employees were 
also upheld by magistrates. And when employers of labour lost in court, it normally left 
them incensed because they thought that ‘as little gods or kings upon their estates ...
133 Rutter, British North Borneo, p. 153
134 PRO: 00531/14. Buxton and Hams, to Under Secretary. 5 February 1920; PRO: C0874/575. 
Bernard A. Platt, Judicial Commissioner, to Government Secretary. 1 September 1919.
135 Bruce. Twenty Years in Borneo, pp. 74 and 76.
136 PRO: C0874/575. Governor No. 559. AR. Judicial Department fo r 1916. 30 June 1917.
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their word was enough; that if they accused a coolie of an offence he must be 
convicted; ... and [they] were perfectly indifferent to the value of evidence...’.137 A 
magistrate showing sympathy to the coolie population was labelled as a ‘bad one’, and 
accused of causing trouble at places of labour because of ‘deteriorating’ discipline 
among its coolies.138 Some planters’ used their influence amongst the European 
administrative circle to dispose of ‘difficult’ government officials. For instance, Manager 
Lease of Sapong Estate succeeded in ‘pulling the right strings’ when the magistrate 
(Oscar Cook) who convicted him of assaulting his labourers, was transferred to a 
different district.139
Punishment by the Colonial-State
Although some estate officials took matters into their own hands in punishing coolies, 
most recalcitrant coolies were handed over to the colonial state for chastisement. The 
colonial state could impose penal sanctions for beaches of contract. The conditions of 
life, while under the indenture of government-imported Javanese, could be gleaned 
from the statistics on convictions and punishments for breach of contract. This 
information was included in the labour reports of the Protectorate Department, but 
unfortunately separate data on each ethnicity were not available. On government- 
imported Javanese, this information could be found in the labour returns submitted 
quarterly to the NEl authorities, but this information was only included in the returns 
from the second quarter of 1927.140 The timing actually coincided with the visit of the 
Dutch Labour Inspector, Baron van Lijnden, so it was possible that he demanded this 
item to be included in the labour returns.
Convictions of government-imported Javanese under the Labour Ordinance, 
between April and December 1927 totalled 170 cases (2nd quarter (43), 3rd quarter (62),
137 Cook. Borneo, p. 209.
138 PRO: C0874/511. Ling to Chairman, NBTCo. Ltd. 25 May 1921; Cook. Borneo, p. 205.
139 Cook. Borneo, pp. 33-34.
140 SSA: N BC A 980. Quarterly Labour Returns 1927.
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4th quarter (65)), out of the 766 labourers overall punished for breach of contract. 
Assuming that between 200-240 government-imported coolies were convicted for the 
year, based on the average of 57 convictions for each of the last three quarters, the 
rate of punishment for government-imported Javanese for the year was between 26 
and 31 per hundred. However, if calculated based on the total population of 
government-imported Javanese (around 6,400 coolies) on 31 December 1927, the rate 
of punishment for breaches of contract was relatively low, between 3.1 and 3.7 per 
hundred. This roughly corresponds with the punishment inflicted on all labourers in the 
territory for that year.
The number of punishments inflicted on labourers in British North Borneo is 
shown in Table 7.1. Convictions of coolies were generally higher in the 1910s and the 
first half of 1920s, ranging from 4.0 to 8.8 per 100. Employers rigorously prosecuted 
and convicted coolies from 1918-1921 because it was a period of high inflation, and 
incidences of desertions and labour unrests were quite common. After a steady 
decrease, the rate of conviction cases rose again in 1925-1926, but the figures had 
never reached the level of the 1910s. There was an economic revival with the boom in 
rubber prices, which witnessed an increase in the level of production.141 The 
imperatives of the economic revival played a part in the harshness of the discipline. 
More forceful methods were used by people in authority to increase production to meet 
targets, secure profit and their commission. At times like this, they looked at coolies as 
just that -  coolies, who were paid for their labour. As long as ‘their pulse is normal, their 
tongue clean, and they have no temperature’, overseers had no understanding or 
sympathy for ‘sakit panat’ (tiredness).142 It was likely that workers showed some form of 
resistance, resulting in prosecutions and convictions.
141 See Appendix 1 on Total Exports o f  Rubber (in Tons and in £)
142 Cook. Borneo. p. 204. ‘Panat’ , meaning ‘ tired’ , is now spelled ‘penat’ in the current Malay language.
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Table 7.1
Coolie Punishments and Desertions in British North Borneo per hundred (1915-1932)
Year Punishment Desertion Year Punishment Desertion
1915 5.5 7.6 1924 4.4 7.5
1916 5.6 6.9 1925 4.8 7.0
1917 5.6 4.5 1926 4.9 6.2
1918 7.0 5.0 1927 3.8 4.3
1919 6.6 5.5 1928 2.8 5.3
1920 8.8 6.9 1929 2.3 5.2
1921 6.2 8.1 1930 2.3 n/a
1922 5.0 8.5 1931 0.6 n/a
1923 5.0 9.1 1932 0.1 n/a
Source: PRO: C0648 Administration Reports, relevant years.
However, it has to be mentioned that employers and the colonial administration 
were very cautious about prosecuting Javanese indentured labourers because of their 
‘special’ status in British North Borneo. If possible, the authorities avoided prosecuting 
them altogether. The threat of penal sanctions was only used to subdue Javanese 
labourers. The depiction by Cook, illustrating a visit he made to Labuk Estate prior to 
the closure of the estate in 1918, concurred with this sentiment:
I had spent the night on the Estate and had arranged to return to Klagan the 
following morning, but before leaving had promised to walk to a distant division and 
harangue some Javanese coolies who were inclined to be troublesome. There was 
no question of a prosecution; I was only to remind them of the obligations of their 
contracts and the possible consequences if they were forgetful.143
Yet, Cook asserted that even if penal sanctions were used to punish obstinate coolies, 
they were not excessively used. He rejected as nonsensical the general perception 
among the critics of indenture at that time that indentured labour was atrocious and 
akin to slavery. Cook believed that ‘every contract in the world has within it the germ of 
slavery’, and that disciplinary measures or penal sanctions, did not necessarily 
constitute ill-treatment or brutality, as proclaimed by critics of indenture.144 As part of 
the administrative circle in British North Borneo during his heyday, Cook’s personal 
convictions were hardly surprising.
143 Cook. Borneo, p. 205.
144 Cook. Borneo, pp. 108-110.
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The main infractions committed by Javanese coolies included desertion, 
vagrancy, absenteeism either from labour, or from work without leave, refusal to work, 
and insubordination.145 Generally, employers did not prosecute, showing a mildness in 
terms of the type of indenture system applied to the Javanese, but other illegal 
methods of punishment were practised, such as imposing fines and wage deductions. 
On a minority of estates, even the smallest breach of estate regulations on occasions 
furnished grounds for prosecution. The stance taken by these employers was that as 
long as their methods of administration were strictly within the confines of the law, 
external parties (including the government) had no right to interfere with the way an 
individual estate was managed.146 Conspicuously, Sapong Estate, which employed a 
large number of Javanese coolies, had been singled out for its excessive number of 
coolies charged yearly before a Magistrate Court, compared to figures shown by other 
estates. Based on the summary of labour returns for 1921, Sapong Estate (Interior 
Residency) headed the list of estates, with more than one hundred convictions under 
the Labour Ordinance, with other estates averaging 30-40 convictions a year.147 In 
1925, Sapong Estate again recorded 100 convictions, followed closely by Membakut 
Estate (97), Ranau Tobacco Estate (83) and New Darvel Bay Tobacco Estate (80).148 
Convicted coolies were punished with criminal penalties, either by fines, rigorous 
imprisonment or whipping (prior to 1922). Indeed, from 1915-1927, a total of 9,846 
estate labourers out of an average 18,000 labour force, had seen the insides of 
government prisons throughout the territory.149 Whipping became optional in 1921, and 
during the second half of the year, there were 494 sentences of alternative whipping or 
imprisonment. Of these, 200 cases had selected whipping. During the first six months 
of 1922, 134 out of 337 persons sentenced to optional punishment elected whipping.150
145 PRO: C0648/7-15. AR. Constabulary Department, relevant years.
146 PRO: C0531/14. Report by Pearson and Elphinstone. Annexure E. 8 A p ril 1920.
147 PRO: C0648/9. Schedule. Summary o f  Quarterly Labour Returns for 1921,
148 PRO: C0648/11. Schedule C. Summary o f Labour Returns For the State fo r the Year Ending 3 
December 1925, in AR. Protectorate Department for 1925.
149 PRO: C0648/7-14. AR. Protectorate Department, relevant years.
150 PRO: C0531/16. Secretary to Under Secretary o f  State, Colonial Office. 13 November 1922.
241
Resistance
The stringent disciplinary control and social discordances described above affected the 
Javanese indentured labourers in many ways. Their responses to these were 
expressed through indirect and open resistance. Indirectly, Javanese indentured 
coolies feigned illness, and often employers accused them of malingering. Also, 
another form of indirect resistance was suicide, and one can occasionally see the term 
‘suicide’ listed as one of the causes of death in the Quarterly Labour Returns. Suicidal 
coolies apparently suffered from fits of depression, and were deemed to have ‘unsound 
minds’.151
The most common type of indirect resistance among the Javanese indentured 
labourers in British North Borneo was desertion. Statistics on desertion are shown on 
Table 7.2 for the years 1915-1932. The statistics however, must be viewed with 
caution, owing to different interpretations of the term ‘deserter’ ascribed by employers 
of labour. Some managers had entered as a ‘deserter’ a man who was absent for over 
24 hours, and so technically had ‘deserted’. Others had entered only those whose 
desertion was reported to the police.152 The table shows that almost a thousand or 
more coolies attempted to abscond every year. The average success rate is 
impressively high, at more than 70% each year, except for 1915 and 1925 which 
recorded 62% and 58% respectively. Unrecovered desertions overall remained high 
throughout the indentured labour period, running at an average of about 4.5% of the 
total number of coolies during the second half of 1910s, and reaching alarming levels in 
the 1920s with an average of 6.1% between 1920 and 1925. Desertion increased due 
to higher wages and lighter work offered by small holders who could afford to pay such 
wages owing to an increase in the price of rubber.153 Interestingly though, the desertion 
percentage for unrecovered coolies for 1925 was 5.22 as against 5.91 in 1921, the 
year preceding the abolition of whipping as a penalty on conviction. The Protector of
151 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Constabulary Department for 1920, by M ajor H.S. Bond. p. 53.
152 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Governor to Chairman. 7 March 1917.
153 PRO: CO874/505. OAG to President BNBC. 22 June 1925.
242
Labour claimed that this drop in the desertion rate significantly proved that the 
relaxation of penal labour legislation was not followed by the ‘evil’ results predicted by 
many employers of labour.154
Table 7.2
Desertions by Labourers in British North Borneo, 1915-1929
Year Total
Desertions
Recovered Un recovered Total
Labour
Force
Overall
Total
Government-
Imported
Javanese
1915 1179 448 731 1 15,513
1916 1180 332 848 10 17,172
1917 938 177 761 17 20,940
1918 1035 185 850 23 20,746
1919 1179 244 935 14 21,487
1920 1436 303 1133 18 20,924
1921 1345 252 1093 30 16,540
1922 1355 235 1120 12 15,923
1923 1469* 331 1138 13 16,179
1924 1260 293 967 14 16,852
1925 1242 348 894 12 17,680
1926 1153 239 914 19 18,491
1927 880 212 668 48 20,401
1928 1006 423 583 34 18,724
1929 965 326 639 27 18,534
C0648/7-14. AR. Protectorate Department, 1914-1932, relevant years.
‘ Inclusive of native labourers who failed to return to the Estates at expiry of their leave 
under the Indigenous Labour Scheme. After that, estates were instructed to distinguish 
between actual desertion and such native labourers who refused to return to the Estate 
after visiting their villages, when submitting their Returns.
As for the government-imported Javanese, a total of 317 or 3.18 percent 
successfully absconded, of the 9,969 imported under the NEI permit throughout the 
years the system was in operation.155 Between 1914 and 1918, desertions were high 
from U Kubota Estate, Tawau Kuhara Estate, Bongawan Estate and Kimanis Estate, 
some of them unrecovered.156 In the late 1910s and throughout the 1920s, desertions 
from Sapong and Melalap estates were the highest. In fact, at the former, 9 Javanese 
out of a gang of 29 newcomers successfully absconded within a few hours of their 
arrival.157 From 1923 until the end of 1929, unrecovered Javanese deserters (of various 
types of contracts) totalled 2,418, averaging 300 deserters each year. This figure is
154 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1921.
I5> Computed from figures available on Table 7.2.
156 PRO: C0648/8. AR. Protectorate Department for 1918; PRO: C0874/358. Jesselton Police Report for 
1915, by Acting Chief Police Officer.
157 HCPP: Cmd. 1060. Annexure E. Report by Pearson and Elphinstone. 8 April 1920.
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slightly lower compared to the number of Chinese deserters recorded during the same 
period which totalled 3,070.158 This shows that a high rate of desertion was not 
exclusive to one particular group of labourers, but was a common phenomenon among 
labourers working under written contract on British North Borneo estates. 
Communication problems and an insufficient means of identification accounted for a 
certain proportion of unrecovered deserters.159 Moreover, a larger proportion escaped 
in boats to neighbouring territories, particularly Brunei, because absconders did not 
need to pass through or go near any government station, or police posts.160
Reasons for desertion varied. The biggest lure was the attraction of higher 
wages offered by other estates.161 Also, some coolies deserted as a response to the 
abuses inflicted by estate management and overseers, and the repeated imposition of 
sentences, legal or illegal, that often linked with mounting tensions and accumulated 
frustrations. Notably, the desertion rate for Sapong Estate was consistently high 
throughout the period under study, and was even exclusively singled out by the Anti- 
Slavery Society for investigation. Naturally, the Commission of Enquiry on Estate 
Abuses did not specifically mention ill-treatment (the true position of ill-treatment by 
Sapong Estate was only revealed during the visits of the Dutch Labour Inspectors in 
1927 and 1928), but the results of excessive and rigid discipline observed on the 
estate, and the fact that the management exacted the utmost from the labour force.162
Employers were quick to blame the high rate of desertions on the ethics of 
coolies, whose main objective was to secure an advance of wages, and then abscond 
as soon as possible. This modus operandi was usually associated with ‘professional’ 
deserters, who were blamed for the tremendous increase in the territory’s desertion
158 PRO: C0648/9-14. AR. Protectorate Department, relevant years.
159 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to Chairman, 1917). Governor to Chairman. 7 March 1917.
16° p r o : C0531/14. Annexure E. Report by Pearson and Elphinstone. 8 A p ril 1920.
161 SSA: Despatches (Chairman to Gov. 1915). J. Hatton Hall to Secretary, Beaufort Borneo Rubber Ltd. 
9 October 1915.
162 PRO: C0531/14. Annexure E. Report by Pearson and Elphinstone. 8 A p ril 1920.
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rates during much of the 1920s, particularly between 1922 and 1923.163 They were 
mostly ‘laukehs’ , or old hands, and they absconded soon after receiving monetary 
advances or bonuses upon recruitment or re-engaging, a common practice in British 
North Borneo. Others allegedly absconded because they felt tidak senang hati 
(restless) or ‘homesick’.164 The rise in desertions towards the end of the decade 
reflected either growing dissatisfaction among the coolies, or increasing tensions in the 
relationship with the employer.
Employers also ‘assisted’ in these desertions during certain economic 
junctures. When the rubber slump occurred in 1921, most estates reduced their labour 
force, with many employers turning a blind eye when coolies deserted, and decided 
against pursuing and prosecuting runaway coolies, hence the high rate of desertion of 
81.3 per 1000, against 62.1 per 1000 conviction. As reported by D.R. Maxwell, the 
Acting Protector of Labour, ‘... the rubber slump compelled Estates to reduce their 
labour force, the desertion of certain types of labourers became in the eyes of some 
employers a quasi- virtuous act, which was positively, if not actively, assisted’.165 In 
fact, 30 Javanese coolies recruited under the Dutch permit absconded that year, the 
highest crude figure ever recorded before 1927. A similar situation could be seen 
during the last few years of the 1920s where more than 100 government coolies 
absconded between 1927 and 1929 alone.166 In view of the intensity of the rubber 
slump and the Depression, estates became anxious to reduce their labour forces, 
whose indentures stipulated wages and conditions which could not be met. Efforts 
were successfully made to induce the labourers to break their contracts. Most 
significantly, by allowing coolies to desert, employers saved on charges incurred by 
repatriating Javanese coolies to Java, a right which had always been insisted upon by 
the NEI authorities.
163 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1922-1923.
164 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Interior Residency 1923.
165 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Protectorate Department for 1921, by D.R. Maxwell, p. 56.
166 See Table 7.2.
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Although the Javanese were stereotyped as being more ‘docile’ and able to 
endure suffering better than Chinese labourers, violence was not uncommon among 
them. On the temperament of his Javanese labourers, a prejudiced planter had this to 
say:
It cannot be said that Javanese are satisfactory labourers. I feel bound -  in duty to 
my fellow planters to write in plain language regarding these people. They are by 
nature vicious and delinquent. I have 18 years experience of coolie labour in India 
and Borneo, and I say without hesitation that the Javanese are the lowest and 
most degenerate race that I have encountered. They have marked homicidal 
tendencies; they are dangerous people. Their morals are practically non-existent. A 
dog or a cat will show more appreciation of kindly treatment. To heap concessions 
and relaxations of discipline on these people is utter folly. The deplorable condition 
of affairs in Sumatra is solely due to such a policy, and any further weakening or 
modification of discipline in Borneo will produce the same results.167
Acts of revenge by a Javanese labourer against his or her employer or property was a 
common form of resistance. Retaliation by coolies was meant to carve out spheres of 
autonomy for themselves in the midst of all the constricting limitations of the system. It 
is worth mentioning that most resistance was not brought to bear exclusively by 
government-imported coolies under the Dutch Contract alone, but was a collective 
action by all Javanese working in the particular enterprise, regardless of the type of 
contracts they were in.
Among the more overt and identifiable forms of resistance committed by 
Javanese coolies would be the various acts against the property of the enterprise, 
physical rebellion, either against an authority figure in the enterprise, or by way of 
collective action as a strike. Lone acts of resistance included sabotage, such as the 
obstruction of transportation on the enterprise, injuring crops and rubber trees, and the 
destruction of estate property.168 Arson was the most common act by coolies to protest 
their lot. Two cases of arson were reported from Marudu Bay in 1915, and in 1919, and 
four tobacco drying sheds at Ranau Tobacco Estate were set alight. The kitchen 
premise of an empty bungalow at Mawao Estate was burnt down in January 1921,
567 SSA: N BC A 533. Carew, Manager o f  Lingkungan Estate, to Protector. 3 September 1929.
168 See PRO: C0648. AR. Constabulary Department for 1920, 1921, 1922.
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presumably because coolies in one coolie line were stopped from playing dominoes, 
while those in another line were allowed to continue.169
The most feared manifestation of coolie discontent in the world of indentured 
labour was physical assault against the management. Hands-on managers and 
overseers were often the targets of outbursts of physical violence which sometimes 
resulted in grievous bodily harm, or even death. The motivations for these outbursts 
were many. Among others, these outbursts were attributed to the constant fining on 
wages and commissions, whereby coolies felt that they had been unjustly punished, 
and that their wages had been deducted as a result of these punishments. The general 
practice of hitting coolies by all those in authority on every possible occasion also 
incurred labourers’ wrath, not to mention heavy task work, the high price of goods 
(especially rice) and disputes over women. Overseers and opases were also regarded 
as sombong (arrogant) and overbearing, and attacks on them were meant to teach 
them a lesson.170 During these attacks, the weapons used included tapping knives, 
rakes, changkol (hoe), parang (machete), and pisau blati (small knife).171
As early as 1914, the planting circle in British North Borneo was shocked by the 
death of F.C. Pauw, the Manager of Melalap Estate, and his assistant, F.J.F. Legatt, 
as a result of assault by 80 Javanese coolies, of whom 22 were newly-arrived 
immigrants. The attack however, was not calculated, and it was triggered by ‘a blow 
with a stick’ on a Javanese coolie named Abdullah, after a verbal reprimand was 
ignored. His other comrades later joined in the attack.172 Also, on 19 May 1921, a 
Javanese head-mandur at Sekong Estate, who continuously oppressed and ill-treated 
his Javanese labourers, was attacked by his subordinates, and almost burned down his
169 PRO: C 0874/511. Extract from Governor Pearson’s No. 108, 14 February 1921. ‘Various Matters’ .
170 SSA: N BC A 231. Prot. 469/17. Lok Kawi Estate Riot; PRO: C0874/475. D iary Reports.
171 Lind. Daily Express. 25 July 1993; BNBH 2 March 1914.
172 SSA: BNBH. 2 March 1914. p. 38.
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house.173 In self-defence, the headmandur fired on the rioters with a shot-gun, 
wounding eight men. Seven ringleaders were imprisoned by the Sandakan Magistrate 
Court, and the rest were ordered back to work by the Assistant Protector of Labour, 
after a $2.00 fine each.174 Javanese overseers at Sekong Estate and Ranau Tobacco 
Estate were also murdered by their subordinates due to jealousy over women.175
Another regular form of resistance in the enterprise was strike activity, although 
its extent is difficult to measure from the official Protectorate records, since local 
officials tended to gloss over the difficulties involved. However there were a number of 
collective discontent that did reach the official tallies, some more serious than others. 
They were mainly isolated incidents and confined to individual estates. Strike activities 
were indications that largely covert forms of protest had failed, and that the normal 
networks had broken down. A specific incident sufficed to trigger them. The open 
resistance that did occur was often the result of Javanese coolies having their existing 
conditions reduced in some way, such as reduced wages or rations, the direct assault 
of a co-worker, and in support of a specific demand, i.e. holiday.
Among the notable collective resistances organised by Javanese coolies that 
resulted in work stoppages was one that occurred as early as June 1914. Here, coolies 
of Lumat Estate refused to turn out to work unless two of their members arrested the 
night before for disobeying a gambling order, were released. Their demand was not 
met, but instead, when their behaviour became too threatening, a police detachment 
was sent, together with the District Officer, who executed his power by punishing them 
with whipping.176 Work stoppages also occurred as a result of strict economy, which 
involved reduced wages, insufficient rations, and in a worst case scenario, transfer to a 
different estate. In 1919, grievances over the high cost of rice and increasing inflation
173 PRO: C 0874/511. Governor Pearson to President BNBC. 2 June 1921.
174 PRO: C0648/9. AR. Constabulary Department for 1921.
175 PRO: CO648/10. AR. Protectorate Department for 1924.
176 PRO: C0648/7. AR, Protectorate Department for 1914. p. 4.
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caused by the First World W ar caused discordance on several estates. Coolies at 
Woodford Estate stopped work when their rice rations were reduced. A more serious 
demonstration, followed by an assault on an Assistant Manager, occurred at Kimanis 
Estate over the issue of rice. A group of policemen was sent to the estate, but three 
hundred Javanese labourers made their way to Papar town to confront the local 
Assistant Protector. They were only pacified after reasons were explained to them.177 
When Ranau Estate abandoned tobacco cultivation in 1927, the labour force staged a 
riot. A small police force was stationed there for several weeks. Finally the superfluous 
labour force was discharged and absorbed elsewhere.178
Work stoppages also occurred over grievances regarding holidays and 
bonuses. In August 1914, Javanese coolies at Beaufort Estate went on strike over the 
question of Hari Raya (the Mohamedan holiday) which fell on a Sunday, therefore, the 
coolies lost an extra day of holiday. The holiday was allowed by the estate 
management, after much compromise.179 In May 1922, the Javanese labour force at 
Malapulut Timber Camp was instigated by three influential leaders to refrain from 
working the day after they celebrated Hari Raya, because they were not satisfied with 
the amount advanced to them for the festival.180 H.S. Arrindell, the Assistant Protector 
of Labour, settled the matter by sending the ringleaders and thirty others to Sandakan, 
where they were subsequently prosecuted and punished by him, in his capacity as 
Magistrate.181 The ringleaders were sentenced to imprisonment and whipping, while the 
rest were fined $3 each under Section 55 (ii) of Ordinance 1916.182
However, the most sensational collective resistance organised by Javanese 
indentured labourers in the territory occurred at Sandala Estate, Sandakan, in 1928. 
The stoppage of work was provoked by a demand made on the 27 August 1928 by
177 PRO: C0648/8. AR, Protectorate Department for 1919. p. 59.
178 PRO: C0648/14. AR. Protectorate Department for 1927. p. 32.
179 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1914.
180 SSA: N BC A  1397. Arrindel to Resident Sandakan. 3 June 1922.
581 PRO: C0874/479. Pearson to President BNBC. 10 June 1922.
!82 SSA: N BC A 1397 Arrindel to Resident Sandakan. 3 June 1922.
249
over more than one hundred government-imported Javanese coolies, to declare the 
next day as a holiday (Hari Maulud). When the estate manager rejected the demand by 
insisting that that day was not a recognised holiday, either under the Dutch Contract or 
under the local contract, they became abusive and threatening. One of the ringleaders, 
Kamdari, threatened the management that they would go on strike. True to their word, 
the entire Javanese labour force failed to turn out for work the next day, and was even 
reported to be insolent to C.D. Martyn, the Deputy Protector, who was called by the 
management to look into the matter. A detachment of policemen in two hired buses, led 
by Subedar Labh Singh, also arrived at the scene.183
Further investigation, supported by testimonials of Javanese mandurs, revealed 
that the work stoppage was no ordinary strike. It was organised by a group of newly- 
arrived Javanese coolies believed to be Communist sympathisers, who managed to 
instil a strong spirit of rebellion, fuelled by elements of communism, among the 
Javanese coolie population of the estate.184 A structurally organised committee had 
been earlier established by the ringleaders -  Kamdari (President), Sastro (Vice 
President), Dalimin (Comrade No. 1), Suratmin (Comrade No. 2), Warno, (Comrade 
No. 3), and Kontji (Comrade No 4, who also served as Intelligence Officer and General 
Intimidator), - supposedly championing the social welfare of Javanese coolies in the 
estate, including protecting them from ill-treatment by mandurs™5 The committee was 
reported to have links with similar coolie committees in other estates, although the only 
proof that a similar committee existed in other estates was that a few Javanese coolies 
from Mile 5 and Mile 11 came to Sandala Estate, and secretly conferred with the 
ringleaders.186
183 SSA; N BC A 1397. OAG to President BNBC. 3 October 1928.
184 PRO; C0874/363. AR. Armed Constabulary Department for 1928. p. 100.
185 SSA: N BC A 1397. Enquiry by C.H.C. Pearson. 28 September 1928.
186 SSA: N BC A  1397. Enquiry into Alleged Communism on Sandala Estate.
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To become an exclusive member of the Committee, each coolie had to 
subscribe between 1 0 - 2 0  cents per month to a common fund. Members were 
informed that subscriptions raised were ostensibly used to aid sick coolies in hospital to 
buy luxuries such as coffee and cigarettes, and to buy winding clothes for the dead.187 
However, the proceeds of the fund were also used to make red flags, clearly a sign of 
Communist allegiance.188 Generally, mandurs were not allowed to become members, 
as they were considered to be traitors to their own bangsa (race), although one or two 
of them did manage to register. The names of each member were listed in a pocket- 
sized account book, which supposedly contained a communistic emblem, written in 
Arabic characters. Members were sworn to secrecy about the existence of the society.
Investigation by the Criminal investigation Department, led by C.H.C. Pearson, 
disclosed that the emblem was not necessarily communistic in nature because it was 
an exact replica worn by Javanese in Java when they fought the Dutch in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, it was considered as a ‘g im af (charm), 
not only used in anti-government propaganda, but was also worn by robbers.189 In his 
final analysis, Pearson remarked that the evidence of a ‘communistic’ organisation at 
Sandala Estate was incomplete, although it appeared entrenched within the related few 
who organised the strike. The police investigation concluded that the main objective of 
the demonstrators was rooted further than a mere demand for an extra holiday for the 
coolies, and that the strike was more against the government than against the 
management of Sandala Estate.190 The confessions of one or two of the ringleaders of 
being former school educators in Java, and were involved in communist uprisings in 
Java in 1927, hammered the notion that the committee had to be quelled quickly by the 
government.191 The leaders were most likely former associates of the Sarekat Islam 
group, which in the 1920s was promoting socialism on an Islamic basis, or the more
187 SSA: N BC A 1397. Evidence given by Manghoenhardjo, a coolie o f Sandala Estate, to the police on 21 
September 1928.
188 SSA: N BC A 1397. Enquiry into Alleged Communism on Sandala Estate.
189 SSA: N BC A  1397. Report o f Enquiry by C.H.C. Pearson. 19 September 1928.
190 SSA: N BC A 1397. Report by Pearson. 29 September 1928.
191 SSA: 1397. Captain Pearson to Government Secretary. 14 September 1928.
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radical Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).192 Six ringleaders were sentenced to 
imprisonment, varying from one to four months, under Section 58 of Ordinance 9/16, in 
the hope that it would serve as a deterrent to the rest of the labour force.193 Kamdari 
and Sastro, the two top leaders of the Committee, were banished from the land under 
the Banishment Ordinance 1901, after they served their sentences, while the rest were 
returned to Sandala Estate, at the request of the manager.194
After the Sandala Estate fracas, the only reported incident involving 
government-imported Javanese occurred on 17 August 1930, when thirty coolies at the 
Litang Estate in Lahad Datu, refused to work, and threatened to attack the estate 
management if they were ordered to do so. The trouble was engineered by two men, 
and the reason given by them was that they did not see fit to work after many of their 
comrades had been repatriated to Java.195 The strike was quashed without any trouble 
by Reginald A. Rutter, Acting District Officer of Lahad Datu, who proceeded to the 
estate by a sampan (small boat), in the company of ten Indian policemen.196 Both 
ringleaders were prosecuted under the Labour Ordinance, since intent to cause riot 
was not proved. Rutter opined that 'loot was the eventual object of the ringleaders’.197 
The other followers were not prosecuted by Rutter on the basis that it would be 
disadvantageous to the estate which needed the remaining labour to do the work. The 
main reason behind this was that the authorities had no means of transporting so many 
prisoners on a low river, a problem which was shared by many enterprises and local 
authorities in the East Coast.198
192 Fred R. von der Mehden. ‘Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism’ . Political Science 
Quarterly. 73,3 (September 1958). pp. 335-351.
193 SSA: N BC A 1397. Agent o f Harrisons &  Crossfield (Borneo) to Captain C.H.C. Pearson. 4 September 
1928.
194 SSA: N BC A 1397. OAG to President BNBC. 3 October 1928.
195 SSA: N BC A 1397. Rutter to Resident Tawau. 23 August 1930.
196 SSA: N BC A 1397 Resident Tawau to Government Secretary. 20 August 1930.
197 SSA: N BC A 1397. Rutter to Resident Tawau. 23 August 1930.
198 SSA: N BC A 1397. Rutter to Resident Sandakan. 23 August 1930.
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Overall, open resistances of Javanese indentured workers in British North 
Borneo were short-lived, comparatively small in scale, and did not spread to other 
enterprises. This revealed the effectiveness of isolation, discipline on the enterprise, 
and hierarchical structures. Any protest, regardless of the underlying reason, was 
perceived as a threat, and was put down by the management with the help of 
overseers. Managers, assistant managers and headmandurs were usually armed with 
guns and rifles, and bullets were not spared in times of ‘self-defence’ and mutiny. 
Effective protests were also hindered because many of the mandurs were pro­
management, being experienced and older individuals who often had personal stakes 
in the advantages offered them by the system. Additionally, the authorities, with the 
support of the armed forces, played a significant part in suppressing coolie 
disturbances. The harsher the punishment inflicted by the authorities, the more 
frightened the coolies were to protest against their conditions. The penal sanctions 
entrenched within the Labour Ordinance proved to be the main factor affecting the 
reluctance of most indentured coolies to challenge the existing system, however 
exploitative it might be, in order not to jeopardise their future freedom. Lastly, to many 
docile Javanese coolies, the labour contract played an important deterring factor for 
open protest. Apart from an insignificant few, these government-imported Javanese 
willingly signed the Dutch Contract, or the local contract upon re-engagement, and they 
felt that they lacked the leverage or justification for complaint or launching a large-scale 
rebellion.
Conclusion
The labour regime and the legal system restricted the freedom and mobility of the 
indentured Javanese. Attempts to go against them were met with threats of prosecution 
and conviction under penal sanctions. Although there was no excessive use of criminal 
prosecution to enforce indenture contract of Javanese labourers, planters did use other 
methods of labour control to exert more from their labour force. Physical abuses and 
other violations of the law by estate officials were not uncommon, although the level of
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abuses varied from one estate to another. For obvious reasons of appeasing the Dutch 
authorities, and not attracting attention to some of the damaging labour conditions in 
British North Borneo, the authorities tried to uphold the rights of the Javanese 
indentured immigrants by pruning such abuses, and shutting off access of some 
enterprises to new labour, pending radical improvements. Despite these efforts, life and 
labour on British North Borneo enterprises was not what Javanese labourers had 
expected when they signed on the indenture contracts in Java. Their multifaceted 
responses to the indenture system were a testimony to this. While some were either 
fatalistic or rebellious about their indenture experience, a majority of them were 
cooperative to the system and lived through the experience until the expiration of their 
indenture contract.
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CHAPTER 8
THE REPATRIATION OF JAVANESE INDENTURED LABOURERS,
1914-1932 
Introduction
Life under indenture meant different experiences for individual Javanese labourers. 
Some had been disappointed, discontented and even in desperation, while others had 
found their indenture experience relatively satisfactory by making the most of difficult 
conditions and challenges. The options individuals made after their indenture contracts 
expired reveal a greater insight into the attitudes of migrants, whether they chose 
repatriation, being re-indentured, or settling into the land of their indenture. The 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) government had made it a condition that Java recruited 
coolies should be repatriated to Java at the end of their indenture contracts. This 
chapter aims to analyse whether this stipulation was adhered to by the Company 
government, while simultaneously identifying problems inherent in the repatriation 
process.
The Repatriation Process
Under the Dutch contract, every employer had to offer free repatriation to the labourer 
and his or her family, from the place of employment to the place of origin, at the latest 
three months after the expiration of the contract. The provision for repatriation was 
assured for one year (although five years was the figure stated on the original contract 
in Dutch)1 after the termination of the last (written or verbal) contract. Expenses 
incurred when providing necessities (i.e. food and water, accommodation, medical 
treatment and clothing) for the labourers and their dependents, while waiting for 
embarkation homeward, were borne by respective employers. The same provision was 
granted to family members if a labourer died during the term of contract, and the claim 
for repatriation was made by the family not later than three months after the labourer’s
' Further information forthcoming.
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death.2 For government-imported Javanese coolies, this privilege of a free return 
passage was inserted in the contract at the urgent request of the NEI government. The 
provision was crucial to the labour arrangement because, in the first place, the Dutch 
authorities were reluctant to allow their subjects to work outside of the Outer Islands. 
British North Borneo was given dispensation on the understanding that the territory 
comply with the wishes of the NEI government. Furthermore, the Javanese migrants 
might not have left their homelands without such a guarantee.
To regularise and monitor the repatriation of Javanese coolies (and other 
coolies) in British North Borneo, a new Instruction for Repatriation was enforced on 1 
January 1919, as a substitute for the old procedure, which had failed to address 
labourers with handicaps such as blindness. As proclaimed through Circular No.3 of 
1919, the instruction served as a new guideline for the future repatriation of Javanese 
coolies from the land. The new ruling strictly enforced the fact that government would 
not bear the cost of repatriating coolies, except with written consent from the Protector 
of Labour for Kudat, West Coast and Interior Residencies, or the Resident of Sandakan 
(Deputy Protector, from 1923 onwards) for Sandakan and East Coast residencies. 
However, if government-funded repatriation was needed, the application should be 
accompanied by a medical certificate, setting forth the reasons why repatriation was 
essential, and supplemented by another certificate, to the effect that proper 
investigation had been made as to the liability of any former employer. No sanction 
from the government was necessary in cases of repatriation at the employer’s 
expense.3 To ensure that every Javanese labourer under the government contract was 
entitled to repatriation after completing his or her term of contract, a repatriation fund 
was instituted in 1919, with a sum of $4,491 (£524) deposited as the nucleus for the
2 See provisions on repatriation in Appendix 1, 2 and 3.
3 SSA: N BC A No. 1243. Circular No 3 o f  1918. Instructions for Repatriation.
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fund. The source of this figure was from the balance of the Protectorate Department’s 
account, in connection with the recruitment of coolies.4
The repatriation of the Javanese, recruited in Java was carried out through the 
Protectorate Department. Javanese from the interior and West Coast residencies were 
sent to the Jesselton coolie depot at Victoria Barracks, while unfit coolies were 
immediately dispatched to the civil hospital at Karamunsing, with a covering letter to 
the Protector of Labour. Javanese coolies from the Kudat and Sandakan residencies 
were also sent to the Protector at Jesselton, while those from the East Coast residency 
were forwarded to the Protector at Jesselton via the Resident of Sandakan. Under 
Instruction for Repatriation 1931, Javanese repatriations from Kudat were handled by 
the Deputy Protector in Sandakan.5
On arrival from the estates, the labourers were maintained by the Protectorate 
at the depot, at the employers’ expense, until a steamer was available. They were 
suitably clothed by officials, and each coolie was provided with a mat, and where 
necessary, a blanket, unless he or she owned one, or had the means to purchase the 
item. Upon completion of these checks, the official in charge would then remark 
‘clothing inspected and found sufficient’ on the repatriation advice list.6 On the day of 
departure, all repatriating Javanese coolies were once again medically checked by a 
government medical officer. Fit labourers were provided with a Repatriation 
Identification Certificate or a Deck Passenger’s Passport, endorsed by the medical 
officer himself.7 They were photographed and thumb-printed at the port, prior to 
boarding the steamer. Subsequently, the Protectorate officers would send a telegram 
to the receiving officer in Java, advising him of the number of Javanese repatriates and
4 PRO: C0874/753. Acting Governor’s No. 234. Fund for Repatriation o f  Javanese Labourers. 28 March 
1919.
5 SSA: Secretariat Circular 1924-1940. Circular No. 6. 1931.
6 SSA: Secretariat Circular 1924-1940. Circular No. 6. 1931.
7 SSA: N BC A No. 1243. Circular No 3 o f 1918. Instructions for Repatriation.
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the names of the vessels involved.8 On reaching Java, they were met by the agents of 
the recruiting agency, and were provided with fares for the further transport to their own 
villages.9 in 1917, the total cost of repatriation per coolie was between $30 and $50 
approximately, which covered the $5 ticket fare to Singapore, the $3 photograph for 
passport, and expenses pending to the sailing date, as well as between $20 to $40 in 
charges imposed by Singapore agents.10
The ‘Missing’ Repatriates
Between 1914 and 1928, government-imported Javanese coolies were repatriated 
through the liaison between the Protectorate Department and the Singapore agents for 
further shipments to Java. The repatriation process went relatively smoothly, without 
major hiccups in the 1910s. From the start of the 1920s until the 1930s, however, this 
state of affairs deteriorated. Three issues regarding repatriation served to affect the 
bilateral relationship between British North Borneo and the NEI; firstly, the numbers of 
Javanese repatriates actually arriving in Java; secondly, the different interpretation of 
the repatriation clause on the Dutch Contract; and thirdly, the disposal of Javanese 
coolies on Singapore soil.
In the early 1920s, the Dutch authorities noticed discrepancies between the 
number of government-imported coolies arriving in Java and the number registered on 
the labour returns provided by the Protectorate Department. Apparently, the number of 
Javanese labourers who were registered upon arrival at Batavia was much less, and in 
most cases, only nine per cent of the labourers registered on the passengers’ list of the 
vessels to Batavia via Singapore.11 For the years 1920, 1921 and 1922, the 
wervingscommisariaten of the NEI traced the number of repatriates arriving in Java as 
17, 42 and 31, significantly lower than the figures supplied by the Company officials.
8 SSA: Secretariat Circular 1924-1940. Circular No. 6.1931.
9 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1931). Governor to Court. Labour in British North Borneo.
10 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from Report by Manager ofM awao Estate. August 1917.
11 K o ji Miyazaki. ‘ Javanese Labourers’ , p. 13.
258
The Dutch Director of Justice, Dr. F.J. Cowan, had called for an enquiry into the 
discrepancy.12
Table 8.1 shows the different figures recorded by both sides. As the table 
depicts, the figures for returning Javanese migrants have never tallied since day one. 
The lowest figure recorded is 1919, at slightly more than three per cent, a drastic 
decrease from the previous year of almost 43%. It is odd that the regressive trend 
failed to cause alarm among the Dutch officials in the first place. Van Hemert could 
have raised the matter during his interview with the territory’s Governor, following his 
tour of inspection in 1918, but for unknown reasons, he did not. To be sure, no action 
to this effect was taken by the Dutch Labour Inspectorate in the 1910s, presumably 
because it ‘was primarily an agency for collecting information rather than directly 
intervening in labour conditions'.13 As Stoler observed, ‘In the early years...the 
Arbeidsinspectie was an information-gathering service, not a vehicle for change’.14
When the issue of the missing Javanese repatriates came to the fore in early 
1920s, the Labour Inspectorate was already pursuing a vigorous policy of intervention 
on labour matters relating to its subjects, not only in the NEI, but to a certain extent in 
British North Borneo.15 This dispelled the theory that suggested it was a fault in the 
registration system in Batavia which led to large numbers of Javanese evading the 
attention of the authorities, and being illegally recruited for further employment 
elsewhere. Stringent control exercised by the Dutch authorities at all ports of entry 
rendered it impossible for a Javanese coolie to go unnoticed on arrival at Batavia from 
Singapore. Not only was each coolie examined and registered by the police, who acted 
for the Labour Department, but registers kept by private recruiting agencies were 
subject to government scrutiny. The Dutch authorities also argued that such large scale
12 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 March 1924.
13 Lindblad. ‘Coolies in D e li’ , p.71.
14 Stoler. Capitalism and Confrontation, p. 58
15 Lindblad. ‘Coolies in D e li’ , p. 71.
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and continuous evasions were by no means accidental. Although it was noted on their 
annual report that coolies probably returned to their desa (villages) on their own, it was 
incomprehensible why several hundreds of Javanese coolies returning to their homes 
in Java would desire to escape notice in the first place, when they could, upon 
application, seek assistance from the Dutch authorities for the journey to their 
villages.16
Table 8.1
Returned Migration of Government-Imported Javanese Labourers supplied by the 
North Borneo Protectorate Department (NBPD) and the NEI Labour Bureau, 1914- 
1929
Year NBPD Netherlands East Indies
1914 3 14
1915 9 87
1916 103 76
1917 112 60
1918 98 42
1919 215 7
1920 242 17
1921 276 42
1922 490 31
1923 438 224
1924 143 97
1925 190 201
1926 155 102
1927 407 392
1928 418 479
1929 804 916
1930 1512 n/a
1931 1000 n/a
Source: KIT: Verslag Arbeidsinspectie, relevant years; SSA: NBCA 980, Quarterly 
Returns of Javanese Labourers; PRO: C0648/7-14, Relevant years.
Both British North Borneo and the NEI denied responsibility for the irregularities, 
and neither accused the other openly of irresponsible conduct. Indeed, the Dutch 
authorities claimed that the Company government performed the repatriation of 
Javanese labourers ‘with all care and despatch’, while the Company administration 
praised the efficiency and meticulousness of government inspections in Java, 
rendering it impossible for such wholesale misrepresentation to go on over a long 
period. Moreover, Company officials considered the fact that the Javanese coolies
KIT: Verslag van den dienst der Arbeidsinspectie in Nederlandsch-lndie over de jaren 1921 en 1922. 
Weltevreden: G. K o lf f &  Co. 1923. p. 79; SSA: NBCA 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 
February 1924.
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themselves could not be willing participants to any ‘deception’.17 In its 1925 report, the 
Protectorate Department commented that many Javanese repatriates preferred to take 
their discharge in Singapore, rather than proceed to Java.18 Privately, though, there 
were officials on both sides who suspected that the irregularity in numbers was the 
consequence of corruption among certain individuals in British North Borneo and 
Java.19
The blame for the discrepancy was placed on Singapore. The NEI authorities 
strongly held that the coolies failed to reach Java, because they were induced to enter 
new employment in Singapore. Newly-arrived Javanese coolies interviewed by the 
Controller of Recruitment in Java told of how they were persuaded by staff in the
organisation responsible for their temporary accommodation in Singapore, to enter
fresh contracts for enterprises in British North Borneo, and most probably, Malaya. This 
took place during transhipment in Singapore, pending the availability of a vessel to 
transport them to Java.20 The agent in-charge (i.e. the Labour Association of 
Singapore) of handling Javanese coolies on behalf of the Company government was 
blamed for the ignominy, a suspicion that the Protector Martyn believed to be ‘almost 
impossible to entertain’ because the Protectorate Department was furnished with full 
details by the Labour Association regarding each batch of repatriates, a statement of 
account for passages, transportation, and a guarantee that all Javanese repatriates 
had been returned to their respective homes.21
By 1924 a more efficient system of repatriation was called for by the NEI
government, to curb the problem of missing repatriates from British North Borneo.22
The Company authorities suggested a direct shipment of Javanese coolies to and from
17 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 February 1924.
18 PRO: C0648/14. AR Protectorate Department for 1925. p. 65.
19 SSA: N B C A  1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 February 1924.
20 SSA: N BC A 1184. Translation o f letter addressed to His Majesty’ s Consul-General at Batavia by the
C hief o f  the Service o f Labour Inspection fo r the Outer Possessions attached to the Labour Bureau o f the 
Netherlands East Indian Government. 11 December 1930.
21 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D, Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 February 1924.
22 SSA: N BC A 1119. C.D. Martyn to Government Secretary. 14 March 1924.
261
British North Borneo as the answer to this problem. However, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, the Dutch authorities were reluctant to associate with the proposed Osaka- 
Shohen-Kaisha liners patronising the route, because of their failure to conform to the 
regulations set forth by the Dutch authorities. Moreover, employers failed to take 
advantage of the private arrangement made between C.D. Martyn and the Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Maatschappi] (KPM) to guarantee a requisition of 150 labourers.23 The 
problem of ‘missing’ repatriates while on transhipment in Singapore continued. The 
dilemma was only solved in 1928, when direct shipment was sanctioned and coolies 
were repatriated direct from Tawau to Java, thus avoiding Singapore.
Meanwhile, in 1925, the west coast branch of the NBCC lobbied for a complete 
system of informing estates as to the safe arrival of repatriates to be adopted by the 
Protectorate Department. The representatives of the organisation argued that the 
system implemented at that time was not sufficient to protect the interests of 
employers. Estates repatriating Javanese coolies were usually presented intermittently 
with three sets of accounts; the first would involve expenditure incurred from Jesselton 
to Singapore; the second would represent an account of expenses while on 
transhipment in Singapore; and the last one involved the cost on arrival in Java. 
Therefore, when a repatriate elected to remain in Singapore, the respective employer 
received no notification of this intention. The Committee felt that employers should be 
made aware of the movements of repatriates, and that in the event that a Javanese 
coolie elected to remain in Singapore or arrived safely at his or her native village, the 
Protectorate Department should immediately inform the respective employer.24
Interpretation of the Repatriation Clause
Further irregularity concerning repatriation that gained considerable attention from the 
NEI authorities was the interpretation of the repatriation clause, as stipulated in the
23 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). OAG to President No. 550. 14 August 1924.
24 SSA: N BC A  1119. R.K. Hardwick to Protector o f Labour. 28 September 1925.
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Dutch Contract Article 8 of the original indenture contract, written in Dutch, guaranteed 
unconditional repatriation within five years after expiration of the last contract.25 
However, the repatriation clause became a debatable issue among the colonial states 
when the Dutch Labour Inspector, Van Hemert, who visited the territory in late 1918, 
identified a faulty translation of the English version of the contract. According to him, 
the English version omitted the important provision of the contract, stipulating the rights 
of repatriation ‘at any time within 5 years of the completion of the last contract’.26 Van 
Hemert warned Governor Pearson that there was a minute possibility of the NEI 
authority agreeing to further batches of labourers leaving Java for British North Borneo 
until the missing provision for repatriation was inserted in the English version, and was 
given full effect.27
The faulty translation was first noticed by H.C. Ridges, the Protector of Labour, 
at the time the contract was arranged in 1914, and in fact, he made a marginal note to 
this effect. Yet he failed to take steps to rectify the matter.28 Since the right of 
repatriation was usually guaranteed within one year in most places of labour, it was 
possible that Ridges purposely disregarded this technical error. In 1921, W.J. Worth 
implied that the phrase was not even on the original version (in Dutch) given to the 
Company government.29 Since there was a gap in the sources, and no further 
information on what had transpired between the two colonial states regarding the 
matter could be found, it is worth mentioning that the Dutch authorities had accepted 
the arguments and excuses given by the Company authorities. This was proven by the 
mere fact that the English version of the contract continued to be enforced, as could be 
seen in the working contract forms of 1925 and 1929.30
25 See ARA: ARA: M ailrappoit 1857/13. Model-Werkcontract. 18 November 1913. No. 25.
26 PRO: C0874/753. Minutes. Interview w ith  Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919. Governor No. 38.
27 PRO: 00874/753. Pearson to Chairman on Interview with Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919. Governor 
No. 38.
28 PRO: C0874/753. Pearson to Chairman. Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert. 18 January 1919.
29 PRO: C0874/753. Copy o f Messrs. Guthrie’ s letters addressed to Government Secretary. Re. Labour 
Contract. 22 November 1921.
30 See Labour Agreements 1925 and 1929, kept under PRO: C0874/752.
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Technically, even if a government-imported Javanese continuously re-engaged 
on a written or verbal local contract on the same estate, the employer would still be 
liable to repatriation if the said coolie claimed the right of repatriation within a year after 
the last contract ended. However, many employers failed to explain this privilege to the 
Javanese coolies, and interpreted the repatriation clause differently. To them, the local 
contract carried within it a lower wage scheme, and did not contain a repatriation 
clause to Java, Hence, if they could induce government-imported Javanese coolies to 
re-contract locally, they could evade their repatriation liability altogether. Van Hemert 
condemned this practice of re-engaging government-imported coolies under the local 
contract because many of the coolies were unaware that it had no repatriation clause 
to Java. He suggested to the government authorities that no Javanese should be 
engaged locally, except under the Dutch Contract. Better still, Javanese labourers 
recruited in Singapore should also be employed on the Dutch Contract. It was no 
secret that the locally contracted Javanese, particularly Singapore-recruited coolies, 
were dissatisfied with the non-existence of a repatriation clause on their local contract. 
Therefore, by suggesting that all Javanese coolies in British North Borneo should be 
employed under the Dutch Contract, Van Hemert was trying to ensure that every 
Javanese coolie in the territory had the means to return to Java. Simultaneously, this 
could alleviate friction, discontent and misunderstanding among Singapore-recruited 
coolies and ‘Java kontrakkan ', which was a common phenomenon caused by the 
repatriation issue.31
Like Java-recruited coolies, employers in British North Borneo were also bound 
under Protectorate circular No. 207/21 of 18 May 1921 to provide a free return passage 
to Singapore-recruited Javanese coolies, but this provision stipulated that tickets would 
be provided only to Singapore, and not to Java.32 However, as usual, certain employers 
realised that they could still beat the system by inserting the repatriation clause in the
3! PRO: C0874/753. Notes o f  Interview w ith Dr. Van Hemert.
32 PRO: C0874/753. D.R. Maxwell to Assistant Protector, Beaufort. Prot.No. 207/21. 18 May 1921.
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labourers1 first local contract. By inducing the coolies to sign a second local contract, 
without the clause, they evaded this liability. Accordingly, it paid them to cancel the first 
contract before it expired, writing off any small debt and promising a fresh advance. 
Out of ignorance, many Javanese coolies re-engaged all over again. It was only when 
the first local contract expired that the coolies realised that they had signed away their 
repatriation rights.33
Governor A.C. Pearson characterised the practice of employers evading 
repatriation liability by enticing coolies to re-engage on a new contract as something 
approaching a swindle. Each local Protector was eventually required to warn a coolie of 
what he or she was about to take on. Consequently, if the coolie clearly understood the 
situation and accepted a cash bonus in lieu of a return passage, the coolie had to be 
responsible for his or her own actions.34 Ideally, this policy of calling for local Protectors 
to exert their protective responsibilities was commendable, but realistically, the existing 
situations and local demands restricted its success. Protector Macaskie himself 
indirectly sanctioned the practice in October 1922, claiming that there was no ruling or 
objection to an employer notifying a labourer that he was unwilling to agree to 
repatriation at the end of a new contract, and offering the labourer instead a bonus, as 
an inducement to him to re-contract without a repatriation clause. It appeared that 
Company administrators had no desire to explain in detail the implications and 
consequences of signing a second local contract, as ‘it is the interest of all that
labourers should remain and settle in this country and there can be no suggestion that
this Department [the Protectorate] wishes to insist upon repatriation1.35
When the problem mentioned above persisted throughout the 1920s, the Dutch 
Inspector Viehoff, in 1928, called for an amendment to the existing Labour Ordinance 
1916. To ensure that Java-recruited coolies were not denied their repatriation passage,
33 PRO: C0874/753, Notes by Governor. 28 September 1923.
34 PRO: C0874/753. Notes by A.C. Pearson. 1 October 1923.
35 PRO: C0874/753. Macaskie to Assistant Protector Beaufort. 5 October 1922.
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he proposed an amendment to Section 13(v), by adding a proviso specifying that the 
employer’s liability for repatriation expenses should not be cancelled by the contract 
becoming void. Additionally, since there could be a possibility that a coolie’s contract 
could be refused attestation which might leave him or her stranded in a new land, 
Viehoff proposed that the Protector should be given discretion in Section 14(i) to force 
an importer to pay the repatriation expenses. Likewise, an employer’s repatriation 
liability should remain, even if a labourer’s contract had been determined with the 
Protector’s permission. Most importantly, even if a government-imported Javanese 
became a free agent, but still worked for the same employer, he or she should not lose 
the right to free repatriation. Instead, the coolie’s discharge certificate had to be 
endorsed by the employer, together with a note of the time worked as a free labourer. 
In any given time that a written contract was cancelled for one reason or another, 
Section 51 of the Labour Ordinance 1916 should provide a clear provision, stipulating 
the employer’s commitment and obligation to repatriate labourers.36
indeed, Viehoff proposed the introduction of the ‘Netherlands’ Indian Labourers’ 
Protection Ordinance (NILPO) for government-imported Javanese, but the Company 
government felt that such an ordinance would create further difficulty, because of the 
different groups of Javanese working in the territory. Labour Ordinance No.2 of 1929, 
substituting Labour Ordinance 1916, was then enforced, following most of Viehoff’s 
recommendations. Nevertheless, one issue concerning repatriation received wide 
attention. The new Ordinance stipulated that a Java-recruited labourer would not lose 
any right of repatriation under the contract, ‘unless the Protector declares such right to 
be forfeited’. This gained critical response from the authorities of the NEI.37 Governor 
General A.C.D. de Graeff (1926-1931) condemned the move as opening the way for 
‘erroneous interpretations’, and stated that the territory’s Labour Ordinance did not 
sufficiently concur with the provisions of the immigration contract, which labourers
35 SSA: N BC A 465. Memoranda o f V iehoff’ s Recommendation.
37 PRO: CO874/760. See Section 18 o f  the new Labour Ordinance.
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recruited in Java had signed in their country.38 Accordingly, De Graeff strongly called 
for the enforcement of Article 10(2) of the Dutch Contract (amended in 1925) which 
guaranteed unconditional repatriation within one year after expiration of the contract. 
Governor Richards finally appeased the Dutch authorities by explaining that the new 
clause was only applicable to a Javanese indentured labourer who had to serve a long 
prison sentence shortly after arrival. Employers claimed unfair treatment if they were to 
be saddled with the labourer’s repatriation expenses when they had little or no benefit 
from the labourer’s services. Hence when such circumstances arose, the labourer 
would be repatriated by the Company government.39
Employers constantly complained of the defective, unfair system of repatriation 
imposed on the original employers (importer) of the government-imported Javanese.40 
They pleaded for new laws to prohibiting a Javanese indentured labourer who had 
claimed repatriation from withdrawing the claim and engaging elsewhere. The 
argument used in favour of such laws was that the original employer remained liable for 
a labourer’s repatriation expenses if claimed within the prescribed periods. Because no 
statutory assurance was given, despite numerous requests, employers tended to 
repatriate a coolie at the time a claim for repatriation was made. In 1929, a 
representative of the NBCC brought to the attention of the government the predicament 
encountered by Langkon Estate. A male Javanese coolie had elected to return to Java 
at the expiration of his contract, and a through ticket from Kudat to Singapore had been 
taken for him by the Assistant Protector of Kudat, at the expense of Langkon Estate. 
Nevertheless, when the coolie arrived at Jesselton, he changed his mind and decided 
to remain in the territory. He was later employed on another estate. The NBCC 
regarded it unfair for Langkon Estate, or any other estate facing similar dilemma, to
38 PRO: C0874/752. Governor General to Governor. Copy o f Enclosure in G.S.O. 1589/30. 16 September 
1930.
39 PRO: C0874/752. Governor Richards to Governor General. 6 October 1930.
40 PRO: C0874/752. Extract from Minutes o f NBCC. Repatriation o f Javanese Coolie. 2 November 1929.
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provide a second passage, if claimed within a year.41 Notwithstanding the ‘injustice’ of 
the situation, the Acting Secretary, W.J. Worth, declared that if the Dutch authorities 
demanded that the coolie be repatriated, the new employer, or the employer under 
whom the ‘last (written or verbal) agreement prior to repatriation was served’, had to 
bear responsibility for repatriating the coolie.42
The Planters’ Association proposed a more extreme measure. It urged the 
government to amend the repatriation clause within the Dutch Contract, so that it would 
be reduced to the same terms as a Javanese emigrant to Sumatra, who received: 
‘repatriation with his family by first opportunity to his place of original engagement, 
unless he wishes to stop in the district. The right of free repatriation remained good 
until one month after expiration of the contract’.43 Again the Company government was 
unprepared to open unnecessary tension with the Dutch authorities pending the 
renewal of the annual recruiting permit. The idea was rejected. It was only in March 
1932 when a more definite regulation as to repatriation for government-imported 
Javanese was decreed, thereby diminishing the ambiguity surrounding the position of 
labourers who engaged with subsequent employers in written or verbal contract, after 
leaving the original importing employer.44 The regulation stipulated that the liability to 
repatriate remained with the employers until the labourer had ‘settled in the state’. And 
under no circumstances would a labourer be considered settled until a full year had 
elapsed, after ceasing work for an employer. Therefore, the original employer of the 
coolie would retain liability until a year had passed after the coolie had ceased to work 
for him, unless in the meantime, the labourer had engaged with another employer. 
Subsequently, the new employer would take over the liability, until such times as the 
labourer had 'settled in the state’.45
41 SSA: N BC A 1126. Labour Advisory Board. Macaskie Report. 11 November 1927.
42 PRO: C0874/752. Comment by W.J. Worth. 24 December 1929.
43 PRO: C0874/752. Extract. Labour in North Borneo.
44 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department for 1932.
45 PRO: C0874/761. Note by W.J. Worth. Notification 103. 19 A pril 1932.
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Singapore, the Dumping Ground
In 1930, the matter of Javanese repatriation again tested not only the bilateral 
relationship between British North Borneo and the NEI, but also between the former 
and the Straits Settlement government. The catalyst was the ‘dumping’ of Javanese 
labourers on Singapore soil. As mentioned, those Javanese labourers recruited in 
Singapore having signed the local contract upon reaching British North Borneo were 
offered a repatriation clause in their contracts in 1921, stipulating that a Javanese 
labourer who originally signed on, or when they re-engaged on the same estate, the 
employer was bound to provide the labourers and their dependants with a free return 
passage to Singapore.40
Between 1921 and the mid-1930s, the repatriation of Javanese coolies to 
Singapore or via the island went without any major glitch. The outstanding issue was 
probably the case of repatriates who went ‘missing’ while on transhipment on their way 
to Java, as discussed in earlier paragraphs in this chapter. Yet business went on as 
usual, and Singapore continued to play its role as the main transit point, or the last 
destination for many Javanese coolies from British North Borneo. Nonetheless, the 
slump conditions of the Great Depression altered the status-quo. As Bauer observed of 
Malaya generally, the economic crisis was all-pervasive, and there was ‘a severe 
reduction in consumption, affecting all classes and races’.47 Owing to the deteriorating 
conditions caused by the economic downturn, the Straits Settlement Government 
objected to the dumping of foreign labour in Singapore, particularly those Javanese 
discharged by British North Borneo estates.48 A significant number of Javanese coolies 
arrived on the island without discharge certificates, while others were provided with 
rather ambiguous documents, endorsed either with the words ‘Repatriation to 
Singapore’, or ‘Sent to Singapore on Repatriation’, while some came with no
46 PRO: C0874/753. D.R. Maxwell to Assistant Protector Beaufort. Prot. No. 207/21, 18 May 1921.
47 Bauer. The Rubber Industry, p. 16; For more information on the effects o f  the Great Depression on 
Singapore, see, W.G. Huff. ‘Entitlements, Destitution, and Emigration in the 1930s Singapore Great 
Depression’ . The Economic History Review. New Series. 54,2 (May 2001). pp. 290-323.
48 PRO: C0874/863. Governor to President. Repatriation o f Javanese Labourers Recruited in Singapore. 
10 November 1930.
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endorsement at all.49 According to the Straits Settlement authorities, the Javanese 
coolies became destitute in Singapore due to insufficient jobs available on the island. 
The Chief Police Officer also complained of Javanese nationals ‘finding their way to the 
House of Detention’ and becoming a charge on the public.50
On 7 October 1930, upon consultation with the Dutch Consul in Singapore, the 
Straits Settlement authorities spent $803.85 repatriating 67 Javanese labourers to 
Java, including three women and two children. Meanwhile, the Javanese labourers 
themselves sought the aid of the Dutch Consulate to repatriate them to Java. The cost 
of this expenditure was forwarded to the Straits Government.51 In total, the Straits 
Settlement spent more than $1,800 as an advance payment to the Consul General of 
the NEI for repatriation of British North Borneo coolies to Java. It demanded repayment 
from the Company government, but the latter was reluctant to reimburse the money, for 
a variety of reasons.52 The Company administrators claimed that the ‘Singapore’ 
Javanese coolies did not pass through the Protectorate Department, except perhaps 
for a day or two’s maintenance in a coolie depot. Moreover, the employers were not 
legally compelled to pay the expenses, as they were subjected to the state’s Labour 
Ordinance and also the ‘Decrepit and Destitute Aliens Ordinance’, which defined 
repatriation as 'the return of a labourer to the original place of his embarkation’ for the 
state. According to the Protector, the original place of embarkation in the case of these 
labourers was Singapore, thus indicating that employers of Javanese labour in the 
territory had fulfilled their legal repatriation obligations by providing passages as far as 
Singapore only.53
49 SSA: N BC A 1243. Despatch by Government Secretary No. 1718/30. 8 October 1930.
50 PRO: C0874/751. Straits Settlement Government to Protector. B.N.B.981/30. 21 November 1930; 
PRO: C0874/751. OAG to President. 27 May 1931.
51 PRO: C0874/751. W. Bartley to Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States. 17 October 
1930.
52 PRO: C0874/751. Governor’s No 648. Repatriation o f Javanese Labourers Recruited in Singapore. 10 
November 1930.
53 SSA: N BC A 1243. Woolley to Messrs. Guthrie. 16 September 1930.
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Nevertheless, when the Labour Bureau in Batavia forwarded claims of 556.42 
guilders to His Majesty’s Consul General at Batavia in respect of transporting these 
labourers from Batavia to their villages, the Company government settled the claims 
without further ado. The Labour Bureau stated that all repatriates on the list were 
officially recruited in Java under the government permit, and had been employed 
without interruption in British North Borneo.54 Such a statement carries a twofold 
connotation. First, it tacitly acknowledges that a significant number of government- 
imported Javanese found their way to Singapore, either with the aid of their employers 
who had opted for a cheaper Singapore fare than a more costly fare to Java, or through 
the agency of corrupt individuals, who abetted with the coolies. The latter confirmed 
what had been suspected by the Dutch authorities all along, namely that there was a 
defect in the repatriation system for government-imported Javanese, both in British 
North Borneo and Singapore. Second, the fact that the Dutch authorities were aware of 
the matter meant that the Company government had no other option but to reimburse 
the payment made by the Labour Bureau. In view of the current atmosphere, where the 
renewal of the recruiting permit was still on hold by the NEI government, the expenses 
incurred on sending the coolies to their villages in Java were by no means comparable 
to the repercussion the territory might suffer, if the Dutch authorities stopped future 
importation of Javanese labour.
The Straits Settlement government issued a warning letter to the Company 
government, demanding that the latter take responsibility for the situation. 
Simultaneously, the former rejected any private arrangement between estates in British 
North Borneo and the Labour Association of Singapore, the recruiting agent in-charge 
of supplying Javanese coolies to the territory.55 Finally, in a drastic move, the Straits 
Settlement government enforced the Passengers Restriction Ordinance (Section 9,
54 SSA: N BC A 1184. Translation o f letter addressed to His Majesty’s Consul-General at Batavia by the 
C hief o f  the Service o f Labour Inspection for the Outer Possessions attached to the Labour Bureau o f the 
Netherlands East Indian Government. 11 December 1930.
55 SSA: N BC A 1243. W. Bartley to Secretary to the High Commissioner fo r the Malay States. 17 October 
1930.
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Ordinance 169) against Javanese coolies arriving from British North Borneo, and would 
return them to where they came from, unless assurances were given that they were to 
be repatriated to Java.56 Under Ordinance No. 169, the Straits Settlement government 
had legal power to return such destitute labour by the boat upon which it arrived.
The Court of Directors in London reprimanded its governing body and 
questioned why employers ‘cannot be legally compelled to pay the expenses 
incurred1.57 The Court maintained that under no circumstances should Javanese 
labourers (or other foreign nationalities) become a charge on the government for 
repatriation or maintenance, when the employers could no longer provide them with 
work. Recommendations by the Court to amend the definition of ‘repatriation’ in the 
Labour Ordinance to cover the return of labourers either to their original place of 
embarkation, or to their native country, or ‘whichever may be required’, was met with 
apprehension.58 The Company government was reluctant to embark on such a drastic 
measure, as ‘conditions have not yet reached such a stage as to justify emergency 
legislation for the purpose of repatriating unemployed labour’.59
Messrs. Stephenson, Harwood & Tathan, representing the Court in London, 
introduced a new ‘Acknowledgement-by employers-of liability to Government’ 
agreement, to be signed by employers of Javanese labour, to clarify that the 
government would not bear any financial responsibility with regard to imported 
labourers.60 The Protectorate Department, too, devised an elaborate scheme which 
placed the financial burden on both employers and labourers, instead of the colonial 
state. The scheme proposed that upon discharge of a Javanese coolie who had a right 
to repatriation to Singapore, the employer had to send the coolie to the Protectorate to
56 PRO: 00874/751. Governor’s No. 687. 1 December 1930; See also, Governor Richards to President 5 
March 1931; PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat fo r Chinese Affairs 1930.
57 PR0:C0874/863. Governor’s No. 648. Repatriation o f Javanese Labourers Recruited in Singapore. 30 
November 1930.
58 PRO: C0874/863. C.F. Collins to Governor A.F. Richards. 8 January 1931.
59 PRO: C0874/751. Governor Richards to President. 5 March 1931.
60 PRO: C0874/751. Acting Secretary BNBC to Governor. 9 January 1931.
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register his or her repatriation rights. The coolie needed to agree before the Protector 
as to his or her wish to be repatriated. Concurrently, the employer had to deposit with 
the Protectorate the cost of the labourer’s fare to Singapore, plus the cost of three days 
depot fees. The Protectorate then had to inform the coolie that due to the ban imposed 
by the Straits Settlement government, a passage to Singapore would not be provided if 
the coolie could not deposit a sufficient amount for further repatriation to Java. Any 
coolie who could pay such a deposit would be repatriated to Java by the Protectorate 
Department, through either Singapore, or Tawau, whichever was cheaper. Otherwise, 
the coolie had to seek work locally, pending the removal of the immigration ban by the 
Singapore authorities. Once the ban had been lifted, the labourer could then apply to 
the Protectorate for a passage, and would be granted one if the application was made 
within one year of lifting the ban.61
Employers hailed the scheme as ‘equitable and sympathetic’, by which the 
interests of both employee and employer had received equal consideration. The 
repatriation rights of the labourer had been preserved, and the employers’ interests 
‘have been fully protected without any departure from what is fairly due to the labourer 
concerned1.62 They unanimously refused to meet any of the expenses claimed by the 
governments of the Straits Settlements and the NEI because of several reasons.63 First 
and foremost, they understood that they had fulfilled their legal obligation in the first 
place by repatriating the labourers to Singapore. Secondly, they alleged that the claims 
made were not substantial enough to warrant payment. They could not identify the 
names of the labourers as those who were previously employed or discharged from 
their estates. Many accused the coolies of being impostors, because they arrived in 
Singapore without discharge certificates.64 Yet when employers did identify the names 
with those of labourers who worked on their estates before, they maintained that these
61 PRO: 00874/751. Extract copy o f a letter from the Secretariat to the Protector. 1 December 1930.
62 PRO: C0874/751. Extract ffom N B P A  Minutes o f Meeting. 1 February 1931.
63 PRO: 00874/751. Extract from NBPA Minutes o f Meeting. 30 November 1930.
64 SSA: N BC A 1243. Macdonald to Acting Government Secretary. 10 November 1930; Manager o f 
Sapong Rubber and Tobacco Estates Lim ited, to Government Secretary. 17 November 1930.
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labourers had been repatriated by them direct to Java via the east coast of British 
North Borneo.65 How they ended up in Singapore after that puzzled them. Meanwhile, 
the Company government tried to prove that these coolies were, indeed, repatriated to 
Java, and made their own way from there to Singapore, thereby freeing it from any 
blame and financial obligation to reimburse all the claims that had been forwarded.66
The third factor restraining the employers from meeting the expenses produced 
by the Straits Settlement was the duration of the coolies’ stay in Singapore, before they 
applied for repatriation at the Dutch Consulate. Apparently, some of the coolies found 
on the lists provided by the Straits Settlement government had been in Singapore long 
before they applied to the Dutch Consul for repatriation, as indicated by the dates on 
which they went into the depot. Some arrived by steamer as early as August 1930, but 
they only reached the depot two months later to claim repatriation to Java.67 Since 
these coolies had been in Singapore for some time, the employers alleged that there 
was no proof that they arrived there destitute.68 They accused the coolies of spending 
all their money upon landing, and because jobs in Singapore were scarce during the 
time of depression, the coolies became destitute, and sought the aid of the Dutch 
Consulate. The bottom line was that the employers would in no way pay for any extra 
expenditure on further transportation from Singapore to Java.
The Protector of Labour also argued that there was no proof that the individuals 
sent to Java were, indeed, British North Borneo coolies, and had not borrowed or 
bought discharge certificates in Singapore. In fact, men with no certificates were 
accepted on their bare assertion that they came from the territory.69 It became known 
among the Javanese coolie circles in Singapore that anyone who wanted a free
55 See the case o f Suradi and his daughter Popon o f Sungei Batang Estate. SSA: N BC A 1243. General 
Manager, Sandakan Estates Ltd., to Government Secretary. 13 November 1930.
66 SSA: N BC A 1243. M inute Paper. G.S.O. No. 1718/30. 18 November 1930.
57 SSA: N BC A 1243. Acting Government Secretary to the Secretary to His Excellency the British Agent 
for North Borneo and Sarawak. 20 November 1930.
68 SSA: N BC A 1243. Extract from memo by Acting Government Secretary. 18 November 1930.
69 SSA: N BC A 1243. Acting Government Secretary to Secretary to His Excellency the British Agent for 
North Borneo and Sarawak. 20 November 1930.
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passage to Java only had to state that he or she came from a British North Borneo 
estate, and it would be given to the person by the Dutch Consulate, with no questions 
asked, and at the expense of the Company government.70 Even locally-contracted 
Javanese still working in British North Borneo took advantage of this. A significant 
number of them gave notice to their employers upon hearing that free passages to 
Java were at their disposal.71
For many Javanese coolies who had the intention of returning or going to 
Singapore, the Passengers Restriction Ordinance imposed by the Straits Settlement 
government confused them. Singapore-recruited Javanese were unable to 
comprehend why their employers would not fulfil their promise of a ticket to Singapore 
as stipulated in their local contract, while government-recruited Javanese whose Dutch 
contract had expired and wished to make their way to Singapore, were not allowed 
entry into the island if they could not guarantee payment of passage from Singapore to 
Java. Generally, the average Javanese discharged from an estate had insufficient 
funds to pay the difference of his fare to Java, even though the estate guaranteed 
passage as far as Singapore.72 Many were ‘forced’ to seek local work in ‘an 
overstocked labour market’, as a consequence of the depression in the world economy. 
Hundreds of them were put onto relief gangs’ and were maintained by the Company 
government.73
Several months passed after the enforcement of the Passenger’s Restriction 
Ordinance before the Company administration decided that repatriation would prove a 
more economical method of dealing with the situation. Deserving cases were soon sent 
home. At the insistence of the Dutch authorities in Java, all government-imported 
Javanese who had forfeited their repatriation rights long before but still wished to return
70 SSA: N BC A 1243. Protector to Government Secretary. Prot. 543/30 (v). 8 November 1930.
71 SSA: N BC A 1243. Manager, British Borneo Para Rubber Company, to Acting Government Secretary. 
12 November 1930.
72 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese A ffa irs for 1931. p. 23.
73 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese Affairs for 1930.
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to Java would be returned by the government.74 Likewise, an arrangement was made 
with the same government, whereby destitute Javanese were sent to Tarakan in Dutch 
Borneo, and from there, the Dutch authorities would deliver them to their respective 
homes. In 1931, a total of 114 non-government imported Javanese were repatriated as 
far as Tarakan, via Tawau, 33 being estate labourers and dependents, and 81 being 
destitute unemployed and destitute dependents.75 In 1932, due to further cases of 
estates going on to the ‘care and maintenance’ basis, the number of repatriates 
swelled, owing to lack of employment.76
It must be mentioned that under the territory’s 'Decrepit and Destitute Aliens 
Proclamation, 1911’ Javanese labourers were protected, as it guaranteed them 
repatriation should they fall into this category. The ordinance of 1911 stipulated that 
employers were responsible for the repatriation of indentured (contract) labourers, 
provided that the labourer was not in possession of $1 when he or she was discharged. 
There was, however, a weakness in this law. To escape liability for their repatriation, 
employers realised that they had only to send their contract coolies off with a dollar 
each.77 It was in consequence of this that the amending Notification 276 of 1914 was 
passed and published in ‘Decrepit and Destitute Aliens Ordinance 1915’, raising the 
amount required to exempt a coolie from the definition ‘destitute’, to $10, and a further 
sum of $3 for each dependent who was a minor.78 However, since the cost of 
repatriation usually amounted to more than $10, most employers made it a practice of 
shirking their responsibility for repatriating coolies by discharging a coolie with only 
$10. So ironically, the effect of one section of the Ordinance was to nullify, in practice, 
the operation of the main principle of the Ordinance, with the result that the burden of 
repatriating estate coolies had to be taken up by the Company government, thereby
74 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese A ffairs for 1930.
75 PRO: C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department and Secretariat for Chinese Affairs for 1931. p. 23.
76 PRO; C0648/15. AR. Protectorate Department for 1932. p. 30.
77 See Section 3 o f the Decrepit and Destitute Aliens Ordinance 1911, in. SSA: The Ordinances and Rules 
o f the State o f  North Borneo, 1881-1936.
78 SSA: N BC A 1348. No. 182. Under Section 3 o f the Decrepit and Destitute Aliens Ordinance 1915.
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burning a big hole in the government’s account.79 This was proven during the time of 
the Depression, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when more than a hundred 
'destitute’ Javanese individuals were returned to their homeland at the expense of the 
Company government.
Total Number of Repatriations under the Dutch Contract
In the total period of indentured immigration (1914 -  1932), on average, almost 70 
percent of the Javanese immigrants recruited from Java eventually took up their return 
passage rights and returned to their homeland (Table 8.2). The Labour Returns of 
Javanese labourers imported by government reported the number of repatriates to be 
more than 7,000 out of 9,969 imported. Those who chose to remain in the new 
environment, despite all the trials and tribulations of their indenture experience, and 
who made British North Borneo their new home, figured at less than 1,500 (15%).
Between 1914 and 1923, around 73 per cent of women did not take up their 
free passage, compared to 53 per cent of men.80 This trend continued until the end of 
indentured migration in 1932. The majority of these women, some probably the ‘street 
women’ the recruiters were accused of procuring, got married locally, thereby 
increasing their social standing. Likewise men who stayed on probably had no intention 
of returning to Java in the first place, and they saw British North Borneo as a possible 
place for social promotion, and to enhance their economic position. Javanese 
indentured migrants and their descendants blended into the local population in general, 
and the Muslim community in particular. Apparently, male ex-coolies made good 
grooms and gardeners.81 Also, as their predecessors who came to the land during the 
late 19th century and early 20th century, these ex-Javanese indentured labourers
79 PRO: C0874/863. Minutes. 21 January 1916.
80 SSA: N BC A  1119. Prot. No. 265/23. Schedule.
81 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 81.
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ended up as police or watchmen, traders, gardeners, tailors, carpenters, servants, 
fishermen and boatmen, seamen, engineers, and firemen.82
Table 8.2
The Quarterly Returns of Javanese Labourers Imported by Government, 1914-1932
Term Repatriated Settled Re-engaged
Y M D During
the
period
To date
During
the
period
To date
During
the
period
To date
1914 12 31 3 3 - - - -
1915 12 31 9 12 9 9 6 6
1916 12 31 103 115 92 101 189 195
1917 12 31 112 227 46 147 94 289
1918 12 31 98 325 142 289 122 411
1919 12 31 215 540 23 312 160 571
1920 12 31 242 782 16 328 417 988
1921 12 31 276 1058*a 97 425 323 1311
1922 12 31 490 1548 78 503 323 1634
1923 12 31 438 1986 79 582 264 1898
1924 12 31 143 2129 26 608 198 2096
1925 12 31 190 2319 18 626 227 2323
1926 12 31 155 2474 9 635 166 2489
1927 12 31 407*b 2881 89 724 372 2861
1928 12 31 418 3299 96 820 324 3185
1929 12 31 804 4103 124 944 636 3821
1930 12 31 1512 5615 343 1287 492 4313
1931 12 31 1000 6615 130 1417 167 4480
1932 12 31 508 7123 73 1490 20 4500
Sources: SSA: NBCA 980; C0874/744, 753, 752; Annual Reports, 1914-1932; C0648/7-15, 
relevant years.
* Some figures presented on the Quarterly Returns in NBCA980 differed from other sources 
due to miscalculation and wrong data entry. Based on the table above, the figures found in 
NBCA 980 for (a) = 1053; (b) = 207. The rest of the figures are computed based on correct 
calculations.
At the end of 1916, when the first batch of government indentured contracts 
expired, more than 100 coolies claimed their repatriation rights. More than half hailed 
from Kinarut Estate. Apparently, the unexpected exodus was caused by the 
machinations of a labourer, who was unhappy about being transferred from the 
company’s estate at Melalap.83 Other estates had fewer coolies opting for repatriation. 
The managements of these estates understood that their labour force formed part of 
the companies’ capital, and implemented a policy of ‘insist on good work but get it done 
with the least possible friction’. They maintained that the estates’ management ability to
82 Sullivan and Regis. ‘ Demography’ , p. 551.
83 PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1916.
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succeed in the aspects of ‘control and treatment of labour’ contributed significantly to 
the high rate of re-engagement.84
From 1919 onwards, Javanese repatriation was heavier, compared to previous 
years, but this repatriation expanded proportionate to the increased number of 
Javanese labourers imported under the government permit. When the rubber slump 
intervened, providing a serious set-back to the planting community, and eventually 
leading to deteriorating economic and social conditions, the rate of Javanese 
repatriation rose to a record high in 1922, for the next six years. An estate manager 
calculated the wastage for the six months ending 30 June 1922 to be 10%, and a 
further decrease in the number of Javanese labourers occurred at the end of 1922, with 
an enormous proportion of Javanese coolies availing themselves of their right to 
repatriation and to leave the territory.85 A similar trend can be seen between 1929 and 
1932. Due to the economic malaise, Javanese coolies were repatriated as soon as 
their three-year contracts expired.
Data from 1918, 1921 and 1927 in Table 8.3 reveals the length of time that 
adult Javanese migrants had resided in British North Borneo before they left the 
territory. Most of the repatriates left the land immediately, following the expiration of 
their contract, and more than 85 per cent stayed no longer than four years. Thompson 
puts this phenomenon down to social and religious ties, which inclined Javanese 
labourers to return to their homeland immediately upon the expiration of their contract, 
or even to desert.86 The table also clearly shows that despite spending more than a 
decade in the territory, some individuals chose to be repatriated towards the end. 
Again, the attachment to their ancestral land probably heightened the call to return.87
84 PRO: C0874/744. Extract from Report for August 1917 by Manager o f  Mawao Estate.
85 SSA: N BC A 533, Carewto Protector. 18 November 1922.
86 Thompson. Labor Problems, p. 2.
87 PRO: CO874/105. Foreign Office to Secretary BNBC. 12 A pril 1890.
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Table 8.3
Length of residence in British North Borneo, Javanese repatriates*
Years 1918 1921 1927 Total Percentage
2 years and below 59 65 277 401 51.3
3-4 years 39 177 52 268 34.3
5-8 years 0 34 56 90 11.5
9-11 years 0 0 20 20 2.6
12-13 years 0 0 2 2 0.3
14-19 years 0 0 0 0 0
Total 98 276 407 781 100
Source: SSA: NBCA 980 Javanese Labourers, Quarterly Returns.
* Data computed manually by author based on dates of registration of contract for each 
repatriate for respective years.
However, the most likely explanation as to why Javanese indentured labourers 
chose to leave British North Borneo was the lack of encouragement and inducement 
for staying provided by the colonial state and the land of their indenture. In the first 
place, the Company government handled the matter of Javanese indentured labour 
very delicately. Right from the start, no serious or direct efforts (as opposed to the 
Chinese) were instigated by the government to promote Javanese settlement schemes 
among the imported coolies. Such an approach was followed as based on the 
understanding agreed upon when the first recruitment permit was granted by the NEI 
government in late 1913, as described in chapter three. The Dutch had openly rejected 
the idea of the Javanese entering as settlers, based on the conditions set by the 
Company government at that time. All imported Javanese were to be considered as 
labourers, and upon expiry of their contracts, they had to be repatriated instantly.88 
Hence, the special circumstances surrounding the introduction of the Javanese 
indenture system had, indeed, affected the rates of Javanese repatriations. Therefore, 
colonial perception from the very beginning viewed Javanese immigrants as transients 
and sojourners, and they were meant to be repatriated.
Moreover, the territory’s labour laws failed to include a provision which required 
an employer to set aside lands for migrant labourers who wanted to settle down in the 
territory. Neither did the government allot state lands to immigrant coolies who chose to
xs Refer sub-section "Negotiation o f Dutch Contract’ in chapter three.
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remain. As mentioned in chapter two, the Land Code in the territory favoured two 
groups of people, the capitalist and the natives, thereby further alienating coolie 
migrants from the equation.89 The land policy aimed primarily to grant foreign investors 
secure title, not to mention the need for the Chartered Company to retain paternalistic 
control of the native population, by preventing large areas of native lands from falling 
into the hands of foreigners.90 In other words, the migrant communities, i.e. the 
Chinese or the Javanese, were prohibited from purchasing or leasing land under a 
native title.
In November 1923, the Company government tried to induce settlement by 
promulgating new land terms for non-indigenous Asians. Lands were offered rent-free 
for the first six years if cultivated within six months of occupation. The terms and 
conditions of the new land policy suited Chinese opportunists well. Ex-Chinese coolies 
secured lands for occupation which developed into smallholdings, and Chinese settlers 
from China applied for 1,054 passes in 1927, when for the first time a two-dollar 
deposit was required.91 Conversely, the Javanese immigrants failed to take advantage 
of the new land policy. Very few, in fact, drifted to small holdings and lands of their 
own. Thompson sees Javanese as individuals who have 'no spirit of rivalry or of 
competition’.92 This perception more than likely suggests that the Javanese preferred 
not to endure the demanding work expected of them should they want to see returns 
within the first six months. The majority of Javanese labourers preferred to remain in 
the more populous centres of labour with their kinfolk, because they considered British 
North Borneo as a place of temporary domicile.93
89 See, Mark Cleary. ‘Codifying Land: Colonial Land Regulation in Early 20th Century British Borneo’ . 
Landscape Research. 27,1 (January 2002). pp. 25-37.
90 Cleary. ‘Plantation Agriculture’ , pp. 179-180.
91 Tregonning. A History o f  Modern Sabah, p. 150.
92 Thompson. Labor Problems, p. 121.
93 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f the Committee appointed in November 1932, to advise on certain matters 
relating to labour.
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However, the situation might have been different if British North Borneo had 
offered an unconditional land allotment policy to immigrants who chose to settle down, 
as occurred at some other destinations using Javanese indentured labourers. 
Comparatively, destinations where colonisation and settlement schemes were enacted 
within labour or immigration ordinances had made it attractive for ex-indentured 
Javanese labourers to settle in the new territories. In Surinam, for example, the 
government played an active role in promoting colonisation by offering plots of lands to 
labourers, including Javanese, who had served their contract. Javanese contract 
labourers who renounced their free repatriation to Java also received Dfl.100. 
Therefore, between 1896 and 1939, less than 24 per cent (around 7684) of the 33,000 
Javanese labourers returned to the NEl, the majority remaining in Surinam.94 In the 
FMS, the labour code required every employer to set aside one-sixth of an acre of 
suitable land for each labourer with dependants to use for allotments or grazing 
lands.95 Large tracts of swampland were drained by the government to be settled and 
cultivated by Javanese immigrants. Block-applications for land were also 
straightforward, only requiring permission from the proper authorities.96 The British 
colonial government in the FMS also both viewed and treated Javanese as originating 
from the same racial stock as the Malays, and granted them full rights, i.e. they were 
given lands on Malay reserved areas. They believed that the Javanese immigrants 
found it easy to assimilate with the indigenous Malay population, because of similarities 
in culture and religious background.97 Such promising carrots rendered it possible for 
many Javanese indentured labourers in Malaya (especially in Selangor and Pahang) to 
settle within the areas after their indenture contracts expired.
In fact, so attractive was the situation in Malaya that kontrakkan Javanese from 
British North Borneo decided to hop over there after the expiration of their contracts,
94 Hoefte. In Place o f  Slavery, p. 62
95 PRO: C0874/761. Minutes -  Extract from the BNBH. 1 February 1934.
96 Tunku Shamsul Bahrain. ‘The Pattern o f  Indonesian M igration’ , p. 239
97 Am arjit Kaur. ‘M obility , Labour Mobilisation and Border Controls: Indonesian Labour Migration to 
Malaysia since 1900’ . p. 4; Lockard. ‘The Javanese as Emigrant.’ , p. 46.
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instead of heading towards Java. The immense number of Javanese repatriates who 
decided to go ‘missing’ in Singapore (explained earlier in this chapter), supports this 
argument. It is possible that some of the 89,735 residents born in Java, and the 
170,000 ethnic Javanese living in Malaya in 1930, had a stint at one of the British North 
Borneo enterprises.98
It is difficult to measure whether the indenture experience of the government- 
imported Javanese had been worth it, and had made material difference in their lives 
because of unavailability of evidence pertaining to collective or individual wealth they 
had accumulated while in service. No figures have been found on remittances of 
Javanese labourers, and there were no signs of institutional channels for remittances to 
Java, as opposed to Chinese coolies who had the liberty, while still under contract, to 
remit money to China with the aid of their employers. Estates such as Beaufort, 
Sapong, Langkon, Lahad Datu Cultuur Maatschappij and Taritipan, had occasionally 
utilised the services of their estate shops to send remittances to China, either direct, or 
through reputable Chinese firms in Jesselton, Kudat or Sandakan." The New Darvel 
Bay Tobacco Estate and Silimpopon Coal Mines remitted through the agent, Harrison 
& Crossfield.100 For other estates that had no such arrangement, Chinese coolies 
remitted by the hand of some friends or relatives returning home.101 Similar methods 
might have been used by the Javanese coolies in British North Borneo. Those who re­
engaged probably remitted through friends or relatives, while those who opted for 
repatriation might have taken money, gold ornaments and jewels back on their
98 Graeme Hugo. ‘ Indonesian Labour M igration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications’ . Asian 
Journal o f  Social Science. 2,1 (1993). p. 37.
99 SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). No. 698. 21 October 1924; For more information on 
Chinese business operation in Southeast Asia and its relationship to kinship and networks, see Rajeswary 
Ampalavanar Brown. Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia. New York: St. M artin ’s Press. 
1994; Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown. ‘ Introduction: Uses and Abuses o f Chinese Business History and 
Methodology’ , in: R,Ampalavanar Brown (ed). Chinese Business Enterprise. London and New York: 
Routledge. 1996. pp. 8-9.
i0° SSA: Despatches (Gov. to President, 1924). Report on the facilities existing for remitting money for 
RChinese labourers in the State to China, by C.D. Martyn.
!0‘ PRO: C0648/7. AR. Protectorate Department for 1914, by D.R. Maxwell, p. 36.
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persons, akin to what had been suggested by researchers working on Javanese 
coolies in East Sumatra and Surinam.102
In her study of Javanese contract labourers in Surinam, Hoefte argues that 
Javanese male labourers had a tendency to remain at the expiry of their contract to 
avoid being ridiculed if they were to return to their homeland without sufficient 
savings.103 If this was the standard attitude of Javanese in general, then the majority of 
Javanese labourers in British North Borneo probably had earned enough to enable 
them to return to Java without such fear. Generally, pauperism amongst Javanese 
coolies was small compared to their Chinese counterparts. Based on statistics 
compiled by the Protectorate Department between 1916 and 1930, around 169 
Javanese labourers (of various contracts) were repatriated as paupers against 1054 
Chinese. This connotes that a majority of Javanese indentured labourers returned to 
Java with sufficient earnings. The number of Javanese ‘paupers’ swelled between 1931 
and 1932 as a result of the Great Depression. Enterprises that went into ‘care and 
maintenance’ basis dismissed a large proportion of their coolie force. To prevent the 
spread of ‘pauperism’ on the territory, the Company government repatriated 387 
dismissed Javanese coolies during the two years alone.104 Many of them, together with 
agricultural labourers expelled from other areas for the same reason, returned to their 
already densely-populated villages in Java.105
The impact on home areas in Java was difficult to measure, due to the lack of 
evidence. This renders it impossible for the author to determine the exact fate of ex­
indentured labourers from British Borneo. However, assumptions could be made based 
on research already done by previous scholars, which give a convincing impression of 
what ex-British North Borneo labourers were involved in when they returned to Java.
102 See Pelzer. Pioneer Settlement. 1945; Hoefte, In Place o f Slavery, p. 67.
103 Hoefte. In Place ofSlaveiy. p. 67.
104 PRO: C0648/7-15. AR. Protectorate Department, relevant years.
105 Thompson. Labour Problems, p. 150.
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Scholars have reiterated that labour emigration increased social-economic 
mobility, since emigrants returned with greater knowledge of agricultural operations.106 
Nevertheless, whether the ex-Javanese indentured workers of British North Borneo 
could put theory into practice is a different matter altogether, considering that when 
these migrants returned to their homeland, Java was still beleaguered with high 
population problems, and the scarcity of land. Thus, when these migrants were 
delivered back to their own villages, a similar environment awaited them as before they 
left. The only difference which might have occurred would be in their attitude, whereby 
they could have toughened up, become more self-reliant and better prepared 
physically, mentally and psychologically, to deal with the impending situation. Those 
who had enough savings could have obtained a plot and planted their own crops. 
Others could have joined agricultural estates in Java, or in Sumatra. Some found their 
way back to Singapore.107
After a rigorous experience as indentured labourers in British North Borneo, 
some could have rejected agricultural labour altogether, and ventured into other areas. 
Scholars observed that persons who rejected agricultural labour from areas, such as 
Jelapar, Kebumen, Purworejo and Wonosobo in Central Java, and districts within the 
Regency of Pasuruan in East Java, had ventured into various petty trades which 
served the needs of villages. While some became carpenters, blacksmiths, cobblers, 
and tailors, others engaged in ‘home industries’, i.e. basket-weaving, mats and hats- 
plaiting, and clay pots-making.108 Ex-immigrants were also reported to have become 
cloth merchants in Rembang, while those from the areas of Pekalongan (north central
106 Adapa Satyanarayana. ‘Birds o f Passage’ , p. 24.
107 SSA: N BC A 1243. General Manager, Sandakan Estates Ltd., to Government Secretary. 13 November
1930.
108 Hurustiati Subandrio, ‘Javanese Peasant L ife  Villages in East Java’ . Thesis submitted for the 
Academic Post-graduate Diploma in Anthropology. University o f  London. May 1951; Koentjaraningrat. 
Some Social-Anthropological Observations on Gotong Rojong Practices in Two Villagers o f Central 
Java. Monograph Series. Ithaca, New York: Cornel! University. 1961.
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Java), Surakarta and Yogyakarta, were involved in the batik industry.109 It would not be 
surprising if Javanese ex-coolies from British North Borneo occupied similar industries.
Conclusion
This chapter shows that Java-recruited labourers who went to British North Borneo 
were repatriated at the end of their indenture contract. This was mainly due to the 
policies of the NEI authorities to restrict or limit the permanent residence of 
government-imported settlers, and the predisposition of the Company government to 
yield to the demands of the Dutch, in order not to shut the door to future importation of 
Javanese labour. Repatriations went accordingly, but challenges and inconsistencies 
relating to the repatriation issue had slightly affected the bilateral relationship of the 
colonial states. Nevertheless, these were eventually ironed out, through intervention 
and communication between the Company government and the NEI authorities. The 
existence of the repatriation clause influenced the Javanese labourers’ decision to stay 
within the estate milieu. A significant number prolonged their stay by re-indenturing for 
another one to two years, following which, repatriation was sought. Fundamentally, on 
the one hand, the lack of incentives afforded to ex-coolies, and the policy of the 
Company government to treat them as Asiatic-aliens, rendered it impractical to set 
down roots in British North Borneo. On the other hand, the few opportunities given to 
them were not seized upon either, thus contributing to the prejudices held by 
employers and government officials against them (i.e. lazy, not industrious, and very 
poor settlers). In the final analysis, Javanese labourers who came to British North 
Borneo between 1914 and 1932 were deemed as transients within the indenture 
system. They were sojourners, nothing more than just ‘birds of passage’. 110
109 Gooszen. A Demographic History, pp. 61-81.
110 PRO: CO874/1061. Report o f  the Committee appointed in November 1932; SSA: N BC A 533. Carew 
to Protector. Copy o f Enclosure No 3. 3 September 1929.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
The original research question posed was to analyse the extent to which the system of 
Javanese indentured labour in British North Borneo over the 1914 to 1932 period, was 
‘a new form of slavery’, or a particular variety of ‘free labour’. The previous seven 
chapters have provided the empirical data to answer this question, by looking into the 
historical realities relating to the recruitment process, living and working conditions, the 
response of Javanese immigrants to the indenture system and to their new social 
environment, and post-indenture options.
When the system of Javanese indentured labour was approved in 1913 and 
immigration began in 1914, British North Borneo was at a crossroads, due to the cut-off 
of supplies of Chinese labourers from Singapore and Hong Kong. The grim realities of 
some systems of indentured labour resulted in the changing perception of the system; 
it was no longer seen as compatible with free labour. The system has been reviled as 
‘differing but little from a form of slavery’.1 This new discernment on the degradation of 
indentured labourers, matched by nationalistic sentiments from the Chinese 
government and Indian leaders, resulted in the suspension of Chinese and Indian 
indentured labour overseas in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Following 
suit, the Colonial Office abolished the indentured labour system in neighbouring Malaya 
by 1914, cutting off one of the main arteries of Chinese labour supply for British North 
Borneo enterprises.
Yet a few questions remain to be answered. Why did the Chartered Company 
assent and yield to the so-called reviled system, when the world, led by Britain, was in 
the midst of a campaign calling for its very abolition? And why did the Netherlands East
1 Tinker. A New System o f Slavery, pp. 339-340.
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Indies (NEI) government agree to export Javanese as indentured labourers? Was the 
system of Javanese indentured labour in British North Borneo really a new kind of 
slavery, as contended by the critics?
The answers to these questions have been explained throughout the thesis. In 
the earlier chapters, the thesis has shown that the BNBC was the principal institution in 
expanding the economy in the territory, and in bringing Javanese indentured labourers 
into the territory. Although not directly participating in the economy until the 1920s, the 
Company government contributed to a fertile environment for economic growth by 
introducing attractive liberal policies to lure capital and investors into the territory. In its 
quest, the BNBC had even been accused by a philanthropist organisation of profit 
maximisation at the expense of the indigenous population. Yet in the late 1880s and 
early 1900s, encouraged by these incentives, British North Borneo was invaded by 
tobacco planters, followed by rubber and timber enterprises, which stimulated revenue 
for the government in export duty and land sales. It also increased employment 
opportunities in the territory.
Nevertheless, the expanding economy had one constant problem, the 
availability of continuous labour to staff the burgeoning enterprises. Java was targeted 
to fill this labour vacuum. The permission granted by the NEI government to recruit 
Javanese labourers from Java came at the most opportune time for the Company 
government, and lifted the territory from a precarious position. Not only had it given a 
life line to the enterprises in British North Borneo by sponging up access labour from 
Java to cater for their needs, but it saved the Chartered Company from 
embarrassment, and from being lambasted by planters who had pumped in huge sums 
of capital into the territory. Meanwhile, the neighbouring NEI government had allowed 
its subjects to avail themselves of this system of labour in an overseas destination, 
because they too relied heavily on Javanese indentured workers for the enterprises at 
Deli, Sumatra. The Dutch also favoured the retention of indenture until the 1930s
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because employment contracts ‘could be regulated and excessive abuses avoided’.2 
Although the numbers of Javanese emigrating to British North Borneo as indentured 
labourers were comparatively small, the system had been part of the solution to lessen 
its domestic problems caused by an ‘overpopulated’ Java.
Critics of indenture denounced the system of indentured labour as a disguised 
form of slavery. They argued that similarities between indentured labour and slavery 
lay in the recruitment, transportation and harsh conditions of labour. Discipline was 
severe, mortality rates were high, and many recruits were forced to sign on after their 
contracts expired, and some never returned home.3 Evidence from the thesis, 
nevertheless, has argued that the shortcomings of the Javanese indenture system in 
British North Borneo do not make it comparable to slavery.
As related in Chapters 3 and 4, the major flow of Javanese indentured 
immigration to British North Borneo started in the 1910s. The Dutch and British 
colonies and protectorates were already aware of the heightened criticism of the 
indentured labour system, so much so that the recruitment process was already highly 
regulated, and many precautions were taken by the Dutch authorities, as well as the 
recruiting agencies, to minimise irregular recruiting practices. Ports and coolie depots 
were brought under greater government supervision and inspection, so as to eliminate 
abuses in the recruiting system. The Recruitment Ordinances (wervingsordonnantien) 
issued by the NEI government in 1909 and 1914 to curtail abuses prevailing in the 
recruiting industry in Java saw to it that a more stringent system of registration was 
enforced. Throughout the whole process, from the initial contact with the recruiter to the 
very end before embarkation for British North Borneo, intending emigrants were 
subjected to check-ups and interviews by government officials in various capacities, to
2 Parmer. Colonial Labour. 1960.
3 Miers. Slavery in the Twentieth Century, p. 7.
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determine that the emigrants were indeed fit for hard labour, and that they were willing 
participants in the system.
Nevertheless, no matter how conscientious the recruitment commissionaires 
(wervingscommissarissen) were in fulfilling this responsibility, there were bound to be 
irregularities. The system of recruiting remained imperfect, and in itself, invited the use 
of malpractices such as fraud and deception by recruiters. Ultimately, the system of 
paying recruiters and their henchmen (wereg) by results inevitably opened the door to 
abuse. The booming bounties drove these recruiters to use unscrupulous methods to 
increase their earnings. There was no official record indicating the use of kidnapping to 
meet the demands of Javanese indentured labour for British North Borneo, which 
significantly implies either that the extreme method of recruitment was non-existent, or 
that it was minuscule. Meanwhile, the misrepresentation of conditions in British North 
Borneo succeeded in luring potential recruits.
The incentive of payment by result given to recruiters was imperative, if they 
were to fulfil the numbers required by British North Borneo and for the system of 
indentured labour to succeed. As highlighted by Lawrence in his study of the West 
Indies, ‘Without recruiters the regular flow of labour essential to estates organised on 
the basis of indenture could not have been provided’.4 However, this does not mean 
that recruiters or colonial recruiting agencies condoned malpractices, such as 
kidnapping emigrants, or using fraud and deception as a regular practice. Emmer 
strongly argued that recruiters and their agents would indefinitely face a financial loss 
when a fraudulently recruited emigrant had a change of mind, and decided against 
emigrating.5
4 K.O. Lawrence. A Question o f Labour: Indentured Immigration into Trinidad and British Guiana, 1875- 
1917. p. 494.
5 P.C. Emmer. ‘The Meek Hindu: The Recruitment o f  Indian Labourers for Service Overseas, 1870- 
1916’ . in: P.C. Emmer (ed.). Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour before and after Slaveiy. 
Dordrecht: Martinus N ijh o ff Publishers. 1986. p. 193.
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The thesis has therefore shown that malpractices such as, fraud, coercion, 
deception and misrepresentation did occur in the recruiting business in Java, but on the 
whole, most Javanese recruits made a deliberate choice to work as indentured 
labourers, and emigrated voluntarily. The fact that the majority came from the poorer 
areas of inland Central and East Java concurs with the argument that their emigration 
to British North Borneo was based on the push factor. In fact, in these parts of Java, 
the majority of the rural population neither owned, nor had direct access to sufficient 
agricultural land to obtain subsistence. To make matters worse, neither the cities nor 
the villages could provide sufficient income to support the villagers and their 
dependents. Thus, indentured labour provided a means for families to maximise their 
income, by encouraging some members of the household, especially men, to work in 
British North Borneo, while remaining household members would somehow cope with 
limited village-based labour demands. The nature of the indentured labour system, 
which provided guaranteed jobs and consistent wages, proved to be the pull factor to 
potential recruits, while monetary advances, another focal trait of the system, enticed 
them even more into enlisting. Apart from providing for family members left behind, 
advances were often welcomed to pay off debts.
Probably the most notable form of ‘deception’ entrenched in the whole 
recruitment system was an institutional one, i.e. the harsh disciplinary law imposed by 
colonial legislatures, contained in the labour ordinances. The Dutch Contract made no 
mention of the types of punishment involved for infraction of the contract and the 
Labour Ordinance in British North Borneo. Punishments of a criminal nature were 
enforced for breach of civil contracts. Java-recruited coolies, on the one hand, had their 
indenture contract and the protective provisions of the Labour Ordinance to protect 
them, but on the other hand, could be prosecuted and punished with whipping, fines, 
imprisonment and extension of contracts, for minor infractions such as absenteeism 
from work and desertion from the estates. Chapter 5 has illustrated this anomaly, and 
proved that the system contained tenets which militated against the Javanese
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indentured immigrant. One could not disregard the profound paradox entailed in the 
laws, which neglected to formally notify the intending Javanese emigrants of their 
existence.
So how ‘voluntary’ were emigrants then, if crucial information was withheld from 
them, as in the enforcement of criminal penalties, and in the fact that they could be 
jailed for failing to perform their job accordingly? Would they embark on the journey 
willingly, knowing the facts? Indeed, this calculated deception, which depicts a 
weakness in the system, has been a constant focal argument between anti-colonialists 
and the revisionists. However, it is impossible to comprehend that the majority of the 
immigrants had no initial knowledge of the existence of penal sanctions, given the fact 
that Semarang, where potential recruits gathered before embarkation to British North 
Borneo, was a bustling port filled with the comings and goings of immigrants, thus 
making the transmission of information about a particular destination easier. Similarly, 
the point regarding chain migration and networking has to be made. One has to take 
into account the fact that over a period of time, indentured migrants were familiarised 
with the conditions in British North Borneo through relatives, friends, and neighbours, 
who often provided vital information. Hence, potential recruits from areas such as 
Kapasan, Karang Tembok, Blitar, and Purworejo, where the majority of British North 
Borneo labourers hailed from, would have known about penal sanctions and the 
conditions of labour in the territory. Yet they still emigrated, despite having this 
knowledge. This strongly subscribes to the contention that recruits emigrated 
voluntarily. They chose to endure temporary hardship in British North Borneo, and 
leave the poverty and social misery behind in Java, hoping that this fate could be 
overturned by the return of wages and savings. Therefore, as observed by Northrup, ‘It 
is that frame of mind that separates them from the involuntary recruitment and 
permanent legal coercion of slavery’.6
6 Northrup. ‘Free and Unfree Labor M igration’ , p. 130.
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From the moment they left their homeland, to their eventual return, the welfare 
of the Javanese labourers was generally taken care of. Ships transporting Javanese 
coolies were highly regulated, be it British-owned or Dutch-owned. Although facilities 
were sometimes lacking on some of these steamers, both the Company government 
(representing Great Britain) and the NEI (representing the Netherlands) attempted to 
improve conditions out of concern of being accused of operating and continuing the 
slave trade under a new guise.7
In British North Borneo itself, despite having criminal penalties to enforce civil 
contracts, the territory’s Labour Ordinance revealed that there was indeed greater effort 
on the part of the Company government to make indenture something different from 
slavery. To be sure, the Company government’s way of safeguarding the indentured 
immigrants was by the amelioration, rather than abolition, of the system. The Labour 
Ordinance 1916 which replaced the one-sidedness of Ordinance 1908 significantly 
improved the leverage of employees in labour relations. Subsequently, reforms were 
made over the years to provide labourers with adequate protection from ill-treatment 
and other potential abuses. The special agreement with the NEI government played a 
significant role, which governed the course of Company government’s policies towards 
the labour question in British North Borneo, particularly regarding Javanese indentured 
labour.
From 1914 to 1932, the Company government strove to maintain a strong 
relationship with the NEI authorities, by expelling undesirables, and eradicating 
practices, which might jeopardise the annually-renewed recruiting permit. It has been 
consistently described throughout the subsequent chapters that the project to recruit 
Javanese labour for British North Borneo enterprises was seen as a ‘favour’ to the 
Company government. The anxiety that this ‘favour’ might be terminated at any time 
rendered it necessary for Company officials to be rigorously vigilant in ensuring that the
7 Temiorshuizen. ‘ Indentured Labour’ , p. 303.
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labour conditions under which Javanese labourers lived and worked, were according to 
standards, and the rights of each labourer protected. Undoubtedly, some managerial 
officials were stricter than others, and cases of ill-treatment, brutality and physical 
aggression by overseers against Javanese labourers could be found occasionally. But 
when they came to light, the administrative machinery of the Company government 
promptly dealt with these cases. However, there is justification for saying that the 
courts now and then extended a more lenient punishment to offending estate officials 
than to coolies for minor breaches of contract.
All the same, it was quite obvious that the treatment of Javanese labourers was 
regulated, and the enforcement of the regulations and laws pertaining to this group of 
labourers was quite strict. Following the infamous incident in 1916, relating to Assistant 
Manager Holman, who was convicted of physically abusing Javanese labourers, the 
system offered reasonable hope that important abuses had been detected and brought 
under control. The Company government, under direct orders from the Court of 
Directors in London, even demanded that quarterly returns on abuses inflicted by 
European estate officials on Asiatic coolies be submitted by employers of labour.
This, once again, reflected the agency of colonial states in manoeuvring the 
conditions of indentured labour away from the path of slavery. The earlier paragraphs 
have already described the responsibility of the NEI government to ensure the system 
of recruitment in Java was free from obvious possibilities of abuses. To complement 
this effort, the NEI authorities, under the auspices of the Labour Inspectorate, not only 
scrutinised the enforcement of the labour laws in British North Borneo, but also 
exercised considerable influence on their inception. Apart from being consulted on 
proposals to amend laws on labour, regular reports were also sought after, particularly 
on health and general conditions of government-imported Javanese working on British 
North Borneo enterprises. The Dutch Labour Inspectors sent to inspect labour 
situations also posed a striking figure of authority. Van Hemert, who visited the territory
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in 1918, was cautious in his inspection, but too easily satisfied with colonial 
explanations, while Baron Van Lijnden, Viehoff, and Frohwein, who came in later years, 
demonstrated more formidable and imposing personalities. In the final analysis, it 
would not be far from the truth to say that the Dutch colonial state and its civil servants 
were genuinely interested in the welfare of the Javanese indentured labourers in British 
North Borneo. The colonial state in the NEI went through an administrative 
strengthening after 1900 under its Ethical Policy. In one way or another, the mindset of 
Dutch colonial civil servants working in the NEI at the time could have been influenced 
by some sense of moral obligation invoked by the Policy.8
Throughout the period of indenture, material conditions were generally taken 
care of by employers. Nominal and real wages of indentured Javanese were usually 
higher than the rest of the coolies on local contracts, although conflicts relating to 
wages and tasks were frequently heard (wages were withheld or illegally deducted for 
various infractions). The coolie accommodation (kongsi), although sometimes 
overcrowded, lacking in privacy, exposed to thieves and other dangers, and in need of 
repairs, met certain minimum standards. Some employers did somehow let coolie lines 
deteriorate to a deplorable condition to save maintenance costs during periods of strict 
economy. Water supply to coolie lines became an issue, particularly when such estates 
depended on streams or unprotected wells. Sanitation problems remained a constant 
headache for visiting government inspectors, although the unhygienic habits of the 
coolies were partially to blame for any health hazards. Medical attention for coolies was 
recognised as important from early on, because of the limited supply of labourers in the 
territory. Economically, the high cost of recruiting, and the difficulty of getting new 
recruits rendered it necessary to maintain the good health of the imported coolies, not 
to mention the impact on production. Various schemes were devised to ensure that 
adequate medical attention was given to sick patients, but on the whole, although the
8 Robert Cribb. ‘ Introduction’ , in R. Cribb (ed.). The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and 
Economic Foundations o f  the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942. Leiden: K IT L V  Press. 1994. pp. 1-9; 
Houben. ‘ Introduction’ , p. 7.
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quality of services was commendable, this aspect of the indenture system was one of 
the most criticised by the NEI authorities. And for their part, government officials and 
international humanitarians continued to be obsessed with improving health conditions 
throughout the territory.
However, as Chapter 6 has shown, the full extent of the ill health of Javanese 
coolies working under indenture in British North Borneo was not much different from 
other labourers and the general population. The number of coolies treated in hospitals 
remained quite large, as compared to the general public, but the statistics, too, could 
not be taken at face value. Employers had a tendency to force labourers to be admitted 
in hospital for signs of illness, whereas the general public, particularly the indigenous 
people, remained sceptical of European doctors and medicines, and preferred to 
consult their own local healers. The mortality rate of labourers was consistently under 
three percent, except for the years when they were affected by the influenza pandemic. 
Also, throughout the period under study, malaria was predominantly the main cause of 
death for both estate labourers and the mass of the population. This affirmed the fact 
that epidemiological factors were the main cause of death of indentured labourers in 
British North Borneo, and not the harshness of life under indenture, as contended by 
critics of the system. This, however, does not excuse some employers’ lack of concern 
for proper nutrients and hygienic sanitary conditions, which contributed to incidences of 
beri-beri and hookworm. But these employers were immediately reprimanded by the 
proper authorities, and campaigns to eradicate both diseases which followed on the 
respective estates, eventually witnessed a cessation of the diseases.
The thesis has shown that the confinement of coolies within the estate milieu 
and the use of penal sanctions made the system open to abuse. Also, continuous 
conflicts relating to tasks and wages, physical assaults, and the denial of certain rights, 
reflected the power held by employers and overseers over their indentured labourers. 
Other elements of social control, such as estate housing, estate shops, estate tokens,
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opium, brothels, and gambling, all invited abuses and made labourers feel dependent 
and vulnerable to the estate. Coolies’ responses to these forms of labour control were 
manifest through the occurrence of desertion, strikes and rebellions, sometimes 
involving loss of life. The treatment of absentees and deserters was sometimes very 
rigorous, and a source of punishment, although it varied widely between enterprises. 
Sometimes, conditions of indenture were made worse by human failings, particularly on 
the part of the Company administrative machinery. The staffs of the Protectorate 
Department were limited during the earlier years of indentured immigration. While this 
matter was gradually resolved, other defects lingered on. The local Protectors of 
Labour were sometimes guilty of negligence, and bias because of their racial 
prejudices. Complaints were not promptly investigated, and law enforcement was, at 
times, very sloppy. The vastness of the territory, with its inadequate transportation and 
communication system, at times hindered effective surveillance by government 
officials. The non-existence of a Javanese interpreter attached to the Protectorate 
Department prior to 1927 also remained a sore point, thus further weakening the 
labourers’ position in voicing their complaints.
Although the life of Javanese labourers working under indenture was harsh, it 
did not make the system in British North Borneo comparable to slavery. The use of 
penal sanctions in the territory did not necessarily reflect the ill-treatment of Javanese 
indentured immigrants. Indeed, the high rates of convictions, which exceeded five per 
cent during the 1910s and early 1920s, were statistics involving the entire labour force 
in the territory, irrespective of the type of labour contract they were in, (i.e. two to three- 
year indenture contract, one-year local contract, or one-month verbal contract). The 
prevailing notion at that time was to evade prosecuting Javanese labourers, particularly 
those recruited from Java under the government permit, to avoid attracting 
unnecessary attention from the Dutch authorities. This fact seems to connote that 
compared to other labourers the disciplining of government-imported Javanese was 
more lax. Therefore, from a broader perspective, the indenture of government-imported
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Javanese in British North Borneo was harsh, if one is to gauge this by the existence of 
penal sanctions, but the fact that penal sanctions were not strictly enforced on Java- 
recruited Javanese meant that the system was weaker than it seemed.
Moreover, the presence and reliance on criminal sanctions for labourers 
working under indenture to prevent absenteeism, desertion and insubordination, 
appeared not to be as effective as the employers had hoped. Over the years, 
employers persistently lobbied for more effective punishments, and complained about 
the ineffectiveness of the Labour Ordinance, which they described as mocking the 
position of employers. The repeated efforts to amend the territory’s labour laws so as to 
secure more effective means of compelling the indentured to work, the constant 
complaining about absenteeism and desertion, and their reluctance to abandon penal 
sanctions altogether for fear it would bring ‘evil’ consequences, reflected their mentality 
and attitude towards labour. It has to be mentioned that some of these attempts by 
employers to amend labour legislation failed because they were disinclined to exert 
themselves after leaning heavily on the government’s assistance for so long. Co­
operation on matters pertaining to labour, and those affecting the planting industry, was 
also prejudiced by dissention in the planting community itself, and the incessant 
distrust between the NBCA and the NBCC. This effectively lowered their collective 
bargaining power.
One of the constitutive elements of slavery is property ownership, where a slave 
is the property of another.9 In British North Borneo, indentured labourers were never 
legally proclaimed to be the property of their employers. Furthermore, even if 
employers held such power, he could only exert it to a certain extent because he was 
constrained by law and subject to time limits.10 Evidently, most employers in British 
North Borneo knew better than to treat their imported Javanese labourers as slaves. As
9 H.J. Nieboer. Slavery as an Industrial System, pp. 3-19. bttp://www.ditext.com/nieboer/plchl .h tm l# l. 
[18/08/2008 15:15].
10 Houben. ‘ Introduction5, p. 5.
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Clarence-Smith opined in his study of indentured labour in the plantations of Sao Tome 
and Principe, the high cost of procuring labourers obliged employers to make certain 
concessions whenever possible.11 Hence, skilful management in British North Borneo 
realised the importance of maintaining good labour relations with their indentured 
workers because this would definitely increase the level of production, create better 
working atmosphere, improve business in the long run, and benefit the enterprise when 
labourers re-engaged. They understood too that that over-reliance on penal sanctions 
would bring the opposite effect, since they would lose not only manpower, but also 
output, if coolies were convicted and punished with imprisonment. Penal sanctions 
were used mainly as a deterrent to subdue labourers, but not necessarily enforced. 
These employers ensured that their labour force was relatively satisfied with the 
working conditions to prevent desertion, or other form of aggressive resistance.
Nieboer contends that the definition of slavery depends on the meaning or idea 
one attaches to the term.12 In British North Borneo, there were a number of employers 
who viewed indentured immigrants as simply a source of profit, meant to be exploited 
as long as they (the employers) did not break any laws. Sapong Estate, for example, 
was singled out for its harsh regime for labourers, and its excessive number of 
prosecutions and convictions. Hence, one could say that this group of employers acted 
on the assumption that their indentured labourers were slaves, as portrayed in their 
attempts to control every aspect of the labourers’ life, as with the attitudes of masters of 
slaves in the transatlantic slave trade. But even in these circumstances, the state of 
being subjugated to someone more powerful was not a continuous process, nor was it 
inherent. Unlike children of chattel slaves, the offspring of Javanese indentured 
labourers in British North Borneo, once of age, were not expected to perform labour.
u W.G. Ciarence-Smith. ‘Labour Conditions in the Plantations o f Sao Tome and Principe, 1875-1914’ . 
Slaveiy & Abolition. 14,1 (A pril 1993). p. 150.
12 Nieboer. Slavery, p. 2.
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Orlando Patterson defines a slave as a ‘socially dead person’ who was ‘denied 
all claims on, and obligations to, his parents and living blood relations’.13 Developments 
in the social life of the Javanese indentured immigrants in British North Borneo, as 
noted in the foregoing chapters, contradict the definition of ‘slave’ used by Patterson. 
Over the years the hold employers had over their indentured coolies’ became more lax. 
Coolies had more access to the outside world after working hours. Social outings such 
as visiting friends at other neighbouring estates, or attending gatherings at tamu or 
native market, became regular affairs during weekends or holidays. Likewise, as 
opposed to Wells’ argument contending that indentured labourers were denied 
opportunities and resources to establish families and reproducing themselves, most 
employers in British North Borneo saw the importance of a settled labour force, and 
encouraged marriages and family life among its labourers.14
Critics of indenture argued that although recruits had a repatriation clause in 
their indenture contract, many never returned home, because they were tricked or 
coerced into forfeiting their free repatriation passage. However, the findings in Chapter 
8 have rejected this notion, with the percentage of returned migration to Java standing 
at more than 70% by the time indentured labour was abolished in late 1932. 
Throughout the period the system was in operation, Javanese immigrants consistently 
opted for their free passage, either as soon as their contract expired, or after a bout of 
three to four years in the territory. Even for those who continuously re-engaged for 
several years, it was apparent that at the end of the day, they were given their right to a 
free repatriation to Java. Whether this was granted at the employer’s expense or the 
government’s was irrelevant. The crux of the matter was, they held a unique position in 
labour ranking in the territory. Not only were they government-imported coolies, but 
they also worked under a different type of contract, under a special permit granted by 
the Dutch authorities in Batavia. The future importation of Javanese labourers into
13 Quotes from Orlando Patterson. Slaveiy and Social Death: A Comparative Study, Cambridge, M A: 
Harvard University Press, pp. 5, 13 and 17.
14 Wells. ‘ Imperial Hegemony’ , p. 190.
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British North Borneo depended upon the ability of the territory to follow the terms and 
conditions of the agreement with the Dutch. From the labourers’ point of view, social 
and religious ties inclined the Javanese indentured workers to return to their home 
villages upon the expiration of their contracts. This argument certainly went against 
Patterson’s definition of ‘slave’ mentioned above.
The Javanese indenture system operating in British North Borneo over the 1914 
to 1932 period was, therefore, not akin to slavery. The Javanese indentured labourers 
were not free men or women in today’s definition of the word, but the system in 
operation then was a particular variety of ‘free labour’. It was a form of coerced labour, 
which stood in between slavery and modern systems of contract labour. As highlighted 
by Campbell and Alpers, coercion, which was ‘generally considered a defining feature 
of slave work, was not exclusive to slavery’. It was only that economies of scale, such 
as plantations, made high levels of coercion profitable.15
The study refutes Amarjit Kaur’s contention that indentured immigrants in British 
North Borneo laboured under conditions reminiscent of slavery, because internal and 
external conditions and pressure, rendered it necessary for employers not to treat 
indentured labourers as slaves.16 The study supports Black’s contention that although 
conditions of labour might have been appalling during the pioneering period in the late 
nineteenth century, which led to high mortality rates, the twentieth century witnessed a 
more progressive policy by the Company government to eradicate abuse and improve 
labour conditions.17 The thesis concurs with the point of view of contemporary actors 
and writers such as Cook and Rutter, namely that disciplinary measures on plantations 
were imperative and did not necessarily mean ill-treatment and brutality. Yet it
15 Gynn Cambell and Edward A. Alpers. 'Introduction: Slaveiy, Forced labour and Resistance in Indian 
Ocean A frica and Asia’ . Slaveiy & Abolition. 25,2 (2004). p. x.
16 Am arjit Kaur. Economic Change in East Malaysia. 1998. p. 93.
17 Black. A Gambling Style o f Government. 1984. p. 211.
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challenges Cook’s philosophy that ‘the labourers were indentured really only in name’ , 
as shown by the upshot of the analysis on the characteristics of indenture.18
Putting the ‘slavery or not slavery’ debate aside, Javanese indentured 
immigration had a profound impact on British North Borneo. The impact was multi­
faceted. The main contribution of the Javanese immigrants was an economic one. The 
advent of the Javanese avoided a major labour crisis in the land, and facilitated the 
expansion of plantation agriculture. Economic prosperity in the territory grew in direct 
proportion to Javanese immigration. A continuous importation of Javanese labour was 
reflected in the increasing production of rubber, and only when rubber prices fell did 
immigration of Javanese decrease, eventually to be suspended altogether. In simpler 
terms, without the Javanese immigrants, bigger rubber estates would have suffered if 
not collapsed, and companies investing capital in British North Borneo would have 
faced financial ruin. Rubber cultivation would still prosper due to the effectiveness of 
small holder rubber cultivation, but the Company government would have been 
embarrassed as a result of its inability to live up to its promises to provide the 
necessary support to capitalist investors.
Additionally, with the immigration of the indentured Javanese, what evolved in 
British North Borneo society, which had no history of slavery on plantations, was a 
hybrid labour system, with indentured and free labour coexisting together in the main 
sector of the plantation system until 1932, and free labour in the tangential areas of 
economic activity. Aside from the economic perspective, the Javanese contribution and 
their involvement in other spheres were minimal. Politically, they were already 
marginalised, because their foreign status denied them a vote. However, socially, there 
were contradictory signs. On the one hand, cultural adaptation and assimilation had 
begun. Contact with other population groups, particularly other Muslim labourers such 
as the Malays and the indigenous population (Bajaus, Suluks, llianuns, Kedayans,
18 Rutter. British North Borneo, p. 168; Cook. Borneo, p. 109.
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etc.), made assimilation easier. The frequent visits to tamu especially eliminated certain 
feelings of hostilities, distrust and ignorance amongst the various ethnic groups, and 
promoted social and racial integration.19 As noted by scholars, acculturation in 
Southeast Asia was facilitated by the fact that slaves, or bonded labourers, originated 
from societies with linguistic and cultural backgrounds similar to that of the dominant 
society.20 These similarities enhanced the dispersion of Islam and intermarriages 
amongst the various ethnic groups of British North Borneo. Javanese men and women 
married local spouses. On the other hand, cultural conservatism prevailed. The 
Javanese retained distinct cultural features in dances, music, marriages, deaths, 
language and customs. Places such as ‘kampung Java’ (Javanese Village) appeared in 
districts where there were high concentrations of Javanese. Although most Javanese 
left British North Borneo at the end of their indenture contracts, those who remained 
became a small, but permanent component of the territory’s population. All things 
considered, the immigration of Javanese indentured labourers into British North 
Borneo, similar to immigration of Chinese and Indians in Malaya, was a direct 
consequence of Western presence, and had contributed to the cultural diversity found 
in Sabah today in particular, and Southeast Asia in general.21
For the majority who left the territory, a significant portion went to Singapore, 
and the Federated Malay States to seek new opportunities, while the rest headed back 
to Java. The number of paupers repatriated to Java was generally small, and there was 
no evidence of the actual amount of savings brought back to Java by indentured 
labourers from British North Borneo. Nevertheless, based on the assumption that 
returning migrants brought monies, jewellery, and gold ornaments on their persons, 
similar to returning migrants from Sumatra and Surinam, it can be construed that ex- 
indentureds from British North Borneo returned with sufficient earnings to enable them
19 Padasian. ‘Cultural Progress and the A rts’ , p. 534.
20 Campbell and Alpers. ‘ Introduction: Slavery, Forced Labour and Resistance’ , p. xiv; Anthony Reid, 
‘ Introduction: Slavery and Bondage in Southeast Asian H istory’ , in: Reid (ed.). Slavery, Bondage and 
Dependency in Southeast Asia. St Lucia: University o f  Queensland Press, pp. 13, 25-26.
21 V ictor T. K ing and W illiam  D. W ilder. The Modern Anthropology o f  Southeast Asia: An Introduction. 
London and New York: Routledge Curzon. 2003. p. 11.
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to secure their own plot of land (either through purchase or lease), or venture onto 
other indigenous enterprises. The availability of new sources could throw some light 
into the matter.
What happened to these Javanese who remained in British North Borneo after 
the system of indentured labour was abolished in the territory deserves further 
research. It would be interesting if an in depth analysis could be conducted on whether 
they continued to work as free labourers on rubber estates when labour was, once 
again, in demand following the increase in the price of rubber, or joined the wage 
labour market in other industries. Javanese labourers continued to be sought by 
employers in British North Borneo. In fact, a new agreement was negotiated by the 
Company government in 1938 for the recruitment of free Javanese labour from Java. 
During World War Two, Javanese labourers arrived in numbers, but they came as 
‘romushas’, or forced labour, under the Japanese flagship. Indeed these historical 
realities provide further avenues for future research.
In the final analysis, it can be concluded that the Javanese indentured labour 
experience in British North Borneo over the 1914 to 1932 period, although it shared 
similar traits with other colonies experimenting with the system of labour, its distinctive 
characteristics were very pronounced. Going back to the main research question, this 
thesis concludes that the experience of Javanese indentured labourers in British North 
was indeed a particular kind of ‘free labour’, and not a disguised form of slavery.
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LIST OF SELECTED INTERVIEWEES
1 . Salamah Sajiran. Age: 67. Kg. Gum-Gum, Sandakan. Date of Interview: 14 March 
2007.
2. Imam Sarji Kartamawijoyo. Age: 53. Kg Rancangan Sg Manila, Bt. 12. Sandakan.
3. Surip Wongsusatiko. Age: 8 6 . K.g Rancangan Sg Manila, Sandakan. Date of 
Interview: 12 March 2007. (Regretfully, Mr. Surip passed away on 8 December 
2007).
4. Satiman. Kg. Jawa 1, Bt. 12, Sandakan. Date of Interview: 14 March 2007.
5. Muslim Imam bin Amat Samsudin. Head of Malaysia Palm Oil Board, Sabah 
Division. Age: Unknown. Date of interview: 26 March 2007.
6 . Tarmin Marsoh. Kg. Bongon, Penampang. Date of Interview: 28 December 2006. 
Age: 70 plus.
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Source: ARA: Mailrapport 1857/13. ‘Model-Werkcontract. Tot de werving is vergunning verleend
by Gouvernment-besluit van 18 November 1913. No. 25’.
Appendix 2
WORKING CONTRACT
F o r
G O V E R N M E N T  I M P O R T E D  J A V A N E S E  L A B O U R E R S  R E C R U IT E D  U N D E R  T H E  P E R M IT  O F  T H E  
G O V E R N O R  G E N E R A L  O F  T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S  IN D I E S  B Y  D E C R E E  
N O . 8 , D A T E D  12t h  N O V E M V E R  1925
The labourers whose names appear in the Schedule hereto on the one part and .................................
...............................................................................................................................................................................  acting as
representative o f the Government o f British North Borneo, hereafter called the Employer, o f the other part, declare to 
have agreed as follows:-
Article 1. — The labourer on behalf o f the undertaking w ill out the following work:-
Men -  Every kind o f work usually performed by Javanese as regards domestic agricultural, including 
horticultural and arboricultural and timber felling work.
Women -  Every kind o f work usually performed by Javanese women as regards domestic and agricultural, 
including horticultural and arboricultural work.
Article 2 -  The working hours during which the labourer must work shall not exceed ten, on the understanding 
that the labourer cannot be compelled to work more than six consecutive hours, the time o f rest must be at least one 
hour.
Under the working hours must be reckoned the time during which the labourer is being employed in other 
work as transport, on watch and also the time necessary for parcelling out the work, and the time taken for going to and 
coming home from his work.
Only in extraordinary circumstances can more hours o f work per day be demanded from the labourer.
In such a case or whenever the labourer is willing to work overtime, he must be paid on the first pay-day extra 
wages for overtime, to be reckoned per hour, on the understanding that the wage in proportion to the wage per hour in 
the contract, must be at least one and a half times the amount.
Article 3. -  The Employer is bound to give wages to the labourer 30 (thirty) dollar-cents per man per day and 
25 (twenty-five) dollar-cents per woman per day, to be paid monthly, fortnightly, weekly or daily at the option o f the 
manager.
I f  monthly payment is made, at the request o f the labourer part o f his wages should be paid half monthly.
This day-wage agreed upon has also to be paid on the days o f rest and holidays as arranged in the terms o f this 
contract, and also on the days during which the labourer, for reasons not due to his own fault, is incapable o f working, 
with the understanding than in case o f sickness o f the labourer no wage is due, provided that in hospital, the labourer is 
provided with food free o f charge.
Deduction from wages agreed upon is only allowed on amount o f payment o f money received in advance, or 
on account o f debt contracted with the Employer.
The tax (poll-tax) due from the labourer w ill become chargeable upon the undertaking where he is being 
employed, the amount not being down to the labourer.
Article 4. -  The labourer acknowledges to have received an advance o f f. 2.50 (two guilders fifty  cents) from 
the Employer. On embarkation a similar amount o f f, 2.50 (two guilders fifty cents) and at the place o f disembarking or 
destination the amount 7 (seven) dollars w ill be advanced to him. These advances amounting to f. 15 (fifteen guilders) 
w ill be squared by monthly deduction from wages, not exceeding $2 (two dollars).
Article 5. -  No work can be demanded o f the labourer on the following day -
a. 3 (three) days on the occasion o f tire Native New Year
b. 2  (two) days each month
Moreover no work may be exacted from female labourers one month before expected delivery, neither within 
forty days after childbirth or after a miscarriage, neither during the first two days o f the menstruation period.
Article 6. -  The Employer shall provide at his own expense the following free o f charge: living quarters, food, 
medical attendance, and drinking water, on behalf o f the labourer and his family.
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The following articles shall be provided free per person per day:-
U n c o o k e d  R ic e .. 1 'Alb.  ( D u tc h  lb ) C o c o n u t  o i l  . .. . . .  1 o z
F is h  ( fre s h  o r  s a l t e d ) .. . 6 o z B la tc h a n . ..  1 o z
V e g e ta b le s  . .. .. 6 o z C h i l l y  (g re e n ) . . .  1 o z
T a m a r in d e  ... . 1 o z C o c o n u t ( y o u n g ) ... 1 o z
O n io n s . 1 o z S u g a r ...  1 o z
C o n d im e n ts . 1 o z T e a . . .  0  'A o z
Salt ... ... 0 'A oz
Article 7. -  The Employer cannot separate the labourer from his family against his w ill.
Article 7a. -  The Employer is obliged to defray the expenses o f a decent burial in case o f death o f the labourer 
or o f a member o f his family.
Article 8. — The Employer undertakes to give free passage to the labourer and his family to the place o f his 
destination and to the place o f origin at the latest three months after expiration o f his contract, but in case o f the contract 
either on account o f protracted incapacity to work or by natural consent, should be dissolved, a corresponding time lim it 
shall be observed unless tire labourer wishes to enter upon a new labour-contract. Nevertheless the right to a return 
passage is ... him and his family as many as there then are, within the period o f 1 year after the expiration o f last 
contract.
The Employer agrees to provide free o f cost, food, drinking water, living quarters, medical treatment and 
clothing, for the labourer and his family, as many as there then are, as long as he has to wait for embarkation homeward.
The Employer further agrees that in the event o f the decease o f a labourer during the term o f his contract or 
thereafter, but before he has made use o f his claim to repatriation, i f  requested, to give free passage to his family, 
however many there be, from the place o f his employment to place o f origin, not later than three months after his 
decease, providing that family, whilst waiting for embarkation, with food, living quarters, drinking water, clothing, and 
medical treatment free o f charge. The Employer immediately after the expiration o f the contract, shall inform the 
Consul-General o f the Netherlands at Singapore, whether the labourer, released o f his contract, has entered into a new 
contract, or whether he has returned to his place o f origin, i f  this be the case, mentioning on what occasion, - or whether 
he has settled elsewhere.
The Employer -  through the Protectorate Department o f British North Borneo and tire Consul General o f the 
Netherlands Singapore -  w ill send in a quarterly report to “ Central Office for Inspection o f Labour in Out-stations”  
established in Batavia, mentioning the mortality amongst the labour force during last quarter, the cause o f death and the 
number o f sickness at the end o f each month and -  i f  this number exceeds 5 percent -  with explanation as to the cause o f 
the number o f cases.
Article 9. -  The time during which the labourer has not worked on account o f illness, less one tenth o f the 
duration o f contract, and time lost on account o f leave (i.e. absence for no valid reason and also o f desertions in 
punishment restricting freedom (not detention on remand) is not counted in the calculation o f the length o f time o f the 
contract.
In no case may the protracted length o f time o f the contract exceed one-third o f the duration o f contract.
Article 10. -  The labourer must be present at the place o f employment and present himself to the Manager on
the .........................................   day o f the month .............  o f the year nineteen
hundred and.............................................................
Article 11.— This contract is entered upon for the period o f three years reckoning from the date o f signing this
contract.
Thus agreed upon at .....................................today, the   day o f the month
.................................................................. o f the year................................................................................
After having read out this agreement in the presence o f both parties and after having explained clearly in the 
native language the contents thereof to the labourer, I have convinced myself that both parties have entered this contract 
freely and that the amount o f advance payment mentioned under article 4 o f this contract has been duly made to the 
labourer, in support whereof and in compliance with State: 8 o f the regulations regarding the execution i f  the Recruiting 
Ordinance (Supplement o f the Gazette o f the Dutch Indies Nos, 8112 and 8174 sub II) this contract has been signed by 
me and by the Employer.
Contracting party on the other side. Recruiting Officer.
1 h e re b y  c e r t i fy  th a t th e  a b o v e  is  a t ru e  c o p y  o f  th e  a u th o r is e d  t ra n s la t io n  o f  th e  D u tc h  C o n tra c t  w h ic h  
a c c o m p a n ie d  th e  la b o u re rs  n a m e d  th e re in ,  th e  o r ig in a l  o f  w h ic h  has b ee n  d u ly  re g is te re d  b y  m e .
Source: PRO: C0874/752 Protector o f  Labour
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Appendix 3
LABOUR AGREEMENT (1929)
PERMISSION TO RECRUIT HAS BEEN GIVEN BY DECREE IF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF 
THE NETHERLANDS INDIES D A T E S ..........................................................
The Labourer whose names appear in the Schedule hereto o f the one part (hereafter referred to as the
Labourer) and .................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................................  Recruiting
Agent, acting as representative i f  the Government o f North Borneo, o f the other part (hereafter referred to as the 
employer), declare to have agreed to the following :-
Article 1. -  On behalf o f the agricultural estate named in Article 12 hereunder the labourer shall perform the 
following labour exclusively above ground: all labour usually done by natives o f Java (both men and women) on 
agricultural estates, including horticulture and cultivation o f trees.
Article 2. -  (1) The number o f working hours during which the Labourer has to work shall not exceed 9 hours 
on each working day, i f  the work is performed between 5.30 a.m. and 6 p.m., and at the most 8 horns per working day i f  
the work is done wholly or partly between 6 p.m. and 5.30 a.m., on the understanding that the labourer may not be 
compelled to work for more than six consecutive hours.
The rest period must be at least one hour.
(2) The number o f working hours includes the time during which the labourer has to perform extra work, such 
as transportation, watching, etc., as also the time necessary for allocation of work and for covering the distance between 
the labourer’s house and the place o f employment, both going to and coming from his work.
(3) When the labourer declares himself w illing to work overtime, then for that overtime work he shall be paid 
per hour or part o f an hour a wage o f 50 per cent more than the equivalent per hour o f the ordinary daily wage.
Article 3. -  (1) The employer shall pay to the labourer 30 (thirty) Straits dollar cents per man per day, and 25 
(twenty-five) Straits dollar cents per woman per day, on the understanding that, i f  no prepared food is given, the money 
value o f such food shall be paid in lieu thereof.
(2) These wages shall be paid monthly, half-monthly, weekly or daily at the option o f the Manager. O f wages 
are paid monthly the labourer must be paid part o f his wage half-monthly at his request,
(3) Tire daily wages agreed upon shall also be paid for the rest-days and holidays stipulated in this contract, as 
also for the days, during which, through no fault o f his won, the labourer is unable to work, it being understood, 
however, that should the labourer be ill, no wages are due to him i f  free food is supplied to him also while in hospital.
(4) Deductions from tire wages agreed upon are only permissible for reimbursement o f advances obtained, or 
debts, incurred to the employer.
(5) The Government poll-tax ( i f  airy) due by the labourer shall be borne by the estate on which he is to be 
employed. These sums shall not be debited to the labourer.
Article 4. -  (1) The time during which the labourer has not worked on account o f illness, less one-tenth o f tire 
duration o f the contract, and tire time during which he has been absent on leave, or desertion, as well as the time during 
which he has undergone imprisonment, is not taken into consideration when determining the number o f days he has 
worked or the duration o f this agreement. The days on which the labourer has been absent without valid reason, are also 
not counted.
(2) The days o f illness which are not spent in a hospital are considered as leave, except in those cases referred 
to in article 6 sub (2).
(3) In no case is the total duration o f service under this contract, including the period o f prolongation thereof to 
make up for absence, to exceed four years.
Article 5. -  (1) As advance the labourer shall be paid the sum o f 7 (seven) dollars at the port o f 
disembarkation, or at destination.
(2) Advances given shall be repaid by monthly deductions o f one-fifth o f the wages earned, but not exceeding 
a maximum o f 2 (two) dollars.
(3) What is given to the labourer in Java is only to be considered a present, and is not permitted to be deducted 
from his wages.
Article 6. -  (1) The labourer cannot be compelled to work on the following days:-
(a) 3 days on the occasion o f the Mohamedan New Year
(b) the twelfth day o f the month Moeloed
(c) the last days o f the month Roewah
(d) the tenth day of the month Hadji
(e) 2 (two) days in every month.
(2) In addition to these, the women labourers may not be compelled to work during one month before expected 
confinement, nor within 40 days after such confinement or after a miscarriage, nor during the first two days o f their 
menstruation. These days are to be considered as days o f illness, even though they be not spent in a hospital, while free 
food is given or the equivalent in money is paid, as is stipulated in article 7.
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Article 7. -  (1) At his own expense the Employer has to supply the labourer and his family free lodgings, free 
board, free medical attendance and nursing, and free drinking and bathing water.
(2) Per day and per person the free food shall consist of:
Raw rice 800 grammes = 21 tahils Salt 25 grammes = 2 tahils
Meat 225 grammes = 6 tahils Coconut-oil 50 grammes = 1 Vi
or Blatchan 100 grammes =2 Vi tahils
Fish 200 grammes = 5 'A tahils Coconut 100 grammes = 2 Vi tahils
Vegetables 500 grammes = 13 tahils Sugar 50 grammes = 1 Vi tahils
Tamarind 50 grammes = 1 A tahils Tea 10 grammes = }A tahils
Onions 100 grammes = 2 'A tahils Chillies 2 pieces
Spices 100 grammes = 2 Vi tahils
or the equivalent thereof amounting to 25 dollar cents.
(3) Children between the ages o f 3 and 10 years receive one-third o f a ration or SVi dollar cents per day, 
children between lo  and 12 years three-quarters o f a ration or 18 ‘A dollar cents per day, children between 12 and 15 
years a full ration or 25 dollar cents per day.
(4) This ration shall be issued to all such children on the Estate irrespective o f whether they perform work or
not.
(5) The labourer loses his right to free board, i f  though fit to work, he absents himself, either by desertion or 
otherwise, from the work which it was his duty to perform.
Article 8. -  The employer may not separate the labourer from his family against his will.
Article 9. — The employer is compelled, at his own expense, to provide a proper funeral in case o f death o f the 
labourer or o f a member o f his family.
Article 10. -  The employer agrees to provide the labourer and his family with free passage to the place o f 
employment. Within at most three months after the expiration o f this agreement, or at such earlier date as this agreement 
is cancelled either on account o f the labourer’s continual unfitness for work, or by mutual consent, the employer shall 
further send the labourer and his family as then constituted, back free o f charge from the place where he is employed to 
his place o f origin, even though he should still have a debt owing to the employer, unless the labourer wishes to enter 
into a new agreement.
(2) Nevertheless the right to free return passage for him and his family, as then constituted, shall be assured 
during one year after the termination o f the last (written or verbal) agreement.
(3) Tlie employer agrees to supply the labourer and his family, as then constituted, with free board, water for 
drinking and bathing, lodgings, medical treatment and nursing, during the time he has to wait for shipping opportunity to 
be repatriated after the expiration o f either this contract or o f a re-engagement contract.
(4) In the event o f death o f the labourer while under agreement, or thereafter, but before he has taken 
advantage o f his acquired right to repatriate, the employer agrees to send back his family, as then constituted, free o f 
charge, at the very latest within three months after the death, i f  desired, from the place where the labourer was employed 
to his place o f origin. For the time during which that family has to wait for a whipping opportunity to be repatriated it 
shall be supplied with free board, water for drinking and bathing, lodgings, medical attendance, and nursing.
Article I I .  -  (1) Immediately after the contract has expired, the employer shall advise the Consul-General o f 
Great Britain at Batavia whether the discharged labourer has entered into a new contract or whether he has returned to 
his place o f origin (in which case the shipping opportunity must be states), or whether he has settled elsewhere.
(2) Through the intermediary o f the Consul-General o f Great Britain at Batavia the employer shall furnish the 
Head Office o f the Labour Inspection Department for the Outer Possessions at Batavia every quarter with a statement o f 
the number o f deaths amongst the labourers, the cause o f death and the number o f sick labourers on the last day o f every 
month, together with an explanation o f the causes for die sick rate, i f  this should exceed 5 per cent.
Article 12. -  The labourer shall report himself to the Manager o f ................................................................Estate
on d ie .........................................................Day o f ...............................o f the year Nineteen hundred and..........................
Article 13. -  This agreement shall be in force for 900 working days to be counted from the date o f arrival on
the estate.
Article 14. -  This contract is otherwise subject to the rules and regulations o f “ The Labour Ordinance, 1929” 
as since altered and supplemented.
This agreement has been made a t ...............................................  on this th e .......................... day o f the month
o f ..........................................o f the year Nineteen hundred and..................................................
After having read this contract to both parties and distinctly made known the contents thereof to the labourers 
in dieir own language, 1 have convinced myself that the parties have entered into diis indenture o f their own free will. 
Contracting party on the odier side. Recruiting Officer.
I hereby certify that the above is a due copy o f the audiorised translation of the Dutch Contract which 
accompanied the labourers named therein, the original of which lias been duly registered by me.
Source: PRO: COS74/752 Protector o f  Labour
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Appendix 4
Estates Employing Javanese Indentured Labourers, 1926
Residency Estate
interior Melalap Estate 
Sapong Estate
West Coast Lingkungan Estate 
Lumadan Estate 
Padas Valley Estate 
Beaufort Estate 
Woodford Estate 
Lumat Estate 
Mawau Estate 
Membakut Estate 
Bongawan Estate 
Mandahan Estate 
Kimanis Estate 
Papar Estate 
Kinarut Estate 
Lok Kawi Estate 
Menggatal Estate
Kudat Pitas Estate 
Ranau Estate 
Taritipan estate 
Langkon Estate
Sandakan Batu Puteh Estate
Sungai Batang Estate
British Borneo Timber Company
Sekong Estate
Bode Estate
Sandala Estate
East Coast New Darvel Bay Tobacco Plantations, Ltd.
Lower Segama Estate
Lahad Datu Cultuur Maatchappij
Tenganipah Estate
Kuhara Estate
Kubota Estate
Source: PRO: C0648/14. ‘AR. Protectorate Department for the year 1926, p. 56’,
Appendix 5
Mortality Rate among Labourers in British North Borneo (1915-1932)
Total Labour 
Force at end of 
year
Total Number 
of Deaths
Death Rate 
(%)
Death Rate 
per 
thousand
1915 15,513 312 2.01 20
1916 17,172 295 1.71 17
1917 20,940 625 2.99 30
1918 20,746 1,301 6.27 63
1919 21,487 505 2.35 24
1920 20,924 507 2.42 24
1921 16,540 547 3.31 33
1922 15,923 426 2.68 27
1923 16,179 359 2.22 22
1924 16,852 299 1.77 18
1925 17,680 368 2.08 21
1926 18,491 298 1.61 16
1927 20,401 399 1.96 20
1928 18,724 376 2.01 20
1929 18,534 291 1.57 16
1930 12,563 218 1.74 17
1931 10,276 155 1.51 15
1932 8,395 126 1.50 15
Source: PRO: 00648/7-1, Annual Report of the Protectorate Department, relevant years
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Appendix 6
Javanese Calendar
Javanese months Days Arabic months
1 Sura 30 Muharram
2 Sapar 29 Safar
3 Mulud 30 Rabi’ al-Awwal
4 Bakda Mulud 29 Rabi’ al-Thani
5 Djemadilawal 30 Jumad al-ula
6 Djemadilakir 29 Jumad al-thaniya
7 Redjeb 30 Rajab
8 Ruwah (Roewah) 29 Sha’ban
9 Pasa 30 Ramadan
10 Sawal 29 Shawwal
11 Sela 30 Zu’l-Qa’da
12 Besar 30 Zu’l-Hiija
The Javanese Calendar is based on the lunar month of either 29, or 30 days, the 
Javanese Year lasting for 354 or 355 days. Although the names of the months are 
derived from Arabic, modifications have been made because certain Arabic consonants 
(i.e. f, z, sh, etc.) are non-existent in the Javanese language. Before and during the 
Second World War, the inhabitants of Java were following the Javanese year (1878 in 
1947 A.D.). After the War, the people of Indonesia used the Arabic year of the Hijra (1368 
in 1949 A.D.).
Source: Hurustiati Subandrio, ‘Javanese peasant life villages in East Java’. Thesis 
submitted for the Academic Post-graduate Diploma in Anthropology. University of 
London. May 1951. p. XXVII.
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Appendix 7
Governors of British North Borneo. 1881-1934
1881 W.H. Treacher
1887 W.M. Crocker (Acting)
1888 C.V. Creagh
1895 L.P. Beaufort
1900 Hugh Clifford
1901 E.W. Birch
1904 E.P. Gueritz
1907 Alex Cook (Acting)
1907 E.P. Gueritz
1910 A.C. Pearson (Acting)
1911 F.R. Ellis
1912 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1912 J. Scott Mason
1912-13 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1913 Sir West Ridgeway (Temporary)
1913 C.W.C. Parr
1915 A.C. Pearson
1915-1916 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1916 A.C. Pearson
1919 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1919 A.C. Pearson
1922 H.W.L. Bunbury (Acting)
1922 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1922 Major General Sir William Rycroft
1924 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1924-25 Major General Sir William Rycroft
1925 F.W. Fraser
1925-26 A.C. Pearson
1926 F.W. Fraser (Acting)
1926 J.L. Humphreys
1928 D.R. Maxwell (Acting)
1929 J.L. Humphreys
1930 A.F. Richards
1934 Sir Douglas Jardine
Source: Handbook of the State o f North Borneo 1929. p. 134; Andrew Massey. The 
Poiiticai Economy of Stagnation’, p. 314.
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Illustrations
1. A coolie tapping rubber 
Source: PRO: C01069/524 Part 1. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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2. A rubber tapper observed by an overseer 
Source: PRO: C01069/524 Part 1. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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3. Carrying bales of tobacco 
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
4. Chinese and Javanese coolies sorting and bundling tobacco at Langkon Estate
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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5. Labourers working on timber camp 
Source: PRO: C01069/524 Part 1. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
6. Trolley transporting staff and labourers
Source: PRO: C01069/524 Part 1. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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7. Coolie houses
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
8. Part of Javanese coolie houses
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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9. Gambling - a necessary ‘evil’
Source: PRO: C 0 1069/524 Part 1. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
10. Opas House and ‘Jail’
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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11. Estate Hospital 
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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12. Tamu - Native market
Source: PRO: C01069/524. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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13. Singapore Quarantine Station (St. John’s Island)
Source: PRO: C01069/560. Langkon Estate, Marudu Bay, British North Borneo
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